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This study examines the intellectual thrust of traditional Sunnī epistemologies as 
articulated in the written legacies of al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (392AH/1002CE - 
463AH/1071CE), a luminary in Muslim scholarship mostly celebrated for his 
proficiency as an expert of ḥadīth and his magnum opus on the history of Baghdad. 
Although several of his works have been hugely influential in shaping critical 
academic debates on subjects such as the problem of the dating and writing down of 
Prophetic tradition, it is striking that there has never been a comprehensive study 
of his intellectual output, despite his being qualified in almost every aspect of ḥadīth 
theory and also given the sheer impact of his thought upon later medieval 
discourses relating to theories of knowledge. The thesis includes a reconstruction of 
his biography; an extensive review of his literary works; an examination of the 
methodological constructs which underpin his writings; and a study of some 
theological controversies and debates in which he became embroiled. The thesis 
will ultimately seek to shed light on the epistemic structures used to develop critical 
concepts such as ʿilm, fiqh, ḥujjah, bayān, istidlāl, khabar, riwāyah, ḥadīth, sunnah, 
mutawātir, āḥād, takhrīj and, most crucially, the concept of fact and potential account 
in Sunnī treatments of historical reports. This will include an analysis of al-Khaṭīb’s 
quest for definitions of orthopraxy and gradation of potentiality. The aim will be to 
identify and construct the guiding principles of his theory of knowledge for the 
creative articulation of Sunnī Islam, with its emphasis on the coupling of 
traditionalist theology with legal thought. It will include the exploration of ṣūfī 
elements and female involvement in pursuing his scholarship. Attention will also be 
paid to assessing the overarching influence of the four madhhabs paradigm, 
particularly with the formation of ḥuffāẓ-ship as a distinguished group and 
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 بـه وال ِذكـُر املغـاينوقـفــُت   لَعْمُرك ما شجـاين رسـُم دار  
 ذكــري مهَد الغواينل تألجـ  وال أثـُر اخلــيام أراَق دمـعي
 وال عاصـيـتـُه فـثـنَّى عـنـاين  وال ملك اهلـوى يوما ِقـيادي
 وما يـلـقـون ِمـْن ُذلِّ اهلـوانِ   عرفُت فِعاَلـه بذوي التصايب
 حيصـى وعـانِ له ِف الناس ما   فلم أطمعـه ِِفَّ وكـم قـتـيـل  
 سليـَم الغيب مأمـوَن اللسـانِ   طلبُت أًخا صحيَح الوّد حمًضا
 نـفـاًقـا ِف التبـاعـد والتـداين  فلم أعرف مـن اإلخـوان إال
 ترى ُصـَوًرا تـروق بال معـاين   وَعالـُم دهـرنا ال خـرَي فـيـه
 أقــول سـوى فـالن  أو فـالنِ   وَوصُف جـميِعهم هذا َفََم أن
 عىل ما ناب من رصف الزمان  ملا لـم أجـد حــًرا يـؤاتـيو
ُت تكرًما لقراع دهـري  ولـم أجــزع ملـا مـنـه دهـاين  َصََبْ
 أقـول لـهـا أال ُكـّفـي كفـاين  ومل أُك ِف الشـدائد مسـتكينًا
 ربـيـط اجلـأش ُُمَتمع اجلَنان  ولكني صليـب العـود عـود
 ََيِْيُء بغري سيفي أو سنـانـي  رزقـاً النفس ال أخـتـاُر  َأبِـّي 
 َأَلـذُّ من املذلـة ِف الـِجـنَـان   لِعـزٌّ ِف لظى بـاغـيه ُيشـوى
 َأَداَر هلا ُرَحى احلَْرِب العـوانِ    واْبَتـَغاَهاِلَ وَمْن َطَلَب املََعـا
 
 أبو بكر اخلطيب البغدادي    
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This study is based on the thesis that traditional Sunnī epistemology can be 
learned from a set of paradigms featured in the writings and expositions of classical 
ḥadīth experts. The phrase “traditional Sunnī epistemology” itself reflects ultimately 
and respectively the concepts of ḥadīth, Sunnah and ʿilm which had been discussed 
heavily and elaborately by classical Muslim scholars. The terms tradition and 
traditionalism are indeed, as observed by many Western scholars, difficult, since 
those who were qualified as traditionalists have been relatively innovative in their 
scholarly enterprises. This study employs this qualifying term based on the idea of 
traditionalism elucidated by William Graham.1 Graham initially asserts that tradition 
in its meaning, either as a traditum; anything which was transmitted to the present 
from the past, or as the modus vivendi of a community, is a value-neutral term despite 
the negative connotation given to it in modern time, viz. the sense of anti-progress. 
Islamic traditionalism in its normative sense is an emphasis on the Qurʾān, the Sunnah 
and the first few generations of Muslims.   
The terms Sunnah and Sunnī are more complex for they have been intertwined 
with the debate on the legitimacy of ḥadīth and riwāyah as the channel and source for 
identifying Prophetic tradition. The epithet Sunnī was eventually infused with a 
strong connotation of opposition to Shīʿīsm, which may compel related discourse to 
meddle in the complexity of sectarian debates. However, as Sunnism solidified in the 
fourth/tenth and early fifth/eleventh century, its broader sense indicated a call to 
traditionalism as illustrated above. While the nature of its adoption of the concept of 
Sunnah has been contentiously and methodically scrutinised since the dawn of 
Western scholarship on Islam and its prophet; Muḥammad, the study of ḥadīth is still 
poring over the emergence of new perspectives and paradigms especially in 
navigating between Islamic traditionalism and modernity.2 One relevant observation 
                                                        
1 William Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 23:3 (1993): 495-522.  
2 See the four-volume collection of articles in: Mustafa Shah, The Ḥadīth: Critical Concepts in Islamic 
Studies (Routledge, 2009). Also and specifically: Harald Motzki, “Dating Muslim Traditions: A Survey,” 
Arabica 52: (2005): 204-253, Sebastian Günther, “Modern Literary Theory Applied to Classical Arabic 
Texts, Ḥadīth Revisited,” in Understanding Near Eastern Literatures: a Spectrum of Interdisciplinary 
Approaches, eds. Verena Klemm and Beatrice Gruendler (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2000), 171-176, R Marston 
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is worth mentioning here. Scott Lucas suggests that the sources employed in modern 
studies of the development of Sunnī Islam have been almost exclusively of a 
theological or legal nature, or with regards to treatment, researched with the sole 
aim of understanding the rise of legal schools (madhāhib). His study indicates that 
proto-Sunnīs of the third century and ḥadīth scholars in general were largely ignored, 
presumably because the vast majority of them were not affiliated with any sectarian 
group or exhibited little interest towards the institutionalisation of legal schools.3 
In appreciating the relation of ḥadīth with ʿilm, most of the studies have also 
focused mainly on what Jonathan Brown terms the Authenticity Question.4 Brown 
had enumerated four stages of chronological or thematic development in modern 
scholarship of ḥadīth which comprise of: (1) The Orientalist Approach, (2) The Philo-
Islamic Apology, (3) The Revisionist Approach and (4) The Western Revaluation. The 
latest stage ultimately led some Western scholars to recognise both that the 
Orientalist method involves some questionable assumptions and that the Muslim 
ḥadīth tradition is much more sophisticated than previously believed. However, 
Brown admitted that Muslim scholars have left some doors open for forged 
materials.5 There is a fundamental question on how this “charitable” stance affected 
the development of Sunnī epistemology? On the other hand, Harald Motzki identified 
two main approaches in addressing the issue of authenticity and dating. The first 
carries the sceptical paradigm mooted by the writings of Ignaz Goldziher and Joseph 
Schacht, and the second is its antithesis which appears in a research approach that 
may be called as tradition-historical “überlieferungsgeschichtlich”.6 Elsewhere, 
Motzki also proposed, in general, two main camps; ‘the sceptics who reject the 
                                                        
Speight, “Narrative Structures in the Hadīth,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 4 (2000): 265. Other relevant 
works: Recep Senturk, Narrative Social Structure: Anatomy of the Ḥadīth Transmission Network 610–1505 
(Stanford University Press, 2005), C.H.M. Versteegh et al (Eds.), The Transmission and Dynamics of the 
Textual Sources of Islam, Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
3 Scott Lucas, Constructive Critics, Ḥadīth Literature and the Articulation of Sunnī Islam: The Legacy of the 
Generation of Ibn Saʿd, Ibn Maʿīn and Ibn Ḥanbal (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 2-9. 
4 Jonathan Brown, Hadith: Muḥammad’s Legacy in Medieval and Modern World (London: Oneworld 
Publication, 2009), 197-236, particularly 204. 
5 Ibid, 235. 
6 Harald Motzki, “The Muṣannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī as a Source of Authentic Aḥādīth of the 
First Century A. H.,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50:1 (1991): 1-21. 
15 
 
existence, -indeed the very possibility- of scientifically grounded knowledge about 
the first century and a half of Islam, and the second group who place considerable 
trust in the potentiality of sources and reports in reconstructing the historical 
beginnings of Islam and Islamic law. In addition, some scholars, for diverse reasons, 
reject radical scepticism and attempt to tread a path between the two extremes.7 
Coming back to Lucas, he has further investigated the crux of the problem and 
suggested: 
‘Western studies of ḥadīth have neglected to unravel the fundamental 
conceptual and historical frameworks employed by classical Muslim scholars 
proficient in this discipline. European scholars such as Joseph Schaht and, in 
particular, G.H.A. Juynboll, have developed an array of esoteric terms and 
diagrams for ḥadīth analysis without seriously investigating how Muslim 
scholars themselves understood the development of this vast literature. 
Studies on the ḥadīth disciplines are few and far between, and I am unaware 
of anyone who has attempted to sketch the history of the development ḥadīth 
literature from the death of Muḥammad to its florescence in Mamluk era.’8 
Lucas’ study has achieved an extremely striking result. He observed that the 
articulation and survival of Sunnī Islam were made possible by virtue of endeavours 
of experts identified as the ḥuffāẓ. He highlighted that ‘the sobriquet ḥāfiẓ was an 
ambiguous stamp of religious authority that was adopted by Sunnī scholars to 
distinguish truly exceptional and indispensable men of learning from the thousands 
of trustworthy transmitters.’ For him, if we venture to describe Shīʿī Islam as 
essentially a “firqah of the Imāms,” it would seem most appropriate to declare Sunnī 
Islam, at least as understood by the ḥadīth scholars, as the “firqah of the Ḥuffāẓ.”9 
Nevertheless, the representation of the ḥuffāẓ in the formation and 
articulation of theological, legal or even spiritual tradition has long been neglected. 
Many works on the formation of tradition, theory or authority in Sunnī Islam contain 
no single mention of the term ḥāfiẓ, let alone the role of huffāẓ-ship in the 
development of Islamic epistemology and sciences. Were those “exceptional and 
indispensable men of learning” in total dissociation from fundamental questions 
                                                        
7 Harald Motzki, “Theme Issue: Methods of Dating Early Legal Traditions,” Islamic Law and Society 19:1 
(2012): 1-10. 
8 Lucas, Constructive, 25. 
9 Ibid, 376. Firqah may be translated as sect, group or side. 
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related to knowledge, authenticity and certainty? Did the scholars of ḥadīth always 
neglect any interest in the theological speculation and deliberation of the cosmos and 
Hellenistic epistemology? What were their perceptions towards the development of 
Sunnī epistemology during the initial period of institutionalisation? 
In this study, the author chooses to explore how the above observations and 
questions could be appreciated and answered intricately through the scholarship of 
a ḥāfiẓ of his time, a leading figure of ḥadīth transmission and criticism from the third 
ʿAbbāsid period, Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (463 AH/1071 CE).10 In general, it 
offers a thorough examination on the testimony of al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Nuqṭah al-Ḥanbalī 
(629/1232) who stated: ‘He (al-Khaṭīb) has many writings in the study of ḥadīth, the 
like of which one has never seen before. It is indisputable that later scholars in ḥadīth 
have been dependent on the scholarship of Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb.’11 Indeed, al-Khaṭīb’s 
authority as a reference in ḥadīth studies has received several recognitions by later 
scholars in the field. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (852/1448), a Shāfiʿī scholar of 
ḥadīth well-known for his elaborate commentary on Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, accorded the 
same remark. While providing a sketch for the history of ḥadīth sciences, Ibn Hajar, 
who began by brief comments on the works of al-Qāḍī Ibn Khallād al-Rāmhurmuzī 
(360/970), al-Ḥākim Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Naysābūrī (405/1014) and al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Nuʿaym 
al-Iṣfahānī (430/1039), recounted: ‘Then, al-Khaṭīb Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī came into 
the picture. He wrote al-Kifāyah on the rules of transmission and al-Jāmi‘ li-Akhlāq al-
Rāwī wa Ādāb al-Sāmi‘ on the etiquettes of transmission. [In fact] he wrote separate 
treatises in almost all aspects of ḥadīth criticism.’ 12  
                                                        
10 See biographical entries for al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī in: W. Marçais, “al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī,” in The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition 1913 – 1938, IV:929-930, R. Seillhem, “al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī,” in The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, 1978, IV:1111–1112, Daphna Ephrat, “al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī,” in 
Medieval Islamic Civilization, An Encyclopaedia, ed. Josef W. Meri (Routledge, 2006), 437, Ana María Rivera 
Medina, “al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī,” in Encyclopaedia of The Medieval Chronicle (Leiden: Brill, 2012). For 
works on al-Khaṭīb and his theory of education, see: Munīr al-Dīn Ahmed, Muslim Education and the 
Scholars’ Social Status up to 5th Century Muslim Era (11th Century Christian Era) in the Light of Tarikh Baghdād 
(Zurich: Verlag, 1968) and Habeeb Aḥmad Malik, The Educational Theory of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (Phd 
Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1993). In the Arab world: Sālik Ahmad Maʿlūm, al-Fikr al-Tarbawī ʿinda 
al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (Damanhur: Maktabah Laynah, 1413/1993), 
11 Ibn Nuqṭah al-Ḥanbalī, al-Taqyīd li-Maʿrifat al-Ruwāt wa’l-Sunan wa al-Masānīd (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif, 
1983), 1:170. 
12 Ather Shahbaz Hussain, The Nuzhah of Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (852/1449); a Translation and Critical 
Commentary (PhD Diss., University of Birmingham, 2012), 34 -35.  
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Ibn Ḥajar cited Ibn Nuqṭah and eventually explained the fact that al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn 
al-Ṣalāḥ (643/1246) based his seminal ḥadīth curriculum at al-Madrasah al-
Ashrafiyyah on the works of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī. According to Ibn Ḥajar, he 
compiled what had hitherto been scattered in various books of al-Khaṭīb and added 
to them. For this reason, people adhered to his curriculum and followed its 
methodology. This was seconded by Lucas while assessing Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s articulation 
and crystallisation of ḥadīth studies. Lucas agreed that ‘the book al-Kifāyah fī Uṣūl ʿIlm 
al-Riwāyah deserves special mention, as it is packed with minute details concerning 
ḥadīth transmission and was cited extensively in the Muqaddamah [of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ].’13 
Indeed, one does not read Muqaddamah and its numerous commentaries except that 
after every few chapters, one will encounter statements such as, “al-Khaṭīb stated 
that” and “al-Khaṭīb authored a specific work on this.” However, up to the present, 
there is no specific dissertation in the Western world to appreciate even al-Khaṭīb’s 
scholarship on ḥadīth in general.14 
Building on the above, the author endeavours to examine the intellectual 
thrust of traditional Sunnī epistemology as articulated in the written legacies of al-
Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī. The study by Paul Heck of al-Khaṭīb’s position on the 
subject of writing down ḥadīth accentuated that ‘the teaching and learning of the 
prophetic tradition, while conducted since the earliest period, only reached a 
theoretical formalization during al-Khaṭīb’s day. It would have been very timely, 
then, for him to have worked to establish the theoretical grounds underlying the 
methods of teaching and studying ḥadīth.’15 Ultimately, Heck argued that al-Khaṭīb’s 
aim – as learned through the structure of one of his works, Taqyīd al-ʿIlm – was to 
create a hierarchical framework in which the various means of knowledge 
transmission – the oral, the written as an alternative to memory and the written as 
                                                        
13 Lucas, Constructive, 27. 
14Previous works on al-Khaṭīb and ḥadīth scholarship in the Arab world: Yūsuf al-ʿIshsh, al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī, Muʾarrikh Baghdād wa Muḥaddithuhā (Damascus: al-Maktabah al-ʿArabiyyah, 1364/1945), 
Mahmud al-Ṭaḥḥān, al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī wa Atharuhu fī ʿUlūm al-Ḥadīth (Published PhD. 
Dissertation, 1401/1981), Ba Bakar Ḥamd al-Turābī, al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī wa Juhūduhu fī ʿIlm al-Ḥadīth 
(Master Diss., Umm al-Qura University, 1402/1982), Akram Ḍiyāʾ al-ʿUmarī, Mawārid al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī fī 
Tārīkh Baghdād (Dār Ṭaybah, 1405/1985), ʿAbd Allāh al-Sihlī, al-Aḥādith allatī ʾAʿallahā al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī fī Tārīkh Baghdād (PhD. Diss., Islamic University of Madinah, 1429/2008). 
15 Paul Heck, “The Epistemological Problem of Writing in Islamic Civilization: al-Ḫatīb al-Baġdādī’s 
Taqyīd al-ʿilm” in Studia Islamica 94 (2002): 85-114. 
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independent of memory – were ranked in an order that conformed to the 
epistemological conditions of revealed knowledge itself.16 The concern of this 
dissertation is not mainly the subject of oral and written transmission in the history 
of ḥadīth; but rather the indications that there were epistemological concerns and 
considerations in the scholarship of this al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Faqīh. While Heck’s conclusions 
are accurate, there are further dimensions to appreciating the dynamic thrust of al-
Khatib’s approach to knowledge. The aim of the Taqyīd; indeed, its purpose (and al-
Khatib’s other works), is to actualise the pursuit of an all-encompassing framework 
within which one is able to view the epistemological value of knowledge and its 
devotional function. In seeking this knowledge, the devotee or student needs not only 
to have recourse to the traditional sciences, but also requires an acute engagement 
with scholarship and the traditions of learning acquired through the rational 
discipline of jurisprudence, with al-Khatib putatively anchoring his loyalties to 
traditional theologians, jurists and judges; a synergy of sorts determines their 
relationship. One also needs to appreciate that the ascetics and the Ṣūfīs were keen 
contributors to the process of actualisation. Therefore, al-Khatib’s approach to 
accessing positive knowledge is one which enshrines this all-encompassing 
methodology. That is the higher plane to which al-Khatib aspires and it should be 
seen as informing both his authorship and legacy, with intellectual integrity being 
achieved through such an approach. 
A methodological question poses itself here. How can we extrapolate from the 
idiosyncrasies of al-Khaṭīb’s thought broad observations and conclusions? In other 
words, how appropriate it is to trust that a scholarship of one person can shed light 
on a broader epistemological and historical context? To what extent can the study of 
al-Khaṭīb’s scholarship contribute to our understanding of traditional Sunnī 
epistemology? The proposition advanced in the analytical reading of microhistory is 
useful at this point. As maintained by Giovanni Levi while assessing the potentiality 
of microhistory, it is possible to use minute details to draw far wider generalisation, 
although the initial observations were made within relatively narrow dimensions and 
as experiments rather than examples. The main condition is to go beyond triviality 
                                                        
16 Op. Cit. 
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and mere collection of details and facts to discern new elements, patterns and 
connections.17 
The overall aim of this research is to present the scholarship of Abū Bakr al-
Khaṭīb to modern readers as a rich source not only for the study of the history of 
Islam, as it has been widely depicted in many western sources due to his magnum opus, 
the voluminous History of Baghdād, but also for intellectual flavours in his expositions 
and elaborative works on the traditional science of ḥadīth criticism. It is hard to find 
an academic study explicating the relation between principles adopted in ḥadīth 
criticism and the broader framework of Islamic epistemology. For the widespread 
slant on the probable nature of ḥadīth, many gigantic rigorous efforts of classical 
ḥadīth scholars were left to no inspection and explanation. Al-Khaṭīb’s effort in ḥadīth 
is to be paired as well with his illustrious understanding of the principles of 
speculation and criticism, and enthusiastic attention towards fiqh and ʿilm that 
recapture the intellectual discourse surrounding the development of Islamic 
epistemology. In the context of this thesis, it penetrates into a series of events and 
ideas that formed the scholarship of al-Khaṭīb, lifting it from mere efforts of technical 
appropriation in ḥadīth studies to the broader discussion of framing epistemological 
endeavour of Muslim scholarship. To achieve this, the research will consider the 
following major questions. (1) What is the concept of knowledge adopted in the 
writings of al-Khaṭīb? (2) How did epistemology affect the outlines of his 
methodological framework? (3) How did the framework affect his idea and 
articulation of ḥadīth criticism? Finally, it is hoped that this thesis will serve as a 
contribution to appreciating, first, the scholar al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, and 
second, the scholarship of ḥadīth and its relation to the broader framework of Islamic 
epistemology. 
                                                        





Chapter One:                                
The Life of al-Khaṭīb 
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1.0  Geographical Background 
 Baghdād, the main geographical focus of the present study, has been 
extensively studied since the encounter between Western scholarship and Islamic 
intellectual history, particularly its ʿAbbāsid era. The scope of this study does not 
involve repetition of the multangular findings on the political and social conditions 
of this City of Peace. The historian of Baghdād, al-Yaʿqūbī (d. post 292/905), 
retrospectively attributed to the founder of the city, Caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr 
(95-158/714-775) a portentous remark that Baghdād will prove to be the crossroads 
of the universe.1 The magnum opus of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tarīkh Madīnat al-Salām 
was deemed indispensable by Guy Le Strange in his pioneering study on Baghdād. 
Marozzi recently described it as a mine of information on the city.2 The political 
period of interest to this study is within the reign of the two ʿAbbāsid caliphs, al-
Qādir bi’l-Lāh (381-422/991-1031) and al-Qāʾim bi Amri’l-Lāh (422-467/1031-1075).3 
Alongside the caliphs, there were sultans whose relationship with the former was 
between rivalry and interdependency. Al-Khaṭīb lived during the consequent reigns 
of the Būyid sultans; Bahāʾ al-Dawlah Abū Naṣr (379-403/989–1012), Sulṭān al-
Dawlah Abū Shujāʿ (403-412/1012–1021), Musharrif al-Dawlah Abū ʿAlī (412-
416/1021-1025), Jalālat al-Dawlah Abū Ṭāhir (416-435/1025–1043), Abū Kālijār 
Marzubān (435-440/1043–1048) and al-Malik al-Raḥīm Abū Naṣr (440-447/1048–
1055) – who was the last of the Būyids.4 He also witnessed the rules of the first two 
Saljūq sultans; Tughril Beg (447-455/1055-1063) and Alp Arslan al-Basāsīrī (455-
464/1063–1072) who toppled the former, although al-Khaṭīb was away from 
Baghdād for eleven years during their reigns. 
 In the context of Islamic traditionalism, the caliphs were perceived to be in 
support of the Sunnīs, especially the über-Sunnī Ḥanbalīs, and the Būyids were 
                                                        
1 al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān (Leiden: Brill, 1860), 8, Gaston Wiet, Baghdad: Metropolis of the Abbasid 
Caliphate (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971) 10-11. 
2 Le Strange, Baghdad During the Abbasid Caliphate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), 323-326, Justin 
Marozzi, Baghdad, City of Peace, City of Blood (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 11. 
3 See: Hugh Kennedy, The Court of the Caliphs: When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World (Da Capo Press Inc, 
2006). 
4 John Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334H/945 to 403H/1012 (Leiden: Brill, 2003).  
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profitably tolerating them in spite of their Shīʿī, anti-Sunnī tendency. This is similar 
to the Saljūqs’ patronage of the Ḥanafism. Cooperson highlighted the culture of 
sanctity to which Ibn Ḥanbal (241/855) was subjected to by his followers during this 
period.5 This began in the aftermath of his celebrated triumph in the Inquisition of 
the ʿAbbāsid Caliph al-Maʾmūn. Medieval Sunnī sources portrayed it as an era of 
terrifying theologically-coated inquisition.6 In the eyes of its contenders, the 
Ḥanbalism extremely opposed the Muʿtazilī ethos that controlled the caliphal court. 
Accounts of attack on scholars such as al-Khaṭīb, his student, Ibn ʿAqīl (513/1119) 
and previously, Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (310/923) generated multiple points of view on 
the idea of traditionalism within this period. On another note, Jonathan Brown 
observed that Baghdād’s canonical culture around the Ṣaḥīḥayn arose between 
390/400 and al-Khaṭīb’s death.7 The culture of serious authentication of ḥadīth was 
promoted by Ibn Ḥanbal’s first generation of students. Cooperson further stated 
that Ḥanbalism, enjoys reception by the majority of Muslims until present day.
 Building on previous scholarships, Daphna Ephrat located the period 338-656 
AH/950-1258 CE as the period of transformation and transition of the Muslim 
societies. Ephrat claimed that during the course of these years, the Sunnī schools of 
law were developed as scholarly establishments, the nuclei of Ṣūfī fraternities were 
formed, and the formal colleges and Ṣūfī hostels (khānqāh and ribāṭ) were founded 
based on substantial pious endowments (awqāf).8 The intellectual culture of 
Baghdād was exemplified by the renowned Sūq al-Warrāqīn, which placed more 
than a hundred booksellers’ shops including highly sophisticated works on 
Aristotelian scholarship. According to Adamson, Baghdād rivalled fifth century 
                                                        
5 Ibn al-Jawzī, Virtues of the Imam Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, ed. & trans. Michael Cooperson (New York: New 
York Univ. Press, 2013), 1: xiv. 
6 Michael Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 38-40. TUG, I:446-
508. Also: ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm al-Matroudi, The Ḥanbalī School of Law and Ibn Taymiyyah: Conflict of Conciliation 
(London: Routledge, 2006), Nimrod Hurvitz, The Formation of Ḥanbalism: Piety into Power (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
7 Jonathan Brown, The Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 267. 
8 Cristopher Melchert, The Formation of Sunnī Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E. (Leiden: brill, 1997), 
George Maksdisi, The Rise of the Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and The West (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1981), Daphna Ephrat, A Learned Society in Period of Transition, The Sunnī 
ʿUlamāʾ of Eleventh-Century Baghdād (New York: SUNY Press, 2000). 
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Alexandria, thirteenth century Paris, and twentieth century Oxford.9 In the midst of 
this development, al-Khaṭīb arose with his project of designing ḥadīth and fiqh as the 
foundation of traditional Sunnī intellectual culture in Baghdād. 
1.1 Sources for Biography 
The author has chronologically divided the primary sources into several 
groups. In the footnote below, the author has included the list of classical sources 
and studies consulted in the author’s reconstruction of al-Khaṭīb’s biography.10 
                                                        
9 Baghdād Aristotelian scholarship differs from the Avicennan approach, which made its way in 
Khorasan contemporaneous to the time of al-Khaṭīb. See Adamson’s remark in: “Lost and Found: 
Newly Discovered Christian Philosophy in Arabic,” accessed July 1, 2016, 
http://blog.apaonline.org/2016/05/26/lost-and-found-newly-discovered-christian-philosophy-in-
arabic/.  
10 Sources from the first century after al-Khaṭīb’s death: 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Nakhshabī (457/1065), Muʿjam al-Shuyūkh, (quoted by al-Samʿānī in al-Muntakhab min 
Muʿjām Shuyūkh al-Nakhshabī which was further quoted by al-Ḥamawī in Muʿjam al-Udabāʾ), ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz al-Kattānī (466/1074), Dhayl Tārīkh Mawlid al-ʿUlamāʾ wa-Wafayātihim (Riyadh: Dār al-ʿĀṣimah, 
1409/1988), 206, Ibn Mākūlā al-Amīr (475/1083), Tahdhīb Mustamirr al-Awhām (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyyah, 1990), 1:57-60, Abū’l-Faḍl Ibn Khayrūn (488/1095), Tārīkh Wafayāt al-Shuyūkh. Ibn Ṭāhir al-
Maqdisī (507/1113), al-Manthūrāt min al-Ḥikāyāt wa’l-Suʾālāt (Riyadh: Dār al-Minhāj, 1430/2009), 
Ghayth ibn ʿAlī al-Ṣūrī al-Armanāzī (509/1116), Tārīkh Ṣūr (apud al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām), Abū’l-
Ḥasan al-Hamadhānī (521/1127), Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ (an addendum for Ṭabaqāt of al-Shīrāzī) (apud al-
Dhahabi, Tārīkh al-Islām and al-Suyūtī, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥuffāẓ), Hibat Allāh Ibn al-Akfānī (524/1130), Dhayl 
Dhayl Tārīkh Mawlid al-ʿUlamāʾ wa Wafayātihim (Riyadh: Dār al-ʿĀṣimah, 1989), 32, Abū Saʿd ʿAbd al-
Karīm al-Samʿānī (562/1167), Al-Ansāb (Beirut: Dār al-Jinān, 1988), 1:502, Dhayl Tārīkh Baghdād (apud 
al-Ḥamawī and al-Dhahabī, see below). 
It is striking that al-Shīrāzī (476/1083) did not include al-Khaṭīb in his Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ 
(Beirut: Dār al-Rāʾīd, 1970), while al-Hamadhānī praised al-Khaṭīb in his Dhayl al-Ṭabaqāt. 
From the second century after his death: 
Ibn ʿAsākir (571/1176), Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1995), 5:31-41, Tabyīn Kadhib al-
Muftarī (Damascus: Maṭbaʿah al-Tawfīq, 1347/1928), 268-271, Ibn Khayr al-Ishbīlī (575/1180), Fihrist 
Ibn al-Khayr al-Ishbīlī (Tunis: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2009), 143, 227(282), 212(253), 231 (292), 228, 
259(345), 266(365), 279(411), 280(416), 553, ʿImād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (586/1190), Nuṣrat al-Fatrah, 
(summarised by al-Bundārī, see below), Ibn al-Jawzī (597/1201), al-Muntaẓam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-
Umam (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1992), 16:129-135, ʿĪsā ibn Abī Bakr ibn Ayyūb al-Ḥanafī, al-
Malik al-Muʿaẓẓam (624/1227), al-Sahm al-Muṣīb fī Kabid al-Khaṭīb, in Tārīkh Baghdād (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah) Mulḥaqāt at the end of volume 13, Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (626/1230), Muʿjam al-Udabāʾ 
(Beirut, Dār al-Gharb, 1993), 1:384-395, Ibn Nuqṭah (629/1232), Takmilat al-Ikmāl (Saudi Arabia: Umm 
al-Qura Univ., 1987), 1:103-105, al-Taqyīd, 1:169-171, Ibn al-Athīr (630/1233), al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1987), 8:390, al-Lubāb fī Tahdhīb al-Ansāb (Baghdād, Matkabah al-




Most of the previous studies relied heavily on the sources from the second group. 
Works such as Tārīkh Wafayāt al-Shuyūkh composed by al-Khaṭīb’s student, Abū’l-
Faḍl Ibn Khayrūn (488/1095) has never been noted by any biographer, as it is non-
extant.11 The modern study by Fedwa Malti-Douglas, whose earliest source was Ibn 
ʿAsākir’s works, has proven the effect of controversy, praise and polemic in the 
biographical tradition of al-Khaṭīb.12 The presented perceptions concerning al-
                                                                                                                                                              
Islām), al-Bundārī al-Iṣfahānī (643/1246), Zubdat al-Nuṣrah wa Nukhbat al-ʿUṣrah (Egypt: al-Kutub al-
ʿArabiyyah, 1900), 42, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (643/1246), Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ al-Shāfiʿiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir 
al-Islāmiyyah, 1992), 1:475. 
From the third century after his death: 
Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, Yūsuf ibn Quzghulī (654/1256), Mirʾāt al-Zamān fī Tārīkh al-Aʿyān (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2013), 12:486-493, al-Nawawī (676/1278), al-Taqrīb wa al-Taysīr (Beirut: Dār al-
Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1985), 119, Ibn Khallikān (681/1282), Wafayāt al-Aʿyān (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir), 1:92-92, 
Abū’l-Fidāʾ (732/1332), al-Mukhtaṣar fī Akhbār al-Bashar (Egypt: al-Maṭbaʿah al-Ḥusayniyyah), 2:187-
188, al-Dhahabī (748/1347), Duwal al-Islām (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1999), 1:398, al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man Ghabar 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 2:314-315, Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 
3:1135-1146, Tārīkh al-Islām wa-Wafayāt al-Aʿlām (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2003), 10:175-188, Siyar 
Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Risālah, 1985), 18:270-297, ʿUmar ibn Muẓaffar Ibn al-Wardī 
(749/1349), Tatimmat al-Mukhtaṣar fī Akhbār al-Bashar (al-Maṭbaʿah al-Wahbiyyah, 1285/1868), 1:374, 
Ibn al-Dumyāṭī (749/1349), al-Mustafād min Dhayl Tārīkh Baghdād (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī), 54-61, 
al-Ṣafadī (764/1363), al-Wāfī bi al-Wafayāt (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2000), 7:126-132. 
 From the fourth century: 
ʿAbd Allāh ibn Asʿad al-Yāfiʿī (768/1367), Mirʾāt al-Jinān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1997), 1:66-
68, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAlī al-Subkī (771/1370), Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah al-Kubrā (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-
Kitāb al-ʿArabī), 4:29-39, ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Asnawī (772/1371), Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1987), 1:99-100, Ibn Kathīr (774/1373), al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah (Dār Hajar), 16: 27-
32, Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ al-Shāfiʿiyyīn (Egypt: Maktabah al-Thaqāfah al-Dīniyyah, 1993), 1:412-413. 
 From the fifth century onwards: 
Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah (851/1447), Manāqib al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī (Damascus: Dār al-Bashāʼir 2003), 434 – 452, 
Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif, 1978), 1:254-256, Ibn Taghrī Bardī (874/1470), al-Nujūm 
al-Zāhirah fī Mulūk Miṣr wa al-Qāhirah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 5:89-90, al-Sakhāwī 
(902/1497), Fatḥ al-Mughīth bi-Sharḥ Alfiyat al-Ḥadīth (Riyadh: Dār al-Minhāj, 2005), 3:230-231, al-Iʿlān bi 
al-Tawbīkh li-man Dhamm al-Tārīkh (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 25-26, Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī 
(909/1503), Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ wa Tabṣirat al-Ayqāẓ (Damascus, Dār al-Nawādir, 2011), 36, al-Suyūṭī 
(911/1505), Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥuffāẓ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1983), 433-435, Ibn Hidāyat Allah al-
Ḥusaynī (1014/1605), Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq, 1982), 164. 
11 Biographers of Ibn Khayrūn have never mentioned this work as well. The title of this work features 
in an isnād recorded by Ibn Nuqṭah in al-Taqyīd, 1:282 and in his work Takmilat al-Ikmāl, 4:334. See: 
TIM, 10:590. 
12 Fedwa Malti-Douglas, “Controversy and Its Effects in the Biographical Tradition of al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī,” Studia Islamica 46 (1977): 115-131. 
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Khaṭīb will be evaluated throughout this study. On another important note, 
Bashshār ʿAwwād provided the most extensive study of al-Khaṭīb’s biography in his 
critical edition of Tārīkh Baghdād. This dissertation will provide revisions and focus 
on the networks concerning al-Khaṭīb. 
1.2 Family Background and Personal Profile 
Al-Khaṭīb was born of an imām and khaṭīb who used to frequent the circle of 
Abū Ḥafṣ al-Kattāni (390/1000), who was an eminent muqriʾ, a tradent13 and a 
disciple of the renowned Ibn Mujāhid (324/936).14 Al-Kattānī held his qirāʾāt and 
ḥadīth classes at his mosque near the bank of the Dajāj canal.15 Even though this new 
anecdote reveals the father’s connection to the circle of qirāʾāt and ḥadīth, there is 
no reference as to which madhhab he or any family member belonged to, contrary to 
the suggestion of Yūsuf al-ʿIshsh. 
Al-Khatib, whose teknonym is Abū Bakr16, mentioned his father in Tārīkh 
Baghdād saying:  
‘ʿAlī ibn Thābit ibn Aḥmad ibn Mahdī, Abū’l-Ḥasan, al-Khaṭīb, is my father, 
may God be pleased with him. He was among the memorisers of al-Qurʾān … 
He delivered religious sermons on the pulpit of Darzījān for about twenty 
years. He once exulted over the fact that he is of Arab stock and that his 
kindred used to ride horses. In the old time, they resided in al-Haṣāṣah 
which is located beside Euphrates.’17  
                                                        
13 Biography in: Ibn al-Jawzī, Ghāyat al-Nihāyah fī Ṭabaqāt al-Qurrāʾ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 
2006), 1:518-519. 
14 His famous work is Kitāb al-Sabʿah fī al-Qirāʾāt. See: Mustafa Shah, “The Early Arabic Grammarians’ 
Contributions to the Collection and Authentication of Qurʾanic Readings: The Prelude to Ibn 
Mujāhid’s Kitāb al-Sabʿa,” Journal of Qurʾanic Studies 6:1 (2004): 72-102. 
15 ʿUmar ibn Ibrāhīm al-Kattānī, Juzʾ min Ḥadīth Abū Ḥafs al-Kattānī (Mss. Dār al-Kutub al-Ẓāhiriyyah, 
Col. 40/21), 1. 
16 No reason was given for this teknonym, whether it refers to an offspring or not. It is also 
interesting to note that a sect adopted a negative view on the teknonym Abū Bakr. Bakr Abū-Zayd 
noted in Ṭabaqāt al-Nassābīn, that the first to write on genealogies of Ṭālibiyyīn was Abū’l-Ḥusayn 
Yaḥyā al-ʿAlawī al-ʿAqīqī. Amongst his works is al-Radd ʿala al-Rāfiḍah wa Ahl al-Makr fī Manʿi al-Takannī 
bi Abī Bakr. Apart from including al-Khaṭīb amongst experts on genealogy, Abū Zayd also affirmed al-
Khaṭīb’s consultation of al-ʿAqīqī’s dictionary on genealogy. See: Ṭabaqāt al-Nassābīn (Riyadh: Dār al-
Rushd, 1987), 68. 
17 TMS, 13:279. 
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Alternatively, Abū Saʿd al-Samʿānī (562/1167) referred to al-Khaṭīb as al-
Thābitī, connecting him back to his grandfather, Thābit.18 
A disagreement was presented by most biographers concerning al-Khaṭīb’s 
year of birth, despite the fact that he had already clarified it in Tārīkh Baghdād 
affirming the year 392/1002.19 This was supported by assertions of students in 
various sources.20 More than two centuries after the demise of al-Khaṭīb, al-Ṣafadī 
(764/1363) mentioned that he was born in ʿIrāq, specifically in a village near Nahr 
al-Malik (the King’s Canal) known as Hanīqiyā.21  
1.3 The Title and Khaṭībship  
In her study, Ephrat listed several traditional positions in Baghdād where the 
top-level legal professions exist: qāḍīship (judge) and muftīship (official reference for 
religious verdicts), followed by several other professions such as shāhid (court 
witness) and khaṭīb (official preacher at mosque). Qāḍīship and khaṭībship were high-
ranking offices often secured by grand scholars who thrived outside the nascent 
madrasah system.22 Khaṭībship in Baghdād was mainly carried out by the Hāshimīs, 
who were often Ḥanbalīs.23 Therefore, it is possible that a person being a khaṭīb in 
Baghdād would have been a member of the Ḥanbalī madhhab. 
As for Aḥmad-ibn-ʿAlī, Ibn Kathīr (774/1373) was the first to state that he 
was referred to as ‘al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī’ as a result of him delivering sermons in 
                                                        
18 al-Samʿānī, al-Ansāb, 1:502. Ibn Nuqṭah stated that al-Samʿānī frequently mentioned al-Khaṭīb by 
this affiliation. Takmilat al-Ikmāl, 1:545. Likewise, Ibn al-Athīr in al-Lubāb, 1:235.  
19  He stated: ‘I was born on Thursday, 6th of Jumādā al-Ākhirah, 392 AH (1002 CE).’ TMS, 13:135. I 
have consulted modern astronomical calculation to confirm the accuracy of the date and the day. 
20 Related by Ghayth ibn ʿAlī (apud TDQ, 5:34 and HMDB, 1:385) and Abū Manṣūr Ibn Khayrūn: Siyar, 
18:274. The disagreement repeatedly copied in later sources stems from Ibn al-Jawzī’s al-Muntaẓam. 
21 al-Ṣafadī mentioned the ḍabt (spelling) of the name and said: ‘That was how I found it maḍbūtan 
(spelled elaborately).’ al-Wafayāt, 7:126. Al-Ṣafadī provides no information on his source concerning 
the birthplace. Series of biographers including al-Dhahabī did not mention this point.  
22 Ephrat, Learned Society, 114. 
23 Ephrat’s list of khaṭībs: Ibid, Appendix C, 175. 
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Darzījān.24 Prior to him, al-Nakhshabī (457/1065) stated: ‘He used to deliver 
sermons in certain districts of Baghdād.’25 Ibn al-Athīr (630/1233) and Bashshār 
ʿAwwād seems to confirm this ascription, although the latter doubted the specific 
mention of Darzījān.26 These attributions, however, seem to reflect more on the 
biography of al-Khaṭīb’s father. 
In Arabic, the epithet al-khaṭīb is not solely attributed to preaching either 
officially or unofficially, since a person with a high level of eloquence may also be 
called al-khaṭīb.27 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (852/1448) asserted that ‘al-khaṭīb (the 
eloquent) is a characteristic (ṣifat) of Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Thābit the Ḥāfiẓ, 
and not his official designation.’28 It characterised him as an excellent orator or 
proficient spokesman, especially considering his literary compositions and 
celebrated work on the history of the metropolis and the technicalities of ḥadīth. 
Furthermore, Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Hamadhānī (521/1127) remarked: ‘al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī was the chief inspector for the preachers (khuṭabāʾ wa al-wu“āẓ). He 
prevented them from delivering any ḥadīth before his inspection.’29 The present 
study also discovered that grand judges consulted the expert Aḥmad-ibn-ʿAlī in 
verifying their collections of ḥadīth, a clear indication of his prominent position in 
                                                        
24 Ibn Kathīr was seconded by al-Ṭaḥḥān and later biographers. Al-Ṭaḥḥān ascribed to Ibn Kathīr the 
statement that al-Khaṭīb used to deliver sermons for Friday and ʿīdayn (two festivals) prayers. 
However, I did not find the mention of that in al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah, 16:28 and neither in Ṭabaqāt, 
1:412. See: al-Ṭaḥḥān, al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb, 30. 
25 Al-Ḥamawī usually used ‘qāla al-Samʿānī’. In this particular account, he notified: ‘I found this in the 
hand-writing of al-Samʿānī.’ HMDB, 1:390. Al-Nakhshabī’s biography: TIM, 10:92. See Chapter Seven on 
al-Samʿānī’s doubt concerning al-Nakhshabī’s account. 
26 Ibn al-Athīr, al-Lubāb, 1:453-454. According to Bashshār, Baghdād is about twenty-five kilometres 
from Darzijan and it is unlikely that a person who lived in Baghdād would deliver any sermon there 
on every Friday. See editorial remark of TMS, 1:22. 
27 The essayist al-Jāḥiẓ was known as Khatīb al-Muʿtazilah and his later rival Ibn Qutaybah was 
rendered Khaṭīb Ahl al-Sunnah. 
28 None of the biographers of al-Khaṭīb highlighted this point before. Ibn Ḥajar gave another example 
saying, ‘amongst those who were designated with the title al-khaṭīb was Abū’l-Faḍl al-Muqriʾ al-Ḍarīr. 
Ibn Nuqṭah said: ‘He had never delivered even a single khuṭbah.’ See: Nuzhat al-Albāb fī al-Alqāb 
(Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 1989), 1:243-244. 
29 al-Suyūṭī, Ṭabaqāt, 435. For al-Hamadhānī: TIM, 11:375. 
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the qāḍīship.30 To most Baghdādian scholars, al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī was 
indeed the world chief scholar (imām al-dunyā) of his time.31  
1.4 Early Childhood Education 
Al-Khaṭīb mentioned Hilāl ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭayyibī (422/1031), a person 
whom he called muʾaddibī (my trainer) which indicates education in literacy, 
recitation of Qurʾān and the basic skills of Arabic language.32 It is important to note 
here that al-Khaṭīb associated Hilāl with teaching the work of the uṣūlī Abū Bakr al-
Ṣayrafī al-Shāfiʿī (330/942), the disciple of the Baghdādian Shāfiʿī leader Abū’l-ʿAbbās 
Ibn Surayj (306/918).33 Another teacher of this period of al-Khaṭīb’s life was Ibn al-
Ṣaydalānī, Abū Bakr al-Akhram (417/1026), who taught in the Shāfiʿī mosque of 
Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Dāraquṭnī at Dār al-Quṭn.34 From him, al-Khaṭīb studied Qurʾanic 
Readings35 and Arabic literature.36 The third teacher was Manṣūr Abū-Manṣūr-al-
Ḥabbāl al-Muqriʾ (430/1039). He was a friend of al-Khaṭīb’s father in the circle of 
Abū-Ḥafṣ-al-Kattānī, implied to be the master who taught al-Khaṭīb the knowledge 
of qirāʾāt.37 Despite the absence of any hint regarding al-Ḥabbāl’s madhhab and 
contrary to some biographers, the author is inclined not to limit this relation to al-
                                                        
30 See Chapter Two. 
31 Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 8:390. 
32 Apparently, a person is entrusted to a muʾaddib in the early childhood. Souleyman Guindo, al-Taʾdīb 
fī al-ʿAsr al-ʿAbbāsī al-Awwal (Saudi Arabia: Islamic Univ. of Madinah, 2011), 327-331, Nasrat Abdel 
Rahman, “The Semantics of Adab in Arabic,” al-Shajarah 2:2 (1997): 189-207. On comparison between 
adab and the Greek concept of paideia, see: Nur Kirabiev, “Paideia and Adab in Islam,” in Educating for 
Democracy: Paideia in an Age of Uncertainty, eds. Alan Olson et al (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2004). 
33 TMS, 16:117. See the chapter “Ibnu Surayj and the Classical Shāfiʿī School” in: Melchert, Formation, 
87-115.  
34 TMS, 6:90. 
35 Qirāʾāt will be translated as Readings with capital R throughout this dissertation. 
36 See al-Khaṭīb’s narrations from Abū Bakr al-Akhram: TMS, 2:357, 4:603 (on al-Mubarrad), 6:448 (on 
Thaʿlab), 6:552. Most of them are from Abū ʿAlī al-Ṭūmārī. Al-Khaṭīb related from him a ḥadīth on 
wearing ṣūf (woolen cloth) as in al-Muntakhab min al-Zuhd, 56. 
37 al-Kifāyah, 1:365. 
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Khaṭīb’s childhood but to extend or place it at a much later period.38 The early 
childhood background, nevertheless, challenged many studies and modern 
biographies that depict al-Khaṭīb as a Ḥanbalī who later converted to Shāfiʿism. 
Unless al-Khaṭīb adjusted these accounts, they seem to indicate an extremely early 
involvement with the Shāfiʿī authorities. 
1.5 Al-Khaṭīb and Competing Taʿlīqāt Traditions 
It is assumed that al-Khaṭīb moved to the central area of Baghdād because he 
came across a session hosted by a Persian Shāfiʿī tradent, Ibn Rizquviyē (412/1022) 
at the central mosque in 403 AH/1012 CE.39 It was his first official audition of 
traditions. He attended this single session and thereupon proceeded to the study of 
jurisprudence. Baghdād embodied the systematic taʿlīqah method, which according 
to Melchert, was an advanced study of law leading to producing a virtual doctoral 
dissertation describing the juridical opinions of a legal school.40 Al-Khaṭīb’s first 
supervisor in this tradition was Abū’l-Ḥasan Ibn al-Maḥāmilī (415/1024), a Shāfiʿī 
master-reference from the renowned Maḥāmilī family.41 The professor introduced 
him to the network of Mukhtaṣar al-Muzānī, a primer on which the teacher based his 
own taʿlīqah.42 He also authored works in Shāfiʿī jurisprudence.  
                                                        
38 Ahmed suggested that this happened in his early childhood since he mistakenly stated that Manṣūr 
al-Ḥabbāl died in 403 AH/1013 CE, in which al-Khaṭīb was only 11 years old. Likewise, al-ʿUmarī and 
al-Dābī. Manṣūr al-Ḥabbāl died in 430 AH/1039 CE in which al-Khaṭīb was 38 years old. See: TMS, 6:61-
62, al-Muntaẓam, 16:129, Ibn al-Dumyāṭī, al-Mustafād, 18:54, and al-ʿ8:54, Mawārid, 30. 
39 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, Abū’l-Ḥasan: TMS, 2:211. 
40 Formation, 87. 
41 Aḥmad-ibn-Muḥammad-ibn-Aḥmad-ibn-al-Qāsim-ibn-Ismāʿīl-al-Ḍabbī. Ismāʿīl was the father of the 
famous muḥaddith, al-Ḥusayn ibn Ismāʿīl, Abū ʿAbd Allāh. See the section on al-Khaṭīb’s veteran 
masters. TMS, 6:25. Ephrat did not include the Maḥāmilians amongst the Shāfiʿī families. Members of 
this family were great traditionalists, jurists and judges who embraced speculative method of the 
Baghdādian Shāfiʿīs. See: ʿAbd al-Karīm al-ʿUmarī, ed. al-Lubāb fī al-Fiqh al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn al-Maḥāmilī 
(Madinah: Dār al-Bukhārī, 1416 H). 
42 A compendium of Shāfiʿī’s legal thought called ‘the epitome of al-Muzanī (264/878)’ was chosen by 
the Baghdādian Shāfiʿīs as the primer on which taʿlīqah (commentary) is produced. The taʿlīqah 
tradition has produced a large network of commentator-supervisors. Al-Muzanī was formerly a 
Ḥanafī rationalist, which might explain the selection of his text in Ibn Surayj’s synthesis of 
traditionalism and rationalism project. See: Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law, A Social 
and Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 134-137 and 174-181. 
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Al-Khaṭīb simultaneously met Ibn al-Maḥāmilī’s professor, Abū Ḥāmid al-
Isfarāyīnī (406/1016),43 the luminary who was hailed by the Shāfiʿīs, sometimes in 
concurrence with Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-Ṣuʿlūkī (404/1014), as the third mujaddid 
(reformer) of Islamic intellectual paradigm after al-Shāfiʿī (204/820) and Ibn 
Surayj.44 Al-Isfarāyīnī struggled to distinguish Shāfiʿism from the Mālikī Abū Bakr al-
Bāqillānī’s (402/1012) influential Ashʿarism.45 Three hundred or seven hundred 
students of jurisprudence supposedly attended his classes at the Fief of al-Rabīʿ.46 He 
was perceived as the reformer of the Baghdādian Shāfiʿīsm, while Abū Bakr al-Qaffāl 
al-Shāshī (365/976) was deemed the founder of the Khurāsānian method.47 Al-
Isfarāyīnī was a former student of Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī al-Shāfiʿī (388/998), a 
traditionalist who penned a work on al-Muzanī’s vocabulary.48  
Al-Khaṭīb presumably witnessed the dispute between al-Isfarāyīnī and Ibn 
al-Maḥāmilī over the approach in instructing legal thought. Al-Isfarāyīnī preferred 
the comparative method and his taʿlīqah produced fifty volumes supplied with the 
opinions of numerous scholars. Ibn al-Maḥāmilī, on the other hand, preferred a 
simplified method, which excluded the views of the Ḥanafīs.49 He was a close 
colleague of Abū Yaʿlā Ibn al-Farrāʾ (458/1066), the scholar who revitalised the 
Ḥanbalī legal school. He held an official position in judgeship and was perceived to 
                                                        
43 Claude Gilliot, “Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfarāyīnī,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam Three, ed. G. Krämer et al. 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), 34-36. 
44 A study by Landau-Tasseron suggests that students of al-Shāfiʿī invented the mujaddid tradition in 
the early ninth century to legitimise his innovations. Her view on al-Shāfiʿī’s legal principles is 
contestable. Melchert had added some discussion related to Ibn Surayj and the anti-Ḥanafī edge of 
the tradition. See: Ella Landau-Tasseron, “The ‘Cyclical Reform’: A Study of the Mujaddid Tradition,” 
Studia Islamica 70 (1989): 99, Melchert, Formation, 107-108. 
45 As recounted by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karajī al-Shāfiʿī (apud Ibn Taymiyyah, Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa’l-Naql 
(Riyadh: Univ. of Imam, 1991), 2:95-101. 
46 Located at the Mosque of Ibn-al-Mubārak. See: TMS, 6:20, Ibn al-Ṣalāh, Ṭabaqāt ,1: 375, TIM, 9: 101. 
47 al-Isfarāyīnī’s student, Abū ʿAlī al-Sanjī was recognised as the first to combine both methods in his 
taʿlīqah.  
48 al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 3:290. 
49 The disputed was over Ibn al-Maḥāmilī’s works al-Muqniʿ and al-Mujarrad, which he composed from 
the Taʿlīqah’s of al-Isfarāyīnī and excluded the comparative content. It was not concerning any list 
pertaining to identification of reformer as ambiguously suggested by Melchert. See: Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, 
Ṭabaqāt, 1:368, al-Nawawī, Tahdhīb al-Asmāʾ wa al-Lughāt (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 2:210. 
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be influenced by the uṣūlī thought of Ashʿarism (although he was against them in 
the subject of Divine attributes).50 Al-Khaṭīb similarly learned from this judge of 
Banū Yaʿlā whose vision of Ḥanbalism was exemplified in his al-ʿUddah fī Uṣūl al-
Fiqh.51  
Al-Khaṭīb also frequented other disciples of al-Isfarāyīnī such as the judge 
Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (449/1058)52 and Sulaym ibn Ayyūb, Abū’l-Fatḥ al-Rāzī 
(447/1055). Both were deemed aṣḥāb al-wujūh, eminent jurists amongst the Shāfiʿīs. 
Sulaym learned the whole taʿlīqah from al-Isfarāyīnī and defeated the method of Ibn 
al-Maḥāmilī.53 He eventually became the first propagator of Baghdādian Shāfiʿīsm in 
Tyre, a place al-Khaṭīb later on resided.54 Al-Māwardī on the other hand was the 
luminary who combined the Baghdādian Surayjī method and the Baṣran method, 
which had been employed by disciples of Ibn Surayj such as Abū-ʿAbd-Allāh al-
Zubayr-ibn-Aḥmad al-Zubayrī (317/929) and al-Qāḍī Abū’l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-
Ṣaymarī (post 386/996).55  
Al-Khaṭīb expressed his frustration with Ibn al-Maḥāmilī concerning ḥadīth 
particularly the collection of his great grand-uncle. He was fortunate to 
subsequently meet and study under the integrative al-Qāḍī Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī 
(450/1058) who was a student of several eminent Shāfiʿī jurists56 and leading 
                                                        
50 Muḥammad-ibn-al-Ḥusayn, Abū-Yaʿlā-Ibn-al-Farrāʾ-(458/1066). His son is Muḥammad Abū’l-
Ḥusayn Ibn Abī Yaʿlā (526/1131), the author of Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah (Saudi Arabia: Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 100 Years Publication, 1999). See: Melchert, Formation, 153. Cf. Hurvitz, Ḥanbalism, 84-87 and 
al-Matroudi, Ḥanbalī School, 13. 
51 TMS, 3:55. For the Ḥanbalī family Banū Yaʿlā, see: Ephrat, Learned Society, 155, and the final chapter 
of this dissertation. 
52 TIM, 9:751. 
53 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Ṭabaqāt, 1:479. 
54 TIM, 9:694.  
55 Melchert, Formation, 101. Biography of al-Zubayrī, see: Ibn Kathīr, Ṭabaqāt, 201, and al-Khaṭīb’s 
library, next chapter. For al-Ṣaymarī, see: al-Isnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:37.  
56 Ṭāhir-ibn-ʿAbd Allāh-ibn-Ṭāhir, Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī, a student of several aṣḥāb al-wujūh in the 
Shāfiʿī madhhab such as the ṣufī and mutakallim student of Ibn Surayj, Abū Sahl al-Ṣuʿlūqī (369/980), 
Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Māsarjisī (384/994), Abū Muḥammad al-Bāfī (398/1007), the student of Ibn al-Qāṣṣ al-
Ṭabarī, Abū ʿAlī al-Zajjājī (before 400/1010), and certainly Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfarāyīnī. Abū’l-Ṭayyib also 




traditionists such as al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Dāraquṭnī (385/995) and al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū 
Aḥmad al-Ghiṭrīfī al-Jurjānī (377/987), the author of al-Musnad al-Ṣaḥīḥ.57 Abū’l-
Ṭayyib was a well-versed traditionalist himself.58 He came to Baghdād and studied 
under al-Isfarāyīnī until he was deemed more proficient than him in jurisprudence 
and in his own taʿlīqah.59 The Ḥanbalī al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn al-Jawzī (656/1258) marked the 
influence of Abū’l-Ṭayyib on al-Khaṭīb by mentioning only him as his professor in 
jurisprudence.60  
The relationship between the Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanafīs in this period could be 
appreciated from recorded accounts of Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Hamadhānī. Juridical debates 
took place between al-Isfarāyīnī and Abū’l-Ḥusayn al-Qudūrī (428/1037), the leading 
Ḥanafī scholar in Baghdād.61 Al-Qudūrī authored the Mukhtaṣar, which paralleled in 
fame the Mukhtaṣar of former Ḥanafīs Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī (321/933) and Abū’l-
Ḥasan al-Karkhī (340/952).62 He also penned a commentary on the Mukhtaṣar al-
Ṭaḥāwī similar to the teacher of his teacher, Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ (370/981).63 Al-
Qudūrī’s work, al-Tajrīd encompassed the opinions of the two schools. Al-Khaṭīb did 
not miss learning from al-Qudūrī and befriended his disciple who became the chief 
                                                                                                                                                              
10:491, al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 5:12.  For aṣḥāb al-wujūh, see: Wael Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in 
Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001), 10-11. 
57 ʿAlī ibn ʿUmar al-Dāraquṭnī, the great Baghdādian Shāfiʿī traditionalist whose excellence was said to 
have not been matched except by al-Khaṭīb. See: Jonathan Brown, “Criticism of the Proto-Hadith 
Canon: al-Daraqutni’s Adjustment of al-Bukhari and Muslim’s Sahihs,” Journal of Islamic Studies 15:1 
(2004): 1-37. For al-Ghiṭrīfī who was also a student of Ibn Surayj, see: Siyar, 16:354. 
58 See his appeal to the method of salaf in: al-Radd ʿalā Man Yuḥibb al-Samāʿ (Tanta: Dār al-Ṣahābah, 
1990). 
59 It is titled al-Taʿliqah al-Kubrā fī al-Furūʿ (edited for PhD Diss., Islamic Univ. of Madinah) and 
considered one of the best representatives of taʿlīqāt tradition. The researchers opine that most 
arguments provided by Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī in al-Muhadhdhab were taken from Abū’l-Ṭayyib. It is, 
hence, not an overstatement to say that similar texts and passages found in the works of al-Khaṭīb 
and Abū Isḥāq might have been learned from this professor. 
60 al-Muntaẓam, 8:265. See relationship between al-Khaṭīb and Abū’l-Ṭayyib in TMS: 3:88, 3:167, stories 
in 11:430, 13:81, evaluation of narrators in 14:285, hypothetical cases in 3:158, 4:371. 
61 Brannon Wheeler, “Identity in the Margins: Unpublished Hanafī Commentaries on the Mukhtaṣar of 
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Qudūrī,” Islamic Law and Society 10-2 (2003): 182-209. 
62 Melchert, Formation, 116-123 (al-Ṭaḥāwī), 125-129 (al-Karkhī).  
63 al-Qudūrī studied under Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Jurjānī al-Baghdādī, who was a student of al-Jaṣṣāṣ. See: 
Melchert, Formation, 64 (al-Jurjānī) and 128 (al-Jaṣṣāṣ). 
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judge, Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Dāmaghānī al-Ḥanafī (478/1086).64 Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī 
once became a witness at al-Dāmaghānī’s court and lauded him as more 
knowledgeable on al-Shāfiʿī’s legal thought than most of his Shāfiʿī peers. Al-
Hamadhānī reported that al-Damaghānī was a man of humour like Abū’l-Ṭayyib’s 
student and al-Khaṭīb’s colleague, Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī al-Shāfiʿī (476/1083). When 
the two of them met in a session, it became a joyful one. 
Al-Dāmaghānī’s court also received Abū’l-Faḍl Ibn ʿAmrūs al-Bazzāz 
(452/1060) as a witness. Al-Khaṭīb stated that he was the leading Mālikī jurist and 
legal theorist whose excellence in Mālikī legal thought had no match in Baghdād. 
Al-Khaṭīb learned from him at the central mosque.65 Ibn ʿAsākir (571/1176) 
attributed him to Ashʿarism.66 Most biographers of al-Khatib have neglected this 
figure although he was an important link between al-Khaṭīb and al-Bāqillānī. This 
authority, as can be observed throughout al-Kifāyah, transmitted fundamental 
concepts related to the criticism of ḥadīth taught by al-Bāqillānī. Al-Bāqillānī’s 
influence on al-Khaṭīb was obfuscated due to the narrative of al-Khaṭīb’s Shāfiʿism 
presented by numerous biographers. 
Another teacher of al-Khaṭīb from the Ḥanafī side was Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-
Ṣaymarī (436/1045).67 He attended the ḥadīth sessions of al-Dāraquṭnī with al-
Isfarāyīnī. However, he left when al-Dāraquṭnī discredited the renowned al-Qāḍī 
Abū Yūsuf al-Ḥanafi (182/798) in a narration.68 Al-Khaṭīb, nevertheless, narrated a 
significant portion from al-Ṣaymarī especially with regards to biographies of the 
Ḥanafīs and the Muʿtazilīs. 
                                                        
64 Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, a leading Ḥanafī jurist during his time. He began his study in Khurāsān, 
migrated to Baghdād and studied under al-Qudūrī and al-Ṣaymarī. He also learned from Abū’l-Ḥasan, 
a student of al-Isfarāyīnī. When he died, his body was washed by the Ḥanbalī Ibn ʿAqīl. TIM, 10: 433. 
65 al-Khaṭīb stated: ‘Intahat ilayhi al-fatwā fī Baghdād.’ See: TMS, 3:589. 
66 Tabyīn, 264. 
67 He is al-Qāḍī al-Ṣaymarī, al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥanafī, the master-reference of the 
Ḥanafīs of Baghdād. Amongst his works are Akhbār Abū Ḥanīfah wa Aṣḥābihi and Masāʾil al-Khilāf fī Uṣūl 
al-Fiqh. Both have been published. See: al-Dārī al-Ghazzī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Saniyyah fī Tarājim al-Ḥanafiyyah 
(Cairo: Dār al-Rifāʿī, 1970) 3:153. 
68 TMS, 8:634. 
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Within this atmosphere of juridical encounters, al-Khaṭīb experienced inter 
and intra school exchanges and debates amongst the traditional fuqahāʾ, particularly 
the Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanafīs. Abū’l-Ṭayyib had once told him al-Isfarāyīnī’s account 
on the Shāfiʿī leading jurist Abū’l-Qāsim al-Dārakī (375/986). Al-Isfarāyīnī lauded al-
Dārakī and remarked that whenever al-Dārakī’s legal opinion differed from al-Shāfiʿī 
and Abū Ḥanīfah (150/767), he asserted: ‘Woe on you people! So-and-so reported 
from so-and-so that the Prophet said it this way. The acceptance of the ḥadīth from 
the Prophet is worthier than the acceptance of the statements of al-Shāfiʿī and Abū 
Ḥanīfah, if they contradict it.’69 Compared to other biographers, al-Khaṭīb’s 
biographical entry of al-Dārakī clearly emphasised his role in ḥadīth rather than his 
role as a Shāfiʿī jurist.70 
Towards the end of al-Isfarayīnī’s life, al-Khaṭīb attended once again the 
sessions of Ibn Rizquviyē at the central mosque and accompanied the tradent until 
his demise.71 During this period, al-Khaṭīb gradually developed the skill to perform 
takhrīj until he was trusted to analyse Ibn Rizquviyē’s transmissions.72 He also 
attended the session at the mosque after Ibn Rizquviyē’s, which was hosted by 
Muḥammad-ibn-ʿAbd Allāh-ibn-Ābān al-Hītī (410/1020), who came to Baghdād from 
Hīt in 406 AH/1016 CE.73 Al-Khaṭīb praised him for his pious character, but he also 
criticised his lack of care concerning ḥadīth narration and its principles. Both 
tradents, however, transmitted derogatory remarks pertaining to Abū Ḥanīfah, 
reflecting a more critical stance within the circle of ḥadīth transmission than the 
stance adopted by al-Khaṭīb’s professors in jurisprudence.  
 
                                                        
69 TMS, 12:236. 
70 See the comparative study of biographical tradition of al-Dārakī in: R Kevin Jacques, Authority, 
Conflict and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic Law (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 71-75. 
71 TMS, 2:211. Al-Ṭaḥḥān and Habeeb Malik stated that al-Khaṭīb returned to Ibn Rizquviyē after the 
demise of al-Isfarāyīnī, whereas al-Khaṭīb had already mentioned that he returned in the early of 
406AH /1016CE. 
72 al-Jāmiʿ 2:88. On takhrīj in ḥadīth studies, see Chapter Six. This account shows a very early mastery 
of ḥadīth criticism contrary to the impression made by some biographers. 
73 TMS, 3: 512. 
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1.6 Journeys of Seeking Knowledge 
 Within the city of Baghdād, al-Khaṭīb strove to meet almost every 
knowledgeable person in ḥadīth and opinions of former scholars. He recorded aural 
sessions from several areas, namely Bāb al-Shām, Bāb al-Shaʿīr and Sūq al-Ṭaʿām.74 
He even travelled frequently to ʿUkbarā75 and recorded his presence in Baṣrah 
several times. A biographer suggested that he passed by Kūfah during the first visit 
to Baṣrah, albeit without clear evidence.76 The two cities were indeed amongst the 
centres of learning during this period. 
1.6.1 Nishapur 
 Nishapur was a metropolis to which al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Sakhāwī (902/1497) 
attributed the epithet Dār al-Sunnah wa al-ʿAwālī (City of Sunnah’s transmission and 
superior living isnāds).77 Around the beginning of 415 AH/1024 CE, al-Khaṭīb was in 
a dilemma of choosing between travelling to the musnid of the Egyptian provinces, 
Abū-Muḥammad-Ibn-al-Naḥḥās (416/1025) and travelling to Nishapur where 
students of the Shāfiʿī grand tradent Abū’l-ʿAbbās al-Aṣamm (46/958) prospered.78 
Ibn al-Naḥḥās possessed distinct classic samāʿāt (audition transcripts or experiences) 
returning back to 331 AH/943 CE, while Nishapur offered scores of meetings.79 He 
                                                        
74 He audited Abū-Naṣr-ibn-ʿAbdūs at the central mosque in 407AH, TMS, 5:527-528, Tarkān ibn al-
Faraj at Bāb al-Shām in 408AH, 8:10-11, al-Ḥasan-ibn-ʿUbayd-Allāh-al-Hummānī at his shop at Bāb al-
Shaʿīr, 8:318 and Abū’l-Qāsim al-Yashkurī, 8:452. 
75 He learned from authorities such as Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-ʿUkbarī. TMS, 2:128. 
76 ʿISH, 20. Al-ʿIshsh’s suggestion was seconded by Munīr al-Dīn in Muslim Education, 14, al-Ṭaḥḥān in 
al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb, 35, al-Turābī in al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, 14, al-ʿUmarī in Mawārid, 35 and Habeeb Malik 
in Educational Theory, 21. See: HMDB, 1:384 and TDQ, 5:31 and 40. Both did not mention any specific 
time. 
77 al-Sakhāwī, al-Iʿlān, 666. See: Richard Bulliet, “The Political-Religious History of Nishapur in the 
Eleventh Century,” in Islamic Civilization 950-1150, ed. D.S. Richard (Oxford: Bruno Cassierrer Ltd, 1973), 
71-91. On the Shāfiʿī madhhab in Nishapur, see: Heinz Helm, Die Ausbreitung der šāfiʿitischen Rechtsschule 
von den Anfängen bis zum 8./14. Jahrhundert, (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1974). For 
Shāfiʿism and other religious thoughts in Khurāsān, see: Wilfred Madelung, Religious Trends in Early 
Islamic Iran (New York: Bibiliotheca Persica, 1988). 
78 al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 4:30.  
79 TIM, 9:270-271. 
36 
 
eventually chose Nishapur following advice from his ḥadīth professors. The journey, 
accompanied by his friend ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Ghālib Ibn al-Qunnī (450/1058),80 allowed 
them to visit Nahrāwān,81 Daskarat al-Malik,82 Ḥulwān,83 Dīnawar,84 Asadʾabād, 
Hamadhān,85 Sāveh and Rayy.86 Nishapur harboured numerous centres of learning 
even before the establishment of the Niẓāmiyyah College in 458 AH/1066 CE, while 
Hamadhān was also named by al-Sakhāwī as Dār al-Sunnah.87 Al-Khaṭīb returned to 
Baghdād between 416 AH/ 1025 CE and 417 AH/1026 CE at the age of 25 and was 
celebrated by his own professors from the schooling. 
1.6.2 Isfahan 
The second-long journey made by al-Khaṭīb was to Isfahan. It occurred 
approximately towards the end of 421 AH/1030 CE as indicated by an incident in 
Tārīkh Baghdād.88 Al-Khaṭīb recorded meeting Rawḥ ibn Muḥammad (423/1032), the 
grandson of the Shāfiʿī Ibn al-Sunnī (364/974) at Karaj in this year, implying a place 
he stopped by during the journey.89 Furthermore, an account confirms that he was 
                                                        
80 al-Samʿānī, al-Ansāb, 4:555. 
81 TMS, 13:233, 13:324 and 13:581.  
82 TMS, 5:92. Al-Yaʿqūbī illustrated that to go to Ḥulwān from Baghdād, one has to take Jisr al-
Nahrāwān, then Daskarat al-Malik, then Ṭarāristān or Nahrāwān, then Jalawlāʾ, then Khānaqīn, then 
the Castle of Shīrīn, then arrive at Ḥulwān. See: al-Buldān, 45-46. 
83 They met here a Ṣūfī authority, Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā ibn ʿAlī al-Daskarī (431/1040), who was known as 
the servant of the mendicants (al-fuqarāʾ), a muḥaddith and a judge. According to al-Ṣarīfīnī, people 
from other cities came to listen from him in search of blessings. See: sl-Muntakhab min Kitāb al-Siyāq li-
Tārikh Naysābūr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1989), 484. For al-Khaṭīb’s narrations from him in 
Ḥulwān, see: Talkhīṣ al-Mutashābih, 1:100, 403, and 2:800.   
84 They learned from the grandson of Ibn al-Sunnī, the student of al-Nasāʾī, although al-Khaṭīb had 
met him before in Baghdād. See: TMS, 9:431. 
85 TMS, 4:524, 8:133 and 12:431. Also 2:6 and 298, 12:251. 
86 TMS, 5:135, 11:393 and 15:548. Also 12:416-417. 
87 al-Sakhāwī, al-Iʿlān, 665. 
88 TMS, 2:544. Also: Lambton, A.K.S. et al, “Iṣfahān” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, eds. P. 
Bearman et al (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 4:97-107. 
89 TMS, 9:397. 
37 
 
in Isfahan in Rabīʿ al-Awwal of 422 AH/1031 CE.90 He was sent by his professor, al-
Ḥāfiẓ al-Barqānī (425/1034) to learn from al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī 
(430/1039).91 Throughout the time there, he also extended his interest to former 
students of the famous rare traditions collector, al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū’l-Qāsim al-Ṭabrānī 
(360/971) and even more to students of Abū Nuʿaym’s rival, al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Mandah al-
Iṣfahānī (395/1005).92 He also travelled to Jarbādhiqān to record biographies of Ṣūfīs 
from a student of Maʿmar ibn Aḥmad al-Zāhiḍ (418/1027), a great Ṣūfī master of 
Isfahan.93 The duration of his stay in Isfahan is not clear, but an event recorded in 
Tārīkh confirms that he was back in Baghdād in Shawwāl of the same year.94 Several 
other short travels to Nahrāwān,95 Baʿqūbā, and Jalultā are recorded in the period 
after this journey.96 
                                                        
90 Ibid, 4:160-161. 
91 See al-Khaṭīb’s teacher below. The content of the letter: ‘Had earnestly executed on a travel to you, 
our respected brother Abū Bakr, Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Thābit to benefit from your knowledge and to 
obtain the advantage of your narrations of ḥadīth. He had already possessed advance knowledge in 
this matter with established efforts and sagacious understanding. He had travelled for the sake of 
ḥadīth and to seek exceptional narrations, in which he had managed to acquire items, which are not 
available to many of his fellow confreres. Those qualities will appear to you through assemblages as 
well as other forms of piousness, conscientiousness and trustworthiness, which will beautify his 
personality before your eyes and elevate his status before your thought. I am full of hope should 
these qualities are proven in your respect that you would offer him a kind assistance and your 
precious time. Likewise, I hope you would bear with him should he become over laborious and 
impetuous as our predecessors in the old days used to bear with their successors in such heavy 
situations. Furthermore, they had given those who deserved special time, attention and recognition, 
which were not usually offered to the rest of the students.’ 
92 Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn Yaḥyā, Abū ʿAbd Allāh, see: Siyar, 17:28. For al-Ṭabrānī, see: 16:119.  
93 Biography of Abū Manṣūr: TIM, 9:302. See al-Khatib’s narration from Ibrāhīm ibn Hibat Allāh from 
Abū Manṣūr in TMS, 2:80, 3:206, 6:397. 
94 TMS, 5:492. 
95 In 427 AH/1036 CE, al-Khaṭīb audited from al-Ḥasan ibn Fahd in Nahrawan. This indicates a second 
visit to the city. TMS, 8:413. 
96 He learned from the judge of Baʿqūba, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn Ibn Ḥamdūn (430/1039). See: TMS, 
3:48. The third visit to Nahrawan was in 430 AH/1039 CE where he met Abū Ṭālib ibn Shahfīrūz 
(456/1064) in the village called Jalultā. See: al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-Buldān (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977), 
2:155, TMS, 15:202. 
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1.6.3 Makkah, Jerusalem and the Cities of Shām 
Al-Khaṭīb decided to perform pilgrimage to Makkah in 445 AH/1054 CE and 
recorded him crossing through the desert of Samāwah heading towards Damascus 
in the month of Ramaḍān.97 Eventually, he departed from Ḥijāz in Ṣafar of 446 
AH/1054 CE leaving no indication of a visit to Madīnah as is the custom of most 
Muslims. He stated that he came across Bayt al-Maqdis on his way back from 
pilgrimage and stayed there momentarily.98 He recorded his presence in Damascus 
in Jumādā al-ʾŪlā of the same year and eventually in Tyre.99 Presumably, by the end 
of that year, he arrived in Baghdād and continued learning, for instance at the al-
Muʿallā canal.100 
This is the end of al-Khaṭīb’s long journey of seeking knowledge. Apparently 
he had taken other journeys. However, there is insufficient information regarding 
the date and the duration. Amongst others was the journey to Jarjarāyā where he 
acquired lessons from the judge Bakrān Ibn al-Aṭrūsh al-Saqaṭī (n.d.).101 Another 
was to al-Anbār, which presumably took place after 423 AH/ 1032 CE.102 The third 
was to Ṣaydā (Sidon) where he recorded auditing several authorities, which could 
have possibly occurred during any of his visits to Damascus and Tyre.103 
1.7 Teachers and Networks 
 Based on the previous journeys, one could expect that al-Khaṭīb met and 
acquired knowledge from a number of key individuals. If one were to extrapolate 
                                                        
97 TMS, 11:375. 
98 Ibid, 2:316. 
99 Ibid, 12:297. 
100 See Ibn-al-Khaffāf: Ibid, 6:124. 
101 TMS, 16:306. Al-Khaṭīb mentioned his visit to the grave of Abū Bakr al-Mufīd at Jarjarāyā in 2:204. 
See for Bakrān: Ibn Nuqṭah, Takmilat al-Ikmāl, 3:205, and for al-Mufīd: TIM, 8:455. 
102 TMS, 10:460. 
103 al-ʿUmarī suggested that al-Khaṭīb had travelled to Mopsuestia based on a narration from al-
Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī al-Faqīh. However, it seems that al-Faqīh’s narration was to Abū Bakr al-Khallāl as 
there is an isnād “al-Khallāl from al-Faqīh” in TMS, 10:433 (cf. 7:595). Ahmed mentioned a journey to 
al-Jibāl, but he provided no reference as well. 
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from Tārīkh Baghdād, his informants reach 777 individuals of various denominations 
and affiliations. Abū Saʿd al-Samʿānī remarked, ‘the number of al-Khaṭīb’s teachers is 
beyond count.’104 
1.7.1 Personages Whom He Described as Veteran Masters 
1. Ibn Dawsat, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, Abū ʿAbd Allāh (407/1017), a Mālikī 
tradent who dictated at the central mosque.105 The fact that he lost his 
original books and depended on memory, due to which he was accused of 
applying accelerated aging to his aural transcript (al-samāʿ), indicates the 
pervading adoption of written records for ḥadīth amongst its experts during 
this time.106 In spite of this, al-Khaṭīb did acquire one volume of his 
traditions. 
2. Muḥammad ibn Fāris Abū’l-Faraj, Ibn al-Ghūrī (409/1019), the son of Abū’l-
Qāsim al-Ghūrī al-Wāʿiẓ (348/959). According to al-Khaṭīb, he was the last 
student of the uncongenial Ḥanbalī personage Aḥmad ibn Jaʿfar, Ibn al-
Munādī (336/947) whose ḥadīth and books were difficult to acquire due to his 
personality.107 Ibn al-Munādī was described as a staunch propagator of 
Ḥanbalism in the face of Shāfiʿism and Jarīrism.108 Al-Khaṭīb attended Ibn al-
Ghūrī’s session in Shawwāl 408 AH/1018 CE at the Mosque of al-Mahdī.109  
3. Abū’l-Ḥusayn, Ibn al-Mutayyam, al-Wāʿiẓ (409/1019), a preacher at the 
central mosque. The jocular yet venerable master owned an extremely 
                                                        
104 al-Samʿānī, al-Ansāb, 1:502. 
105 TMS, 6:320. 
106 This was apparently done by burying the transcript in the ground. See: Qasim Samarrai, ʿIlm al-
Iktināh al-ʿArabī al-Islāmī (Riyadh: King Faysal Centre, 2001), 387. The case of Ibn Dawsat was quoted in 
the book, however, without any substantiation as well. On the problem of writing ḥadīth, see: Michael 
Cook, “The Opponents of the Writing of Tradition in Early Islam,” Arabica 4 (1997): 437. 
107 Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, Ṭabaqāt, 2:430. See al-Khaṭīb’s collection of his books in the next chapter.  
108 On the role and attitude of Ibn al-Munādī, see: Melchert, Formation, 153. 
109 TMS, 4:273–274.  
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superior isnād (aqdam al-samāʿ), in comparison to all the other Baghdādian 
teachers of al-Khaṭīb.110 
4. Abū ʿUmar ibn Mahdī al-Fāriṣī (410/1020), a personage who according to al-
Dhahabī was the leading musnid of his time.111 He was also a student of the 
renowned traditionist al-Qāḍī al-Ḥusayn ibn Ismāʿīl al-Mahāmilī al-Shāfiʿī 
(330/941), the chief of the Maḥāmilians, the author of al-Sunan, the jurist, 
and the judge of Kūfah for sixty years.112 
5. al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū’l-Fatḥ ibn Abī al-Fawāris (412/1022), a student of Abū Bakr al-
Ismāʿīlī al-Shāfiʿī (371/982)113 and Abū Bakr al-Ṣayrafī al-Shāfiʿī.114 He was 
also the teacher of al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī (405/1014), al-Dāraquṭnī and Abū 
Bakr al-Barqānī. According to al-Khaṭīb, people recorded ḥadīths of other 
authorities based on his inspection.115 
6. Abū Saʿad al-Mālīnī al-Harawī (412/1022), a famous tradent and Ṣūfī master 
known by the sobriquet ṭāwūṣ al-fuqarāʾ (the peafowl of the mendicants). Al-
Khaṭīb met him during his several visits to the ribāṭ al-ṣūfiyyah (Ṣūfī lodges) 
near the central mosque in Baghdad. 116 Among his works are al-Arbaʿūn fī 
Shuyūkh al-Ṣūfiyyah and al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif.117 
                                                        
110 Biography in: TMS, 6:23. Narration in 408 AH/1018 CE: 4:505. 
111 Siyar, 17:221. Biography in: TMS, 12:263 and TIM, 9:153. Sessions were held at his majlis or masjid, 
see: TMS, 10:164 and 15:429. 
112 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah, 11:203, al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām (Dār al-ʿIlm li’l-Malāyīn, 2002), 2:234. 
For the Maḥāmilians, see the previous section.  
113 The author of al-Mustakhraj ʿala al-Ṣaḥīḥ and according to Brown, a rationalist muḥaddith. See: 
Canonization, 109. 
114 See the previous Hilāl al-Muʾaddib. 
115 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad; his sessions took place at the Mosque of al-Raṣāfah, TMS, 
2:213. 
116 Ibid, 6:24. 
117 al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 1:211. Al-Arbaʿūn is published. The second book is on gentilics. See Chapter Six. 
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7. al-Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad, Abū ʿAlī ibn Shādhān (426/1035), a luminary well-
versed in the method of Ashʿarī kalām.118 Al-Khaṭīb assumably attached 
himself to this teacher for a lengthy period of time, using the nostalgic 
phrase ‘the days of Ibn Shādhān’ when referring to old days. 
These biographies reveal that al-Khaṭīb’s mention of the above personages 
as qudamāʾ shuyūkhinā (our veteran teachers) referred to their role in providing 
superior isnāds back to the past eminent notables. They included him in the best 
ḥamalah network in addition to conveying to him the theological, legal and taṣawwuf 
tradition of Baghdād.119 
1.7.2 Personages Whom Were Perceived as Influential Professors 
1. Abū Bakr al-Barqānī (425/1034), a leading jurist and ḥāfiẓ who was also a 
student of al-Dāraquṭnī.120 He was the most intimate master to al-Khaṭīb who 
trained him in the Ṣaḥīḥayn principles. His work al-Mustakhraj al-Ṣaḥīḥ 
denotes his involvement in the Ṣaḥīḥayn Network.121 
2. Abū Ḥāzim al-ʿAbduwiyyī al-Naysābūrī (417/1026), the chief ḥāfiẓ of 
Khurasān and a Shāfiʿī reference.122 Al-Khaṭīb learned from his students in 
Baghdād and later directly taught by him in Nishapur.123 Al-ʿAbduwiyy 
reported Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s (324/935) statement, ‘Bear witness upon 
me, I do not accuse of unbelief anyone who belongs to this qiblah (Muslims), 
                                                        
118TMS, 8:223, TIM, 9:406.  
119 For ḥamalah, see Chapter Four. 
120 TMS, 6:27, Siyar, 17:464.   
121 See the format of his takhrīj and its relation to the Ṣaḥīḥayn network in: Brown, Canonization, 218. 
See next chapter for al-Khaṭīb’s commentary on al-Barqānī. 
122 Ibn Kathīr, Ṭabaqāt, 375. 




because they all point out to the same One God. Verily, their differences are 
merely in expressions.’124 
3. Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī, Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh (430/1039), the chief ḥāfiẓ of 
Iṣfahān and Ṣūfī author.125 Abū Nuʿaym and Abū Ḥāzim were lauded by al-
Khaṭīb as the only two towering ḥāfiẓ he had seen, indicating his thought on 
the supremacy of the Shāfiʿīs and the Ashʿarīs in ḥadīth.   
4. Abū’l-Qāsim Ibn al-Sawādī al-Azharī (435/1044).126 Al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ 
(643/1246) included him in his Ṭabaqāt of the Shāfiʿī jurists. He was followed 
by Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (771/1370).127 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ highlighted that Tārīkh 
Baghdād is replete with accounts and anecdotes on the authority of al-Azharī, 
reflecting the professor’s influence on al-Khaṭīb. 
5. Abū’l-Qāsim ʿAlī ibn al-Muḥsin al-Tanūkhī (447/1055),128 a grandson of the 
famous Muʿtazilī judge ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad who possessed immense 
knowledge in Muʿtazilī theology, logic, architecture, astronomical science 
and poetry.129 He was associated with Shiʿism and Muʿtazilism.130 Al-Ḥamawī 
                                                        
124 Ibn ʿAsākir, Tabyīn, 148-149. 
125 TIM, 9:468, See: Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ wa Ṭabaqāt al-Aṣfiyāʾ (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1996), 
Cristopher Melchert, “Abū Nuʿaym's Sources for Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ, Ṣūfī and Traditionalist,” in Les 
maîtres soufis et leurs disciples des IIIe-Ve siècles de l'Hégire (IXe-XIe), eds. Geneviève Gobillot et al 
(Beyrouth: Presses de l’Ifpo, 2012), 145-159. According to Ibn Ṭāhir, al-Khaṭīb did not include Abū 
Nuʿaym in  his Tārīkh Baghdād to avoid criticising the teacher on the subject of Juzʾ Ibn ʿĀṣim. See: al-
Manthūrāt, 22-24 and the next chapter. 
126 TMS, 12:120. 
127 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Ṭabaqāt, 2:583, al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 5:232. 
128 TMS, 13:604. 
129 For the biography of the grandfather, al-Qāḍī ʿAlī, see: TIM, 7: 783-784. Also: Julia Bray, “Practical 
Muʿtazilism, The Case of al-Tanūkhī,” in ʿAbbasid studies: Occasional papers of the School of ʿstudies Studies, 
Cambridge ... 2002 (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 111-126. 
130 al-Dhahabī, Mīzān al-Iʿtidāl fī Naqd al-Rijāl (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1963), 3:152. 
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narrated that al-Khaṭīb and al-Ṣūrī131 used to stay overnight at the house of 
al-Tanūkhī.132  
1.7.3 Other Connections 
1. al-Qāsim ibn Jaʿfar, Abū ʿUmar al-Hāshimī al-Baṣrī (414/1023), a Shāfiʿī judge. 
Abū ʿUmar received Sunan Abū Dāwūd from Abū ʿAlī al-Luʾluʾī, from the 
author himself.133 He was the transmitter of the work to al-Khaṭīb. 
2. Ismāʿīl ibn Aḥmad al-Ḥīrī (post 430/1039), a Shāfiʿī scholar. Ismāʿīl acquired 
the aural edition of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī from al-Kushmayhanī (389/999), who 
had learned it from Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Farabrī (320/932), a student of 
al-Bukhārī (256/870).134 Al-Khaṭīb’s recapitulative recitation of Ṣaḥīḥ al-
Bukhārī before Ismāʿīl in just three consecutive sittings was regarded as the 
fastest ever in history.135 
3. Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Ṭayyib, Abū’l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (436/1044), a 
Muʿtazilī judge and an expert on uṣūl and kalām. His works include al-
Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh.136 
4. Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṣūrī (441/1050), a ḥadīth luminary 
being the link between al-Khaṭīb and the Egyptian al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd al-Ghaniyy 
ibn Saʿīd al-Azdī (409/1019) and al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Jumayʿ of Ṣaydā (402/1012).137 
Al-Ṣūrī migrated to Baghdād in 418 AH/1027 CE and al-Khaṭīb admitted that 
al-Ṣūrī was extremely scrupulous in his evaluation of narrators. His close 
                                                        
131 See below. 
132 HMDB, 4:1845-1846. 
133 Abū Dāwūd al-Sajistānī, al-Sunan (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Rayyān, 1998), 33. See Chapter Two. 
134 Biography of al-Kushmayhanī: TIM, 8:653 and al-Farabrī: 7:375. 
135 al-Dhahabī commented: ‘By God, it was never reported a faster reading than this one.’ See: Siyar, 
18:280. 
136 TMS, 4:168, al-Dhahabī, Mīzān, 3:655, Wael Hallaq, “A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise on Juridical 
Dialectic,” Muslim World 77 (1987): 197-206.  
137 TMS, 4:172, TIM, 9:630–632. 
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disciple, Abū’l-Ḥusayn ibn al-Ṭuyūrī (500/1107) asserted, ‘It was through al-
Ṣūrī that al-Khaṭīb received the knowledge of criticism of ḥadīth.’138 The 
present study suggests that this refers to the genre of taʿyīn al-rāwī, which al-
Dāraquṭnī and al-Ṣūrī had learned from al-Azdī’s pioneering works.139 
1.8 Major Life Events 
-- After returning from Isfahan, there was a period of twenty-two years where, apart 
from local efforts, no distant journey was recorded in Tārīkh. This period between 
423 AH/1032 CE and 445 AH/1054 CE has been suggested as the time when al-Khaṭīb 
devoted more attention to composition and writing books. 140 During his pilgrimage 
in the year 445 AH/1054 CE, al-Khaṭīb has already spoken of reading Tārīkh to the 
public.141 This period was also identified by some as the period of transition from 
Ḥanbalī to Shāfiʿī jurisprudence based on the idea that a leader of a funeral prayer 
adopting the same madhhab with the dead.142 
 
-- In the year 447 AH/1055 CE, al-Khaṭīb’s friend, ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥasan, Ibn al-Muslimah 
(450/1058) who became a minister for the ʿAbbāsid Caliph, al-Qāʾim bi Amri’l-Lāh, 
sought his opinion on a case involving the Jewish community where a fake 
                                                        
138 TIM, 9:629-630. Biography of Ibn al-Ṭuyūrī: 10:830. 
139 See Chapter Six. 
140 See Tārīkh for years: 423 AH, 3:613, 424 AH, 9:62, 425 AH, 6:26, 426 AH, 8:223, 427 AH, 2:625 (the 
demise of his close friend, Ibn al-Karajī), 428 AH, 2:215, 429 AH, 5:393, 430 AH, 6:61, 431 AH, 4:165, 432 
AH, 16:153, 433 AH, 6:233, 434 AH, 5:442, 435 AH, 12:120, 436 AH, 3:51, 437 AH, 3:51 (at the mosque of 
al-Manṣūr), 438 AH, 5:445, 439 AH, 8:453, 440 AH, 4:382, 441 AH, 4:172 (demise of al-Ṣūrī), 442 AH, 
4:383, 443 AH, 15:310, and 444 AH, 12:244. 
141 al-Muntaẓam, 16:134. 
142 al-Khaṭīb lost two of his intimate masters, al-Barqānī and Abū ʿAlī ibn Shādhān between 425 
AH/1034 CE and 426 AH/1035 CE. Despite being a Shāfiʿī, the funeral prayer for the former was led by 
a Ḥanbalī muftī, Abū ʿAlī ibn Abū Mūsā al-Hāshimī (428/1037). After three years, al-Hāshimī died and 
the funeral prayer was led by al-Khaṭīb, which does not reflect any legal affiliation likewise. 
However, it does show the venerated status of al-Khaṭīb for being an imām at the central mosque. 
See: TMS, 6:26, 8:22 and 2:215, Ibn-Abī-Yaʿlā, Ṭabaqāt, 3:335. 
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document was advanced in order to avoid the jizyah.143 Al-Khaṭīb’s success in 
addressing the case granted him an official task of examining narrations of all 
preachers, which occasioned the case of Ibn al-Qādisī of al-Barāthā.144 His 
reputation reached the Caliph himself, granting him a meeting at the royal palace 
and an official recognition.145 
 
-- As previously mentioned, due to the invasions of Baghdād by the Saljūqs and the 
execution of Ibn al-Muslimah, al-Khaṭīb left the city in the midst of Ṣafar of 451 
AH/1058 CE and was reportedly present in Damascus in Jumādā al-ʾŪlā of the same 
year.146 That instance bestowed on him a celebrated position at the Umayyad 
central mosque. He enjoyed great audience in his session, as reported by his 
student, al-Khaṭīb al-Tabrīzī (502/1109).147 However, he subsequently faced an 
accusation of being a Nāṣibī and he was saved from prosecution although expelled 
from Damascus,148 following an intercession by his ʿAlawī friend the judge, ʿAlī ibn 
                                                        
143 al-Sakhāwī reported that al-Khaṭīb managed to identify a flaw in the document and Ibn al-
Muslimah issued an accord refuting the quest of those people, which was signed by notable 
authorities namely Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī, Abū Naṣr ibn al-Ṣabbāgh (477/1085), Muḥammad ibn 
Muḥammad al-Bayḍāwī (498/1105), Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Dāmaghānī (478/1086) and others. See: al-
Sakhāwī, al-Iʿlān, 26. 
144 HMDB, 1:386, TFZ, 3:1141. Al-Khaṭīb recounted his disapproval of the activities of the Rāfiḍī Ibn al-
Qādisī at the Mosque of al-Barāthā. He eventually left to the eastern side, accused al-Khaṭīb as a 
Naṣibī and spread horrendous fabricated ḥadīth, reviling on the pious predecessors. TMS, 8:530. 
145 As depicted in the Caliph’s response to al-Khaṭīb’s request for an aural session with him. Due to 
the meeting, he was given permission to dictate at the Mosque of al-Manṣūr signed by the general 
director of the city information affairs. See: TDQ, 5:34, HMDB, 1:385. 
146 TMS, 6:396 and 4:179. 
147 Even though the caliph al-Qāʾim managed to reclaim the situation by the end of 451 AH/1058 CE, 
al-Khaṭīb remained in Damascus despite the fact that the city was under the administration of 
ʿUbaydites, the ally of the Faṭimids. The Shīʿī government seems to tolerate the civilians who adopted 
Sunnī doctrines. Al-Khaṭīb enjoyed the friendship of students of ḥadīth in Damascus as could be seen 
from the transmissions of his works. See: HMDB, 1:392, next chapter and Chapter Seven. 
148 He was accused of spreading anti Shīʿism propaganda by dictating the virtues of the Companions, 
particularly al-ʿAbbās and his descendants. Ibn ʿAsākir related that a person named al-Ḥusayn ibn 
ʿAlī, who was also known as al-Damanshī (491/1098), lodged a report to the general of the national 




Ibrāhīm ibn Abī al-Jinn (508/1115).149 He then left for Tyre and enjoyed the 
patronage of a member of Banī Abī ʿAqīl; Muḥammad Abū’l-Ḥasan, ʿIzz al-Dawlah.150 
After having the massive crowd surrounding him for three years, al-Khaṭīb finally 
returned to Baghdād in 462 AH/1070 CE and continued his classes with the Ashʿarīs 
and some Ḥanbalīs at Gate of Degrees Quarter.151 
 
-- Beginning in Ramaḍān 463 AH/1071 CE, al-Khaṭīb’s health worsened for three 
months. He bequeathed all his books to his student, Abū’l-Faḍl Ibn al-Khayrūn and 
made them a waqf (endowment). He distributed his wealth to fellows of ḥadīth, 
fellows of fiqh and the Ṣūfis. On Monday morning, 7th of Dhū-al-Ḥijjah, 463 AH/1071 
CE, al-Khaṭīb departed this life.152 The account on his funeral indicates his highly-
celebrated position among the Ṣūfīs of Baghdād. There were also dreams reported 
on his state in the afterlife.153 
Conclusion 
 Al-Khaṭīb’s biography and connections are certainly beyond the description 
of these pages. However, this chapter has adequately shown that al-Khaṭīb has been 
                                                        
149 See Chapter Two. 
150 ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī, Tārīkh Ṭarablus al-Siyāsī wa’l-Ḥaḍārī ʿabra al-ʿUṣūr (Lubnan: Maṭābiʿ Dār al-
Bilād, 1978), 350, and “Usrat Banī Abī ʿAqīl fī Madīnat al-Ṣūr,” Majallah Tārīkh al-ʿArab wa al-ʿĀlam 16 
(1980): 9-18. See also: Ibn al-Dumyāṭī, al-Mustafād, 18:45. 
151 It is a sacrosanct place of asylum (ḥarīm) where Ibn ʿAqīl lived in exile. George Makdisi, Ibn ʿAqīl: 
Religion and Culture in Classical Islam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1997), 3. Ibn ʿAqīl spoke of 
some Ḥanbalīs who forbade people from learning from scholars deemed as heretics. See Chapter 
Seven. 
152 Ibn al-Akfānī, Dhayl, 33, al-Dhahabī, Duwal al-Islām, 1:398. 
153 The funeral prayer was led by the jurist Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī and he was buried nearby the grave 
of the prominent Ṣūfī, Bishr al-Ḥāfī as he requested afore, albeit after a conflict on the grave spot. 
The spot was reserved earlier by Abū Bakr Aḥmad Ibn Zahrāʾ al-Ṭuraythīthī al-Ṣūfī. However, Ibn al-
Zahrāʾ’s friend Abū Saʿd Aḥmad ibn Muhammd ibn Dust al-Ṣūfī resolved the conflict after comparing 
his position to al-Khaṭīb with regards to Bishr al-Ḥāfī. Ibn Ḥanbal was also buried in the same 
graveyard, which for some Ḥanbalīs might indicate al-Khaṭīb’s real wish to be buried beside him. Abū 
Saʿd was the founder of Ribāṭ Shaykh al-Shuyūkh and the chief of Banu Dust al-Naysābūrī. On this Ṣūfī 
family who brought Sufism from Nishapur to Baghdād, see: Ephrat, Learned Society, 169. Biography of 




associating himself with three major networks: (1) the network of Mukhtaṣar al-
Muzanī, which comprises of eminent Shāfiʿī jurists who produced taʿlīqāt and 
takhrījāt on the basis of al-Shāfiʿī’s legal hermeneutics, (2) the network of traditional 
ḥamalat al-ʿilm, whose members were of diverse affiliations and their main concern 
was transmitting traditional knowledge while cherishing the ethos of living and 
superior isnād, and (3) the network of the Ṣaḥīḥayn, which advanced the new ḥadīth 
authentication paradigm. His life also reveals intimate connections with the fuqarāʾ, 
zuhhād and Ṣūfīs, and the use of Ṣūfī lodges for meetings and classes by the jurists 
and fellows of ḥadīth. There was no indication that he became embroiled with 
philosophy although he was exposed to an intellectual discourse suffused with 
traditional kalām. Although he was initially trained as a jurist, his passion for 
genuineness and authenticity led him to immerse in ḥadīth study and transmission, 
an enterprise which might portray a person as a follower of Ibn Ḥanbal, the 
supreme persona in Baghdādian ḥadīth culture. Although the scholars may have 
perceived al-Khaṭīb as a student of al-Shāfiʿī, he considered the whole ḥadīth 
scholarship as the legacy of al-Shāfiʿī and engaged himself with the Shāfiʿīte 
doctrinal community locally and abroad. His intellectual endeavours indicate that 
he was preparing himself to be an independent scholar with original insights into 
the crux of ḥadīth scholarship; the history of transmitters and transmission beyond 
the sectarian borders. His main scholarship can be adequately appreciated only 













This chapter explores the intellectual legacy of al-Khaṭīb with reference to 
his literary oeuvre, which has not been extensively explored in modern 
scholarship.1 Modern treatment of catalogues in many libraries and the publication 
of discovered manuscripts have enabled this study to add a few titles, provide 
important revisions and delineate significant aspects germane to the 
epistemological shaping of his intellectual project. Al-Khaṭīb was a prolific author 
who possessed the undeniably strong passion in organising facts, scrutinising 
minute details, sourcing accounts and quotes, engaging with debates and concerns, 
and committing his knowledge to writings. His scrupulous character is illustrated in 
an account where he was reluctant to offer rash responses when asked for his 
views.2 Al-Khaṭīb produced 16,000 pages of manuscripts, which settled in 
approximately 400 folios, excluding the takhrījāt.3 As for the number of titles, Ibn al-
Najjār, the author of Dhayl Tārīkh Baghdād, who claimed to find a fihrist of al-Khaṭīb’s 
works, counted sixty-odd titles and copied the names of the extant among them for 
some of al-Khaṭīb’s works caught fire after his death.4 Recently, al-Māliki’s list of al-
                                                        
1 See: Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur (Leiden: Brill, 1943), 1:400-401, (Leiden: 
Brill, 1937, Supplementband), 1:562-563, ʿISH, 120. al-Ṭaḥḥān, al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb, 117, and al-ʿUmarī, 
Mawārid. 
The main primary sources for al-Khaṭīb’s works are Dhayl Tārīkh Baghdād of Abū Saʿd Ibn al-
Samʿānī, Dhayl Tārīkh Baghdād of Ibn al-Najjār, and the Fihrist of al-Mālikī. The first two are not extant. 
Abū Saʿd’s record, however, was copied by Ibn al-Jawzī (without attribution), and al-Dhahabī in three 
of his works. Ibn al-Najjār’s record was partly preserved by al-Dhahabī in Tadhkirat al-Huffāẓ (without 
attribution) and in Siyar (with attribution). Ibn al-Jawzī was furthermore copied by Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, 
and al-Dhahabī was later copied by al-Ṣafadī. Since the edition of some of these works requires 
further revisions, some slight differences will appear during comparison. See: al-Muntaẓam, 16:130, 
HMDB, 1:386, TIM, 10:180, Siyar, 18:289, TFZ, 3:1140, al-Ṣafadī, al-Wafayāt, 7:131. 
2 TIM, 10:184. 
3 Takhrīj is supplying a naked dictum (al-mujarrad) with an isnād or tracing an isnād-supported dictum 
(al-musnad) with its record in canonical collections for the purpose of legitimisation. Based on the 
semantic of the word, I will translate it as “retracement.” 
4 Ibid, 10:182. 
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Khaṭīb’s books was published revealing that by the time of migration to Damascus, 
there were already sixty-four titles authored by him.5  
2.1 Writing and Composition Styles 
 As tangential as they could be to the author’s main idea, superscriptions 
were often provided in most of al-Khaṭīb’s works. Their essential vocabularies 
reflect the relation between the human endeavour of seeking knowledge and God’s 
providence, namely ifḍāl (advancement), tawfīq (agreement), ʿawn (assistance), inʿām 
(bestowal), irshād (guidance), hadā (direct), ʿallama (teach), manna (give), alhama 
(inspire) and ḥiyāṭa (encompassing care).6 Generally, they are written in a 
rhythmical style, which illustrates the unique character of al-Khaṭīb in intellectual 
treatises.7 Compared to the ḥadīth theorist al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī, al-Khaṭīb’s 
writings are more replete with rhythmical phrases and exquisite words, whether in 
titles, superscriptions, subtitles or some passages of the content.8  
Al-Khaṭīb presented himself as a loyal transmitter of words where one will 
frequently encounter phrases such as “according to the wording of so-and-so (wa al-
lafẓ li fulān)” when various accounts of an event are related.9 In many cases, 
especially concerning the biographical accounts, he dissociated himself from being 
responsible for inciteful content by pronouncing, “according to what we have been 
told (ʿalā mā ruwiya lanā).”10 Hence, the frequent use of passive form such as 
“ruwiya” and the likes in his works should be treated with extreme care in 
extrapolating and attributing any view and stance to al-Khaṭīb. 
                                                        
5 My re-edition of the manuscript counts 65 titles. The numbering below will follow my own edition.  
6 See Chapter Three. 
7 This is important in reading or figuring the way to read al-Khaṭīb’s texts. 
8 Some biographical entries reflect his comparative evaluation of poets and belletrists. See for 
instance: TMS, 4:227 (al-Marzubānī is better than al-Jāḥiẓ).  
9 He precisely distinguished between haddathanā (we have been informed by him in a face-to-face 
session) and akhbaranā (we have been informed by him, usually through ijāzah). See his criticism of 
Abū Nuʿaym concerning the narration of Juzʾ Ibn ʿĀṣim and Ibn Ḥajar’s justification in: Ibn Ḥajar, Lisān 
al-Mīzān (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah, 2002), 1:507.   
10 TMS, 14:63. 
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 At the heart of his authorship is his ability to organise traditions in various 
ways; viz. topic-based and narrator-based.11 Moreover, these traditions were 
supported by his own isnāds despite being already recorded in “canonical ḥadīth 
collections” available in his possession. In Tārīkh Baghdād alone, Khaldūn al-Aḥdab 
successfully proved the huge amount of his additional chains and their unique 
significance (zawāʾid).12 Whenever it is possible, al-Khaṭīb will provide numerous 
strands of transmission even for one single tradition and subsequently offer his 
evaluation. The modern science of takhrīj has enabled us to trace al-Khaṭīb’s sources 
from these chains of narration. His acquisition of immense sources was later 
manifested in various genres of his works through compilation, intikhāb al-fawāʾid13 
and takhrīj. This study arranges those works according to the following sections and 
themes: 
2.2 Fundamentals of Sunnī Epistemology 
(01-01) Bayān Ahl al-Darajāt al-ʿUlā.14 
This work apparently explains the prophetic tradition concerning the 
members of the loftiest ranks in the hereafter, among other the Caliphs Abū Bakr 
and ʿUmar. It explains the aim of epistemological endeavour in Sunnī tradition, 
which is exemplified in the darajāt paradigm.15  
                                                        
11 See Chapter Four.  
12 See: Khaldūn al-Aḥdab, Zawāʾid Tārīkh Baghdād ʿalā al-Kutub al-Sittah (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam). 
Zawāʾid concerns significant addition made by a muḥaddith either in isnād or matn on a specific ḥadīth 
collection, often the two ṣaḥīḥs. 
13 The genre of fawāʾid concerns treatises that extract (intikhāb) traditions of a muḥaddith, which seem 
to contribute additional information. The editor of al-Mihrawāniyyāt remarked that he had come 
across 181 compositions in this genre, whilst there are another 277 titles, which he had not yet 
discovered. This amounts to a total of 458 works. One will frequently find in these works phrases 
such as “This is a rare narration. We have never seen such a narration except through the report of 
so-and-so from so-and-so.” See below for al-Mihrawāniyyāt. 
14 Tasmiyah, (47). al-Khaṭīb recorded the tradition of al-darajāt al-ʿulā in several places in his works. 
See: TMS, 4:318, 5:103, 12:331, 13:616, and Muwaḍḍiḥ, 2:332. In another place, he reported a tradition 
that relates it to knowledge. It reads: ‘Knowledge is gained through learning ... three acts that will 
dislodge a person from al-darajāt al-ʿulā …’ TMS, 6:442. 
15 See Chapter Four. The tradition was reported on the authority of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī, that the 




(02-02) Sharaf Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth.16 
 The treatise was composed as a refutation to transgressive theologians, yet 
implicitly carries an invitation for fellow traditionists to embrace a higher level of 
ḥadīth criticism and to pay adequate attention towards the study of aspects of 
meaning. The concept of “ḥadīth” was expanded broadly to represent faithful 
traditional learning methodology and to triumph over the method of ahl al-ʿadl wa 
al-tawḥid who were previously venerated by the Baṣran Muʿtazilī Abū ʿUthmān al-
Jāḥiẓ (255/869) as ashrāf ahl al-ḥikmah (noble fellows of wisdom). The treatise was 
meant as a preliminary reading before the following work. 
(03-03) al-Jāmiʿ, li Akhlāq al-Rāwī wa Ādāb al-Sāmiʿ.17 
This book is a sequel to the previous title and provides pedagogical and 
methodological advice for the attendees of circles of traditional learning. Although 
former ḥadīth scholars had already written chapters on the etiquette of learning 
ḥadīth; al-Khaṭīb’s work stands as the first in its detailed coverage of the subject. A 
thorough survey of the book reveals that it was arranged according to several major 
themes.18  
(04-04) al-Dalāʾil wa al-Shawāhid, ʿalā Ṣiḥḥat al-ʿAmal bi Khabar al-Wāḥid.19 
This is a compilation of indicative-texts from traditional sources on the 
validity of acts based on individual reports as adopted by traditional scholars.20 
                                                                                                                                                              
the eastern star or the western star that sets in the far horizon, due to their higher degrees.’ The Companions 
said, ‘Are those the prophets, O Messenger of Allah?’ He said: ‘No, by Him in Whose Hand is my soul, (they are) 
people who have faith in Allah and comply with His Messengers.’ 
16 (Ankara: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Sunnah). If a published book is based on several manuscripts, the present 
study will refrain from any further elaboration.  
17 (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Maʿārif, 1983). 
18 (1) Setting the right intention for learning and teaching ḥadīth, (2) the decorum of a novice auditor 
(sāmiʿ), (3) maintaining the relation between an auditor and an executive narrator (muḥaddith), (4) 
the technique of transcribing narrations, (5) the decorum of an executive narrator or scholar, (6) the 
etiquette of ḥadīth session and the post-session revision (7) the elucidation of the ultimate status of 
al-ḥifẓ (ḥadīth expertise) (8) a ḥafiẓ extensive transcription of narrations, (9) the elaboration on 
journey for seeking knowledge, (10) the guide for learning and memorisation, (11) the exposition on 
ḥadīth documentation and authorship, and (12) ending the professional career in ḥadīth mastership. 
19 Self-attribution: al-Kifāyah, 1:125, Tasmiyah, (17), al-Samʿānī (apud HMDB, 1:386), ʿISH, 127. 
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(05-05) Ṭalab al-ʿIlm Farīḍat ʿalā Kulli Muslim.21 
This is a study of the prophetic tradition concerning the obligation of 
seeking knowledge upon every Muslim.22 
(06-06) Ṭuruq Ḥadīth Qabḍ al-ʿIlm.23 
This is a study of the prophetic tradition concerning the status of traditional 
scholars as the true heirs of knowledge and the obligation of consulting the right 
scholars.24 
(07-07) Kitāb fīhi Ḥadīth Naḍḍara Allāh Imraʾan Samiʿa Minnā Ḥadīthā. 25 
 This is a treatise on the naḍrah (radiant self) tradition.26 
(08-08) Ḥadīth ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Samurah wa-Ṭuruquhu.27   
 This is a study of the prophetic tradition concerning the desire to seek 
leadership. In Kitāb al-Faqīh, al-Khaṭīb applies this tradition as a reminder for 
scholars against seeking a position to issue fatwā (legal responsa).28 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
20 See: G.H.A Juynboll, “Khabar al-Wāḥid” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, eds. P. Bearman et 
al (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 4:896. 
21 Tasmiyah, (49), ʿISH, 121. 
22 The tradition reads ‘Seeking knowledge is an obligation upon every Muslim.’ Later ḥadīth scholar, al-
Nawawī opined that the transmission of this tradition is unreliable, yet the meaning is true. Al-
Suyūṭī traced fifty strands of transmission for this tradition in an effort to refute al-Nawawī. 
Whether the seeking of knowledge is generally an obligation upon every individual or is it sufficient 
to seek it when required by an action. Al-Khaṭīb addressed this question in Iqtiḍāʾ al-ʿIlm al-ʿAmal. See: 
al-Suyūṭī, Juzʾ fīhi Ṭuruq Ḥadīth Ṭalab al-ʿIlm Farīḍah ʿalā Kulli Muslim (Amman: Dār ʿAmmār, 1998).  
23 Tasmiyah, (45) -three fasciculi, Ibn al-Najjār (apud TFZ, 3:1140), ʿISH, 121. 
24 The tradition reads: ‘Indeed, God does not take away knowledge by snatching it from the people, but He 
takes away knowledge by taking away the scholars, until there remains no scholar and the people take the 
ignorant as their guides.’ 
25 Tasmiyah, (50). 
26 See Chapter Four. 
27 Tasmiyah, (52), consisting of two fasciculi, ʿISH, 121. 
28 The tradition reads: ‘O ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, do not ask for leadership, for if you are given it after asking you will 




2.2.1 Valid Channels of Knowledge 
(09-09-i) Taqyīd al-ʿIlm.29 
In the work’s introduction, al-Khaṭīb was essentially attending to the subject 
of written materials as one of the two legitimate repositories for knowledge. Paul 
Heck studied this work in relation to the epistemological problem of writing in 
Islamic civilisation.30 The work is a counterpart to the following work, even though 
the latter addresses the acquisition of ḥadīth specifically, instead of ʿilm. 
(10-10-ii) al-Riḥlah fī Ṭalab al-Ḥadīth.31 
The work illustrates how the ‘hearts of men’ were admired as the primary 
repository of knowledge. Although the title suggests a treatment of journeys to 
collect or recollect ḥadīth from men, the theoretical and methodological exposition 
of riḥlah was furnished in the previous Jāmiʿ. This work, however, serves as a useful 
source in understanding the common culture of riḥlah in Islamic civilisation as 
reflected in stories and accounts presented by al-Khaṭīb. 
(11-11-iii) Ijāzat al-Majhūl wa al-Maʿdūm wa Taʿlīquhumā bi Sharṭ.32 
This short epistle treats the legitimacy of an ijāzah (permission for relation)33 
                                                        
29 (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Sunnah). 
30 Heck, Epistemological Problem … (cited earlier). 
31 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1975). 
32 (Cairo: Maktabah Ibn Taymiyyah, 1413/1992). In Tasmiyah, (63): wa’l-Muʿallaqah bi Sharṭ. The extant 
manuscripts: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, Col. 66 (155 – 159), Istanbul: Library of Sultan Ahmet III, 
Ref. No. 624/27 (251 alif – 252 bāʾ). See: Ramazan Şeşen, Mukhtārāt min al-Makhṭūṭāt al-ʿArabiyyah al-
Nādirah fī Turkiyā, 407. Transmission of this work in two strands; the mashriq line: al-Ḥusayn ibn Hibat 
Allah al-Dimashqī (626/1229); from al-Faḍl ibn Sahl al-Dimashqī -also known as al-Athīr al-Ḥalabī- 
(548/1153) who transmitted it and copied it from al-Khaṭīb. The maghrib line: Ibn Khayr al-Ishbīlī; 
from Ibn Waḍḍāḥ al-Qaysī (539/1145); from Yaḥyā ibn Ibrāhīm Abū Zakariyyā/Abū Bakr al-
Iskandarānī al-Mālikī (514/1120) at Alexandria in 511/1118; from al-Khaṭīb at the mahras (?) of Ibn 
Rajāʾ at Tyre. Al-Ishbīlī also reported that according to Ibn Bashkuwāl, this epistle was read in the 
circle of Ibn al-ʿArabī al-Mālikī and had been practised by his teacher ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Aḥmad al-
Kattānī (468/1076). See: al-Anṣārī al-Marrākishī, al-Dhayl wa’l-Takmilah (Tunis: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmi, 
2012), 4:74, al-Ishbīlī, Fihrist, 194 and 401. 
33 Ijāzah and majāz (in rhetoric) share the same root meaning, which reflects the transgressive mode 




when it was conferred by a head-narrator to an unidentified individual or group 
(majhūl), or given to the yet-to-be-born (maʿdūm), or conferred to them with a 
certain condition.34 The effective continuity in the transmission of knowledge is at 
stake. 
(12-12-iv) Irwāʾ al-Ẓamiyy, fī Tabkīr Simāʿ al-Ḥadīth li’l-Ṣabiyy.35 
 According to the editor, it is a republication of a section from one of al-
Khaṭīb’s works, possibly al-Jāmiʿ. It concerns the merit and validity of the 
transmission of an adult when a narration was received during the early childhood. 
(13-13) Kitāb al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih. 
The work stands as the epitome of al-Khaṭīb’s scholarship whose excellence, 
according to al-ʿUmarī, could only be challenged by Tārīkh Baghdād and al-Kifāyah. 
The uniqueness of this work on uṣūl, despite many treatises being composed in the 
field of legal principles, lies in the fact that it was authored through the lenses of a 
proficient scholar in the sciences of ḥadīth. Although Scott Lucas studied some 
aspects of the book, it was not intended to explore the broader dimensions of al-
Khaṭīb’s scholarship.36 This study discovered that the work was divided into several 
major themes.37  
(14-14) Naṣīḥat Ahl al-Ḥadīth.38  
This epistle is a republication of the section on the virtue of knowledge and 
scholarship of Kitāb al-Faqīh beginning from “wa-rasamtu fi hādha al-kitāb” until 
                                                                                                                                                              
connotations; (1) a permission to establish a relation in the chain with the executive narrator despite 
the gap between them, and (2) a permission to relate the tradition to a future audience. 
34 Teachers being quoted in this epistle reflected al-Khaṭīb’s reference to the four legal schools.  
35 Edited by Bashīr Ḍayf al-Jazāʾirī (Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2009).  
36 Scott Lucas, “The Legal Principles of Muḥammad B. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī and Their Relationship to 
Classical Salafi Islam,” Islamic Law and Society 13:3 (2006): 289-324. 
37 Arrangement: (1) Twenty sections on al-faḍl wa al-fadīlat of fiqh and fuqahāʾ (2) A brief explanation 
on fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh (3) Three extensive chapters on Qurʾān, Sunnah and Ijmāʿ (4) Explanations on 
several disputed legal principles (5) Several sections on naẓar, jadal and ijtihād (6) A chapter on the 
virtue of knowledge and scholars (7) The decorum for the faqīh and the learner of fiqh, and (8) the 
etiquette of the muftī and the mustaftī. 
38 (Jordan: Maktabah al-Manār, 1988). 
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“inqaṭaʿa shammuhu abadan”. It strengthens the previous premise that Kitāb al-Faqīh 
was authored to construct an epistemological framework, rather than being a 
conclusive reference for legal studies. The term ahl al-ḥadīth here mainly refers to 
the students of riwāyāt and akhbār and the main concern of this epistle is to 
encourage them to study the basic sciences of meaning.  
(15-15) Masʾalat al-Iḥtijāj bi al-Shāfiʿī fīmā Usnida Ilayhi wa al-Radd ʿalā ‘l-Ṭāʿinīn bi ʿIẓami 
Jahlihim ʿalayhi.39 
The title translates “The Legitimacy of al-Shāfī’s Transmissions and Answering the 
Critics through Exposing Their Colossal Ignorance of His Status.” This epistle reflects al-
Khaṭīb’s struggle against critics from both sides: the rationalists and the 
traditionalists, who expressed their scepticism towards Shāfiʿism. Parts from his 
other work, Manāqib al-Shāfiʿī was included in this epistle.  
(16-16) Iqtiḍāʾ al-ʿIlm al-ʿAmal.40 
  The work posits action and performance as the corresponding part of 
intellectual endeavours through the enlistment of 201 statements found in ḥadīth 
and words of wisdom by scholars. It reflects the place of orthopraxy in Sunnī 
epistemology in addition to intellectual struggles. ʿAmal was illustrated as the route 
to the ultimate spiritual happiness in Islam.  
2.3 Facilitation of Intellectual Endeavour 
Al-Khaṭīb, being a littérateur, is an enthusiast of adab and poetry.41 Al-Khaṭīb 
was concerned with the psychology of students and the daunting nature of 
intellectual enterprise, particularly ḥadīth criticism. He entertained his audience 
with humourous anecdotes, occasionally found as well in the midst of works, which 
                                                        
39 (Saudi Arabia: Idārah al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1980). 
40 (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1984). The extant manuscripts: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, (257 
Adab), Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, (577 Tafsīr). The work was recited and copied before al-Khaṭīb 
by two of his students: Ibn al-Akfānī and Ibn Abū Yaʿlā. It was later circulated among the scholars of 
Damascus. 
41 See for the relation of the works with a particular notion of adab in: C. A. Nallino, La literature arabe 
des origins à l’époque de la dynastie umayyade, trans. Charles Pellat (Paris: Maisonnneuve, 1950), 7-28. 
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are not dedicated for this purpose.42 The mixture of information, entertainment, 
indirect linguistic instruction and a concern with proper conduct in social affairs 
placed his works as an excellent handicraft of adab literature. They include: 
(17-01) Juzʾ fīhi Khuṭbat ʿĀʾishah fī Dhikr Abīhā wa ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, takhrīj al-Imām 
Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb.43  
The primary work was authored by the linguist Abū Bakr ibn al-Anbārī 
(328/940). He recorded exquisite speeches attributed to ʿĀʾishah in describing and 
defending her father, the caliph Abū Bakr and the second caliph, ʿUmar. Ibn al-
Anbārī provided a commentary on this speech and explained nearly fifty peculiar 
words and expressions used by ʿĀʾishah. Al-Khaṭīb supplied the speech with isnāds 
from him to ʿĀʾishah.44 It is possible that some supplementary commentary by al-
Khaṭīb had also been attached to the work. 
(18-02) al-Bukhalāʾ.45 
The book treats the subject of parsimoniousness and presents entertaining 
accounts of incidents where misers were involved. Malti-Douglas provided a literary 
analysis on this work and concluded striking differences between the work of al-
Khaṭīb and the one prior to him authored by al-Jāḥiẓ.46 Linear progression, 
organisation, precedence of religious materials, and ethico-moral significance are 
among other characteristics she attributed to al-Khaṭīb’s craft.47 
 
 
                                                        
42 See the story of a father who envied his son in: al-Jāmiʿ, 2:139. 
43 al-Ishbīlī, Fihrist, 228 (282). Ibn al-Anbārī, Sharḥ Khuṭbat ʿĀʾishah Umm al-Muʾminīn fī Abīhā 
(Damascus: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī, 1962). This work was present in the library of al-Khaṭīb. His students, 
Abū’l-Faḍl Ibn Khayrūn and IbnʿAbd al-Bāqī, transmitted al-Khaṭīb’s work. 
44 al-Ishbīlī, Fihrist, 212(253). 
45 (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2000). 
46 Fedwa Malti-Douglas, “Humor and Structure in Two “Buḫalāʾ” Anecdotes: al-Ǧāḥiẓ and al-Haṭīb al-
Baġdādī,” Arabica 27:3 (1980): 300-323. 






(19-03) al-Taṭfīl wa Ḥikāyāt al-Ṭufayliyyīn wa Akhbāruhum wa Nawādir Kalāmihim wa 
Ashʿārihim.48 
This work deals with pithy accounts about freeloaders.49 As Malti-Douglas 
observed, it is a common practice of those who review the previous subject to adopt 
their works with this subject. Regarding al-Khaṭīb’s intellectual character, this 
serves as another mark of his practice of moderation between two opposing sides.50  
(20-04) al-Tanbīh wa al-Tawqīf, ʿalā Faḍāʾil al-Kharīf. 51 
It is possibly a literary treatise concerning the virtues and wonders of 
autumn. The praise of Baghdād’s variety of fruits, which harboured the market 
especially during the autumn was boasted in a statement reported by al-Khaṭīb in 
Tārīkh.52 
2.4 The Study of Taʿyīn al-Rāwī.53 
There are twelve titles related to this area of study (thematically arranged): 
(21-01) al-Asmāʾ al-Mubhamah, fī al-Anbāʾ al-Muḥkamah.54 
(22-02) al-Mukmal, fī Bayān al-Muhmal.55  
                                                        
48 (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm). 
49 Fedwa Malti-Douglas, “Structure and Organization in a Monographic Adab Work: al-Taṭfīl of al-
Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 40:3 (1981): 227-245. See selections from this work 
in: Emily Selove, Selections from the Art of Party-Crashing in Medieval Iraq (Syracuse University Press, 
2013). 
50 See: Malti-Douglas, Humor and Structure. 
51 al-Samʿānī, Dhayl (apud HMDB, 1:387).  
52 TMS, 1:354. 
53 See Chapter Six. 
54 (Cairo: Maktabah al-Khānijī, 1997). 
55 Tasmiyah, (9) and al-Samʿānī (apud TIM, 10:181) both mentioned eight fasciculi. In TFZ, 3:1139, al-




(23-03) al-Asmāʾ al-Mutawāṭiʾah, wa al-Ansāb al-Mutakāfiʾah.56 
(24-04) Man Wāfaqat Kunyatuhu Isma Abīhi min-mā lā Yuʾman Wuqūʿ al-Khaṭaʾ fīhi.57 
(25-05) Ghunyat al-Multamis,58 ʾĪḍāḥ al-Multabis.59 
(26-06) al-Muʾtanif, Takmilat al-Muʾtalif wa al-Mukhtalif. 60 
(27-07) al-Muttafiq wa al-Muftariq.61 
(28-08) Talkhīṣ al-Mutashābih fī al-Rasm, wa Ḥimāyat mā Ashkala minhu ʿan Bawādir al-
Taṣḥīf wa al-Wahm.62 
(29-09) Tālī Talkhīṣ al-Mutashābih.63 
(30-10) Rāfiʿ al-Irtiyāb, fī al-Maqlūb min al-Asmāʾ wa al-Ansāb.64 
(31-11) al-Kitāb al-Muwaḍḍiḥ li65 Awhām al-Jamʿ wa al-Tafrīq.66 
(*1-12)67 Fawāʾid al-Nasab.68 
                                                                                                                                                              
excellence.’ See: al-Ishbīlī, Fihrist, 231 (292), ʿISH, 124. al-Suyūṭī named it al-Dhayl al-Mukmil fī al-
Muhmal. See: Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥuffāẓ, 434. 
56 Tasmiyah, (19). Also: ʿISH, 129. 
57 The original does not extant. It was attributed by al-Samʿānī -mentioning three fasciculi (apud TIM, 
10:181). Selection for this work was made by the Turkish scholar Mughalṭāy ibn Qalīj (762/1361) and 
published under the title Intikhāb-Kitāb-Man-Wāfaqat-Kunyatuhu-Isma-Abīhi-min-mā lā Yuʾman-Wuqūʿ-
al-Khaṭaʾ-fīhi (Kuwait: Jamʿiyyat Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth, 1988).  
58 al-Samʿānī named it Ghunyat al-Muqtabis as in: al-Muntaẓam, 16:130, HMDB, 1:386, and TFZ, 3:1140. 
The last part was spelled fī Tafsīr al-Multabis as in: Ismāʿīl Bāshā, Hadiyyat al-ʿĀrifīn (Beirut: Iḥyāʾ al-
Turāth, 1951), 1:79. Al-Khaṭīb named it al-Multamis as in: Mughalṭāy, Intikhāb, 111.  
59 (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 2001). It seems to be a summarised version. 
60 (PhD Diss., Islamic University of Madinah, 1433/2012), an unpublished dissertation. 
61 (Damascus: Dār al-Qādiri, 1997). 
62 (Damascus: Ṭilās, 1985). 
63 (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, 1997). 
64 Self-attribution: al-Asmāʾ-al-Mubhamah, 1:9, Muwaḍḍiḥ, 1:74, Talkhīs-al-Mutashābih, 1:487. Also: 
Tasmiyah, (11), al-Samʿānī (apud TFZ, 3:1140 -one volume, al-Ṣafadī, al-Wafayāt, 7:131, -12 fasciculi). 
65 See: al-Muttafiq-wa-al-Muftariq, 2:809, al-Kifāyah, 2:161, Mughalṭāy, Intikhāb, 115. 
66 (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif, 1959). 
67 * indicates a pseudo or uncertain attribution to al-Khaṭīb. All works preceded by this mark will not 
be considered as part of his works. 
60 
 
These titles represent al-Khaṭīb’s huge project in mapping the isnād-
identification system. For this reason, the elaboration of their contents and 
receptions will be presented in a separate chapter. 
2.5 History and Biography of Narrators and Scholars 
(32-01) Tārīkh Madīnat al-Salām. 
This is the renowned magnum opus of al-Khaṭīb concerning the history of 
ḥadīth in Baghdād.69 Al-Khaṭīb recorded the biographies of approximately five 
thousand narrators of ḥadīth from a total of 7831 biographies, which is 
alphabetically detailed in seventeen volumes of modern publication. The work 
begins with topographical descriptions of Baghdād and surrounding cities, before 
the biographical entries. A detailed analysis of this work is beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
(33-02) Manāqib Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. 70 
This is a treatise on the virtues of Ibn Ḥanbal. Most of the content was 
preserved in Manāqib Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal by Ibn al-Jawzī.71 
(34-03) Manāqib al-Shāfiʿī.72 
This is a treatise on the virtues of al-Shāfiʿī. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
68 The last title, however, was found only in the printed Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ. It was copied by a number 
of modern scholars, but it is most probably a distortion of another title, Fawāʾid Abū’l-Qāsim al-Nasīb. 
See: TFZ, 3:241. See below for the other work. 
69 Brockelmann, GAL, 1:401. See: Georges Salmon, L'introduction topographique à l'histoire de Bagdâdh 
d’Aboû Bakr Aḥmad ibn Thâbit al-Khatib al-Bagdâdhî, an introduction to Tārīkh Baghdād in 300 pages. 
Also: Guy Le Strange, “A Greek Embassy to Baghdād in 917 A.D., translated from the Arabic MS of al-
Khaṭīb, in the British Museum Library,” The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 
3 (1897): 35-45. 
70 Self-attribution: TMS, 6:103. 
71 Edited and translated by Michael Cooperson. No study was provided on the sources of the book. A 
brief study of the book shows that 16% of the first ten chapters (26 out of 164 accounts) are reported 
via al-Khaṭīb, excluding the list of teachers. 
72 The extant manuscripts: Istanbul: Haci Selim Aga Library, 538/3 (193 bāʾ - 203 alif), Istanbul: Murat 




(35-04) Akhbār Man Ḥaddatha wa Nasiya.73 
The work gathers names of notable tradents who transmitted tradition to a 
certain receiver, but overlooked the latter or their former meeting. The work has its 
implicit aim of addressing the Ḥanafīs’ rejection of certain narrations with such 
character.74 Al-Khaṭīb was identified as the second person to compose on the 
subject after al-Dāraquṭnī.75  
(36-05) Taʿlīq al-Khaṭīb ʿalā Suʾālāt al-Barqānī fī al-Jarḥ wa al-Taʿdīl.76 
The work consists of al-Khaṭīb’s commentary on al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Barqānī’s 
inquisitive conversation with al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Dāraquṭnī concerning the impugnment 
and validation of narrators.  
(*2-06) Tārīkh al-Anbiyāʾ 
 This work concerns the history of Prophets. However, the attribution of this 
work to al-Khaṭīb is highly doubted as studied by Asyā Kulaybān.77 
(*3-07) al-Wafayāt. 
 No related information was found.78 The title suggests a work in listing the 
dates of the demise of narrators. 
                                                        
73 al-Khaṭīb’s work was summarised by al-Suyūṭī with the title Tadhkirat al-Muʾtasī fī Man Haddatha Wa 
Nasī (Kuwait: al-Dār al-Salafiyyah, 1984), and it was the only extant work in the subject. Al-Suyūṭī’s 
abbreviation consists of 37 cases of memory lapse, denouncement and unrecalled meeting. The cover 
should have mentioned that it is an abridged version of al-Khaṭīb’s work. 
74 al-Kifāyah, 2:178. 
75 al-Dāraquṭnī’s work does not extant. 
76 The extant manuscript: Istanbul: Library of Sultan Aḥmet III, 624/14 (116 alif – 119 alif). See: Şeşen, 
Mukhtārāt, 407. 
77 Asyā Kulaybān, ed. Tārīkh al-Anbiyāʾ (ascribed to al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī), (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyyah, 2004). 




2.6 Titles Germane to the Order, Continuity or Superiority in Isnād 
2.6.1 Avoiding assumptions of accidental switches 
(37-01) Riwāyat al-Ābāʾ ʿan al-Abnāʾ.79 
(38-02) Riwāyāt al-Ṣaḥābah ʿan al-Tābiʿīn.80 
These titles review unusual narrations by earlier figures from later figures. 
The first discusses narration by parents from offspring, and the second reviews 
narrations by the Companions from the Followers. Adam Mez regarded these two 
works as a reflection of high subtlety in ḥadīth technical criticism.81 
2.6.2 Avoiding assumptions of error due to inferior narration 
(39-03) Ḥadīth al-Sittah min al-Tābiʿīn wa Dhikr Ṭuruqihi, wa-huwa Ḥadīth Ayaʿjizu 
Aḥadukum an Yaqra’a Kulla Laylah bi Thuluth al-Qurʾān.82  
Al-Khaṭīb analysed in this work various conflicting strands in the 
transmission of six Followers from one another, namely Manṣūr ibn al-Muʿtamir 
(132/750),83 Hilāl ibn Yasāf (between 91-100/710-719),84 al-Rabīʿ ibn Khuthaym (61 
or 63/681 or 683),85 ʿAmr ibn Maymūn al-Awdī (74/694),86 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī 
Laylā (83/702),87 and an Anṣārian woman whose name was not mentioned.  
                                                        
79 Self-attribution: TMS, 3:97, and 16:403, al-Asmāʾ al-Mubhamah, 2:151. Also: al-Samʿānī (apud TIM, 
10:181 -one fasciculus).  
80 al-Samʿānī, op. cit. 
81 Adam Mez, The Renaissance of Islam, trans. Salahuddin Bakhsh (India: Kitāb Bhavan, 1995), 251. 
82 (Ahsāʾ: Dār Fawāz, 1412/1991). 
83 Siyar, 5:402. 
84 Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-Niẓāmiyyah, 1909) 11:86. 
85 Ibid, 3:242. 
86 Ibid, 8:109. 
87 Ibid, 6:260 
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2.6.3 Avoiding assumptions of accidental slip or addition 
(40-04) al-Sābiq wa al-Lāḥiq fī Tabāʿud Ma Bayna Wafātay Rāwiyayn ʿan Shaykh Wāḥid.88 
The title translates The Early and the Late; Cases of Far Distance between the Years 
of Demise of Two Students Who Both Relate from the Same Teacher. The gap might suggest 
a missing link although it is not the case. Al-Khaṭīb was the first to compose on this 
subject.89  
(41-05) Tamyīz al-Mazīd fī Muttaṣil al-Asānīd.90 
Its subject concerns interpolation of a trustworthy narrator in an already 
unbroken chain of transmission. 
2.7 Phenomena Germane to the Soundness of Riwāyah 
(42-01) al-Tafṣīl li Mubham al-Marāsīl.91 
 It is not clear whether the book addresses the subject of mursal in general or 
a certain type of mursal, particulary al-mursal al-mubham (conceived discontinuity).92 
Al-ʿAlāʾī (761/1359) in his extensive study on the narrators of mursal, he asserted that 
the composition in the subject of hidden mursal could only be done by an expert 
with acquisition of extremely vast materials.93 
                                                        
88 (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, 2000) 
89 For the subject of The Early and The Late, see Ibn al-Ṣalāh’s work in: Eerik Dickinson, trans., An 
Introduction to the Science of Ḥadīth (Garnet Publishing, 2006), 235. 
90 Self-attribution: Muwaḍḍiḥ, 1:294. Al-Mālikī recorded a title Bayān Ḥukm al-Mazīd fī Muttaṣil al-
Asānīd. It could be a different treatise concerning the theoretical discussion on the subject while the 
one here compiles cases of such character. 
91 Self-attribution: Talkhīṣ al-Mutashābih, 1:302. A summary made by al-Nawāwī is extant at Escorial, 
Collection (1589). 
92 The excerpts suggest that it is a work on al-mursal al-mubham where a narrator used certain terms 
that entail direct audition or receipt of a narration from a contemporary whereas he only received it 
through indirect medium such as written correspondence. Hence, the irsāl (unlinked forward) is 
obscured (mubham). Later, the term al-mursal al-khafiyy (hidden mursal) was relatively agreed.  See: 
Ḥātim al-ʿAwnī, al-Mursal al-Khafiy wa-ʿAlāqatuhu bi’l-Tadlīs (Riyadh: Dār al-Hijrah, 1997). 
93 Abū Saʿīd al-ʿAlāʾī, Jāmiʿ al-Taḥṣīl fī Aḥkām al-Marāsīl, (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1986), 125.   
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(43-02) al-Tabyīn li Asmāʾ al-Mudallisīn.94 
 The title suggests a list of ḥadīth narrators who exercised the obfuscation 
(tadlīs) of sources or transmission modes for a certain reason to the extent that it 
resembles a kind of deception. 
(44-03) al-Faṣl li al-Waṣl al-Mudraj fī al-Naql.95 
This is the first dedicated work on the subject of interpolation in the isnād 
and/or matan of ḥadīth, which reflects an application of both sanad and matan 
criticism. Al-Ishbīlī stated: This book has no match in its excellence.96 The content 
will be further elaborated in future chapters. 
2.8 The Principles of Ḥadīth Criticism 
(45-01) Bayān Ḥukm al-Mazīd fī Muttaṣil al-Asānīd.97 
(46-02) al-Kifāyah fī Maʿrifat Uṣūl ʿIlm al-Riwāyah. 
This book is the culmination of al-Khaṭīb’s research on the principles of 
takhrīj and sciences of transmission. Eerik Dickinson and Scott Lucas both have 
pointed out the pivotal role of this work in the development of ḥadīth criticism.98 
This is seconded by the fact that Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ quoted from it more than seventy 
times in his ḥadīth curriculum, Maʿrifat-Anwaʿ ʿUlūm al-Ḥadīth, whilst he quoted less 
than fifteen times from Ibn Khallād al-Rāmhurmuzī (360/970) and less than fifty 
                                                        
94 Self-attribution: al-Kifāyah, 2:144. 
95 (Riyadh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1997). It was transmitted from al-Khaṭīb’s student Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-
Miṣṣīṣī al-Dimashqī (516/1122), the teacher of Ibn ʿAsākir. From this line, it reached figures such as 
Abū Ṭāhir al-Silafī (576/1181) and ʿAbd Allāh Abū Muḥammad al-Fāriqī (703/1304), a professor at Dār 
al-Ḥadīth in Damascus. This is the mashriq line). As for the maghrib line, his student, Abū’l-Walīd al-
Bājī, transmitted it (474/1082). Through him, it reached figures such as Ibn Khayr al-Ishbīlī 
(575/1180) and al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ ibn Mūsā al-Yaḥṣubī (544/1150). See: al-Waṣl al-Mudraj, 1:98-105, Ibn 
ʿAsākir, Muʿjam Ibn ʿAsākir (Damascus: Dār al-Bashāʾir, 2000), 2:989, TIM, 11:266.  
96 al-Ishbīlī, Fihrist, 231 (292) 
97 Tasmiyah, (16), ʿISH, 123. See above: Tamyīz al-Mazīd fī Muttaṣil al-Asānīd. 
98 Dickinson, Introduction, 190 fn6. Scott Lucas, Constructive Critics, Ḥadīth Literature and the Articulation 
of Sunnī Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 27.  
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times from al-Ḥākim of Nishapur.99  
(*4-03) Ajwibat al-Masāʾil.100 
 Alleged to be responses to questions pertaining to science of ḥadīth. 
2.9 The Study of Fiqh or Disputed Traditions 
(*5) The first reference to al-Khaṭīb’s involvement in the writing of fiqh was his 
exercise of the taʿlīqah tradition under Ibn al-Maḥāmilī.101 However, no biographer 
speaks about this taʿlīqah and no information was found pertaining to its completion 
or publication. The following works are arranged according to the common order of 
subtopics in fiqh works around al-Khaṭīb’s time. 
(47-01) al-Wuḍūʾ min Mass al-Dhakar.102  
 Al-Qudūrī reported a dispute between the Ḥanafīs and the Shāfiʿīs under a 
section with the same title in al-Tajrīd.103 Al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī (494/1101), a Zaydite 
Muʿtazilite scholar expressed that aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth fabricated the tradition of Busrah 
bint Ṣafwān to support their doctrinal position.104 This shows that the term aṣḥāb al-
ḥadīth refers specifically to the Shāfiʿites. Al-Khaṭīb had listed some of the related 
traditions and discussed them in his work on al-Mudraj.105    
                                                        
99 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s work was more popularly recognised as Muqaddamah. For the study and translation 
of the work, and al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar’s mention of al-Rāmhurmuzī, al-Ḥākim and al-Khaṭīb, see: Eerik 
Dickinson, Introduction, xiii-xiv.  
100 It was attributed loosely by Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, however, was refuted by al-Ḥāfiẓ al-ʿIrāqī saying that the 
same statement could be found in al-Kifāyah. See: Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Muqaddamah, 225, al-ʿIrāqī, al-Taqyīd, 
147. 
101 See Chapter One. 
102 Self-attribution: al-Waṣl al-Mudraj, 1:348, Tasmiyah, (31). 
103 al-Tajrīd (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2004), 1:180. 
104 It suggests that touching the genital necessitates an ablution. See: al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī, Jilāʾ al-
Abṣār fī Mutūn al-Akhbār (MSS. Princeton University, Yemeni Manuscript Digitization Initiative), 39-
40, http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/2r36tz81t, accessed July 15, 2016. For al-Jushamī, see: 
Suleiman Mourad, “Towards a reconstruction of the Muʿtazili tradition of Qurʾanic exegesis” in Aims, 
methods and contexts of Qur'anic exegesis (2nd/8th-9th/15th centuries), ed. Karen Bauer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 101-137. 
105 al-Waṣl al-Mudraj, 1:348. 
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(48-02) Ḥadīth Idhā Uqīmat al-Ṣalāt falā Ṣalāt illa al-Maktūbah.106 
 Al-Khaṭīb’s contemporary and the great Shāfiʿī reference in Merv, al-Qāḍī al-
Ḥusayn al-Marwarrūdhī (462/1069) asserted that this tradition of Abū Hurayrah 
supports al-Muzanī’s refutation against the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah.107 According to 
the Shāfiʿīs, supererogatory prayer is annulled with the beginning of iqāmah (second 
call to prayer after adhān). The Ḥanafīs held that as long as one expects that one 
may still join the congregation without missing the obligatory prayer, one should 
perform the supererogatory prayer first.108 
(49-03) Ḥadith al-Imām Ḍāmin wa al-Muʾadhdhin Muʾtaman.109 
 It is difficult to identify the issue that is discussed in this book for there are 
several issues attached to this tradition. Ibn al-Jawzī reported a dispute over the 
status of maʾmūm’s (followers) prayer if the imām (leader) was not in the required 
state of purity. According to him, al-Shāfiʿī opined that the congregation never 
repeat their prayer save for the leader while Abū Ḥanifah opined that the whole 
congregation should repeat their prayer in whatever condition. The Ḥanbalīs were 
of the same opinion with the latter as long as the leader has yet completed the 
prayer and the tradition above was employed against al-Shāfiʿī.110   
(50-04) Nahj al-Ṣawāb, fī anna al-Tasmiyah Āyah min Fātihat al-Kitāb.111 
 Based on the responses against this work, it is clear that the aim of this work 
is to support the position of al-Shāfiʿī that the basmalah (Bismillah al-Raḥmān al-
Raḥīm) is attested as one of the seven verses of al-Fātiḥah, the first chapter in the 
                                                        
106 Tasmiyah, (48). The tradition reads ‘When the minor calling to the prayer was made, there is no prayer 
save the obligatory one.’  
107 al-Ḥusayn al-Marwarrūdhī, al-Taʿlīqah ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī (Makkah: Maktabah Nizār al-Bāz), 
2:980. 
108 As explained by al-Khaṭīb’s junior contemporary al-Sarakhsī in his commentary on Mukhtaṣār al-
Karkhī. See: al-Mabsūt (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1993), 1:167.  
109 Tasmiyah, (62), ʿISH, 121. 
110 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Taḥqīq fī Aḥādīth al-Khilāf (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1415), 1:487-488. 
111 Tasmiyah, (25), mentioning two fasciculi, al-Samʿānī (apud TFZ, 3:1140, -one fasciculus), Ibn al-
Jawzī, al-Taḥqīq, 1:345, and al-Muntaẓam. 
67 
 
Qurʾān. Ibn al-Jawzī wrote against both al-Dāraquṭnī and al-Khaṭīb on this subject 
upholding the view of the Ḥanbalīs.112  
(51-05) al-Jahr bi Bismillāh al-Raḥmān al-Raḥīm fī al-Ṣalāh.113 
 Similar to the above, this work reflected al-Khaṭīb’s support for the opinion 
of al-Shāfiʿī who maintains that recitation of basmalah before al-Fātiḥah must be 
made aloud in audible prayers. Al-Khaṭīb advanced a number of traditions 
concluding that this opinion was the practice of most Companions in Madinah after 
the Prophet time. The Ḥanbalī Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī (909/1503) wrote a refutation 
against this work entitled al-Radd ʿalā al-Khaṭīb fī Masʾalat al-Jahr bi l-Basmalah. 
(52-06) al-Qunūt wa al-Āthār al-Marwiyyah fīhi ʿalā Ikhtilāfihā wa Tartībuhā ʿalā Madhhab 
al-Shāfiʿī. 114 
Ibn al-Jawzī viewed this work as al-Khaṭīb’s fanatical attempt to defend the 
Shāfiʿīte position on the subject of al-qunūt (devout invocation) in the obligatory 
dawn prayer.115 
(53-07) al-Ghusl li’l-Jumʿah. 116 
 It is unclear what inspired this compilation. Al-Khaṭīb’s contemporary, the 
Mālikī Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (463/1071) asserted that except for the Ẓāhirīs, no scholar he 
knew opines that the bathing for Friday congregation is obligatory. They based 
their view on two traditions he mentioned in al-Istidhkār.117  
                                                        
112 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Taḥqīq, 1:345. 
113 The original does not extant. It was attributed by al-Samʿānī (apud HMDB, 1:387). See: Ibn al-Jawzī, 
al-Taḥqīq, 1:352, Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī al-Ḥanbalī, Tanqīḥ al-Taḥqīq (Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, 2007) 2:178, and 
al-Dhahabī, Mukhtaṣar al-Jahr bi al-Basmalah (Abu Dhabi: Baynūnah, 2003). 
114 Tasmiyah, (27), -three fasciculi, al-Samʿānī (apud HMDB, 1:387). 
115 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Taḥqīq, 1:464. 
116 Tasmiyah, (46), -two fasciculi, al-Samʿānī (apud HMDB, 1:387). 
117 Ibn-ʿAbd-al-Barr, al-Istidhkār (Damascus: Dār Qutaybah, 1993), 5:17. There is a minor dispute 
amongst the Ḥanafīs due to different statement made by Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī. Nevertheless, 
al-Qudūrī asserted that the bathing is supererogatory. Mukhtaṣar (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 





(54-08) Ṣalāt al-Tasbīḥ, wa al-Aḥādīth allatī Ruwiyat ʿan al-Nabiyy ṣalla Allāh ʿalayhi wa 
sallam fīhā, wa Ikhtilāf Alfāẓ al-Nāqilīn ʿalayhā. 
 The book concerns a type of supererogatory prayer known as ṣalāt al-tasbīḥ, 
whose legitimacy has been debated for a long time amongst scholars. The Shāfiʿīs 
Ibn al-Maḥāmilī and al-Qāḍī al-Ḥusayn al-Marwarrūdhī viewed that it is considered 
mustaḥabb (encouraged) although Ibn al-Maḥāmilī had asserted that the narration is 
not fully convincing.118 Later Shāfiʿīs such as al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Nawawī (676/1277) 
affirmed that it has no basis in the prophetic tradition, but hesitated on the final 
conclusion.119 Accounts related from Ibn Ḥanbal indicate that he affirms no 
authentic tradition to support the cause.120 Ibn al-Jawzī included most of related 
traditions in his work on apocryphal traditions.121 Al-Khaṭīb provided twenty-nine 
primary narrations for this prayer and the editor describes this treatise as the most 
comprehensive extant work that affirms the legitimacy of this prayer. 
(55-09) Juzʾ fīhi Ṭuruq Ḥadīth ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar ʿan al-Nabiyy fī Tarāʾi al-Hilāl, Takhrīj 
Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb.122 
The treatise studies the tradition of Ibn ʿUmar on determining the beginning 
and the end of fasting in Ramaḍān through the sighting of the moon and disputed 
reliance on the calculating method due to the ambiguous clause “fa-qdurū lahu” 
(limit vs. expand it).  It is closely connected to the issue of the doubtful date (yawm 
al-shakk), which follows the cloudy evening of 29th of Shaʿbān, as well as the reliance 
on one witness for the sighting.  Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr pointed out how this tradition was 
held as a proof to maintain Ibn Ḥanbal’s view on fasting on the doubtful day.123 
                                                        
118 Ibn al-Maḥāmilī, al-Lubāb, 145, al-Qāḍī al-Ḥusayn (apud Ibn Ḥajar, see below). 
119 For opinion of scholars see: Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Talkhīṣ al-Ḥabīr (Egypt: Qurṭubah, 1995), 2:14. 
He viewed that Ibn al-Jawzī transgressed in his judgment over the traditions when he included them 
in al-Mawḍūʿāt, a treatise on apocryphal traditions. 
120 ʿAbd Allāh al-Shaybānī, Masāʾil al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmi, 1981), 89. 
121 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Mawḍūʿāt (Madinah: al-Maktabah al-Salafiyyah, 1966), 2:143. 
122 (Egypt: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 1998) 
123 See below, next work. 
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Among the traditions reported on this subject, the tradition of Ibn ʿUmar is of the 
highest import due to its high potential validity and its unusual interpretation by 
Ibn ʿUmar himself. Al-Khaṭīb exhausted most of the important chains of this 
tradition and provided its significant wording variants that lead to the differences 
of opinion on the subject.124 
(56-10) Masʾalat Ṣiyām Yawm al-Shakk, fī al-Radd ʿalā Man Raʾā Wujūbahu.125 
The book provides arguments against the obligation of fasting on the 
doubtful date. This is apprehended from the sharp rebuke by Ibn al-Jawzī in regards 
to this work.126 Both al-Khaṭīb and Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr assigned to Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal a 
view that is contrary to the majority of Sunnī scholars, which is an obligation of 
fasting during the doubtful date (30th of Shaʿbān or 1st of Ramaḍān). Should it be 
discovered as the first of Ramaḍān based on moon sighting at the end of it, the 
former fasting sufficed to be counted as one day of fasting.127  
(57-11) Ibṭāl al-Nikāḥ bi Ghayr Waliyy.128 
Inferred from the work of al-Qudūrī and al-Khaṭīb’s passages, this treatise 
evidently concerns a debate between the Hanafites and other jurists particularly the 
Shāfiʿīs on the permissibility of a mature female to bring herself into a marriage 
without having a waliyy (eligible representative) to affect the marriage on her 
behalf.129 Al-Khaṭīb alluded to this debate in al-Kifāyah where he expressed that 
later Ḥanafīs rejected the tradition of Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (124/742) in this 
subject.130 
 
                                                        
124 The tradition reads: ‘Observe fast on witnessing it (the new moon) and break it on witnessing it. But if (due 
to clouds) the actual position of the month is concealed from you, you should then uqdurū’ in a version ‘count it 
thirty days.’ 
125 Tasmiyah, (28), -one fasciculus, al-Samʿānī (apud HMDB, 1:387). 
126 Ibn al-Jawzī, Darʾ al-Lawm wa al-Ḍaym fī Ṣawm Yawm al-Ghaym, (Riyadh: Dār al-Bashāʾir, 1994). 
127 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Istidhkār, 10:17. Cf. al-Matroudi, Ḥanbalī School, 104. 
128 Self attribution: al-Waṣl al-Mudraj, 2:757. Also: Tasmiyah, (29).  
129 al-Qudūrī, al-Tajrīd, 9:4237. 
130 al-Kifāyah, 2:178. 
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(58-12) al-Qaḍāʾ bi al-Yamīn maʿa al-Shāhid.131 
 The work evidently compiles traditions on making legal decision based on a 
single witness accompanied by his oath. According to al-Khaṭīb, it is a position held 
by aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth, most of the jurists among the Mālikites and the Shāfiʿites, and 
most of the theologians, while the later Ḥanafīs rejected this position. Among their 
arguments is that the tradition of Suhayl ibn Abī Ṣāliḥ that supports it is invalid 
because Suhayl did not recognised it in the later phase of his life. This coincides 
with al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s discussion on this particular subject and tradition when he 
explained the work of the Ḥanafī traditionist, Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī. Al-Khaṭīb 
treated the Ḥanafīs argument from two perspectives; the potential veracity of 
ḥadīths in the subject and the status of the forgotten narrations.132  
 (59-13) al-Ḥiyal.133 
 The title refers to a sort of legal evasion, where a jurist replaces an apparent 
sense of a law with another sense that suits a legal solution, which is legitimate only 
in another specific situation.134 It has been a bone of contention between aṣḥāb al-
ḥadīth and the Ḥanafīs as suggested by Melchert. However, al-Khaṭīb exhibited a 
distinctive stance.135   
2.10 Compilations on Theology 
(60-01) Ḥadīth al-Nuzūl.136 
 Apparently, it is a compilation of traditions pertaining to God’s descend to 
the lowest heaven at the end of two-third of a night as done prior to him by al-
Dāraquṭnī.137 
                                                        
131 al-Samʿānī (apud TIM, 10:181).  
132 See above: Akhbār Man Ḥaddatha.  
133 al-Samʿānī (apud HMDB, 1:387). The title was distorted to read al-Khayl (Horse). 
134 See: Muhammed Imran, “Legal Stratagems (Ḥiyal) and Usury in Islamic Commercial Law” (PhD 
Diss., University of Birmingham, 2010). 
135 See Chapter Four. 




(61-02) al-Kalām or Masʾalat fī al-Ṣifāt.138 
 It is a brief epistle on the apparently anthropomorphic attributes of God.139 
(62-03) al-Qawl fī ʿIlm al-Nujūm, Hal al-Shurūʿ fīhi Mashrūʿ aw Madhmūm.140 
 It is a response to the question asked to al-Khaṭīb on the permissibility of 
learning the science of celestial bodies. The original work was supported with isnād 
for every account. Al-Khaṭīb differentiated between astrology and astronomy in this 
work. 
2.11 Compilations Pertaining to Spirituality, Pietism and the States of the Heart 
The works in this area indicate al-Khaṭīb’s adoption of the culture of piety 
during his time. 
(63-01) Aḥādīth Gharībah wa Manāmāt.141 
 The title suggests a collection of strange stories and dreams. 
(64-02) Raqīq Inshādāt fī al-Zuhd wa’l-Raqāʾiq.142 
 The title mentioned by al-Ishbīlī suggests a compilation of poems and words 
of wisdom, especially from the ascetics and Ṣūfīs, which indicates a distinct work 
from the following. 
(65-03) al-Zuhd wa al-Raqāʾiq.143 
 The original work seems to contain narrations pertaining to ascetic acts of 
the Prophets, the Companions, the Successors and the later practitioners of zuhd 
                                                                                                                                                              
137 See: Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Dāraquṭnī, Kitāb al-Nuzūl (Madinah, 1983). 
138 It was edited by ʿAbd Allāh al-Judaei and published in: Majallah al-Ḥikmah 1 (1414/1993): 281. 
139 The extant manuscript: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, Col. 16. 
140 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2004). 
141 al-Ishbīlī, Fihrist, 228.  
142 Op. Cit.  




and taṣawwuf. This is evident from Ibn al-Jawzī’s citation of al-Khaṭīb for his isnāds in 
Ṣifat al-Ṣafwah. The published part contains 119 accounts treating subjects such as 
the definition and concept of taṣawwuf, certitude, love, wearing wool clothes, and 
miracles of saints. 
2.12 Unknown Subjects 
(66-04) Kashf al-Asrār.144 
 The title translates as Revealing the Secrets. 
(67-05) Riyāḍ al-Uns ilā Ḥadāʾir al-Quds.145 
 All the previous are titles attributed to al-Khaṭīb with regard to topic-based 
compilations. A statement he made in al-Jāmiʿ, however, might add another twelve 
titles if al-Khaṭīb was actually referring to himself in that statement.146 
2.13 al-Khaṭīb’s Personal, Rare and Unique Collections 
(68-01) al-Amālī or Amālīhi fī Masjid Dimashq. 
 This comprises of al-Khaṭīb’s collections of dicta, which he delivered at the 
Ummayad Mosque of Damascus until Muḥarram of 459 AH/1067 CE.147 Parts of it 
were found in manuscripts148 and the fifth part was published in digital form under 
the title Arbaʿu Majālis li’l-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī. The original autograph collection was 
transmitted on the authority of al-Khaṭīb’s student, Abū Manṣūr Ibn Khayrūn 
                                                        
144 Hacı Halife, Kashf al-Ẓunūn (Beirut: Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth), 2:1486, Ismāʿīl Bashā, Hadiyyat al-ʿĀrifīn, 1:79.  
145 The extant manuscript of this work: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, (22 Tafsīr) 124. Al-ʿIshsh 
concluded that the style of the text does not match the style of al-Khaṭīb, yet he was refuted by al-
Dābī. The present study does not have access to the manuscript. 
146 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:300. 
147 He later moved to Tyre in Ṣafar of 459 H. The following sittings are learned from the fifth part of 
the manuscript: (1) Friday, in Dhū al-Ḥijjat 458 H, (2) Friday, 3rd Muḥarram 459 H, (3) Friday, 10th 
Muharram 459 H, and (4) Friday, 4 days remained of Shawwāl 459 H (?). 
148 The extant manuscripts: The fifth (5) part at Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, Col. 27 (Qāf 203 – 210). 
See: al-Albānī, Fihris Makhṭūṭāt Dar al-Kutub al-Ẓāhiriyyat, 362. The seventh (7) and eighth (8) parts: 
Brockelmann mentioned this work with the title Aḥādīth Mukhtārat and stated that they are in ten 
parts with reference to Fayḍullah 555 and Ẓahiriyyah 353. According to al-ʿIshsh, the two parts are at 
Zahiriyyah, Col. 92 (9) 171. See: Brockelmann, GAL, (19), and ʿISH, 121.  
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(539/1145). The forty-five published traditions engaged subjects such as adhkār 
(sayings of remembrance), fasting and the remembrance of the hereafter, 
illustrating the nature of al-Khaṭīb’s session at the mosque.  
(69-02) al-Rubāʿiyyāt.149 
 It promises a collection of transmissions with four-tier chains that indicate 
superior isnāds of al-Khaṭīb.150 
(70-03) al-Musalsalāt and Musalsal al-ʿĪdayn.151 
 The original huge work of al-Khaṭīb entitled al-Musalsalāt does not extant 
except for a fragment reporting the musalsal of ʿīdayn (the two celebrations). It 
shows that all narrators in the strand, beginning with al-Khaṭīb to the source of the 
ḥadīth, shared the same attribute, which is transmitting this particular ḥadīth either 
after the prayer of ʿĪyd al-Fiṭr or ʿĪyd al-Aḍḥā.152  
(71-04) Min Ḥadīthihi ʿan Shuyūkhī.153 
 A collection of traditions al-Khaṭīb gathered from his informants. 
 
 
                                                        
149 Ibn al-Najjār in Dhayl (apud TFZ, 3:1140, -three fasciculi). Also: ʿISH, 123 (mistakenly recorded as 
Shuhbah instead of al-Dhahabī). 
150 The term rubāʿiyyāt is usually used in the genre of al-ʿawāli wa al-nawāzil to denote chains that have 
only four tiers of narrators. It demonstrates either the early involvement of a person in the learning 
circles or his diligence and perseverance in seeking the superior sources of ḥadīth. 
151 The extant manuscript of this work: Turkey: Istanbul University Library, apud Akram al-ʿUmarī, 
Madinah: Arif Hekmat Library, Col. 167, and Madinah: Islamic University Library, 498/mīm. The 
Musalsal al-ʿĪdayn was trasmitted by al-Khaṭīb to his student Abū Muḥammad al-Akfānī twice, during 
ʿĪyd al-Fiṭr and ʿĪyd al-Aḍḥā of the year 457/1065 at Damascus. 
152 The tradition reads: ‘O people, you have attained goodness (by praying with us). Whoever wishes to leave, 
he may leave, and whoever wishes to stay until the end of the sermon may stay along.’ Musalsal (sequenced) is 
a genre of ḥadīth collection, which documented narrations that appear like a sequenced story where 
in every tier of the chain a same state, story or condition is repeated. 
153 The extant manuscript: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, (228 Ḥadīth), 41-42 (apud al-Albānī). 
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2.14 Personal Compilations of Riwāyah (Ḥadīth or Transmitters) of an Individual 
Chief Narrator 
2.14.1 Musnad of the Companions 
(72-01) Musnad Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (13/635) ʿalā Sharṭ al-Ṣaḥīḥayn.154 
 This promises a collection of sound traditions attributed to the first Caliph 
that comply with the criteria of the two ṣaḥīḥs.155  
(73-02) Musnad Ṣafwān ibn ʿAssāl (d. Kufah, between 35-40/656-661).156 
(74-03) Musnad or Juzʾ Ḥadīth Nuʿaym ibn Hammār al-Ghaṭafānī (d. Shām, between 41-
50/662-670). 157 
2.14.2 Traditions of the second Hijrī / eight century 
(75-01) Majmūʾ Ḥadith Maṭar ibn Ṭuhmān al-Warrāq (125 or 129/743 or 747).158 
Maṭar is a Khurāsānian narrator from the Companion Anas.159  
(76-02) Majmūʿ Ḥadīth Muḥammad ibn Jaḥādah (131/749). 160 
                                                        
154 Tasmiyah, (55), ʿISH, 122. 
155 The title alludes to the status of the two ṣaḥīḥs, yet the work is not extant to enable an 
examination of al-Khaṭīb’s understanding of the principles of taṣḥīḥ (evaluation) employed by al-
Bukhārī and Muslim.  
156 al-Murādī. See: al-Asmāʾ al-Mubhamah, 2:144, Abū Nuʿaym, Maʿrifat al-Ṣaḥābah (Riyadh: Dār al-
Waṭan, 1998), 3:1501. Attribution: Tasmiyah, (51), ʿISH, 122. 
157 The work could be reproduced from al-Khaṭīb’s text in al-Mihrawāniyyāt. Abū Nuʿaym stated: 
‘Nuʿaym ibn Hammār or Habbār, al-Ghaṭafānī, reported too as ibn Ḥimār, Haddār or Ḥammād.’ Al-
Khaṭīb added: ‘It was also reported Khammār.’ Abū Nuʿaym recorded three narrations reported on 
the authority of Nuʿaym.  Al-Khaṭīb added the fourth but mentioned that the strand is broken. Hence, 
al-Khaṭīb concluded that the three narrations recorded by al-Mihrawānī were the only unbroken 
transmissions to the Companion. The biography of Nuʿaym was also discussed by Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr. 
See: Abū Nuʿaym, Maʿrifat al-Ṣaḥābah, 5:2669, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Istīʿāb fī Maʿrifat al-Aṣḥāb (Beirut: Dār 
al-Jīl, 1992), 4:1509, al-Mihrawānī, al-Mihrawāniyyāt (Madinah: Islamic University, 2002), 560-577. 
158 Tasmiyah, (54), al-Samʿānī (apud Siyar, 18:292), both mentioned one fasciculus, ʿISH, 122, 
(mistakenly recorded as ibn Hammāz al-ʿAṣfānī). 
159  Abū Rajāʾ al-Khurasānī, a scribe and a narrator: Siyar, 5:452. 
160 Tasmiyah, (40), ʿISH, 122 (mistakenly recorded as ibn Ḥijārah).   
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He was a Kūfan narrator from Anas.161  
(77-03) Majmūʾ Ḥadith Bayān ibn Bishr (between 131-140/749-758). 162 
He was a Kūfan narrator from Anas.163 
(78-04) Majmūʾ Ḥadith Ṣafwān ibn Sulaym (132/750).164 
He was a Madīnan narrator from Anas.165 
(79-05) Majmūʿ Ḥadīth Abī Isḥāq al-Shaybānī (ca. 140/758).166 
 He was a Kūfan narrator from the Companion Ibn Abī Awfā.167 
(80-06) Majmūʿ Ḥadīth or Musnad168 Muḥammad bin Sūqah (ca. 140/758).169 
 He was a Kūfan narrator from Anas.170 Al-Khaṭīb mentioned this work in 
Tārīkh.171  
                                                        
161 Siyar, 6:175. 
162 Tasmiyah, (41), ʿISH, 122. 
163 al-Aḥmasī, Siyar, 6:124. 
164 Tasmiyah, (42), ʿISH, 122. 
165 al-Zuhrī al-Madanī, see: Siyar, 5:364. 
166 Tasmiyah, (39) -three fasciculi, ʿISH, 121. 
167 There were two individuals known as Abū Isḥāq al-Shaybānī. I identify his name as Sulaymān due 
to a statement in al-Jāmiʿ. See below. Sulaymān ibn Abī Sulaymān was born in the time of the 
Companions. See: Siyar, 6:193. 
168 As named by Ibn al-Najjār, see below. 
169 Tasmiyah, (38), Ibn al-Najjār in Dhayl, (apud TFZ, 3:1140), both mentioned four fasciculi. Also: ʿISH, 
122. 
170 Abū Bakr al-Ghanawī, see: Ibn Ḥibbān, Mashāhīr ʿUlamāʾ al-Amṣār (Egypt: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 1991), 266, 
Siyar, 6:134.  
171 In the entry on ʿAlī ibn ʿĀṣim ibn Ṣuhayb al-Wāsiṭī, al-Khaṭīb recorded conflicting opinions on this 
Kūfan narrator by critics of transmitters. Al-Khaṭīb asserted that the problem of ʿAlī ibn ʿĀṣim lies 
mainly in the tradition he narrated on the authority of Muḥammad ibn Sūqah, The tradition was 
considered spurious by many ḥadīth masters. However, some of them approved it. Ibn Rizquviyē 
narrated to al-Khaṭīb that the Prophet was seen in a dream and asked of it and he approved the 
ḥadīth. Al-Khaṭīb stated that many other figures were reported to have narrated this ḥadīth from Ibn 
Sūqah, apart from ʿAlī ibn ʿĀṣim. He concluded: ‘We have mentioned their isnāds in our collection of 
the ḥadīth of Muḥammad ibn Sūqah. However, none of these were reported with a reliable strand.’ 





(81-07) Majmūʿ Ḥadīth Jaʿfar ibn Ḥayyān (165/782).172 
He was a Baṣran narrator said to have lived contemporaneously with Anas 
ibn Mālik but has never met him.173 
(82-08) Majmūʾ Ḥadith Misʿar ibn Kidām (155/772).174 
He was a great Kūfan traditionist compared usually with Shuʿbah ibn al-
Ḥajjāj.175 
(83-09) Muʿjam al-Ruwāt ʿan Shuʿbah (160/777).176 
The title suggests a list of all narrators (possibly with their narrations) who 
transmitted from the renowned Baṣran traditionalist, Shuʿbāh ibn al-Ḥajjāj.177 This 
huge collection should have been amongst al-Khaṭīb’s greatest contribution to the 
study of history of transmission.  
(84-10) al-Ruwāt ʿan Mālik ibn Anas (179/796) wa Dhikr Ḥadīth li Kullin Minhum.178 
 This gigantic work is similar to the previous and another great contribution 
to the field. It lists all transmitters from Mālik ibn Anas including those found in al-
Muwaṭṭāʾ and elsewhere, with the mention of their specific narrations. 
                                                        
172 The extant manuscript of this work: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library (390 Ḥadīth). See: ʿISH, 122. 
173 Talkhīṣ al-Mutashābih, vol. 1, p. 235 and Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 7, p. 286. 
174 Tasmiyah, (44), ʿISH, 122. 
175 Misʿar al-Hilālī, see: Siyar, 7:163. For Shuʿbah, see below. 
176 Ibn al-Najjār in Dhayl (apud TFZ, 3:1140, one volume, Siyar, 18:292, eight fasciculi).   
177 On critical reading of Shuʿbah, see: G.H.A. Juynboll, “Shuʿba b. al-Ḥajjāj and his Position among the 
Traditionalists of Baṣra” Le Muséon 111 (1998): 187-226. 
178 Despite that al-Dāraquṭnī and another scholar al-Ḥasan ibn Ismāʿīl al-Ḍarrāb had already 
composed on the subject, al-Khaṭīb’s work was chosen for two abridgements. The first was made by 
Rashīd al-Dīn al-ʿAṭṭār (662/1264), entitled Mujarrad Asmāʾ al-Ruwāt ʿan Mālik (Madinah, Maktabah al-
Ghurabāʾ, 1416/1995). In his work, the number of narrators from Mālik reaches 1586 persons. The 
second was made by al-Suyūṭī and included in his book, Tazyīn al-Mamālik fī Manāqib al-Imām Mālik 
(Morocco: Dār al-Rashād, 2010). In al-Suyūṭī’s version, the number was only 935. Both works list only 





(85-11) Aṭrāf al-Muwaṭṭaʾ.179 
This is an index of the first phrase of every ḥadīth in the Muwaṭṭaʾ of Mālik 
ibn Anas.180 The present Muwaṭṭāʾ has several versions disseminated by the students 
of Mālik; however, the approximate total of narrations in the book is 1720. 
It is highly possible that there are some other collections resembling the 
previous type of work. Al-Khaṭīb could have indicated himself by mentioning 
“fellows of ḥadīth” in a statement in al-Jāmiʿ.181 Assuming that this is true, it will add 
another eighteen titles to his oeuvres. 
2.15 Selection, Partition and Retracement 
(Arranged according to the date of demise of the author of the primary text 
or collection). 
(86-01) ʿAwālī Aḥādīth Mālik ibn Anas.182 
 It consists of a list of ḥadīths with superior strands reported on the authority 
of Mālik ibn Anas. Al-Khaṭīb retraced these ḥadīths either in other canonical 
collections or by finding other sound chains for them. 
(87-02) Tajziʾat Sunan Abū Dāwūd (275/889). 
Some biographers had taken this work as a summary of al-Khaṭīb’s Sunan.183 
Al-Khaṭīb had instead audited from his ḥadīth teachers the Sunan of Abū Dāwūd from 
                                                        
179 al-Suyūṭī, Tanwīr al-Ḥawālik Sharḥ Muwaṭṭāʾ Mālik (Egypt: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyyah), 1:12. 
180 See on Muwaṭṭāʾ: Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies (Muhammedanische Studien), ed. S. M. Stern, 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971), 2:198. 
181  al-Khaṭīb said: ‘The normative practice of fellows of ḥadīth is to compile traditions of a certain 
notables apart from the above. I shall mention here those I remember. Amongst them, Ismāʿīl ibn Abī 
Khālid al-Bajalī, Ayyūb ibn Abī Tamīmah al-Sakhtiyānī, Bayān ibn Bishr al-Aḥmasī …’ See: al-Jāmiʿ, 
2:297. 
182 The extant manuscript of this work: Damacus: Zahiriyyah Library, Col. 101 (Qāf 70 – 80). See: al-
Albānī, Fihris al-Ẓāhiriyyah, 364. 
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students of Abū Dāwūd.184 The copy represents al-Khaṭīb’s narration and partition 
of Abū Dāwūd’s work. 
(88-03) Fawāʾid ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAyyāḍ al-Ṣūrī (450/1058).185  
This is a selection and retracement for the collection of the judge ʿAyn al-
Dawlah of Tyre.186 
(89-04) al-Fawāʾid al-Muntakhabah, al-Ṣiḥāḥ wa’l-Gharāʾib, li-Abū’l-Faraj Ḥamd ibn al-
Ḥasan al-Dīnawarī al-Kisāʾī (460/1068).187 
 The title translates The Selected Beneficial Narrations from the Collection of al-
Dīnawarī al-Kisāʾī:188 Sound and Rare Narrations. 
(90-05) Majlis min Imlāʾ Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Ibn al-Muslimah (465/1073). 189 
 A retracement for the collection of the leading traditionist, Abū Jaʿfar, who 
was the uncle of al-Khaṭīb’s close friend, the minister Ibn al-Muslimah.190 Al-
                                                                                                                                                              
183 Brockelmann and al-ʿIshsh named it Mukhtaṣar al-Sunan min Aṣl al-Khaṭīb and both ascribed it to al-
Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Mundhirī (656/1258). Al-Mundhirī’s manuscript of the summary of Sunan Abū 
Dāwūd is preserved at Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyat (485 Ḥadīth). Muḥammad ʿAwwāmah, a modern 
editor of Sunan Abū Dāwūd explains in lengthy the nature of al-Khaṭīb’s copy providing al-Ḥāfiẓ al-
ʿIrāqī’s testimony on al-Khaṭīb’s partition. See: Brockelmann, GAL, Supplementband, 1:564, ʿISH, 122, 
Muḥammad ʿAwwāmah, ed. Sunan Abū Dāwūd, 1:33. 
184 See the chapter on biography. For the transmission of Sunan Abū Dāwūd by al-Khaṭīb and others, 
see: James Robson, “The Transmission of Abū Dāwūd’s Sunan,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies 14:3 (1952): 579-588. 
185 al-Kattāni, Dhayl, 206, TDQ, 31:72, Ibn Taghrī Bardī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah, 5:65 (four fasciculi). 
186 His son, the judge Aḥmad Abū’l-Faraj audited Kitāb al-Faqīh from al-Khaṭīb at Tyre in Rabīʿ al-
Ākhir, 459/1067.  
187 The extant manuscripts: Istanbul: Millet National Library, Feyzullah Efendi, Ms 555, Kuwait: 
Kuwait University Library, CD 5649 (A copy of the previous). The cover on the manuscript indicates 
that the work consists of 10 fasciculi. Ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn stated in the biography of Abū’l-Faraj: ‘al-
Khaṭīb retraced for him al-Fawāʾid.’ See below. 
188 He was a leading Shāfiʿī jurist who resided in Baghdād. He transmitted from Abū ʿAlī ibn Shādhān, 
al-Ḥusayn al-Mahāmilī, etc. Ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Dimashqī, Tawḍih al-Mushtabih (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-
Risālah, 1993), 7:332. 
189 The extant manuscript of this work: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, Col. 117 (21) (apud ʿISH, 123).  
190 His father, Abū’l-Faraj, was a Ḥanafī traditionalist who studied under al-Jaṣṣāṣ. See the previous 
chapter for his nephew. Regarding the family of Ibn al-Muslimah, Rufayl who became a Muslim 
under the Caliph ʿUmar, see: Siyar, 18:213-218. 
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Dhahabī stated: al-Khaṭīb transmitted from him [Abū Jaʿfar] and asked him for imlāʾ 
(specific dictation).191 
(91-06) al-Fawāʾid al-Muntakhabah, al-Ṣiḥāḥ wa’l-Gharāʾib, li-Abū’l-Qāsim al-Mihrawānī 
(468/1076). 
 This is a retracement for the collection of al-Mihrawānī, a Ṣūfī from the ribāṭ 
of al-Zawzanī and a ḥāfiẓ of ḥadīth.192 
(92-07) Muntakhab min Ḥadīth Abū Bakr al-Shīrāzī (487/1094) wa Ghayrihi.193 
This is a selection from the collection of the Ṣūfī and the chief musnid of 
Nishapur, al-Shīrāzī,194 as well as other masters. 
(93-08) al-Fawāʾid al-Muntakhabah, al-Ṣiḥāh al-ʿAwālī, li-Jaʿfar ibn Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn 
al-Sarrāj al-Qāriʾ (500/1107).195 
This is a selection and retracement for the collection of a muqriʾ and ḥāfiẓ of 




                                                        
191 TIM, 10: 224. 
192 He resided in Baghdād. He transmitted to the Qāḍī of Māristān and others. Al-Khaṭīb’s student, Ibn 
Khayrūn, had also selectively benefited from his collection. The amount of narration presented in al-
Khaṭīb’s retracement is 171 narrations. See: Siyar, 18:346-347.   
193 The extant manuscript of this work: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, (330 ḥadīth), 27-35. 
194 Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī Ibn Khalaf al-Shīrāzī was also a belletrist. He was the link between al-Khaṭīb and 
the writings of al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī. He was also the student of Ibn Fūrak and al-Ziyādī, and 
learned from the students of al-Aṣamm. He received the ṭarīqah from Zayn al-Islām Abū’l-Qāsim al-
Qushayrī (465/1073). He combined between immersion in taṣawwuf and acquisition of riwāyāt. See: al-
Ṣarīfīnī, al-Muntakhab, 116 (242), TIM, 10:573. 
195 The extant manuscript: The first part at Zahiriyyah, Col. 31 (12), according to Bassām al-Jābī 
(Sheet 397 – 407), the second part at Zahiriyyah, Col. 27 (8), the fourth part at Zahiriyyah, Col. 27 (8), 
and the fifth part at Zahiriyyah, Col. 27 (8), Col. 98 (3) and Col. 98 (14). According to Bassām al-Jābī, 
the second, third, fourth and fifth (final) parts are in Zahiriyyah, Col. 31 (353 Ḥadīth) 1- 60. See: ʿISH, 
123, al-Jābī, ed. al-Taṭfīl, (), 19. 




(94-09) Fawāʾid Abū’l-Qāsim al-Nasīb (508/1115),197or al-Fawāʾid al-Muntakhabah, al-Ṣiḥāḥ 
wa’l-Gharāʾib, intiqāʾ al-Khaṭīb min Ḥadīth al-Sharīf Abū’l-Qāsim ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm ibn al-
ʿAbbās ibn Abū’l-Jinn al-Ḥusaynī. 198  
This is a selection and retracement for the khaṭīb of Damascus and the 
registrar of Prophetic descendants (Nasīb al-Dawlah) in Shām.199 
(95-10) Majlisān min200 Amālī al-Jawharī (454/1062), takhrīj li-riwāyat Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd 
al-Bāqī al-Bazzāz (535/1141).201 
This contains the takhrīj of al-Khaṭīb concerning the collection from two 
sittings of imlāʾ session by al-Jawharī;202 narrated by the judge of Māristān, who was 
also the musnid of ʿIrāq.203 This possibly happened towards the end of al-Khaṭīb’s life 
as al-Bazzāz was born in 442/1051. The whole work comprises of twenty-three 
narrations touching many subjects including the virtues of the caliphs Abū Bakr, 
ʿUmar and ʿAlī. 
                                                        
197 al-ʿIshsh named it Fawāʾid Abū’l-Qāsim al-Nursī and differentiated between the two titles. Al-Nursī is 
unidentified. Al-Dhahabī mentioned in the entry on al-Nasīb that Fawāʾid al-Nasīb with intikhāb by al-
Khaṭīb comprises of twenty fasciculi. See: ʿISH, 122, and al-Dhahabī, below. 
198 The extant manuscripts: Section from the eighth (8th) part at Zahiriyyah Library, Col. 4 (462), the 
thirteenth (13th) part at Zahiriyyah, Col. 140 (139), the fourteenth (14th) part at Zahiriyyah, Col. 40 
(178) and undetermined part at Zahiriyyah, Col. 40 (172). The thirteenth (13th) part has been 
published in a digital form in the software Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim. It was based on the manuscript from 
Majāmīʿ al-Madrasah al-ʿUmariyyah, which was found in the Zahiriyyah Library. Its reference: Col. 
3777 ʿāmm [Majāmīʿ 40].  
199 He was a descendant of the Caliph ʿAlī ibn Abū Ṭālib, a fellow student of al-Khaṭīb and the teacher 
of Ibn ʿAsākir. He was also the person who interceded for al-Khaṭīb during the interrogation in 
Damascus. Despite his descend from the Prophetic lineage, he was extremely against the Rāfiḍīs. 
According to al-Samʿānī in Dhayl, he audited a great deal from al-Khaṭīb. One may find his 
handwriting and audition register on most manuscripts of al-Khaṭīb (apud Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī). See:  
Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, Mirʾāt al-Zamān, 13:358, TDQ, 41:244, Siyar, 19:358-359, 
200 Amālī al-Jawharī as in: ʿISH, 122. 
201 The extant manuscript: Damascus: Zahiriyyah Library, Col. 105 (6). ʿISH, 122. 
202 al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī, Abū Muḥammad al-Jawharī, a leading traditionalist. al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 2:202. 
203 Qāḍī Māristān was a Ḥanbalī judge who transmitted from the judges: Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī, 
Abū’l-Qāsim al-Tanūkhī, Ibn Salāmah al-Quḍāʿī and learned under Abū Yaʿlā al-Ḥanbalī. He was also a 
witness in the court of the Ḥanafī Chief Judge al-Dāmaghānī. Ibn ʿAsākir criticised him for adopting 
the madhhab of al-awāʾil. His student, Ibn al-Jawzī, praised him. TIM, 11:639. 
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2.16 The Library of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī  
 Following his study on al-Khaṭīb’s sources, Akram al-ʿUmarī suggests that al-
Khaṭīb’s library could be one of the biggest libraries in Baghdād.204 This section 
explores the list of books brought by al-Khaṭīb during the migration to Damascus. 
The understudied list was provided by Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Mālikī al-Andalusī 
and it contains 476 titles covering various areas and topics. Even a cursory look into 
the list reveals the vast exposure of al-Khaṭīb to different schools of thought. The 
author has studied the correct titles and attribution of these books including the 
extant and published. This section, however, will provide only a summary of areas 
and important books that al-Khaṭīb were concerned with. 
  In the field of Qurʾanic studies, there are ten titles carrying the word tafsīr 
(exegesis) attributed to ancient personages with the earliest being ʿAṭiyyah ibn Saʿd 
al-ʿŪfī (111/729). There are seven titles pertaining to the genre of al-nāsikh wa’l-
mansūkh (the abrogation) including the one attributed to Abū ʿUbayd (224/839). The 
earliest was attributed to Qatādah ibn Diʿāmah al-Sadūsī (118/737). Three titles are 
related to gharīb al-Qurʾān (peculiar words in the Qurʾān), amongst them Taḥṣīl 
Naẓāʾir al-Qurʾān by the renowned Ṣūfī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (ca. 320/932). Two other 
titles read mushkil al-Qurʾān (apparent problem). Al-Khaṭīb also possessed copies of 
Maʿānī al-Qurʾān by al-Farrāʾ (207/823) and Majāz al-Qurʾān by Abū ʿUbaydah 
(209/825). Another four titles concern al-lughāt fī al-Qurʾān with one of them named 
Yāqūtat al-Ṣirāṭ, a work by Ghulām Thaʿlab (345/957). Five works bear the title Faḍāʾil 
al-Qurʾān (the virtues of the Qurʾān) and two works on al-Wujūh wa’l-Naẓāʾir (the 
concordance of Qurʾanic polysemy). There are also works concerning certain 
themes in the Qurʾān namely al-Jawābāt fī al-Qurʾān, al-Istithnāʾ wa'l-Shurūṭ fī Kitāb 
Allah and ʿAdad Sujūd al-Qurʾān (responses, rules and exceptions and numbers of 
prostration in the Qurʾān). 
 Furthermore, another five works address the subject of maṣāḥif (Qurʾanic 
copies), one of them reading: al-Radd ʿalā Man Khālafa Muṣḥaf al-Imām ʿUthmān.205 In 
                                                        
204 Mawārid, 51. 
205 It was authored by Abū Bakr Ibn al-Anbārī. 
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terms of the method of Reading (qirāʾat), there are three works related to the subject 
of al-waqf wa al-ibtidāʾ and thirteen titles on the collections of qirāʾāt (Reading 
Variants). 
 In the field of theology, al-Khaṭīb seems to be interested in the works penned 
for refutation. Two of them are on refutation against Abū Ḥanīfah, one on a 
refutation against the rationalists, and a few refutations are against Jahmism, 
Qadarism, and the doctrine of the created Qurʾān.206 He also owns an epistle of 
ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz on refuting Qadarism, two works on the subject of ʾīmān (the 
confession of faith), Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī’s work against kalām and two works 
on the indicators of the Prophethood (dalāʾil al-nubuwwah).  
 The works on ḥadīth studies populate the major part of the list reflecting al-
Khaṭīb’s main scholarship concerns. In the genre of al-arbaʿūn (forty ḥadīths), he 
owns three titles including the work of Muḥammad ibn Aslam al-Kindī (242/856), 
one of those deemed as an abdāl (saints). He also owns two versions of Jāmiʿ 
attributed to Sufyān al-Thawrī (161/778) and both Amālī and Jāmiʿ of ʿAbd al-Razzāq 
al-Ṣanʿānī (211/827). In the genre of musnad or collections of certain muḥaddith, al-
Khaṭīb has nineteen books of early traditionalists who compiled the narrations of 
Abū Ḥanīfah, Mālik ibn Anas, Sufyān al-Thawrī, and the likes. Specifically pertaining 
to Mālik’s Muwaṭṭaʾ, al-Khaṭīb possesses seven versions of it. He also owns three 
works on ṣaḥīḥ’s collection belonging respectively to the renowned al-Bukhārī, al-
Khaṭīb’s master al-Barqānī, and Abū Bakr Ibn Manjuviyē (428/1037). Whereas in the 
genre of legal traditions, al-Khaṭīb has five books bearing the title Sunan, with the 
earliest belonging to Abū Qurrah Mūsā ibn Ṭāriq (203/819), the judge of Zabīd, 
Yemen.207 Moreover, thirty-one collections of ḥadīth were presented ranging over 
various topics such as matters of belief, purification, funeral, obligatory alms giving, 
inheritance, invocations, etc. 
                                                        
206 Van Ess, TUG, II:493-508 (Ğahm b. Ṣafwān, Ğahmīya und Ibn Ḥanbal’s Radd ʿalā l-Ğahmīya), I:72-135 
(Die Qadarīya), Zwischen Hạdīt̲ Und Theologie: Studien Zum Entstehen Prädestinatianischer Überlieferung 
(Berlin: New York: De Gruyter, 1975). 
207 He wrote a book on fiqh combining the opinions from works in Mālikī madhhab, Abū Ḥanīfah and 
Ibn Jurayj. See: al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 7:323.  
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 On a theoretical level, al-Khaṭīb had collected several treatises on topics in 
ḥadīth investigation principles such as the epistle of Abū Bakr al-Bardījī (301/914) on 
Uṣūl al-Ḥadīth, Ibn Qutaybah’s (276/890) treatise titled Mushkil al-Ḥadīth, and Abū 
Bakr al-Ismāʿīlī’s work, al-Madkhal ilā al-Ṣaḥīḥ.208 He also possessed two works on 
gharīb al-ḥadīth (peculiar words in ḥadīth texts) and two others on taṣḥīf 
(misreading). The collections on peculiarity are not limited to the texts, but also 
extended to traditions narrated in single strand back to notable tradent known as 
“gharāʾib ḥadīth of so-and- so”. In this regard, he owns five books with three of them 
concern the gharāʾib of Mālik ibn Anas.  
 Al-Khaṭīb’s desire for proficiency in ḥadīth criticism is evident in the 
collections of books in ʿilal al-ḥadīth (hidden flaws in ḥadīth) amounting to five titles 
and the same number for treatises in suʾālāt (master-disciple dialogues) concerning 
transmissions. He also treasured six works in the genre of awhām (errors) such as 
the criticism of al-Bukhārī and Muslim (261/875) by al-Dāraquṭnī and al-Awhām by 
ʿAbd al-Ghaniyy al-Azdī.209 
 The works in the study of narrators are also voliminous. There are sixteen 
books pertaining to the genre of ṭabaqāt including five versions of Tārīkh of Yaḥyā 
Ibn Maʿīn (233/848) and the Tārīkh of al-Bukhārī. Five works are listed on ḍuʿafāʾ 
(impugned narrators) and another five belong to various subjects in the 
classification of narrators. Al-Khaṭīb had also shown his profound interest in the 
history of transmissions by collecting six books in the genre of maʿājim wa mashīkhāt 
(registers of personal informants and masters). Furthermore, he also possessed five 
works pertinent to the study of primary and cultural designation of narrators.210 
 Apart from the study of al-Khaṭīb’s historical sources in Tārīkh by Akram al-
ʿUmarī, the list of al-Mālikī also provided us with al-Khaṭīb’s collection of books in 
the field of general history. Al-Khaṭīb owns six titles in the subject of ansāb 
(genealogies) and twenty-eight titles in the early history of Islam with eight bearing 
                                                        
208 It is possibly an introduction of his al-Mustakhraj ʿalā al-Ṣaḥīḥ. See Chapter One. 
209 Brown, Criticism of the Proto-Hadith Canon … (cited earlier), and the previous chapter. 
210 See Chapter Six. 
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the word maghāzī (campaigns) and fourteen pertaining to chronicles of the 
Companions collectively or individually. He also preserved four works on the 
history of ancient nations, nine works on historical events, seven works on history 
of cities and twenty-eight works on history of prominent figures. Four works in the 
list are related to manāqib and faḍāʾil (virtues of luminaries) and around ten works 
concern the accounts on classes, groups and sects. 
 Al-Khaṭīb’s view on the crucial place of ethics, moral conduct, piety and 
taṣawwuf is well supported by the fact that he brought with him to Damascus around 
seventy-three titles regarding this area of interest. Amongst them, five are related 
to ethics in general, eight on the description of zuhd (piety), wilāyah (sainthood) and 
taṣawwuf, a dozen on accounts of early zuhhād (ascetics) and eleven on various acts 
of noble characters. Al-Khaṭīb’s preference of narrations in this area being 
supported with isnād could be attested from his collection of the works of al-Ḥāfiẓ 
Ibn Abī al-Dunyā (281/894). He owns thirty-seven of his works out of approximately 
seventy known titles.211 These include those considered lost today such as al-
Tafakkur wa-al-Iʿtibār, al-Taqwā, al-Ḥadhar wa’l-Shafaqah, al-Khāʾifīn, al-Duʿāʾ, al-Dhikr, 
and al-ʿAfw wa-Dhamm al-Ghaḍab. 
 In the subject of Arabic syntaxes and morphology, al-Khaṭīb collected 
around ten books authored or attributed to prominent figures such the Kūfan al-
Farrāʾ, Ibn Qutaybah al-Dīnawarī, Abū’l-ʿAbbās Thaʿlab al-Kūfī (291/904), Abū Isḥāq 
al-Zajjāj (311/924) (the follower of Baṣran school), Abū Bakr Ibn al-Anbārī (the 
opponent of Ibn Qutaybah), and the Ḥanbalī Ibn al-Munādī. Another ten books in his 
possession relate accounts of Arabian poets and belletrists, most of them penned by 
Muḥammad ibn Khalaf Ibn al-Marzubān (309/922). There are also some works 
bearing the title khutbah with two attributed to Ibn al-Anbārī and the rest is possibly 
al-Khaṭīb’s own notes. Three titles in the list discuss the art and skill of composition 
and writing, while nineteen titles touch various subjects such as horses, weather, 
monasteries, the creation of human, celestial bodies, rings, etc. Amongst these 
works is the book of the prince al-Ḥasan, grandson of the caliph al-Muqtadir bi’l-
                                                        
211 He penned a total of 219 works according to Muʿjam Muṣannafāt Ibn Abī al-Dunyā. See: Fāḍil al-
Raqqī, Ibn Abī al-Dunyā Muḥaddithan wa-Muṣliḥan, (Riyadh: Dār Aṭlas al-Khaḍrāʾ, 2012), 72. 
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Lah, titled al-Tawqīf ʿalā Faṣl al-Kharīf.212 There are also nine titles on Arabic poetry 
either a single poem or collectively in a dīwān. 
 Just like al-Khaṭīb’s own interest in jocular stories, he also possessed three 
titles in the genre of nawādir and two works on the specific stories of al-thuqalāʾ (the 
sluggish). The thuqalāʾ works were composed by Abū Muzāḥim al-Khāqānī (325/937) 
and Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī.  
 Furthermore, there are four works concerning the interpretation of dreams 
attributed to Muḥammad Ibn Sīrīn (110/729), Isḥāq ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn Sinīn (283/896), 
Ibn Qutaybah, and Abū Bakr al-Firyābī (301/914). 
 There are also thirteen titles that generally belong to the subject of fitan wa-
malāḥim (trials and fierce battles) with most of them written by Abū’l-Ḥasan al-
Madāʾinī (225/840). 
 Finally, al-Khaṭīb’s collection of works pertaining to fiqh as legal studies 
reflects his exposure to different madhāhib, yet, with skewed interest towards 
celebrated authorities that combine ḥadīth and fiqh. At the top of the list are the 
works of al-Shāfiʿī, namely al-Risālah, Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm, al-Radd ʿalā al-Barāhimah, al-Radd 
ʿalā Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan, Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth and the Musnad of al-Shāfiʿī (possibly a 
collection by later students). Next are the Mukhtaṣar of Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam (268/882), 
who wrote a refutation against al-Shāfiʿī, and the Masāʾil of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, 
which were collected by Abū Bakr al-Marrūdhī (278/888). Another leading jurist 
whose works were collected by al-Khaṭīb was Ibrāhīm ibn Isḥāq al-Ḥarbī al-
Baghdādī (285/898), a student of Ibn Ḥanbal who applauded al-Shāfiʿī as a teacher of 
the latter.213 Al-Khaṭīb also collected the works of the Baṣran Shāfiʿī jurist al-
Zubayrī.214  
 Apart from the works of notable luminaries, al-Khaṭīb’s topical collections of 
legal works reflect a breadth of interest in the stances of various Sunnī madhāhib. On 
the subject of pilgrimage, al-Khaṭīb owns the work of the previous al-Ḥarbī and the 
                                                        
212 This title is similar to the title of al-Khaṭīb’s work on the same subject. 
213 He has a long entry in: TMS, 6:522. 
214 See Chapter One. 
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Shāfiʿī Abū Bakr al-Naqqāsh (351/962). While on the subject of zawāl (the perfect 
position of the sun) and mawāqīt (time points), al-Khaṭīb owns the works of Kūfan, 
Baṣran and Ḥanbalī authors.215 Moreover, al-Khaṭīb also cherished an ancient 
collection titled Raʾy al-Fuqahāʾ al-Sabʿah (the Opinion of the Seven Scholars of 
Madīnah) attributed allegedly to ʿAbd Allāh ibn Dhakwān. 
Conclusion 
This in-depth study has provided, up to the present, the most 
comprehensive and structured survey of al-Khaṭīb’s written legacies. The total 
number of works that can be attributed to him reaches eighty-five in number 
excluding several works on retracement he provided for the ḥadīth collections of 
notable figures. With the inclusion of these types of works and the possibility of 
other titles that may have been lost, al-Khaṭīb could have penned more than a 
hundred works. The majority of the treatises were meant to solve disputations and 
provide stances with strong bases. The most striking characteristic in his writings is 
the concern for providing examples and concrete accounts for any concept, 
discussed phenomenon or theoretical postulate coupled with the keen attention to 
organisation, division, classification.  Compared to thirty ḥuffāẓ of his time listed by 
al-Dhahabī in Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ, none has composed in al-Khaṭīb’s style and found 
wide recognition in later works on ḥadīth studies. Some of his works were the only 
written or extant treatise in its subject. Although his legal treatises mostly 
supported the views of the Shāfiʿīs, they were not following the style of the jurists. 
Furthermore, his takhrījāt in the legal topics can be characterised as a new form of 
takhrījāt following the decline of the legal takhrījāt amongst the Shāfiʿī jurists. Al-
Khaṭīb had not only written against the Ḥanafīs, but also the Ẓāhirīs and the 
Ḥanbalīs, although he held a deep respect to all masters and critics of ḥadīth 
                                                        
215 al-Khaṭīb mentioned the name Abū Jaʿfar al-Rāsibī in al-Qawl fī ʿIlm al-Nujūm. Al-Nawawī stated in 
al-Majmūʿ that al-Qāḍī Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī, quoted from his work entitled al-Mawāqīt. In a 
manuscript titled Shuyūkh Lāḥiq ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Iskāf (Mss. Software Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim, 
published by Islamweb.net), there is a mention of a narrator whose name is Ahmad ibn Muhammad 
al-Harawī, Abu Jaʿfar al-Rāsibī and who narrated in the year 315 AH/927 CE. See ḥadīth number (10). 
Modern editors consider him an unknown person. We now know that some of his works concern the 
subject of time points and the declination of sun. 
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especially Ibn Ḥanbal. Undoubtedly, if all his isnāds were to be compiled, al-Khaṭīb 
could possibly have collected more than a hundred thousand of lines. A section of 
his library proves his passion for knowledge in general even though his scholarship 
was more related to ḥadīth and religious knowledge. The next chapter will provide 






Chapter Three:                     




This chapter examines the theory of knowledge that underpins the writings 
of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī and traces the background behind its construction based 
on his scattered statements on uṣūl (principles) in ḥadīth and fiqh studies. It argues 
that it could be misleading to read his uṣūl works solely through the lenses of an 
uṣūlī without taking into consideration his personal vision and experience of ḥadīth 
scholarship. In fact, it is crucial to observe different approaches to theological 
subjects before him in order to uncover the conscious selection of terms, ideas and 
discussions, which had been infused with his writings and expositions of traditional 
epistemology, particularly his ideas on traditional proofs. 
3.1 The Aim and Status of Knowledge 
 Al-Khaṭīb professed that seeking knowledge reflects the movement of self 
nearer and nearer to the Truth that ultimately forms a relationship of contentment 
with God.1 The similitude of seeking knowledge is comparable to approaching a 
palace and entering it to adore its interior or hiking up a mountain to obtain a 
better view. Each individual has a relatively advanced view that corresponds to his 
position or nearness to a centre.2 This idea of knowledge highly suggests relativity. 
Habib Malik observed that al-Khaṭīb precedes later Sunnī renowned epistemologist 
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (505/1111) in his intellectual exposition of the relation 
between knowledge, effort, the highest rutbah (rank), and happiness in both worlds 
(here and the hereafter).3 Al-Ghazālī, however, expanded the discourse to suffuse 
within it his mystical theory of perpetual love of God, yet, still maintained the 
                                                        
1 Iqtiḍāʾ, 31. 
2 FWM, 2:8-9. 




different degrees between men in knowledge, which entails the same in his theory 
of love.4  
While al-Khaṭīb speaks of riḍā (contentment), al-Ghazālī speaks of love. Both 
cited tradition, particularly the famous Muʿādh speech, however, with Abū 
Hurayrah as the transmitter from the Prophet in al-Khaṭīb’s version. It reads: 
‘Learn knowledge, for learning is a virtuous act, studying constitutes the 
glorification of God, searching for it is a jihād (praiseworthy struggle), 
teaching it to those who do not know is a charity and delivering it to those 
worthy of it is an act of drawing closer to God. Knowledge is a light on the 
path for the people of Heaven, a companion during loneliness, a friend 
during estrangement, a guide in darkness, a converser during seclusion, 
and a weapon to use against the contenders. God elevates certain people 
through knowledge to high ranks, and He makes them the greatest of 
guides to metaphysical goodness, and leaders towards His guidance whom 
people can emulate. Their workmanship would be witnessed, angels desire 
to befriend them, and they hold them dearly with their wings. Everything 
wet or dry invokes God to forgive them, even the fish in the sea, the insects 
on the land, the wild beasts in the desert and the stars in the sky. Verily, 
knowledge is the life of hearts against ignorance and the lamp of the eyes 
against darkness. By virtue of knowledge, a servant obeys God, worships 
Him, praises Him, and ties of kinship are kept, and the lawful and the 
unlawful also become distinguished. It is the leader of the mind, and action 
follows its lead. God inspires it to the happy souls and deprives it from the 
wretched. There is no goodness in an act of worship deprived of 
comprehension, and no goodness in a recitation without pure intention 
and thorough contemplation. A little of comprehension is better than a lot 
of service. One second in the sitting of comprehension is better than a year 
of service.’5  
 Both al-Khaṭīb and al-Ghazālī, nevertheless, agreed that effort and obedience 
is the path to salvation in the hereafter. However, al-Khaṭīb’s intellectual audience 
seems to have questioned the status of mere obedience in comparison to intellectual 
or philosophical endeavours. Ironically, a number of traditionalists had also 
                                                        
4 According to al-Ghazālī, love depends on knowledge. Consequently, the best lover is the best 
knower of God and the world. Binyamin Abrahamov, Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism: The Teachings of 
al-Ghazali and al-Dabbagh (Routledge: 2003), 85. 
5 It is a statement attributed widely to the Companion Muʿādh ibn Jabal and sometimes to the 
Prophet. Al-Khaṭīb was the only muḥaddith who documented it as marfūʿ (said by the Prophet) on the 




reported a dictum that indicates certain occasion where having knowledge is better 
than offering services (al-ʿilm fīhi khayrun min al-ʿamal).6 Al-Khaṭīb addresses this 
issue uttering: 
‘Do not feel satisfied with actions so long as you are lacking in knowledge. 
Nor feel satisfied with knowledge so long as you fall short of breeding 
actions. Rather, combine them both, even if your share of the two is small 
… A little of this alongside a little of that is what is most likely to save you 
in the end, when God bestows His mercy upon His servant and completes 
His favour upon him.’7 
 This statement reflects his middle position on the debate between 
authenticity (ṣawāb) and sincerity (ikhlāṣ). As knowledge is not the aim in itself, al-
Khaṭīb cautioned the philosophers and theologians who pursued authenticity and 
mocked the public’s sincere worship. He quoted Jesus’s warning against ʿulamāʾ al-sūʾ 
(corrupted intellectuals) and their misguiding of people from al-falāḥ (great 
happiness) in the hereafter.8 
3.2 The Problem of Defining Knowledge 
 A reader of al-Khaṭīb’s works would find it perplexing to understand the idea 
of knowledge he pursued. On the one hand, al-Khaṭīb, being a scholar of traditions 
seems to allocate all his attention to the compilation, retracement, analysis and 
verification of ḥadīth. He simultaneously speaks about seeking knowledge as if the 
only knowledge that matters is the knowledge of ḥadīth. He even argues against his 
contenders in various issues based on the impressions of ḥadīth.9 On the other hand, 
he seems to echo former theologians and Sunnī legal theorists who adopted that 
individual reports or recounts, inter alia, ḥadīth, do not yield knowledge. Moreover, 
he prepared a section in his book on ḥadīth principles to refute those who hold that 
                                                        
6 Ibn Abī ʿĀsim, al-Āḥād wa’l-Mathānī (Riyadh: Dār al-Rāyah, 1991), 2:144(864) and Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, 
Jāmiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1994), 1:114(103). Also: Muwaḍḍiḥ, 1:108.  
7 Iqtiḍāʾ, 14-15. 
8 Ibid, 67. 
9 See his works on disputed aḥkām in previous chapter. 
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individual reports yield knowledge, a position that apparently goes against the 
whole scholarship of the traditionalists and the book itself.10  
In an article on the “truth” of ḥadīth, Jonathan Brown addresses a similar 
question. He notices the equation of knowledge with Aristotelian certainty and the 
influence of philosophical certainty on many modern treatments of this subject.11 
Brown observed that Wael Hallaq and classical Muslim legal theorists had  
established that even if ḥadīth were verified as ṣaḥīḥ (sound), they were only 
epistemologically probable (ẓann).12 According to Brown, the ambiguous 
certain/probable dichotomy in Hallaq’s exposition could mislead readers into 
thinking that the probable state of ḥadīth signifies effective doubt concerning its 
reliability. Brown further suggests the notion of “approximate certainty”, which 
informs and converges with the epistemological scale and gradation of the 
formative Partisans of Ḥadīth, instead of binary certainty.13 We may assume that 
based on Brown’s analysis, knowledge in the mind of ḥadīth scholars signify 
effective truth acquired from the attainment of approximate certainty. 
 While Brown’s analysis assists in appreciating the scholarship of the 
traditionists, Hallaq’s conclusion reaffirmed al-Khaṭīb’s assertion. The appearance 
of the term ẓann (conventionally translated as probable) associated with individual 
reports in the latter’s writing and other legal theorists exposes a ḥadīth practitioner 
to a possibility of contradicting the Qurʾanic injunction; abiding with knowledge and 
                                                        
10 Dhikr shubhah man zaʿama anna khabar al-wāḥid yūjib al-ʿilm wa ibṭāluhā al-Kifāyah, 1:123. 
11 The Certainty of Aristotle is knowledge that could not be otherwise. Certainty in daily discourse is 
the common-sense certainty of Thomas Reid and the commanding probability of Hume, not the 
epistemological certainty of Descartes. See: Jonathan Brown, “Did the Prophet Say It or Not?: The 
Literal, Historical and Effective Truth of Hadiths in Sunni Islam.” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society 129.2 (2009): 259-285. 
12 Wael Hallaq, “The Authenticity of Prophetic Ḥadīth: A Pseudo-problem,” Studia Islamica 99 (1999): 
75-90. 
13 Brown employs Lincoln’s speech at the Gettysburg Address of 1863 to show that as an object of 
historical truth, our generation may only be “certain” of the “gist” of Lincoln’s message. Brown 
conflates here aḥād reports with tawātur maʿnawī that will be presented in a future chapter.  
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staying away from ẓann (conjecture).14 Brown attempted to explain the linguistic 
twist to the meaning of ẓann applied by the traditionalists. Hallaq and Brown both 
noticed the solution by way of Consensus where Sunnī scholars introduced and 
endorsed the concept of “sufficient ẓann” for ḥadīth application in certain areas.15 
This is intuitively, as Brown submits, not sufficient to explain relentless debates 
amongst the scholars that have been based on ḥadīth especially in theological issues, 
let alone the psychological effect of ḥadīth upon the masses. Furthermore, al-Khaṭīb 
had succinctly emphasised:   
‘Individually reported statements (āḥād) cannot be accepted in matters of 
religion which necessitate apodictic knowledge and an absolute answer 
(final settlement). The reason for this is if one does not know 
incontrovertibly that the report represents the words of the Messenger, one 
is even less informed about the idea it bears.’16 
 In response to this statement, Brown mentioned that few spokesmen for the 
institutionalised Sunnism of the fifth/eleventh century had already absorbed the 
epistemological framework of Muslim rationalists. In the case of al-Khaṭīb, 
something similar has been said about him by the Ḥashawīs. It is crucial, therefore, 
to find a coherent explanation to al-Khaṭīb’s idea of knowledge and analyse the way 
it coalesces with his personal scholarship and his vision of traditional Sunnī 
epistemology.  
3.3 The Nexus between Religious and Philosophical Knowledge 
 In the Venture of Islam, Hodgson outlined elaborately the encounter of 
Abrahamic monotheistic traditions with Irano-Semitic culture traditions. The latter 
vindicates the rational orders of the universe as the source of knowledge, ever since 
                                                        
14 See: Kassim Ahmad, Ḥadīth: A Re-Evaluation, trans. Syed Akbar ʿAlī (Universal Unity, 1997), 45. 
Kassim argues that many religious books written by men are merely guesswork and conjecture. See 
the early origin of this idea attributed to the Ẓāhirī al-Qāsānī in: Aaron Zysow, The Economy of 
Certainty (Georgia: Lockwood Press, 2013), 30-31. 
15 See unit-tradition in: Zysow, Economy, 22-33. 
16 al-Kifāyah, 2: 258. Brown’s translation of ‘abwāb al-dīn al-maʾkhūdh ʿalā al-mukallafīn’ as theology does 
not suit the whole framework of al-Khaṭīb’s scholarship. Al-Khaṭīb had few works on theological 
subjects based on ḥadīth. A further explanation will be given afterwards. 
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the Cuneiform time, instead of moral judgements of history venerated by the 
former. The independence of the two dialogues has also been reflected in their 
linguistic differences.17 The Hellenisation of rationalistic traditions, however, 
opened the doors for the encounter between Muslim and Greek traditions inherited 
within the Sasanian and Roman provinces at the time of Arab conquest. In the midst 
of these staggering cultural exchanges, especially later on in Baghdād, Muʿtazilī 
thinkers emerged as the proponents of rational tradition. They initiated apologetic 
discourse to prove that nothing in the Qurʾān is repugnant to systematic reasoning, 
and subsequently embarked on the endeavour to discover the theory of everything 
based on highly complicated speculations.18 In a study on the renaissance of Islam, 
Adam Mez remarked that the Muʿtazilah drew everything into the meshes of their 
speculations and craved for all knowledge.19  
Certainly, the most challenging issue with regard to understanding the 
essence of knowledge within the Abrahamic-Hellenic plane is the understanding of 
the knowledge of God and its relation to human knowledge. The answer given by 
the first comprehensive integrative approach to religion and cosmology proposed 
by Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (235/805) acquired great rejection from the scholars of 
the Sharīʿah (religious jurisdiction, lit. water tract).20 As a scholar of Sharīʿah, al-
Khaṭīb preserved the conflict between the two trains of thought concluding that al-
ʿAllāf has turned God into knowledge and power by abstracting God of attributes, 
and explaining His knowledge and power as His essence.21 The Muʿtazilīs were 
                                                        
17 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 1:410, Also: 
Majid Fakhry, Philosophy, Dogma and the Impact of Greek Thought in Islam (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 
1994). 
18 On the hegemony of the Muʿtazilah, see: Mustafa Shah, “Kalām: Rational Expressions of Medieval 
Theological Thought,” in Houari Touati (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Mediterranean Humanism, Spring 
2014, http://www.encyclopedie-humanisme.com/Islamic-Kalām 
19 Mez, The Renaissance, 264. 
20 On early discourse that relates to the problem of attribute, see: Richard Frank, “Attribute, 
Attribution and Being: Three Islamic Views,” in Texts and Studies on the Development and History of 
Kalām, ed. Dimitri Gutas, vol. III: Classical Islamic Theology: The Ashʿarites (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Variorum, 2008), V:258-278. 
21 Al-Khaṭīb stated: ‘He uttered blasphemous statements and deviated from the ijmāʿ of the Muslim 
Community.’ TMS, 4:582. 
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relatively pursuing the unity of God and they refused to subscribe to eternal 
composition of Divine attributes, which denotes multiplicity. In their scheme of 
thought, integration of religious knowledge and philosophical knowledge is of high 
importance as insisted by al-Jāḥiẓ.22 
 Philosophy, the peak of cosmology and rational discourse, however, is 
concerned with universality, the permanently valid truth. Therefore, it 
conceptualises knowledge as a matter of timeless concepts, essences and natural 
laws.23 The cosmos is replete with differing changes and conflicts, which are the 
subjects of particularities and not of the realm of the universals. The history of 
Islam had witnessed civil wars amongst the early generations and conflicting 
reports were transmitted concerning the events of the past. Naturally, there exist 
scepticism on the philosophical side towards the conflicting reports transmitted 
individually by unbounded mass of the great Muslim community. While this is 
intellectually challenging, ultimately it threatens the concept of religion itself for 
religion is outside individual experience. Islam particularly, can only be known 
through reports from past recipients. Hence, there arises the question of the 
authenticity of past reports and religious knowledge.24 
3.4 Existence and the Formation of Ḍarūrī Knowledge 
 Insufficient philosophical study has been made on realisation (wajd) or 
availability (mawjūd) in the formative period of Islam because most of the potential 
resources do not exist.25 Despite the application of the concept in mystical, 
theological and psychological treatises and discourse, it has rarely been pointed out 
                                                        
22 ‘One is not a master of the kalām universe until what he has mastered with regard to the religious 
discourse is equal to what he mastered concerning philosophical discourse.’ al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-
Ḥayawān (Cairo: al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1965), 2:134. See also: Richard Frank, “Remarks on the Early 
Development of the Kalām,” in Texts and Studies, vol. I: Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism in 
Medieval Islam, (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2005), VI:315-329. 
23 Hodgson, Venture, 1:440. Cf. Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation against theologians on the subject of 
changes and ḥarakāt: Darʾ Taʿāruḍ, 1::320. 
24 Bernard Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past: The Theory of “Tawātur” According to Ghazālī,” Studia 
Islamica 61 (1985): 81-105. 
25 It is to be distinguished from studies on the existence of God. 
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that the semantic compass of the root w-j-d may establish a relation between wujūd 
as in physical existence and wajada as in internal rational or psychological 
realisation.26 It illustrates the function of Arabic linguistic sophistication to 
intellectually construct the concept of knowledge from the realisation27 of the 
sensory experience.28 This is also helpful in explaining the resemblance between 
the exposition of the concept of human knowledge by Muslim theologians and ideas 
germane to sensory knowledge. Simon Van-Den-Bergh suggested that Muslim 
theologians initially followed the Greek empiricists who take the existence of a 
country or town as true knowledge when it was obtained through sensory 
experience, namely the eyewitness (αυτόπτης). Muslims, however, expanded the 
concept in their bifurcation of historical knowledge.29  
The sensory experience of an existence by itself and an occurrence of 
knowledge by itself30 are both without any conscious individual human 
intervention. This informs the concept of ḍarūrī, which is the term for forcefully 
imparted, immediate or necessary knowledge. Studying this notion as expounded 
by a number of theologians, Abrahamov concluded that ḍarūrī knowledge could be 
defined by five criteria: (a) occurrence without one’s power (b) necessity (c) 
production by God (d) absence of doubt and (e) absence of speculation.31  
Al-Khaṭīb had cited the Ashʿarī al-Bāqillānī (402/1012) on the subject of 
ḍarūrī knowledge. When al-Bāqillānī was asked about it, he explained the relation 
                                                        
26 Realisation here and afterwards is used in the sense of Old French reel, which signifies actually 
existing, and real. 
27 The verbal noun is crucial to illustrate al-Ashʿarī’s assertion that knowledge is gained through the 
realisation, not the realities. 
28 The German philosopher J. G. Herder was one of the pioneers who maintain that thought is 
essentially dependent on language. A nation’s perception of the universe and its way of articulating 
its thought is highly influenced by its language system, vocabulary, semantic, syntax and structure. 
See: Michael Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2010), 16 and 50.  
29 Such as Alexandria, Crete, Sicily, and Sardinia in Galen’s writings. See: Simon Van Den Bergh, 
Averroes Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (London: Gibb Memorial, 1969), 2:16.  
30 Both can be represented by the term wujūd. 
31 Binyamin Abrahamov, “Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology,” British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 20:1(1993): 20-32. 
97 
 
between realisation (wajada) and ḍarūrī knowledge. When asked about the sign of 
ḍarūrah, he pointed out:  
‘We realised (wajada) that the knowledge they told us [i.e. of ḍarūrī] is at the 
same level as knowledge we perceived (adraka) through our senses, and at 
the same level with what we realised (wajada) in ourselves with the absence 
of doubt, and that the same knowledge is shared by women, the public and 
uneducated persons who do not exercise speculation (naẓar). This proves 
that this particular knowledge is one which is forcefully imparted (ḍarūrī).’32  
 Furthermore, al-Bāqillānī’s student, ʿAbd al-Qāhir divides ḍarūrī knowledge 
into two kinds: (i) self-evident (ἀξίωμα) or a priori knowledge (ʿilm badīhī), and (ii) 
sense perception (ʿilm ḥissī). Regarding the positive axiomatic knowledge, he 
mentioned the knowledge of wujūd (the real existence) of oneself and what a person 
realises (wajada) of pain, pleasure, hunger, etc.33 When speaking of sense 
perception, he stressed that kull mawjūd (all existing things) can potentially be 
perceived.34 
 Additionally, the notion of “our realisation through sensory experience” has 
played an important role in many areas of Muslim intellectual discourse. Prior to 
the exposition made by al-Baqillānī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī applied this notion as 
the proof for theological truth in the putative al-Ibānah, having forwarded it 
assertively as ḍarūrī knowledge. When argued by the Muʿtazilah that God cannot sit 
on the Throne since His existence in a specific place would imply tashbīh (equating 
God with spatial-bound creation),35 al-Ashʿarī replied: ‘we saw (raʾaynā) [essentially 
sensed] all Muslims raised their hands towards heaven when they pray to God. If He 
were not on the Throne, they would not raise their hands towards it.’36 This answer 
represents at least the thinking of fellows of ḥadīth.37 According to Abrahamov, this 
                                                        
32 al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd al-Awāʾil wa Talkhīṣ al-Dalāʾil (Beirut: Maktabah Sharqiyyah, 1957), 383. 
33 He also mentioned negative axiomatic knowledge. However, we are concerned in this chapter with 
the use of wujūd. 
34 ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-Dīn (Istanbul: Maṭbaʿat al-Dawlah, 1928), 8-9. 
35 On the concept of tashbīh, see: Zulfiqar Ali Shah, Anthropomorphic Depictions of God (Herndon: IIIT, 
2012), 545. 
36 al-Ashʿarī, al-Ibānah ʿan Uṣūl al-Diyānah (Cairo: Dār al-Anṣār, 1977), 2:107 
37 Al-Ashʿarī was formerly a Muʿtazilī but later identified himself with fellows of ḥadīth. 
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answer was rather simplistic, but was later usefully explained and associated by al-
Rāzī with the proof of fiṭrah (natural disposition) in man.38 We may notice how the 
existence of certain practice amongst the masses was transformed by these 
theologians into the proof of fiṭrah, which implies necessary truth and knowledge, 
for one cannot repudiate it from oneself. This relationship between existence and 
necessary truth is crucial to understand al-Khaṭīb’s forthcoming statements. 
3.5 Ḍarūrī, Human Power and the Epistemology of Iʿjāz (Disempowering) 
The Ashʾarīs were chiefly concerned with the relation of God’s power to 
human’s powerful actions. This concern is strikingly woven into their conceptions 
of human knowledge, an approach that is also apparent in al-Khaṭīb’s work. When 
defining ḍarūrī knowledge, al-Baqillānī stated that it was forcefully imparted in man 
that he has no imkān (ability) to disown or have suspicion about its object.39 ʿAbd al-
Qāhir gave qudrah (power) as the measure for ḍarūrī knowledge since this 
knowledge is realised independent of the power of man.40 It is at this point that the 
Ashʿarī position is distinguished from that of the Muʿtazilah. The Ashʿarīs attempted 
to maintain both God’s omnipotence and God’s justice. They were not content with 
the Muʿtazilī integrative solution that to logically understand Divine justice, man 
must be made fully responsible for his own action. God must submit to the moral 
law that he will only punish man for his own non-predestined activity.41 This 
perception of Muʿtazilī’s thought was preserved by al-Khaṭīb in his entry on ʿAmru 
ibn ʿUbayd.42 Moreover, al-Khaṭīb called them Qadarī Muʿtazilīs, which indicates 
indeterminism as the basis of their thought. To preserve God’s omnipotence, al-
Ashʿarī maintains that God is ultimately the only agent and He creates absolutely 
everything apart from Himself, including human actions. However, in order to 
                                                        
38 On al-fiṭrah al-aṣliyyah, see: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 
1987), 3:164. 
39 al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 7. 
40 al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl, 8.  
41 Richard Frank, “Two Islamic Views of Human Agency,” in Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Dimitri 
Gutas, VI:37-49.  
42 TMS, 14:63. 
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preserve God’s justice, he introduces the theory of acquisition (al-kasb), where 
despite their actions being created by God, it is humans who select the appropriate 
actions and therefore become responsible for them.43  
With the introduction of this theory, it is easy to apprehend the ḍarūrī/kasbī 
relation regarding the reality of knowledge and human responsibility of seeking 
knowledge. According to Ibn Fūrak (406/1015), al-Ashʿarī highlighted that: 
‘The native knowledge (ḍarūrī) is the basis (uṣūl) for the acquired knowledge 
(kasbī). The person who seeks evidence (mustadill) would only perform that 
action in order to know what he has not yet known by virtue of speculation 
based on the force of what he has natively known and conflating the former 
with the latter. When they coalesce mentally (fī al-maʿnā), he is able to 
inform a coherent conclusion mentally and extra-mentally (fī al-ḥukm). That 
is when he has fulfilled the right of speculation (ḥaqq al-naẓar) and met all its 
stipulations.44   
 Al-Ashaʿrī instates here the idea of valid speculation. Hence, we find al-
Baqillānī preparing his readers with the ḍarūrī-ness of the Qurʾān when he 
constructs his concept of iʿjāz al-Qrʾān (how the Qurʾān proves its independency from 
man power; disempowering man). Al-Baqillānī demanded first the approval of wujūd 
(existence) and taẓāhur (empirically sensed by multiple sides) of the Qurʾān itself 
from his respondents.45 This is his first principle. The second principle reads that 
the use of man’s power to produce the same has only experienced failure throughout 
history. Apart from applying a historical proof, al-Baqillānī’s implicit strategy 
behind this second principle is the concept of ʿādah (repetition or customary 
pattern).46  
                                                        
43 It is also worth noting that according to al-Ashʿarī, the act in the acquisition of knowledge and the 
acquisition too are chosen and performed by man, yet God creates that particular act and that 
particular knowledge. This distinguishes his position from the Muʿtazilah when they hold that al-
naẓar yuwalliduhu (speculation generates knowledge). Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī’l-
Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987), 19. See also: Frank Griffel on Ashʿarite occasionalism in 
the generations before al-Ghazālī in: Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology (Oxford: oxford University 
Press, 2009), 124-27. 
44 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 13-14. 
45 Wa-idhā thabata hādha al-asl wujūdan. al-Bāqillānī, Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif), 17.  
46 Even though in the Ashʿarī scheme, a cause (sabab) has no organic independent effect on the 
caused (musabbab), and their relationship is merely learned in customary human experience, which 




Already in the Ashʿarīs writings, they established that God is the immediate 
and only cause of everything. This, according to Nicholas Heer, is helpful to explain 
that acts contrary to the customary pattern are immediately caused by God, a sign 
for metaphysical realm. Hence, the occurrence of this type of act at the claim of 
Prophethood proves that the Prophet has a direct contact with God.47 Conversely, 
the inability of anyone to produce the same as the Qurʾān proves that it is beyond 
human customary acts.  
 This concept of muʿjizah can be sensed in the writings of many Ashʿarīs. Al-
Khaṭīb exhibits a similar understanding. In his comment on the study of astrology, 
he said: 
‘Even when a true reading is found (wujida) in the practice of a person who 
claimed mastery of this field, his errors are much more. His true reading will 
not redeem a tenth of one tenth of his errors. The real occurrence is merely 
a coincidence ... One should not say that it is reliable based on that 
incidence, neither act upon it. Only if true prediction repeats, his words are 
found honest many times, his judgment is right likewise, and he was not 
proven wrong except a small number of time, then we recognise his noble 
mastery and we testify it as a miracle (muʿjizah).’48 
 This statement exemplifies how ʿādah (repetitive pattern) and counter-ʿādah 
were conceptualised as valid sources for knowledge. Through the concept of iʿjāz al-
Qurʾān, the Ashʿarīs were convinced that they have maintained both: (1) the truth of 
the Qurʾān and the Prophet, and (2) the human right and ability to selectively 
speculate the knowledge of the truth.49 Consequently, luzūm al-ḥujjah (the demand of 
                                                                                                                                                              
informs a certain level of truth.  A counter customary pattern (khāriq al-ʿādah) signifies a higher 
realm since it is a truth of immediate cause. Hodgson, Venture, 1:443. 
47 Nicholas Heer, “The Proof for the Truthfulness of the Prophet” (paper presented at the 1967 
annual meeting of the Western Branch of the American Oriental Society in Portland, Oregon, 2006, 
updated 2013). 
48 al-Qawl-fī-al-Nujūm, 58. 
49 Speculation therefore could be based adequately on religious sources and intellectual sources. The 
Ashʿarīs constructed two epistemological routes for knowledge: sensory experience and religious 
sources to respond to the Muʿtazilī’s supremacy of reason. See: Ulrich Rudolph, “Ratio und 
Überlieferung in der Erkenntnislehre al-Ašʿarī’s und al-Māturīdī’s,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen 
Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 142 (1992), 72-89. Rudolph stated: ‘Ersteres besteht unter anderem aus 
den Erkenntnissen der Sinne und aus gesicherter Überlieferung, das andere erwirbt man durch die 




the compelling argument) can be understood as explained by al-Bāqillānī.50 It is, 
therefore, understandable to find al-Khaṭīb’s emphasis on the Prophethood and 
muʿjizah of the Prophet, albeit briefly, at the beginning of his exposition of the 
Sunnah of Muhammad.51 
3.6 The Metaphysical Realism and Iktisābī Knowledge 
 This section considers the question: how does theological epistemology 
converge with legal judgement and the study of ḥadīth? On further examination, the 
aforementioned connection of ḍarūrī with kasbī shares a similar logic to that 
observed by Joseph Lowry from the metaphysical realism of al-Shāfiʿī. This helps to 
enrich the explanation of the proximity between Ashʿarism and Shāfiʿism.52 Lowry 
extrapolates from al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Risālah the relationship between revelation and law 
in the scholar’s epistemology. On the one hand, revelation is all encompassing and 
never self-contradictory. On the other, law is often a result of hermeneutics and 
manipulation of texts. Lowry then concludes that al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of ijtihād (legal 
inference) implicitly holds that the correct answer to a legal question has an 
objective, metaphysical existence.53 Consequently, ijtihād is an endeavour to seek 
that truth despite human limitations. Thus, the relation between al-ḥaqq (the truth) 
and ijtihād becomes similar to the relation that the abovementioned scholars 
established between the ultimate end of ḍarūrī knowledge and the result of the valid 
kasbī knowledge. According to al-Ashʿarī, human knowledge of Allah is iktisābī in this 
world, based on al-naẓar wa al-istidlāl (speculation and indicant-cognition), but it is 
ḍarūrī in the hereafter, where people necessarily know Allah.54 Where there is an 
                                                                                                                                                              
mögliche Grundlagen, weil sie sowohl von den gesicherten Daten der Sinneswahrnehmung wie auch 
von den Aussagen der Überlieferung ausgehen kann.’ 
50 The concept of ḥujjah will be explained in a future section. 
51 FWM, 1:277.  
52 They share a similar epistemological scheme. al-Ṣafadī stated that many Ḥanafīs were Muʿtazilīs, 
many Shāfiʿīs were Ashʿarīs, many Mālikīs were Jabriyyah and many Ḥanbalīs were Ḥashawīs. See: al-
Ghayth al-Musjam fī Sharḥ Lāmiyat al-ʿAjam (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1990), 2:55. 
53 Joseph Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 245-247. 
54 The author uses the name Allah here for there is a significant strategy in the Ashʿarīs writings to 
differ between al-Ṣāniʿ (Maker) and Allah. 
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ideal ijtihād in al-Shāfiʿī’s scheme, there also exist an ideal speculation in al-Ashʿarī’s 
scheme. Both the ijtihād endeavour and the kasbī knowledge, or more appropriately 
called iktisāb, have potential in regards to the objects of truth (al-ḥaqq). 
 Al-Khaṭīb makes it crystal clear when he applies this notion to the legitimacy 
of the Sunnah of Muḥammad. He commented on the part of human limitation: ‘I 
swear, by my life, that the sunan [of Muḥammad] and the facets of Truth are often 
contrary to the logical inference, in fact, extremely divergent. Nevertheless, Muslims 
are obliged to follow and submit to them.’55 Al-Khaṭīb then exploited the story of 
Moses and the righteous servant, conventionally identified as Khiḍr, and pointed out 
how Moses was sceptical of the latter’s acts until God unveiled (kashafa) the truth to 
Moses.56 This is to explain the issue of knowing the final answer based on sole 
rational faculty, exemplified in multiple attitudes towards revelation. Al-Khaṭīb 
asserted that there exist metaphysical realities (uṣūl), which would explain away the 
apparently unreasonable sunan (metaphorically: pathways) if they were unveiled to 
humans (law kushifa li’l-nās).57 However, al-Khaṭīb believes that it is thoughtless for a 
person to avoid following the injunction of the Sunnah just because God has yet to 
unveil the wisdom behind it. 
 It is crucial to note that al-Khaṭīb used the term Sunnah and sunan when 
attending to this subject instead of individual reports or ḥadīth. By virtue of ḍarūrī 
and kasbī theory alongside the concepts of the veiled haqq and ijtihād, al-Khaṭīb 
found a support for the Sunnī stance on following the Sunnah of the Prophet. This is 
despite the epistemological uncertainties in its channels and the selective nature of 
its execution. We may also infer that the term istidlālī is often used instead of iktisābī 
and ijtihādī for it encompasses the significance of both notions regarding intellectual 
                                                        
55 FWM, 1:393. Al-Khaṭīb listed here six examples in the ruling of compensation (diyah) that do not 
make sense according to rational thought. 
56 Ibid, 1:395-396. 
57 This constructs naẓar as a movement and the words muqārabat al-ṣawāb (being closer to the truth) 




endeavour.58 For this reason as well, al-Khaṭīb initiated his seminal work on ḥadīth 
criticism, al-Kifāyah, with a chapter on human responsibility and equated Sunnah 
with the Qurʾān in demanding iktisāb (acts) and taklīf (commanding responsibility).59 
3.7 Shāfiʿism and Sunnī Istidlāl 
In addition to the metaphysical realism of al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Risālah, al-Khaṭīb’s 
concept of Sunnī istidlāl seems to be deeply rooted and developed on the theory of 
Sunnī bayān. Initially, when metaphysics and revelation constitute coequal principles 
as explained above; it ultimately projects revelation as expression (bayān) of 
metaphysical truths (uṣūl).60 Regarding this, al-Khaṭīb cited al-Shīrāzī who defines 
bayān as the dalīl (indicant) that leads to the correct object by virtue of valid 
speculation.61 To further connect istidlāl with ḥadīth, al-Khaṭīb mentions the 
truthfulness of the Prophet as an individual reporter. He asserted that a report of 
the Prophet from God, despite being alone in his claim, must yield knowledge - in 
the sense that Muslims know theologically that it is necessarily true. This assertion 
was also based on the absence of fundamental distinction between the Prophet’s 
model and his deliverance of God’s scripture.62 Consequently, it affirms the theory of 
istidlāl and buttresses the potentiality of all statements related to the Sunnah for they 
are the pathways to the ultimate objects of truth. On this elaboration, the bayān-
istidlāl notion at the time of al-Khaṭīb may have been infused with the theological 
epistemology of Ashʿarism. 
The theology of muʿjizah should have sufficed al-Khaṭīb to argue for the 
Sunnah, following Qurʾanic injunctions concerning the Prophetic model. 
                                                        
58  On the connection between theological dalīl, madlūl, dalālah and istidlāl with σημειον, σημειωτον and 
others, see: Van Ess, “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology,” in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, 
ed. G.E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1970).   
59 al-Kifāyah, 1:90. 
60 God’s self-disclosure is the bedrock and fundamental presupposition of any theological activity. 
John Renand, Islamic Theological Themes (Univ. of California, 2014), 164. 
61 FWM, 1:316. 
62 Kassim Ahmad, Ḥadīth, 56. He argues that Prophet Muḥammad’s sole mission was to deliver the 
divine message, the Qurʾān. His model is of secondary subject.  
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Nevertheless, the language of Shāfiʿī’s hermeneutic was also dominant in the works 
of al-Khaṭīb.63 The second chapter of al-Kifāyah points out two functions of the 
Sunnah with regards to the Qurʾān: takhṣīṣ (specification) and tafsīr wa-bayān 
(explanation).64 Burton has observed that al-Shāfiʿī’s hermeneutical techniques to 
explain any conflict between Qurʾān and fiqh (Sunnah) can be summarised into two 
words: takhṣīṣ and bayān. Burton even goes further to state that takhṣīṣ is a form of 
bayān.65 This observation would suggest that the traditional epistemology of al-
Khaṭīb is fundamentally Shāfiʿī’s. It implies that his development of ḥadīth principles 
of criticism was also based on the hermeneutics of an authority. On the other hand, 
it serves as an important indicator of the influence of al-Shāfiʿī on ḥadīth studies, 
despite being largely ignored by ḥadīth critics in the technical exploitation of the 
discipline as studied by Scott Lucas.66  
Burton, however, opined that al-Shāfiʿī’s bayān was a product of the 
circumstances of his time. He avers that ‘it was the circulation of conflicting ḥadīths 
rather than the Qurʾān’s ambiguity which provoked his theory of bayān.’67 A 
polemical reading would suggest that certain norms and practices were raised to the 
status of Sunnah through exploitation of projected ḥadīth and the bayān theory was 
subsequently developed to win over the polemics and construct orthodoxy.68 While 
presenting the need to specify Qurʾanic injunctions, al-Khaṭīb shows how the Sunnah 
establishes that difference in religion disqualifies inheritance allowed in the Qurʾān 
between parents and offspring without specification. There arises a question on the 
authenticity of this specific condition as a Sunnah and not a selective construction of 
orthodoxy. Al-Khaṭīb conferred a double route method in his presentation: istiqrār 
al-ʿamal (the established practice) and the presumably non-orthodox based isnād 
                                                        
63 See Chapter Five. 
64 John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1990), 139-140. 
65 Ibid, 146. 
66 Lucas, Constructive, 151.  
67 Burton, Sources, 139. 
68 For al-Shāfiʿī’s argument for the authority of Sunnah and his linkage of obedience to the Prophet 
with bayān theory, see: Lowry, Legal Theory, 174. 
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(transmission).69 Already in Kitāb al-Faqīh, he cited the Shāfiʿī Ibn al-Qāṣṣ al-Ṭabarī 
(335/946) arguing for the nexus between Sharīʿah (the established practice) and 
reports of practice. Ibn al-Qāṣṣ stated: ‘whosoever denounces akhbār (reports) [of the 
narrators]; he, in effect, denounces the Sharīʿah (traditional legal practice).’ 
However, due to the reliance of certain practice on a certain agreement, he 
furthered: ‘whosoever denounces Consensus; he, in effect, denounces his Prophet.’70 
The fact that both transmission and agreement are potential, and not final, al-Khaṭīb 
cited al-Shāfiʿī alluding to this double route strategy:  
‘The basis is either Qurʾān or Sunnah. If [an answer] cannot be found in them, 
then a reasoning imitative (qiyās) to their internal patterns [is applied]. 
When a statement is transmitted unbrokenly in succession (isnād) to the 
Prophet and the transmission is safe and sound, then it affirms a Sunnah. 
Recurrent affirmations (ijmāʿ) are greater in strength than a sole reporter.’71  
The ideal mutual confirmation between ḥadīth and ʿamal/ijmāʿ was clearly 
emphasised in this scheme. It suggests variably that al-Khaṭīb’s istidlāl 
methodology was developed on the basis of an orthodox epistemology. 
 However, Lowry argues that despite Burton’s fervent observation, it was 
rather limited. According to Lowry, ‘the concept of bayān aims to demonstrate that 
the Qurʾān and the Sunnah function together, in several different ways, to express 
rules of law,’ and mainly indicates the model principles of source-interaction. The 
possible contradictions in the evidences could be resolved by several hermeneutical 
techniques termed generally as taʾwīl.72 Taʿwīl in one of its functions serves as an 
istidlālī tool to piece them together. Hence, the term bayān, which also signifies 
                                                        
69 al-Kifāyah, 1:99. Al-Khaṭīb argued that the isnād tradition is beyond sectarian filter. Kassim Ahmad 
had also subscribed to the concept of religious practices handed down through generations. Kassim, 
Ḥadīth, 56 (4). 
70 Either denounces the historical fact on the existence of the Prophet or the Prophetic ḥadīth on 
ijmāʿ. 
71 FWM, 1:533. 
72 Lowry, Legal Theory, 48. See Chapter Two. 
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clarity73 was conceptualised. This coalesces soundly with Vishanoff’s conclusion that 
al-Shāfiʿī’s comprehensive legal system ‘combined the scripturalist impulse to 
ground all law in the Qurʾān, with the traditionists’ reliance on reports, and with the 
rationalist jurists’ reliance on analogical reasoning.’74 This is a meticulous 
observation that proposes interdepending sources. However, instead of limiting the 
theory to intertextuality, it would be more fitting to underline that al-Shāfiʿī was 
grounding an inter-indicants “clarificatory” relationship which poses both stability 
(revelation and hermeneutical principles), and dynamicity (ambiguity and 
contradiction in human transmission and interpretation). Vishanoff argues that al-
Shāfiʿī blended together concepts from exegesis of the Qurʾān, law and even 
theology.75 This inter-indicant coherence theory can be proved to have been 
expanded by later Shāfiʿīs to furnish the Sunnī concept of al-naẓar wa al-istidlāl as will 
be shown in the next section.  On another important note, the dynamics that 
preserve human right to choose the appropriate naẓar on evidences sits 
conveniently with the Ashʿarī’s iktisāb al-naẓar al-ḥaqq. 
3.8 Sources for Speculative Endeavour and Indicant-Cognition 
 Al-Khaṭīb dedicated a large part of his work, Kitāb al-Faqīh, to elucidating the 
method of the valid naẓar (speculation). It begins with the section on al-naẓar wa al-
mujādalah (speculation and disputation). He defines naẓar after specifying the naẓar 
of the qalb (insight) as having a thought on the contemplated objects (al-fikr fī ḥāl al-
manẓūr fīhi).76 The same definition was provided by al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, Ibn Fūrak, 
al-Shīrāzī, and even Abū Yaʿlā.77 Al-Khaṭīb subsequently staged a debate on the 
                                                        
73 Based on al-Shāfiʿī’s metaphor of ijtihād and seeking the direction of Kaʿbah, it is assumed that the 
clarity refers to adequate clarity of the region of the Kaʿbah that emerges as a person moves nearer 
towards it with the help of the desert guides (adillah).  
74 According to Vishanoff, this was beautiful as an abstraction, but at the level of individual text and 
legal rules, it is far from perfect. David Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics (American 
Oriental Society, 2011), 40. 
75 Ibid, 42. 
76 FWM, 1:551. 
77 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 31, al-Baqillānī, al-Taqrīb wa al-Irshād (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Risālah, 1998), 




legitimacy of naẓar and employing disputation (jadal) as a means to seeking 
knowledge. He then quoted Ibn al-Qāṣṣ enlisting sources of knowledge in this 
speculative endeavour. According to Ibn al-Qāṣṣ, 
‘The sources of knowledge are seven: (1) Sense impression (2) the impression 
of sound logic (3) the knowledge of the Kitāb (Qurʾān) (4) the knowledge of 
Sunnah (5) the knowledge of recurrent approvals (ijmāʿ) (6) language 
impression, and (7) inferential impression (ʿibrah).’78 
Ibn al-Qāṣṣ goes on to elaborate each of the sources. As for senses, he 
mentions five of them: hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, and touching. As for sound 
logic, it is either natured (gharīzī) or nurtured (mustajlab). The Kitāb and the Sunnah 
are of two linguistic habits: summarised speeches (mujmal) and clarified ones 
(mubayyan). The transmission of the Sunnah is through one of two ways: recurrent 
statements of facts and individually transmitted reports. The recurrent affirmation 
(ijmāʿ) is of two kinds: the affirmation of the whole Community (ijmāʿ al-ummah), and 
the affirmations which form a compelling proof (ijmāʿ al-ḥujjah). Language is of two 
states: permissive usage (majāz) and normative usage. Inference is of two kinds: 
based on the original premise, and based on multiple aspects and indicants.  
 Al-Khaṭīb’s further elaboration of Ibn al-Qāṣṣ’s statement summarises and 
exemplifies the aforementioned theological discussion of this chapter. Concerning 
the senses, al-Khaṭīb states that they yield ʿilm ḍarūrī and not iktisābī, because it is 
impossible to cast doubt upon it. Ibn al-Qāṣṣ did not explain the epistemological 
weight of sensory experience. The connection made by al-Khaṭīb shows a significant 
development on the subject and al-Khaṭīb’s own devotion to the theological 
approach towards it.  
Al-Khaṭīb then embellished the topic of sound logic. In contrast to his usual 
approach where he initiates a discussion with indicative texts from the Qurʾān and 
Sunnah, al-Khaṭīb this time begins his exposition with several views on ʿaql. The first 
                                                                                                                                                              
Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Beirut: Dār al-Kalim al-Ṭayyib, 1995), 32, Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUddah fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Riyadh: 1993), 
1:84. 
78 FWM, 2:36. 
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defines ʿaql as a type of ʿilm ḍarūrī placed in the heart. This may remind us of ʿAbd al-
Qāhir’s axiomatic and a priori knowledge. The second definition views ʿaql as a light 
and insight where ʿaql in relation to the heart is as sight is to the eyes. Ibn al-Jawzī, 
who wrote a similar discussion after al-Khaṭīb, attributed this definition to the Ṣūfī 
al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (243/857) and the Ḥanbalī Abū al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī (371/982), 
the author of Kitāb al-ʿAql.79 The third definition portrays ʿaql as inner potency that 
serves to discern the realities of objects of knowledge. ʿAql, therefore, fits the 
concept of human responsibility to undertake the valid speculation as discussed in 
the previous sections. It was emphasised as well in al-Khaṭīb’s fifth definition where 
ʿaql is described as what makes the concept of taklīf (demanding responsibility from 
humans) beautifully attuned. The definition prior to this definition views ʿaql as 
knowledge which distances its possessor from unwise conduct.   
 Unlike Ibn al-Jawzī who prefers the definition of ʿaql as natural disposition 
(gharīzah) that is similar to an inner light, al-Khaṭīb concludes that all these 
definitions lead to a similar idea. He then traditionalises the concept of ʿaql, adducing 
a dictum documented by a ḥadīth expert.80 Despite the dictum being transmitted by 
Dāwūd ibn al-Muḥabbar, the author of a ḥadīth compilation titled Kitāb al-ʿAql, whom 
al-Khaṭīb regarded as non-trustworthy and had demonstrated his work to be 
forgery,81 al-Khaṭīb proceeded to relate via his chain that the Prophet says: 
‘O people, for every journey there is a dependable ride and a clear path. The 
best person who possesses the best ride, the best knowledge of direction, 
and the best understanding of the clear proof, is the one with the best mind 
(afḍaluhum ʿaqlan).’ 
Dāwūd has been accused of being influenced by the Muʿtazilīs. Some critics, 
however, did have a good perception of Dāwūd. Ibn al-Jawzī also included this 
tradition amongst his traditional proofs for the virtue of ʿaql, even though, he 
                                                        
79 Ibn al-Jawzī, Dhamm al-Hawā (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1998), 23-34. His arrangement of 
definitions follows totally al-Khaṭīb’s order. Ibn al-Jawzī despised al-Khaṭīb’s implicit criticism of al-
Tamīmī. See Chapter Seven. 
80 al-Haythamī, Bughyat al-Bāḥith ʿan Zawāʾid Musnad al-Ḥārith (Madinah: Islamic University, 1992), 
2:801.   
81 TMS, 9:326. 
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eventually quoted al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥibbān (354/965) saying that there is no authentic 
ḥadīth concerning ʿaql.82 Al-Khaṭīb went further by quoting predecessor who asserts 
that ikhtiyār (lit. selecting; making a good decision) shows the state of ʿaql of a 
person. This point is important as the concept of ikhtiyār explains the 
understanding of iktisāb and taklīf in his scheme. 
Al-Khaṭīb turned back to the sources for speculation and touched briefly on 
the four other sources. The Kitāb, the Sunnah and the Ijmāʿ have already been 
elaborated prior to the section on al-naẓar wa al-mujādalah. He added in this section 
that one would not recognise the true object of ijmāʿ except after a study of 
divergence of opinions (al-khilāf). As for the impression of language, al-Khaṭīb 
relates it to the vast nature of the Arabic language. Speculation corresponds heavily 
to the knowledge of the language. Al-Khaṭīb asserts that in the Qurʾān, a verse might 
carry a verbal form of an imperative, but its meanings differ in many ways, which 
can only be determined with the help of the Arabic language.83 This ambiguity in 
language was also propounded by al-Bāqillānī, albeit in a more flexible way than the 
traditionalists.84 
The last source for speculative endeavour is al-ʿibrah or inference.  As for Ibn 
al-Qāṣṣ’ first kind of inference, which is an inference based on the original premise, 
al-Khaṭīb gave an example which indicates deductive reasoning: (i) God prohibits us 
from grumbling ‘urgh’ before the parent, (ii) God’s prohibition signifies tahrīm 
(religiously unlawful), (iii) It follows that what is beyond ‘urgh’ is necessarily 
unlawful. According to al-Khaṭīb, this is common sense and ignorance in this kind of 
inference is unjustified. As for the second inference, al-Khaṭīb mentions the 
flexibility of meanings, analogical reasoning, intensive observation and qiyās al-
                                                        
82 Ibn al-Jawzī, Dhamm-al-Hawā, 27-29. 
83 When a command is stripped off from any possible modification, it implies an obligation. See al-
amr wa’l-nahy, in FWM, 1:218, al-ʾamr lahu ṣīghah, 1:219, āyāt makhrajuhā amr wa maʿānīhā wujūh 
mutaghayyirah, min tahaddud, iʿjāz, ʾījāb, irshād, 2:41. 
84 Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 180-181. He states, ‘al-Bāqillānī argued his case for the 
indeterminacy of meaning against those, both Muʿtazilites and traditionalists, who identified certain 
meaning with certain verbal forms (for example, commands with imperative).’ Al-Bāqillānī argues 
for suspension of judgement since verbal expression has more than one possible meaning. Al-
Bāqillānī exploited here the Ashʿarī theory of speech.  
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ghāʾib ʿala al-mushāhadah85, which collectively indicate an inductive reasoning 
similar to the method of the theologians. Al-Khaṭīb’s indicative-text is the verse in 
which God makes an analogy between His power to produce vegetation from a 
barren land and His power to bring creation from nothing into existence.86 
According to al-Khaṭīb, those who arrive at a wrong conclusion in this type of 
inference are stripped off from the attribute of knowledge. Their speculation is then 
exposed to the danger of deviation and divine threat (waʿīd). 
By affirming these seven sources of speculative endeavours, al-Khaṭīb places 
himself as the most unique scholar who combines proficiency and innovative skill in 
the study of individual reports with an apparently acute awareness of a broader 
epistemological framework encompassing cosmological, theological, legal and social 
aspects of knowledge. He was not a scripturalist (Qurʾānist), empiricist (or 
naturalist), traditionalist, rationalist, or a person who upholds linguistic 
determinism. Instead, he pursued the Shāfiʿīte interdependent clarifying 
relationship between indicants, infiltrated cohesively, yet relatively, by al-
Baqillānī’s Ashʿarism. As a ḥadīth expert, al-Khaṭīb proposed this framework to the 
circle of ḥadīth and invited its fellows to another level of criticism, which will be 
elaborated in a future chapter. 
3.9 Istidlāl and the Occurrence of Knowledge 
 Unlike al-Bāqillānī, al-Khaṭīb did not discuss the mechanism by which 
knowledge is acquired through al-naẓar wa al-istidlāl. Al-Bāqillānī was against the 
concept of tawallud (generation) propagated by the Muʿtazilah. According to them, 
speculation yuwallid (generates) knowledge.87 As for al-Bāqillānī, knowledge is 
                                                        
85 It suggests an inference of the invisible from the visible. The theologians used this method to 
prove the existence of God by way of analogy between the two realms. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, 
this inductive view differs radically from the method used in the Qurʾān. See: Georges Tamer, “The 
Curse of Philosophy: Ibn Taymiyyah as a Philosopher” in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law, ed. 
Birgit Krawietz, Georges Tamer (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 344. 
86 Qurʾān, al-Ḥajj: 5. 
87 Die tawallud-Theorie in: TUG, III:116-121. 
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created directly by God at every independent moment.88 Naẓar and istidlāl are the 
paths to knowledge, not its producer (al-naẓar al-ṣaḥīḥ mutaḍammin li al-ʿilm bi ḥāl al-
manẓūr fīhi wa-ṭarīq ilayhi).89 This exemplifies the concept of ʿādah espoused by al-
Ashʿarī. According to al-Ashʿarī, drunkenness after intoxication, fullness after 
eating, thirst being quenched after drinking, health after consuming medicine, 
burning after the touch of fire, the fall of a stone after a throw, all are neither by 
means of intrinsic forces (maʿanī) that necessitate their occurrences, nor generated 
by causes that beget them. They are the ikhtiyār (selective commands) of God, which 
He creates directly in agreement with the ʿādah manifested before the servants.90 
Hence, according to him, the right speculation yuthmir (bears, lit. fruits) knowledge, 
but not in the sense of tawallud that has been propagated by the Muʿtazilah.91 Al-
Ashʿarī in this sense, establishes an extremely pragmatic solution maintaining 
mutual selectivity and activity on the part of both God and humans.92 
       Although al-Khaṭīb did not delve into this discussion, his treatment of the 
subject of al-naẓar al-ṣaḥīḥ (the valid selective speculation) echoes faultlessly the 
words of al-Baqillānī on the corrupted naẓar that hinders a speculator from arriving 
at the right knowledge. Al-Khaṭīb commented: 
‘It is incumbent upon a person who has mastered the sources for speculative 
endeavours and wishes to engage in speculative dialogue to speculate 
according to the dalīl (indicant), not the shubhah (trickery), to fulfil all the 
requirements of the indicant, and to arrange indicants according to the right 
condition and order.’93 
 According to al-Khaṭīb, this will lead a speculator to a compelling answer 
(ḥujjah), “by the will of God”. Al-Baqillānī enlisted amongst the causes of corrupted 
                                                        
88 According to al-Ashʿarī, al-muḥdith (creator) is the one who brings non-existence into existence. 
For him, khalaqa, faʿala, aḥdatha, abdaʿa, anshaʾa, ikhtaraʿa, dharaʾa, baraʾa, ibtadaʿa, and faṭara are 
essentially synonymous. Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 91.  
89 al-Taqrīb, 1:211-212. 
90 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 134. 
91 Ibid, 285. 
92 See Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation of this notion of selectivity in: al-Nubūʾāt (Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, 
2000), 2:871. 
93 FWM, 2:43. 
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speculation: (i) to speculate based on trickery, not on indicants, (ii) to fail the 
requirements of an indicant, (iii) to deviate from the right arrangement of 
indicants, and several other causes.94  
 In summary, al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī and al-Khaṭīb, all consider that 
knowledge is freely created (iḥdāth) by God, yet mostly in agreement with the ʿādah, 
viz. after the execution of the appropriate selection and speculation by a servant. 
God, however, is free to create knowledge in the heart of the servant without a prior 
naẓar undertaken by him.95 Even though naẓar is only a potential means to attaining 
the ideal knowledge or objective truth, from the perspective of ʿādah, naẓar is indeed 
the path to knowledge and truth. According to al-Khaṭīb, the occurrence of 
knowledge without effort is contrary to ʿādah, which signifies a muʿjizah.96 On this 
account, the concept of ẓann denotes more potentiality rather than mere probability 
or doubt. A well established dalīl is the path for God’s bestowal of knowledge, even 
though the dalīl might be characterised as not yielding knowledge prior to naẓar. In 
the case of al-Khaṭīb, this serves as one way to explain why ḥadīth is characterised as 
ẓannī (potential) and ultimately called ʿilm (knowledge) as well as being affirmed as 
ḥujjah (compelling argument). 
3.10 Ẓāhir, Ghalabah and Speculative Knowledge 
 Scant attention has been paid to the concept of ʿādah as the source of 
knowledge in the scheme of al-Ashʿarī. The ʿādah referred to here is not the 
customary practice of a certain tribe or society, but as explained as well by Ibn 
Taymiyyah (728/1328), a synonymous concept to the notion of sunnat Allah (God’s 
customary way of acting).97 According to the Ashʿarī scheme, because God 
customarily acts in accordance with certain patterns, the appearance (ẓuhūr) of 
                                                        
94 al-Taqrīb, 1:219. 
95 Heer, The Proof, 4. 
96 Wujūduhu bi khilāf dhālik kharqu ʿādatin ṣāra bihi muʿjizah, FWM, 2:334. Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 134: 
Counter-ʿādah is either a miracle of the Prophet, a karāmah (thaumaturgic gift) for the saints, signs 
for the ṣādiqīn (faithful) or exposition of liars. 
97 Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Nubūʾāt, 2:867-869. 
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actions in this world is meant for humans to conceive. Furthermore, al-Bāqillānī had 
listed a number of instances where ʿādah yields ʿilm ḍarūrī such as the impossibility of 
giving life to the dead, transforming Tigris into gold (in our time), or turning a youth 
into an old man. Our knowledge of these non-occurring actions is intellectually 
necessary, and customarily proven.98 Unless there is an evidence for a counter-ʿādah 
situation, the established ʿādah is the assumed default state. This is the basis for why 
ẓāhir (perceived reality) is more dominant in the Ashʿarī theological deliberation of 
speculation. The normative principle is often prioritised over any transgressive 
instances. 
 For the Ashʿarīs, if God intends other than the ẓāhir, He will customarily 
provide indicants through which humans can arrive at the intended object of 
speculation, which is relatively termed bāṭin and occasionally mughayyab.99 Despite 
the previous discussion on the affirmation of metaphysical realities, occasional 
human limitation in acquiring them proves customarily to the Ashʿarīs that humans 
are disempowered from going further beyond the ẓāhir and that “the truth in 
apparent” is the furthest they may achieved and perceived. Knowledge therefore 
corresponds to the limit of human power to produce it and the Divine Will is 
estimated by the limit at which disempowering is perceived. This way of thinking 
replicates the underlying notion of al-Shāfiʿī’s cognitive process for legal question 
and arriving at the objectively correct answer. According to Lowry, al-Shāfiʿī instates 
that a mujtahid (seeker of knowledge) may acquire ʿilm by simultaneously iḥāṭah 
(encompassing) a correct answer (ṣawāb) in both the ẓāhir (apparent) and the bāṭin 
(objectively correct, lit. concealed, inner). When he fails to arrive at the bāṭin, he 
only discovers al-ḥaqq fī al-ẓāhir (the truth in apparent). A mujtahid, however, must 
never bypass the ẓāhir to arrive at the bāṭin alone.100 
                                                        
98 al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, 1:191. 
99 Lowry suggests that al-Shāfiʿī’s emphasis on attempts to gain access to the objective or hidden 
truth could be an anti-Murjiʿī position since that proto-Murjiʾī epistemology suspended judgment 
concerning things not directly knowable. Lowry, Legal Theory, 248 fn 26. 
100 Ibid, 247-248. 
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 This ambiguous relation between the ẓāhir side and the multiple possibilities 
of the bāṭin side underlies the concept of ẓann. For the Ashʿarīs, ẓann is inevitable in 
human cognitive processes. In defining ẓann, Ibn Fūrak says: ‘Ẓann is allowing for 
two uncertain possibilities one being potentially more apparent (aẓhar) than the 
other.’101 Ẓāhir according to him is what allows two uncertain possibilities one being 
potentially more apparent than the other.102 Therefore, ẓann and ẓāhir resemble 
“knowing” and “the object of knowledge”. Consequently, the closer a side to a state 
of ẓāhir (visibility), the more one experiences an increase in his ẓann (allowance) for 
the perception of truth in that side. When the ẓann cannot be increased anymore in 
all sides, human power is disempowered103 and a relatively dominant sign for a 
correct answer in a previously concealed side is attested. This is an instance of 
ghalabat al-ẓann (the dominant allowance or potentiality).104 This allowance is made 
possible by virtue of appearance (ẓuhūr) from the potential side and previous 
experienced perception (ʿādah). Both ẓāhir and ʿādah play a vital role in the making of 
ghalabat al-ẓann. 
 Al-Khaṭīb exhibits this line of thinking in a variety of contexts.105 When 
explaining the weighing process between statements, al-Khaṭīb asserts that 
statements that do not yield a final state are open to preference (tarjīḥ) for they 
supply epistemologically only dominant allowance or potentiality (ghalabat al-ẓann), 
not certainty or apodictic knowledge (ʿilm). According to him, ‘ẓann (potential 
thought) accepts increase (yaqwa) with multiple repetitions of situations and 
                                                        
101  Tajwīz amrayn aḥaduhuma aẓhar min al-ākhar: al-Ḥudūd, 148. Ẓann is contrasted to shakk, for shakk is 
allowing two possibilities without any kind of advantage between them. 
102 Ma iḥtamala amrayn aḥaduhuma aẓhar min al-ākhar: al-Ḥudūd, 142. 
103 The defeat of human power always serves as an indicator of God’s will in the scheme of the 
Ashʿarīs. God only demands what is within the power of human. The discussion of this subject could 
be found under the concept of taklīf mā lā yuṭāq.  
104 From the human effort’s side, it is a dominant allowance of perception or predominance of 
thought. While from the side of the indicant, it refers to its dominant potential. 
105 See his use of taẓāhur: al-Kifāyah,1:719. 
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conditions (kathrat al-aḥwāl wa al-ʾumūr) that produce dominance.’106 It is worth to 
note that kathrah (multiple repetitions) is amongst the indicators of ʿādah (pattern). 
 In the orthodox scheme, predominant thought on metaphysical objects is 
secured and justified by adequate reliance on dalīl (indicant).107 In the case of 
religious questions, dalīl is acquired from the sources of religious propositions.108 For 
this reason, when a dalīl appears to be dominating, at least according to al-Khaṭīb, a 
legal actor who prefers his own opinion is deemed ghalaba ʿalayhi al-raʾyu (dominated 
by loose rationale).109 For the Sunnīs, within the sphere of aḥkām sharʿiyyah (positive 
statutes), most dalīls comprise of individual reports of the past experience, 
particularly the Prophetic and pious predecessors’ experiences. Hence, the study of 
potentiality in individual reports is of crucial importance in the making of 
speculative knowledge. This is another way to explain the equation of ghalabat al-
ẓann with ʿilm, here al-ʿilm al-naẓarī. 
 On another note, the reliance on ʿādah and ẓāhir informs a relatively 
distinctive feature of the uṣūlīs in contrast to the Ṣūfī scheme. According to Ibn 
Taymiyyah, in extreme cases, the Ṣūfī way of recognising truth is corrupted by the 
situation of ghalabat al-ḥāl (dominated by emotional state), even though God through 
His mercy may accept their efforts.110 
                                                        
106 Ibid, 2:261. 
107 It is a response against accusation of both: following a mere conjecture and liberating oneself 
from the sharʿī sources. Rudolph states, ‘Allerdings will Ashari die Ratio auch im Bereich der 
Gotteskenntnis nich gänzlich von der Offenbarung lösen, sondern fügt sofort wieder zwei 
Einschränkungen hinzu: Zum einen kann der Verstand auf diesem Wege lediglich feststellen, dass 
Gott existiert, nicht jedoch, wie Gott zu beschreiben ist. Denn sämtliche Namen, die wir ihm geben, 
müssen laut Ashari wieder in der Überlieferung bezeugt sein … Aber auch hier bleibt letztendlich der 
Eindruck bestehen, das Ashari sehr sorgfältig darauf geachtet hat, die rationale Spekulation in einen 
von der Überlieferung vorgegebenen Rahmen einzubinden.’ Ratio und Überlieferung, 72-78. 
108 See next chapter for al-Khaṭīb’s sources of religious statutes. 
109 al-Khaṭīb’s explanation on the preference of khabar al-wāḥid over qiyās. FWM, 2:140. 
110 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ Fatāwā (Madinah: King Fahd Complex, 2004), 10:557. 
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3.11 Language Denotation and the Speculative Knowledge 
 As mentioned above, language constitutes one of the sources for speculative 
undertaking. In tracing al-Shāfiʿī’s epistemology, Lowry grants that al-Shāfiʿī stands 
in between having a coherent concept of language and exploiting it for legal 
interpretation, and his concern that the vastness of the Arabic language and its 
expressive possibilities could be a barrier to achieving the correct answer in legal 
exercises.111 Lowry also quoted Jackson on the idea that al-Shāfiʿī’s insistence on the 
idiosyncratic character of Arabic defies systematisation and stands against the 
incipient formalism thriving in contemporaneous legal thought in Irāq. The above 
observation supports the later Shāfiʿīs’ expansion of mature uṣūl al-fiqh where 
language is conceived as merely a source or dalīl, as qualified by al-Khaṭīb and Ibn 
al-Qāṣṣ. Within his framework of istidlāl, language impression is often potential to 
the metaphysical truth, and not final. This conception of language and the 
aforementioned attitude of al-Shāfiʿī buttress the thesis that the Shāfiʿism al-Khaṭīb 
propagated does not subscribe to linguistic determinism.  
 Theologians and theorists of legal principles had been occupied with 
negotiation between the language denotation and the sharʿī denotation.112 The sharʿī 
denotations are essentially meanings established in the traditional proofs. In his 
study on al-Taqrīb of al-Bāqillānī, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd deduces six major opinions on the 
relationship between the two denotations: (i) that it is not intellectually acceptable 
for Sharīʿah to transfer the original meaning of words from what it was denoted in 
language, (ii) that Sharīʿah may transfer a word from its original meaning to a 
completely new meaning, (iii) that Sharīʿah interferes in the original meaning by 
adding new connotation, however with a preserved connection between the two 
sides, (iv) that Sharīʿah uses the original meaning with elaboration only in the 
operational part, (v) that Sharīʿah changes  the meanings of nouns with regard to 
                                                        
111 Al-Shāfiʿī’s technical vocabulary in al-Risālah evokes a grammatical and linguistic resonance that 
proposes a fundamental connection between language and legal hermeneutics. Lowry, Legal Theory, 
251-254. 
112 See: Mustafa Shah, “The Philological Endeavors of the Early Arabic Linguists: Theological 
Implications of the tawqīf-isṭilāḥ Antithesis and the majāz Controversy,” (Parts I and II) Journal of 
Qur’anic Studies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press) (1999:1.1), 27-44 and (2000:2.1), 44-66. 
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practices, not the faith-related terms, and (vi) that the relationship could not be 
intellectually decided.113 Ultimately, most of the Ashʿarīs were against the 
Muʿtazilah idea that Sharīʿah may introduce a completely new meaning in faith-
related terms such as īmān, kufr, fisq without any connection to its original 
denotation.  
The elaboration of these views is beyond the scope of the present study. 
However, it is sufficient to assert here that al-Khaṭīb, and al-Shīrāzī too, 
manipulated the language denotation to mould together the speculative knowledge 
with apodictic knowledge in their effects on human undertakings. According to 
them, the Arabic language has never distinguished between what yields apodictic 
knowledge (ʿilm) and what yields potentiality (ẓann) in the definition of ḥujjah 
(compelling argument), dalīl (indicant) and burhān (proof).114 Al-Khaṭīb, 
argumentatively, cited the language expert, Thaʿlab on the equation of ḥujjah 
(intellectual argument) with burhān (in logic and philosophy: apodictic proof). The 
language, therefore, supports their designation of individual reports as ʿilm, dalīl or 
burhān. Substantially, it is a clever manipulation of language within the traditional 
legal circle to reconcile between the legal bayān and the theological burhān.115 
3.12 The Theological Challenge and the Essence of Proof 
 Rosenthal in his landmark study on knowledge asserts that theology had a 
fundamental stake in defining “knowledge” and that the basic guidelines for the 
phrasing of various definitions can be assumed to have been operative at the very 
beginning of kalām.116 It is noticeable that theological polemic between the 
Ashāʿirah and the Murjiʾah brings to light the distinction between knowledge as 
                                                        
113 ʿAbd al-Hamīd Abū Zunayd, trans. al-Taqrīb wa’l-Irshād, 1:104-134. 
114 Wa-laysa tufarriqu al-ʿArab bayna mā yuaddī ila al-ʿilm aw al-ẓann an tusammīhi ḥujjatan wa dalīlan wa 
burhāna. FWM, 2:45. al-Shīrāzī, al-Lumaʿ, 33. Contrary to al-Khaṭīb, al-Shīrāzī criticised the theologians 
for their distinction between the two epistemological classes.  
115 Van Ess, Logical Structure, 26. 
116 Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 47. 
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cognition (maʿrifah) and knowledge as belief (iʿtiqād).117 The dispute between the 
Ashāʿirah and the Muʿtazilah evinces the distinction between knowledge as kasbī 
and knowledge as a product of natural generation (tawallud). Al-Bāqillānī adopted 
the position that knowledge is the cognition of object known as it is (al-maʿlūm ʿalā 
mā huwa bihi). He and al-Ashʿarī rejected the definition of knowledge as belief for it 
includes presupposition and probable belief by the layman as well. For al-Bāqillānī, 
the clause “as it is” is merely complementary since the word al-maʿlūm (the object of 
knowledge) has already encapsulated it. He also rejects that it be replaced with shayʾ 
(thing), for it excludes the knowledge of non-existence (al-maʿdūm). Al-Baqillānī 
presented four phrasings that embody the notion of iʿtiqād al-shayʾ and refuted 
them.118 The Ḥanbalī Abū Yaʿlā seems to copy al-Bāqillānī on this.119 
Al-Khaṭīb quoted al-Bāqillānī when he exploits the elaboration of al-maʿlūm 
ʿalā mā huwa bihi to refute those who opine that individual reports yield definite 
knowledge solely from the apparent side (al-ʿilm al-ẓāhir), and its reality (bāṭin) has 
no implication on qualifying humans as knowing. According to this view, ẓāhir alone 
is sufficient to be deemed definite knowledge. The indicative text for this is the 
clause “ʿalimtumūhunna muʾmināt” (you “know” them as believers) in the Qurʾān.120 
Despite the fact that the state of faith in the heart is unknown, the Qurʾān calls the 
cognition of the external state “knowing”. Humans, therefore, are obliged to 
conclude a definite stance based on the external state.121 Al-Bāqillānī, according to 
al-Khaṭīb, says: ‘The jurists who hold this view do not understand this subject. 
Knowing could not be considered as really knowing except when the object known 
                                                        
117 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 11, al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, 1:178, al-Shīrāzī, Sharḥ al-Lumaʿ (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb 
al-Islāmī, 1988), 1:147-148.  
118 Rosenthal places “knowledge is the trust that the object known is at it is (al-thiqah bi anna al-
maʿlūm ʿalā mā huwa bihi)” in the cluster that views knowledge as belief, while al-Bāqillānī places it 
amongst his acceptable definitions since al-thiqah is understood in the sense of cognition. Knowledge, 
63. 
119 al-ʿUddah, 1:78-79. 
120 Qurʾān, al-Mumtaḥanah 60:10. 
121 The difference between this absolute dependence on ẓāhir (visible) and the previous Ashʿarite 
conception that ẓāhir and ʿādah are dependable is that ẓāhir and ʿādah are viewed as dalīl (indicant) 
and not the madlūl.  
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(al-maʿlūm) is as it is externally and internally (ʿalā mā huwa bihi ẓāhiran wa-
bāṭinan).’122 The use of “knowing” in the Qurʾanic verse is permissive (majāz), for 
one may hear only their confessions, and the real state of the heart is unknown. 
Since utterance is a dalīl (sign) to what is in the heart, the transgressive use of 
‘knowing’ is acceptable in language.123 Al-Khaṭīb’s narrative suggests that one 
cannot have a definite stance of what is in the heart of others and most of what was 
in the past, for they are mughayyab (outside direct experience). The assertion that 
individual reports must bear a definite knowledge in order to be legitimately 
reliable is similar to having a definite knowledge of the truthfulness of judges and 
witnesses, especially when we are obliged to accept their statements. For al-Khaṭīb, 
this is impossible (ʿajz), certainly based on the theological definition of knowledge 
he adopted. 
3.13 The Traditionists and Speculative Deliberation 
The pre-canonical and canonical collections of ḥadīth and traditions until the 
fourth/eleventh century did not express any intensional definition of knowledge. 
Rosenthal provided a comprehensive study on collections with books, chapters and 
headings “on Knowledge” and concluded that the traditionists’ presentation of 
knowledge is rather methodological and confessional. It aims to preserve the 
educational procedure in the study of traditions and to stress the essential 
relationship of knowledge with faith.124 Brown has also observed that neither al-
Bukhārī nor Muslim explained the description of the requirements for a sound 
ḥadīth. Certainly, there was no explanation on the relationship between the 
conditions of soundness and the epistemological degrees. Amongst the authors of 
collections of sound traditions, it was Ibn Khuzaymah (311/923) who was also a 
student of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, who notified his intended meaning of 
                                                        
122 al-Kifāyah, 1:123. The text is found in al-Taqrīb, 3:53-54 with different wordings and additional 
elaboration. This could be out of different versions of the work authored by al-Bāqillānī for he had 
authored the large, medium and small version. Cf. al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (summary of al-
Bāqillānī’s Taqrīb) (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir, 1996), 2:326. 
123 This was also an influence of al-Ashʿarī concept of al-kalām al-nafsī (inner speech). 
124 Rosenthal, Knowledge, 70-96. 
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soundness.125 Ibn Khuzaymah has been associated with Shāfiʿism and exhibits a 
staunch belief in creative manipulation. Traditionalists and later scholars including 
al-Khaṭīb celebrated his confident statement that asserts no contradiction amongst 
the traditions except that it can be creatively harmonised.126 
The traditionists’ attitudes seem to suggest a non-interest in speculative 
explanation. This character can be easily sensed from their attitudes towards 
speculative deliberation (al-jadal). According to al-Khaṭīb, this is due to some 
statements, which carry what resembles as an inductive pessimist argument. Al-
Khalīl ibn Aḥmad said: ‘There is no speculative assertion except there will be 
another speculative assertion that demolishes it.’ Mālik ibn Anas in a disproving 
manner asked: ‘Do we need to refute what Gabriel brought to the Prophet every 
time we encounter a man who is more proficient in his speculative argument than 
the previous one?’127 For the traditionists, knowledge is self-realised. Organic and 
natural experience of knowledge through a long encounter with traditions is more 
convincing than systematic speculative elaboration, which is highly fragile. In 
certain instances, knowledge seems to be rather an epiphany. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn 
Mahdī (198/814) said: ‘The knowledge of tradition is through inspiration (ilhām). If 
you asked a knower “how did you know?” he will not have a compelling 
explanation.’ Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Zurʿah (264/878) illustrated that a ḥadīth is compelling 
whenever one consults several ḥadīth experts without mentioning his previous 
meeting with any of them and finds that their responses were uniform. His 
interlocutor did that and eventually expressed: ‘I witness this knowledge is an 
inspiration!’128 Prior to them, Mālik ibn Anas said: ‘Knowledge is the light God 
placed in the heart.’129 Many later quotations of these statements expressed the 
notion that knowledge is iḥdāth (instated) by God in the heart of the believer. This 
thought was crystallised by the ḥadīth exegete, al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn al-ʿArabī (543/1148) as 
                                                        
125 Brown, Did the Prophet, 271. 
126 al-Kifāyah, 2:259. 
127 FWM, 1:554. 
128 al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī, Maʿrifat ʿUlūm al-Ḥadīth (Beirut; Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2003) 360-361. 
129 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:174. 
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he said: ‘Knowledge is too clear a concept to require an explanation, but atheists 
and heretics have wished to complicate the term “knowledge” and other religious 
or intellectual concepts in order to confuse the people and drive them into 
sophistries.’130 Later mystics also caution the attempt at defining knowledge for it 
may indicate an ignorance of the true meaning (sirr) of knowledge.131  
Brown eventually quoted Ibn Taymiyyah’s comment on discrepancies in the 
ḥadīth of Jābir: ‘Whoever studies its chains of transmissions knows decisively (qaṭʿan) 
that the ḥadīth is sound, even though the narrators disagreed on the (specific) 
price.”132 A traditionist intuitively knows the truth despite contradictory details. 
Yet, there remains a question: How does a person know incontrovertibly that this 
claimed certainty was not influenced by a tendentious construct from the past? 
3.14 Al-Khaṭīb’s Solution 
 In his exposition of the concept of dalīl and ḥujjah, al-Khaṭīb stated that 
traditional scholars (fuqahāʾ) designate individual reports (dictum), analogical 
reasoning (derivatum) and everything that yields high potentiality (ghalabat al-ẓann) 
as ḥujjah (compelling argument) and dalīl (proof). The verifiers amongst the 
theologians and experts of speculation discredit that designation and uphold that a 
proof is what grants apodictic knowledge of the object proven. It must yield final 
yaqīn (certainty). Whatever leads to high potentiality is not essentially a proof, but a 
sign or hint (amārah). As mentioned above, al-Shīrāzī would regard the theologian 
as making a mistake since the Arabic language does not differentiate between 
indicant and proof. Al-Khaṭīb, however, commented: 
‘I shall say: Neither the traditional scholars nor the theologians were wrong. 
As for the theologians, they asserted the real essence (al-ḥaqīqah) of dalīl and 
ḥujjah. As for the traditional scholars, they name the signs they were 
commanded to consult such as individual reports, analogical reasoning and 
everything that yields high potentiality as proof because God commands 
                                                        
130 Ibn al-ʿArabī, ʿĀriḍat al-Aḥwazī bi-Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Tirmidhī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 10:114. 
131 La yajūz taʿrīf al-ʿilm: al-Qūnawī, Iʿjāz al-Bayān fī Tafsīr Umm al-Qurʾān (Iran: Bustān Kitāb) 49. Also: 
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah,  
132 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, 13:350. 
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them to speculate (naẓar) based on this high potentiality. Hence, they call 
these signs as ḥujjah and dalīl (proof) since reliance on sharʿī injunction will 
necessarily lead them to its ultimate aim [i.e. these signs are indirectly 
proven by God].’133 
 By asserting the above, al-Khaṭīb had theorised that the right rational proof 
and the reliable traditional proof will mutually lead to the same aim. He seems to 
suggess the possibility of adopting two realities; ḥaqīqah ʿaqliyyah and ḥaqīqah 
naqliyyah. 
On the basis of this line of thinking, we may infer as well that while al-Khaṭīb 
adopted the essential definition of knowledge espoused by the theologians and 
experts of speculation, he also acknowledged that individual transmission from the 
Prophet is called ʿilm in the traditional sources. Hence, the endeavour into 
documenting individual reports including ḥadīth is called taqyīd al-ʿilm, as in the title 
of his work. 
 Additionally, al-Khaṭīb illustrates that in principal, report (dictum) and 
imitative reasoning (derivatum) are recognised as the source of proof, argument and 
knowledge. It is only at the level of particular cases that individual report or 
individual reasoning commensurate to high potentiality. 
For al-Khaṭīb, even the Qurʾān [through majāz] names what is not a 
compelling argument as a compelling argument. According to him, God does not 
need to submit to the moral law by proving that a servant has committed 
disobedience of law in order to punish him. Even if God began the creation with 
punishment, it is not against the logic of wisdom since He is free to dispose His will 
over His possessions. Therefore, the punished in actuality owns no compelling 
argument in demanding an explainer of a “moral code” i.e. the Messenger of God. 
However, the Qurʾān calls their hypothetical reaction a compelling argument.134 
This additional argument of al-Khaṭīb may place him amongst those the Muʿtazilah 
                                                        
133 FWM, 2:45.  
134 The verse translates: ‘[We sent] Messengers of good cheer and of warning, in order that mankind might 
have no argument against Allah after the messengers. Allah was ever Mighty, Wise.’ Qurʾān, al-Nisāʾ 4:165. 
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designated as mujabbirah, an epithet for extremist espousal of the doctrine of 
predestination.135  
 Nevertheless, al-Khaṭīb’s stress on human acquisition of knowledge affects 
his approach to traditions. Experience and trainings precede the cognition of ḥadīth, 
even though the cognition is self-realised as expressed by the traditionists. Al-
Khaṭīb concluded: 
 ‘The cognition of ḥadīth is not through being instructed (talqīn) with former 
verifications. Rather it is a knowledge immediately placed (iḥdāth) by God in 
the heart. The closest similitude to the knowledge of ḥadīth is the knowledge 
of coins and the identification of counterfeited coins (dīnārs and dirhams). 
The genuineness of these coins is not recognised through colour, feel, 
freshness, weariness, engraving, or any characteristic that relates to the size 
or the thickness of the coin. Rather an examiner recognises it when he looks 
at it. He will recognise whether it is coated or counterfeited, genuine or 
mixed. Likewise, is the identification of ḥadīth. It is a knowledge created by 
God in the hearts, however, after extensive training and keen attention 
towards it.’136 
Conclusion 
Every reading of the idea of knowledge in traditional epistemology must 
take into consideration the problem of authenticity versus sincerity. Traditionalism 
as expressed in the scheme of al-Khaṭīb does not always pursue authenticity. 
Sincerity and practice have a significant impact on the concept of knowledge for 
individual endeavour and acquisition are always connected to the will of God. 
Furthermore, there are several key theologico-epistemological concepts which are 
fundamental to the reading of his works:  the concept of mushāhadah (seen/sensed) 
and ghayb (unseen), the concept of ʿādah (intelligible pattern) and muʿjizah (beyond 
intellect), the concept of iktisāb (voluntary acquisition) and maʿānī (Divinely 
                                                        
135 Ibn Taymiyyah criticised the kasb theory of al-Ashʿarī saying that ‘the Ashʿarīs essentially agreed 
with the Mujabbirah [such as Jahm ibn Ṣafwān and his followers] on jabr, and their dispute with them 
is only terminological (nizāʿ lafẓī), since they had introduced kasb and the potentiality of kasb.’ At 
another place, he argued that the kasb of al-Ashʿarī is merely superficial. This subject requires a more 
thorough study of the Ashʿarī epistemology of ʿādah since kasb according to the Ashʿarīs relates to 
customary occasionalism (al-iqtirān al-ʿādī), and not to essential effect (taʾthīr). See: Ibn Taymiyyah, 
Majmūʿ Fatāwā, 13:228 and 8:128.  
136 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:255.  
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bestowed meanings), and the concept of ʿaqlī (speculatively derived) and naqlī 
(transmittedly dictated) proofs. The above dualism between the intellectual realm 
and the will of God underpinned the notion of ghalabat al-ẓann (the point at which 
thought may arive), for in the scheme of the Ashʿarite atomistic kalām, 
generalisation, speculation and causes are merely secondary and the only enduring 
existence is the Divine Will. Consequently, Divine message is more important and 
corresponding to God’s arbitrary decision. Sunnah and Sharīʿah, therefore, secure a 
higher epistemological status. Due to the fact that khabar and qiyās both involved 
speculation at the level of individuals, they are potential with regard to the objects 
of higher truth. However, the Qurʾān and Sunnah themselves name the potential 
sources as ʿilm and praise ijtihād which is voluntary and non-arbitrary. A more 
detailed explanation and methodological framework of this ijtihād will be treated in 











 Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī has been associated in modern scholarship with 
various denominations. Titles from his works such as Sharaf Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth imply 
that he was an acute traditionalist. In addition to various perceptions, al-Khaṭīb’s 
view on the relation between traditionalism, ḥadīth, fiqh, ijtihād and ʿilm has never 
been studied exclusively and explained in a way that reveals either the breadth of 
its originality or the state of being influenced by any preceding scholarship. This 
chapter attempts to delineate the methodological framework that fashions the 
intellectual course of this scholar while at the same time provides a fresh 
perspective in addressing the previous perceptions. It explores the polemical 
backgrounds and crises as they appear in the writings of al-Khaṭīb and gathers 
scattered theoretical expositions made by him, which could be appreciated as 
affirmations to the proposed methodological framework.   
4.1 Primary Methodological Writings 
 Like many other scholars, a framework of a scholar’s methodology cannot be 
appreciated from a single individual work. For instance, al-Khaṭīb’s point of view on 
the subject of documenting ḥadīth should not be extrapolated exclusively from 
Taqyīd al-ʿIlm, whereas he had also touched upon the subject in other works 
especially those that deal with methodological exposition. Despite that Taqyīd 
concentrates solely on its subject, a broader methodological framework formed by 
the entirety of his scholarship remains to be placed at utmost consideration. In the 
case of al-Khaṭīb, two works discernibly function as the pivot of his methodology, al-
Jāmiʿ li-Akhlāq al-Rāwī wa-Ādāb al-Sāmiʿ and Kitāb-al-Faqīh-wa'l-Mutafaqqih. This is 
based on the followings: 
(1) Al-Khaṭīb’s assertion in the exordium of both works that they serve as a 
methodological guide for anyone who aspires to pursue their subject areas. 
Al-Khaṭīb placed al-Jāmiʿ as the second work to be consulted following Sharaf 
al-Aṣḥāb despite that his seminal work on ḥadīth, al-Kifāyah had already been 
completed. As for Kitāb-al-Faqīh it was the original source from which the 
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advice, Naṣīḥat Ahl al-Ḥadīth was extracted indicating the primacy and 
enormity of the former as higher methodological guide.1 
(2) Both works emphasise adab, which represents the methodological 
framework of education in Islam. Despite that adab has been more 
extensively elaborated in Ṣūfī fraternities, it is a methodological concept 
shared in many fields of specialisation. Al-Khaṭīb borrowed a Ṣūfī master, 
Yūsuf-ibn-al-Ḥusayn-al-Rāzī’s (304/916) programme:  
‘Adab leads to knowledge. Knowledge guides performance. 
Performance leads to wisdom. Wisdom reveals abstinence. 
Abstinence leads to denigration of lowly life. Avoiding the lowly life 
leads to the yearning for the higher afterlife. The yearning for the 
higher afterlife leads to the content relation with God.’2     
(3) There are explicit statements in these works, which explain certain 
approaches in the other works. For example, al-Khaṭīb’s entry for Abū 
Ḥanīfah in Tārīkh Baghdād has been perceived as the most controversial 
treatment of the luminary’s biography as reflected in the modern exchanged 
refutations between the Ḥanafī Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Cairo, 1371/1951) and the 
Ḥanbalī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Muʿallimī (Makkah, 1386/1966).3 Al-Khaṭīb’s 
following statement in al-Jāmiʿ serves as his initial justification: 
‘Should there be conflicting features concerning the biography of a 
person where goodness and badness, virtues and vices were 
simultaneously reported, it is incumbent upon him (the chronicler) 
to record everything and transmit them altogether. He should 
mention them completely and make them known (to the objective 
audience of his work).’4  
                                                        
1 He stated, ‘I will encourage who possesses a bright mind and a moderate character to pursue 
tafaqquh ... and I will speak about the sources of fiqh (Uṣūl al-Fiqh) ... and the decorum (ādāb) for the 
faqīh and the student of fiqh ... in a manner that will bring benefits to those who comprehend it and 
blessed to act upon it.’ FWM, 71. 
2 Iqtiḍāʾ, 31. 
3 See the series: al-Kawtharī, Taʾnīb al-Khaṭīb (Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah, 1990), al-Muaʿllimī, Ṭalīʿat 
al-Tankīl (Dār ʿĀlam al-Fawāʾid), al-Kawthari, al-Tarḥīb bi-Naqd al-Taʾnīb (Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah, 
1990), al-Muʿallimī, al-Tankīl (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1986).  
4 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:202. 
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 This should be taken into consideration alongside other principles such as 
his rules of narrators-criticism presented in al-Kifāyah. 
4.2 Polemical Background of the Works 
4.2.1 Elegant and Significant Scholarship 
Alongside the journey of the intellectual culture in Baghdād, al-Khaṭīb’s 
writings depict a resolute struggle of traditional scholarship to retain its elegance 
and significance. His treatise on the question of astrology, Risālat-al-Nujūm, shows a 
noticeable competition between disciplines and areas of interest within that 
cultured society. Even inside the circle of traditional scholars, legal studies prove to 
be more attractive than the study of transmission and its history. Al-Khaṭīb 
commented after a long experience of traversing the Muslim cities: 
‘Should you observe carefully, you will realise that there is no city amongst 
the buldān al-Islām (cities governed by Muslims) except that there is a faqīh 
(jurist) or student of jurisprudence to whom people can refer in their affairs 
and rely on their opinions. However, you will find many of these cities are in 
absence of a fellow of ḥadīth who knows deeply its subjects and becomes an 
expert in the field.’ 5  
By portraying this state of affairs, al-Khaṭīb, certainly, was visioning a higher 
standard of expertise than the prevailing ḥadīth scholarship in those cities.  
On the theological plane, al-Khaṭīb was irritated by some Baghdādian 
Muʿtazilī perception, which was employed to portray ḥadīth scholarship as marginal, 
less meaningful or uncritical.6 A derogatory tag, ḥashawiyyah, was applied to 
outburst this perception. Modern studies affirm that this tag was commonly 
identified with aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth, particularly the followers of Ibn Ḥanbal. Al-Khaṭīb 
recounted the Baṣran Muʿtazilī, al-Jāḥiẓ assigning it to them, which carries a similar 
connotation with his other tag, nābitah.7 A Muʿtazilī contemporary, al-Ḥākim al-
Jushamī asserts that the opponents assumed the names ahl al-ḥadīth and ahl al-
                                                        
5 Ibid, 1:112. 
6 He calls them al-Muʿtazilah al-Qadariyyah. Ibid, 2:180. 
7 TMS, 14:125. 
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sunnah wa al-jamāʿah when they were al-ḥashwiyyah al-nābitah.8 Wadad al-Qāḍī 
studied the use of these pejorative nicknames by al-Jāḥiẓ and others to denote an 
infuriating rebellion from inferior dissenters, which surprisingly challenges the 
superior group.9 From the general Muʿtazilī theological point of view, ḥashawiyyah 
are identified with those who advocate the doctrine of bi-lā kayf regarding the 
Divine attributes, the eternity of the Qurʾān and predestination. Didactical and 
literal affirmation in these subjects were perceived as transmitting speeches i.e. 
traditions or knowledge meaninglessly.10 This coalesces with the assertion of al-
Khaṭīb’s oft-cited source Ibn Qutaybah who ascribed to Muʿtazilah the use of these 
tags and several others such as mujabbirah, jabriyyah (both indicate predestination), 
ghuthāʾ and ghuthar (indicating worthless unsophisticated mass) against the 
transmitters of ḥadīth.11 More importantly, al-hashw was equated with al-waḍʿu 
(ascribing fabricated ḥadīth to the Prophet).12 
Similarly, the tag al-hashw has been used by the fuqahāʾ. The Ḥanafī al-Jaṣṣāṣ 
employs it when he rejected al-Bukhārī’s heedless narration of the Prophet being 
bewitched.13 The Ashʿarī-Shāfiʿī al-Juwaynī (478/1085) later used it against the 
Ḥanbalīs and the scribes of ḥadīth.14 This is not new with regard to students. One 
century ago, the leading traditionist Abū-Khalīfah-al-Jumaḥī (305/917) called 
students of ḥadīth as ghuthāʾ (scum).15 Al-Khaṭīb himself criticised the cult of 
accumulating books without studying them, citing a poet who depicts this act as 
                                                        
8 al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-Masaʾil (MS Ṣanʿāʾ, Maktabah al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, ʿIlm al-Kalām 99), 
vol.1, fol. 27(b). 
9 Wadād al-Qāḍī, “The Earliest ‘Nābita’ and the Paradigmatic ‘Nawābit’,” Studia Islamica 78 (1993): 27–
61. Earlier: A. S. Halkin, “The Ḥashwiyya,” Journal of the American Oriental Society (1934): 1–28. 
10 al-Jushamī assosiated the Ḥashawīs with the view that some of the Qurʾān was revealed for ritual 
recitation, instead of having a meaning. See: ʿAdnān Zarzūr, al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī wa-Manhajuhu fī al-
Tafsīr (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Risālah, 1971), 233.  
11 Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth (Muʾassasah al-Ishrāq, 1999), 136. 
12 FWM, 2:151, ibṭal wa ikfār al-mutakallimīn li al-muḥaddithīn. 
13 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth, 1992), 1:60. 
14 al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Cairo: Dār al-Anṣār), 1:606 
15 al-Qifṭī, Inbāh al-Ruwāh ʿalā Anbāʾ al-Nuḥāh (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, 1986), 3:5. 
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stuffing cottons inside a pillow (ḥashwuhā ḥashwu al-masāwir). He also criticised the 
cult of possessing a huge collection of ḥadīth without any intellectual significance. 
Al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd Allāh ibn Idrīs (192/808), Mālik ibn Anas and ʿAbd al-Razzāq were all 
cited to indicate that possessing enormous collections of ḥadīth is a sign of madness 
and those collections could be entirely malicious.16  
 The emergence of Ashʿarism, to a significant extent, divided the fellows of 
ḥadīth. The Muʿtazilī ʿAbd al-Jabbār still considered all of them, and those who 
uphold literal affirmation such as the belief in the thread-like sharpness of the ṣirāṭ 
(Afterlife Bridge), as Ḥashawīs.17 Ibn Fūrak explained the nature of the division by 
mentioning two groups amongst aṣḥāb-al-ḥadīth; those who transmit traditions, and 
those who exercise speculation and engage in disputation (nuẓẓār or fuqahāʾ aṣḥāb al-
ḥadīth).18 Prior to him, Ibn Khallād al-Rāmhurmuzī wrote a treatise discerning 
between riwāyah (transmission) and dirāyah (understanding) applying the terms 
rāwī (transmitter) and wāʿī (conscious tradent).19 According to the study by Racha 
el-Omarī, it harbours a refutation against the accusation of al-ḥashw made by the 
Muʿtazilī Abū’l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balkhī (319/913). El-Omarī admits that al-Kaʿbī had 
to accommodate the compelling argument of ḥadīth movement and involve in the 
scholarship himself.20 Prior to him, al-Jāḥiẓ who boasted the epithet ashrāf ahl al-
ḥikmah was uncertain in his stance concerning Shāfiʿism that propagated both 
authentication and comprehension, and combined ḥadīth and fiqh in the concept of 
ḥikmah.21 
Ultimately, for al-Khaṭīb, traditional scholarship remains elegant and 
significant as long as its fellows combine the appropriate aspects of scholarship. He 
quoted the traditionist Abū ʿĀṣim al-Nabīl’s mock that headship in ḥadīth without 
                                                        
16 Sharaf-al-Aṣḥāb, 128-129. 
17 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 1996), 727. 
18 Mujarrad, 10. 
19 See: al-Rāmhurmuzī, al-Muḥaddith al-Fāṣil bayna al-Rāwī wa’l-Wāʿī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1771). 
20 Racha-el-Omari, “Accommodation and Resistance: Classical Muʿtazilites on Ḥadīth,” Journal of Near 
Eastern Studies 17:2 (2012): 231-256. 
21 Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, 1:216. 
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dirāyah is shameful.22 The whole treatise of al-Jāmiʿ was advanced to synthesise 
those aspects. Addressing the people from all fractions but particularly students of 
ḥadīth, he said in al-Faqīh:  
‘I pen down in this book, addressing any fellow of ḥadīth particularly and 
other people generally, a sincere advice from myself, as a sign of my 
heartfelt care for them, that a person should distinct himself from becoming 
an individual who is happy to live in ignorance and who does not seek any 
meaning to include himself in the fold of the people of noble vantage.’23 
Nevertheless, he reminded the scholars and students of the requirement of 
elegance citing Plato who said: ‘The lover of sharaf is the one who exerts himself 
with constant revision of his knowledge.’24 
4.2.2 Mediocre and Inexperienced Scholars 
 The narrative al-Khaṭīb constructed in the beginning of al-Jāmiʿ shows an 
attempt to relate meaninglessness with mediocrity and to shift the notion of al-
ḥashw to the fold of non-real-experience scholarship. Al-Khaṭīb recounted in the 
beginning of al-Jāmiʿ how the Caliph al-Maʾmūn unmasked a claim of expertise in 
ḥadīth by a person who was not able to produce any ḥadīth pertaining to a certain 
topic during inspection.25 The image of royal inspection is used to magnify the 
occurrence of the story and the emphasis on recognising ḥadīth according to 
chapters in the story alludes to the problem of meaninglessness. Next, it was related 
to mediocrity and lack of vast experience through the statement of Ibn Ḥanbal 
mentioned afterwards. The statement prescribed more than three hundred 
thousand ḥadīth for a merit of ḥadīth mastery. The figure of Ibn Ḥanbal himself was 
powerful enough to curb any presumed meagre Ḥanbalite tendency that stands 
against the experienced ḥadīth scholars. Prior to these accounts, al-Khaṭīb had 
already connected between mediocrity and the inability to appropriate traditions in 
chapters. He stated: 
                                                        
22 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:180. 
23 FWM, 2:152. 
24 Ibid, 2:206. 
25 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:76. 
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‘A person amongst them after jolting down several folios of traditions and 
attending aural sessions a couple of times claims himself ṣāḥib ḥadīth (expert 
on ḥadīth), even though he had yet to exhaust himself in studying them and 
had not faced the difficulties in memorising them and placing them in 
corresponding chapters.’26 
 The narrative is actually a prolonged critique that al-Khaṭīb advanced in his 
many works. He had already criticised several phenomena amongst ḥadīth 
enthusiasts such as boasting upon superior isnāds, seeking rare traditions without 
any real significance, collecting books without performing actions, repeating 
traditions in sessions whilst unaware of the verification and implication in the 
bigger framework of scholarship, etc. Al-Khaṭīb portrayed that these were executed 
mainly by the aḥdāth (immatures) within the intellectual circles.27 They came out 
with strange works and amazing features, yet most of them are fabricated and 
posses no real benefit. Al-Khaṭīb asserted: 
‘Due to these phenomena, many students of ḥadīth are distracted from 
pondering the meanings of knowledge and structuring its significance. The 
students of law in our time have subsequently done the similar thing and 
followed the same direction. They turned away from listening to 
traditionists and occupied themselves with the works of [non-traditional] 
theologians. What a pity that both circles are losing what is meaningful to 
them and heading towards non-beneficial ends.’28 
 Elsewhere, al-Khaṭīb assigned these attitudes to the heretics. Despite his 
lenient stance on narrating from heretics in al-Kifāyah, al-Khaṭīb advised seekers of 
knowledge to avoid listening from them in al-Jāmiʿ.29 This advice is clearly affirming 
the narrative of mediocrity and inexpertness he attempted to construct in the 
latter, since al-Kifāyah is meant for the near-expert level. After presenting the 
prophetic tradition that associates the signs of End of Time with seeking knowledge 
from aṣāghir (ignoble individuals), al-Khaṭīb quoted Ibn al-Mubārak’s interpretation 
that aṣāghir refers to heretics. The identification of heretical subjects is far more 
complex than a mere reference towards certain sects; however, at this point in al-
                                                        
26 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:75. 
27 Sharaf-al-Aṣḥāb, 129. 
28 Ibid, 130. 
29 al-Kifāyah, 1:310, cf. al-Jāmiʿ, 1:137. 
133 
 
Jāmiʿ, a narrative is constructed to denote inexperienced scholars or unsophisticated 
scholarship. In his Muʿtazilī professor’s biography, Abū’l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Khaṭīb 
reported: ‘He narrated only one ḥadīth. I asked him about it and he related it from 
memory.’30  Even though he did not identify al-Baṣrī with heresy, the treatment is 
extremely economical in contrast to ḥadīth scholars. This is the image of almost all 
Muʿtazilī thinkers he included in Tārīkh. On the upmost edge, heretics were also 
portrayed as attempting to abuse ḥadīth for their campaigns through fabricating 
ḥadīth.31 Al-Khaṭīb reminded the students that they should distance themselves 
from embracing the abovementioned attitudes for those are the doors towards 
heresay.  
 Through this narrative, al-Khaṭīb aimed to elevate the status of real scholars, 
particularly ḥadīth and fiqh scholars and to protect their scholarship from the harsh 
and demeaning attacks of both the immatures in ḥadīth and the opponent of ḥadīth. 
Concerning the immatures, al-Khaṭīb remarked: 
‘In spite of their underdeveloped compilation and understanding, they 
appear extremely arrogant, easily tempted and boastful, and they do not 
respect any teacher and do not hold dear any student. They distort the 
credibility of narrators and act harshly before those who come to learn.’ 32 
 This problem has convinced him to compose a methodological guide for real 
scholarship. 
4.2.3 The Spiritual-Methodological Depravity 
  Meaningful scholarship cannot be personified with the absence of purified 
insights attained through the edification of the heart. Al-Khaṭīb underlined this 
article citing Ibn Khallād who states that there is no goodness in fiqh without waraʿ 
(piety).33 Beforehand, he had provided several recounts for ʿAlī ibn Abū Ṭālib’s 
statement:  
                                                        
30 TMS, 4:168. 
31 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:137. 
32 Ibid, 1:77. 
33 FWM, 2:340. 
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‘There is no goodness in knowledge without the understanding of its 
meaning, no goodness in the understanding without pious abstinence, and 
no goodness in reading without insight (tadabbur).’ 
Internalising this view, al-Khaṭīb’s treatment of the method of travelling 
(riḥlah) to seek knowledge, for instance, illustrates the insightful recognition of the 
rights of multiple sides and the best attitudes in many aspects. To al-Khaṭīb, only 
through the building of the right insight one could attain the benefits of 
knowledge.34 His exposition, thus, includes: the right reason for travel, the right of 
the existing scholars in one’s hometown, the right model, the right of the parent, 
the right of the spouse, the right economic condition for a traveller, the right travel 
companion, the right of God in seeking permission to travel, the right day, the right 
of the left friends and acquaintances, the right word to say during farewell, the 
right attitudes towards the travel companion, the right of the destination and its 
denizens, and the right returning conduct.35 All these, despite ethical, are included 
in the method of seeking ḥadīth in al-Jāmiʿ. Spiritual insight is connected intimately 
with methodological accuracy and moral conduct.36 
On this account, one can apprehend al-Khaṭīb’s grief expression of the moral 
depravity amongst the devotees of ḥadīth of his time as he wrote:  
‘While what was supposed to be seen amongst students of ḥadīth is that they 
shall be the most perfect human in adab (insightful attitude), the humblest 
amongst the creation, the best model of chastity and religiosity, and the 
most difficult to turn overhasty and outrageous.’37 
 Regardless of various possible polemics behind this statement, particularly 
his encounter with the Ḥanbalīs, theoretically al-Khaṭīb dreamt in general of a safe 
and harmony intellectual discourse. He stressed the importance of leniency and 
gentle words in all his treatments on disputation. Having lived within the Islamic 
community, al-Khaṭīb said in Kitāb-al-Faqīh: 
                                                        
34 Iqtiḍāʾ, 31. 
35 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:223-248.  
36 See al-Khaṭīb’s explication of removing worldly attractions (ḥadhf al-ʿalāʾiq) including getting 
married at an early stage. He provided as well accounts of scholars being destitute and poor. al-Jāmiʿ, 
1:101-105. 
37 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:78. 
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‘A faqīh should attune his tongue with soft words and adorn his character 
with gentleness while providing questions and answers. This should be his 
attitude with all, the Muslim community and the people of dhimmah (non-
Muslim residences).’38   
 In al-Jāmiʿ, he included a section on a traditionist applying gentle speech and 
being careful in his choice of words.39 He appealed to the story of the Follower Saʿīd 
ibn Jubayr who was asked: ‘If a Magian greets me with peace, should I reply?’ Saʿīd 
related that Ibn ʿAbbās said: ‘Even if the [tyrant] Pharaoh greets me with good word, 
I will honour him.’40 Similarly, al-Khaṭīb’s concern for teachers being amiable to 
students is evident in both works.41 All these point out a certain moral problem he 
must have faced inside the metropolitan city. 
 Furthermore, al-Khaṭīb had also offered an advice to curb commercialised 
scholarship. He asked students to seek economical stability at an individual or 
family level before proceeding to learn ḥadīth. This reflects his compromised 
solution for the forbiddance of taking payments for dictating ḥadīth or giving 
juridical opinion amongst the aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth as ascribed broadly to them by 
Melchert.42 For al-Khaṭīb, all that leads towards moral aberration should be solved 
or eliminated for these depravities invite negative impressions and corrupt 
methodological accuracy. One who is no longer able to dictate ḥadīth due to old age 
is encouraged to stop from doing so, for it may trouble the whole scholarship.43 
4.3 The Naḍrah Tradition 
 Despite the above-mentioned problems, al-Khaṭīb having been trained in 
ḥadīth studies, finds a useful tradition to fashion his methodological framework. 
This tradition, which will be called naḍrah (radiant face or self) tradition, reads:  
                                                        
38 FWM, 2:230. 
39 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:403. 
40 FWM, 2:230. 
41 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:343, FWM, 2:237. 
42 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:97-100, Melchert, Formation, 29-30. 
43 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:153. 
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‘God makes radiant those who heard our article, recognise it, safeguard it, 
and transmit it to others. Perchance a ḥāmil (carrier) of fiqh (this article) is 
not a faqīh (one who comprehends it). Perchance a carrier of fiqh (the article) 
leads it to one who is afqah (possess higher or better level of insight).’  
 Al-Khaṭīb had a dedicated work on evaluating this Prophetic tradition as he 
mentioned in Kitāb-al-Faqīh and other works.44 Our retracement shows that the 
tradition was recorded in more than fifty ḥadīth works with the earliest being the 
Musnad of al-Ḥumaydī (219/834), a teacher of al-Bukhārī.45  
  In line with Ibn Fūrak’s division of aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth, al-Khaṭīb exploits this 
tradition to support the legitimacy of specialisations. Already in Sharaf, one may 
observe an implicit invitation to the study of fiqh. Two things prove this 
observation: (1) the expansion of the concept of ḥadīth in its exordium to include 
genres such as tafsīr, history, stories of saints and ascetics, opinions of jurists, etc., 
and (2) the citation from leading jurists and the mention of virtues of jurisprudence 
in the work.46 His work, Naṣīḥat, further affirms this argument. He asserts that ‘one 
should not be satisfied at being a mere transmitter or tradent (wa-lā yaqtaniʿ bi-an 
yakūn rāwiyan wa-muḥaddithan faqaṭ).’47 One should advance forward to the study of 
fiqh. Yet, the fiqh al-Khaṭīb was referring encompass the study of positive laws as he 
defined in the beginning of Kitāb al-Faqīh and the broader concept of Islamic 
knowledge as he propounded in the chapter on Faḍl al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿUlamāʾ (the 
advantage of knowledge and scholars). He even ascribed fiqh to the sphere of 
sainthood. Al-Khaṭīb said: 
‘God has made knowledge the means of His saints (awliyāʾ) and He safeguards 
through it the select amongst His servants (aṣfiyāʾ)… In safe-carrying it, 
fellows of knowledge are similar to one another. However, they differ in 
constructing its meaning (fī istinbāṭ fiqhihi mutabāyinūn). For this reason, the 
Prophet uttered [the naḍrah tradition].’48 
                                                        
44 FWM, 2:140, al-Jāmiʿ, 2:301, Sharaf-al-Aṣḥāb, 17, al-Kifāyah, 1:438. 
45 al-Ḥumaydī, Musnad (Damascus: Dār al-Saqā, 1996), 1:200 (88). 
46 Sharaf al-Aṣḥāb, 77, 79, 125-126.  
47 Naṣīḥat, 31. 
48 FWM, 2:139. Cf. his professor’s work Ḥilyah al-Awliyāʾ wa Tabaqāt al-Aṣfiyāʾ. 
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 The spiritual feature of sainthood, indeed, resonates with the mention of 
radiant light in the beginning of the tradition. However, al-Khaṭīb needed to address 
the aforementioned problems. This tradition usefully provides for him three 
categories of scholar: (1) ḥāmil fiqh laysa bi faqīh (a knowledge-bearer who does not 
involve in comprehension), (2) ḥāmil fiqh wa-huwa faqīh (a bearer who exercises 
comprehension), and (3) ḥāmil fiqh ilā man huwa afqah (an insightful bearer who 
transmits to the one with better comprehension). The second category was not 
mentioned in the text; however, it is inferred from the third.  
 By having the first category, all tasks that could be related to the act of 
transmitting texts are included under the rubric of ḥaml (carrying), i.e. the activities 
of katabat al-ḥadīth (scribes), raḥalah (seeking-travellers), naqalah (transmitters), the 
jāmiʿūn (compilers) and the muḥaddith (tradent), irrespective of their involvement in 
the interpretation of texts. This could be further vitalised by a number of traditions 
bearing the notion of ḥaml al-ʿilm (carrying knowledge).49 This attribute also 
encompasses carriers from all madhāhib except those that allow for intentional 
fabrication.50 
 Al-Khaṭīb, then, constructs his vision of the combination between tradition 
and speculation. However, the ḥamalah of his time transgressed in their attacks on 
men of speculation. He grumbled: 
 ‘All of these negativities occurred because those of our time [the ḥamalah] 
have little insight on what they have gathered, and did not comprehend 
what they have heard and recorded. Then, they prevented themselves from 
attending the lectures of the fuqahāʾ, they criticised the appliers of qiyās 
amongst the scholars … they were not able to distinct between praiseworthy 
and blameworthy speculation. They rushed to the conclusion that 
speculation is forbidden entirely. However, when new unprecedented cases 
(nawāzil) transpire, they followed blindly the appliers of speculation, and 
relied completely on their statements and opinions. By so doing, they 
annulled their own positions and permitted what they have previously 
                                                        
49 ḥamalat al-Qurʾān wa al-aḥādīth. Sharaf-al-Aṣḥāb, 31, FWM, 2:140, yaḥmilu al-ḥadīth man yakūn lahu 
ḥāfiẓā, wa-lā yakūn fīhi faqīhā. 
50 al-Kifāyah, 1:302-310. 
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forbid. Such people deserve hideous words and deserve to be defamed with 
all kinds of vilification.’51 
 Al-Khaṭīb emboldened the self-contradictory attitude of the traditionalists. 
He appeared to be facing modern subjects where traditionalists relied on scholars 
they had harshly criticised for dealing with speculations. Frustrated with naqalat al-
ḥadīth (transmitters)52 of his time, he boasted the good name of early luminaries 
such as Mālik, al-Awzāʿī (157/774), Shuʿbah, al-Thawrī, Ibn al-Qaṭṭān (198/813), Ibn 
Mahdī, Ibn al-Madīnī (234/849), Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Maʿīn.53 This list proves that the 
above statement was addressed to rigour ḥadīth critics of his time; for he had 
excluded many other imams, especially al-Shāfiʿī, who was not of their main interest. 
According to al-Khaṭīb, the condition of ḥadīth learning has undergone the same 
situation as taṣawwuf where the attitudes of later associates tarnished the name of 
former luminaries. This criticism also proves al-Khaṭīb’s thought and construction 
of the second category.  
 Nonetheless, both sides may still contest him, for those in his list were not 
well known of speculation either. Al-Khaṭīb’s inclination to the fuqahāʾ transpires at 
this point. Firstly, being a traditionalist himself, he forthrightly remarked that the 
heretics who criticised and rejected the later ḥamalah, who emulated the former 
muḥaddith, were making a grave mistake. The naḍrah tradition evidently preserves 
their right of mere transmission. They deserve their sanctity and their rights should 
be fulfilled by listening and taking ḥadīth from them (inna lahum ḥurmat turʿā, wa-
ḥaqq yajibu an yuʿaddā). Consequently, calling fellows of ḥadīth as ḥashawiyyah is a 
sign of either ignorance or arrogance (ʿāmmiy jāhil aw khāṣṣiy mutaḥāmil).54 
 However, he returned back to venerate fiqh and inform that fiqh is of 
multiple degrees. His list of traditions afterwards contains two markers of this 
                                                        
51 FWM, 2:140. 
52 The use of this tag by him sometimes bears a diminishing connotation. See: TMS, 15:502. 
53 These names are also present in al-Khaṭīb’s list of sixteen personages “so widely recognised as 
sound and reliable that one cannot dispute the integrity of [their] probity” which Scott Lucas 
adopted as al-Khaṭīb’s list of Sunnī ḥadīth critics. The list was taken from a chapter in al-Kifāyah and 
al-Shāfiʿī was not present in the list as well. See: al-Kifāyah, 1:242, Lucas, Constructive, 117. 
54 FWM, 2:142. 
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thought: (1) The encouragement of seeking knowledge from the elders, and (2) the 
illustration that fiqh is a life-long learning activity.55 This narrative implicitly 
supports the last part of the tradition where there is a mention of faqīh and man 
huwa afqah, i.e. wise and wiser. According to a tradition al-Khaṭīb recounted, a faqīh 
must constantly seek for knowledge and raises his degree until he meets the 
Prophet Muḥammad where there is no gap left between a faqīh and all the prophets 
except the attribute of Prophethood.56 In doing so, al-Khaṭīb forced the jurists to 
always seek for knowledge and practice, accompanied by ḥadīth, until the end of life. 
 In summary, al-Khaṭīb managed to construct from the naḍrah tradition the 
interdependency between different areas of expertise. The combination of ḥadīth, 
fiqh and constant speculation or revision of knowledge coalesces soundly with his 
assertion that ijtihād is to exert oneself industriously in requesting knowledge (badhl 
al-majhūd fī ṭalab al-ʿilm).57 Despite the presence of technical definition of ijtihād 
germane to legal practice, al-Khaṭīb illustrates through his treatment of the naḍrah 
tradition that every area of expertise has its own respectful ijtihād and a mujtahid is 
a faithful expert who continuously exercises challenging speculation and revision of 
his knowledge (al-mujtahid mukhāṭir).58 This application of ijtihād was largely 
ignored in some Western discourse on the subject.59 Ultimately, it substantiates 
three major paradigms in al-Khaṭīb methodological framework of ijtihād. 
                                                        
55 Ibid, 2:152-158. 
56 Ibid, 2:165. 
57 Al-Khaṭīb defines ijtihād in the same sense of Latin experiens, which denotes industriousness. This 
will prove useful to appreciate a mujtahid as an expert. 
58 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:115. 
59 I have not encountered any study on the concept of ijtihād in the evaluation of ḥadīth. See FWM, 
1:362, wa’l-ijtihād fī khabar al-wāḥid innamā huwa fī thubūt ṣidq al-rāwī. 
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4.4 Major Paradigms in the Methodological Writings 
4.4.1 The Traditional Isnād Paradigm 
William Graham has systematically elaborated the connection between 
traditionalism and isnād paradigm.60 Its main element is the sense of connectedness 
or as Graham coins its Arabic term, ittiṣaliyyah. Four main criteria of traditionalism 
that he enumerated found their parallels in al-Khaṭīb’s writings as evidenced in the 
previous chapter. These are: (1) the isnād paradigm (2) the rijāl (transmission 
biographical) works (3) the personal transmission of knowledge, and (4) the ijāzah 
system. Several other manifestations of isnād paradigm Graham proposes, which are 
Ṣūfī affiliation, Shīʿī attachment to the prophet’s lineage and Sharifism, would 
require a further study. This section concerns the assiduousness of al-Khaṭīb’s 
immersion in this paradigm regarding the broader epistemological framework. 
In his reading of al-Khaṭīb’s attitude to writing knowledge, Paul Heck 
suggests that al-Khaṭīb allows two approaches to knowledge; (1) for ḥadīth-related 
knowledge, which is epistemologically validated by the isnād, and (2) for all other 
knowledge, which can be appreciated without isnād.61 Al-Khaṭīb once again borrows 
the Ṣūfī Yūsuf al-Rāzī’s saying, ‘the isnād of [philosophical human] wisdom (ḥikmah) 
is wujūduhā (its existence).’62 According to Heck, al-Khaṭīb connected this saying 
with Ibn al-Mubārak’s approval for exhortation found in books to legitimise the use 
of books with regards to knowledge not related to ḥadīth. Human wisdom has no 
authority apart from itself and such knowledge is validated by its effectiveness as 
wisdom. Al-Khaṭīb’s citation, however, is ambiguous in its embodiment of the idea 
of wujūd. In the previous chapter, it is learned that he owes a huge deal to the 
theologian use of self-realisation (al-wujd). The above Ṣūfī’s quote, however, should 
be learned in the sense of al-ilhām wa’l-wijdān (inspiration and intuition). This 
necessitates a study on al-Khaṭīb’s position with regard to the Ṣūfī path to 
                                                        
60 William Graham, Traditionalism in Islam … (cited earlier). 
61 Heck, Epistemological Problem, 92. 
62 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:213. 
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knowledge.63 Nevertheless, it is sufficient to appreciate here that isnād is 
epistemologically essential in particulars of religion for they are outside human 
direct experience. Should the Prophet leave a book on his Sunnah, there will be no 
need for an isnād except for the blessings of attachment.64  
Al-Khaṭīb names the subjects that require isnād as masāʾil sharʿiyyah (sharʿī 
propositions).65 All these propositions must be brought to the epistemological 
ground of riwāyah. In al-Jāmiʿ, he listed the subjects and works that must be recorded 
with isnād; ḥadīth collections of all degrees, riwāyāt in tafsīr (Qurʾanic exegesis), in 
maghāzī (Prophetic campaigns), in qirāʾāt (Qurʾanic Readings), ancient poems, 
biographical data, statements of ḥadīth critics, versions and repeated copies of 
ḥadīth, and isnād variants. As for historical accounts of the righteous and the 
ascetics, exhortations of the eloquent, and wisdom of the well educated, isnād serves 
merely as a decoration.66  
Within Sunnism, the strictest adherence to isnād paradigm is demonstrated 
by critical rigorism and the incipient Ṣaḥīḥayn paradigm studied by Brown.67 
Nevertheless, al-Khaṭīb’s adoption of epistemological dualism and pragmatism has 
been successfully shown by Heck, which exemplifies in his verbal approval for 
isnādic and non-isnādic knowledge, as well as direct oral transmission (samāʿ) and 
indirect written permission (ijāzah) at the same time.68 To add to Heck’s 
observation, al-Khaṭīb’s propagation of both āthār/ārāʾ (traditions/speculations), 
and khabar al-āḥād/qiyās al-āḥād (dictum/derivatum) should be emphasised.69 It 
                                                        
63 See Chapter Seven. 
64 In later centuries, this point was made clear by al-Suyūṭī as all ḥadīths had been recorded in books. 
Al-Suyūṭī, Tadrīb al-Rāwī (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Kawthar, 1994), 1:402-403. 
65 FWM, 1:424. 
66 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:182-214. 
67 Jonathan Brown, “Critical Rigor vs. Juridical Pragmatism: How Legal Theorists and Hadith Scholars 
Approached the Backgrowth of Isnads,” Islamic Law and Society 14:1 (2007): 1-41. 
68 See Chapter Six. 
69 He quoted the muḥaddith Ibn al-Mubārak and the qāḍī Yaḥyā ibn Aktham, both stipulating 
knowledge on āthār and ārāʾ for criteria of a muftī. FWM, 2:332-333. 
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proves that for him, the traditional isnād paradigm was historically imposed as the 
path to attaining the maʿnā (Divine intended meaning). 
4.4.2 The Rational Maʿnawī Paradigm 
 Al-Khaṭīb’s most lucid expression of this paradigm epitomises in this 
statement: 
‘Know that the magnified accumulation of ḥadīth does not turn a person into 
a faqīh, for the real fiqh is attained through the excavation of in-depth 
meanings (istinbāṭ al-maʿānī) and a committed thinking (inʿām al-tafakkur) on 
them.’70 
 It is furthermore committed in his powerful statement: 
‘Know that all sciences are seeds for fiqh (al-ʿulūm kulluhā abāzīr li’l-fiqh). 
There is no science below the fiqh except that the seeker of that science 
requires what is lesser than what is required by a faqīh, for the faqīh needs to 
cling himself to a portion of knowledge from every matter of this world and 
the hereafter.’71 
 These two statements reflect a significant opposite to the signs of division 
between aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth and aṣḥāb al-raʾy presented by Melchert. For the practical 
aspect, Melchert states that legal stratagem (ḥīlat, pl. ḥiyal) was one bitter point of 
contention between the two sides. Ibn Ḥanbal was against ḥīlat and typically Kitāb 
al-Ḥiyal. They were generally known as features of Hanafism.72 Nevertheless, al-
Khaṭīb authored a work with the same title possibly to support it. He had provided a 
section on ḥīlah in Kitāb-al-Faqīh promoting first the nobility and genius of Abū 
Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf in their legal stratagem before mentioning the creativity of 
                                                        
70 Naṣīḥat, 37. 
71 FWM, 2:333. 
72 Melchert, Formation, 9. 
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al-Shāfiʿī.73Although he changed the referential noun into al-tamaḥḥul (striving for a 
good strategy), it embodies the same concept of ḥiyal.74 
 Melchert had also associated the traditionalists with mudhākarah and the 
rationalists with munāẓarah.75 Some traditionists, he argued, might engage with 
munāẓarah before the conversion to traditionalism, but Baghdādīan traditionalists in 
particular rejected munāẓarah.76 Again, al-Khaṭīb approved both mudhākarah and 
munāẓarah. In al-Jāmiʿ, he specified a section on the importance of mudhākarah.77 The 
previous chapter has threaded the background of his view on al-naẓar wa’l-istidlāl. 
Apart from his multi-patterned emphasis on naẓar in the above sections, al-Khaṭīb 
had a dedicated chapter on munāẓarah in Kitāb al-Faqīh. From this chapter, it is 
learned that his maʿnā is of two types: (1) maʿnā fiqhī (meaning derived from 
traditional sources) and (2) maʿnā naẓarī (meaning derived by human speculation). 
According to al-Khaṭīb: 
‘The best and the most powerful debater is the one who replies initially with 
an intellectual answer (jawāb naẓarī) that preserves the rules and principles 
of speculation. Then, he followed it with an answer that explains the fiqhī 
understanding of the point debated.’78 
 One may conclude here that a maʿnā or knowledge could be derived from 
naẓar and munāẓarah, and it is, at instances such as intellectual debate, placed higher 
than a fiqhī maʿnā. The preservation of rules and principles of speculation is of a high 
                                                        
73 The account he provided shows that Abū Ḥanīfah was better than Ibn Abī Laylā and Sufyān al-
Thawrī who cannot find any solution for the problem referred to them by a hater of Abū Ḥanīfah. In 
spite of that, Abū Ḥanīfah gave the person a perfect solution for his problem. FWM, 2:410-414. 
74 Bāb al-Tamaḥḥul fī al-Fatwā. The use of tamaḥḥul could possibly relate to the Qurʾanic verse that 
describes God as shadīd al-miḥāl. For the discussion on ḥīlah and tamaḥḥul and their different 
connotations despite morphological relation, see: al-Azharī, Tahdhīb al-Lughah (Dār al-Qawmiyyah, 
1964), 5:95. 
75 He describes mudhākarah as a friendly contest to determine who could recite the most ḥadīth 
reports, or the most chains of authorities for a given text. Munāẓarah in contrast, is a formal debate 
over a point of law or theology practiced by mutakallimūn and rationalistic jurisprudents. Formation, 
18-22.  
76 Melchert did remark, ‘By some accounts, admittedly, even the Baghdādīs engaged in munāẓarah.’ 
77 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:267-279.  
78 FWM, 2:109. 
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consideration. The sources of fiqhī maʿnā will be explained soon. A concern here is 
that the mode by which this maʿnā is obtained with regard to revelation is either 
one of two: (1) denomination (al-ism) or (2) extraction (al-istikhrāj).79 This recalls 
immediately al-Shāfiʿī’s naṣṣ (hermeneutically self sufficient passage) and istinbāṭ 
(derivation), and according to Lowry too, al-Shāfiʿī’s khabar (dictated by clear cut 
text) and istidlāl (derived by inference).80 This dualism of dictum and derivatum was 
also replicated in the conclusion of Abū’l-Muẓaffar al-Samʿānī (489/1096) on the idea 
of Shāfiʿism when he concluded it as naṣṣ and maʿnā.81 The bifurcation was 
epistemologically evoked by the thought that revelation encompasses all meanings 
needed by human with regard to God’s commandment. When a point of law is not 
mentioned clear-cut in revelation, imitative reasoning or rationale speculation is 
applied.   
  Ultimately, like the idea of the Ashʿarīs, the right naẓār (speculation) will 
confirm to the aim intended by revelation. On the same wavelength, al-Khaṭīb 
asserts: 
‘As for raʾy (rationalisation), it is an act of deducting the objectively correct 
result. Whoever places raʾy at its rightful position and applies naẓar 
rightfully, he will be lead to the sought truth. Just as a person who wishes to 
go to a mosque, and he chooses the right road and does not turn away from 
it, he will surely arrive at the destination.’82 
 Hence, in the scheme of al-Khaṭīb, rationality is always conditioned, 
likewise ʿilm is guided by dalīl, and dirāyah is guided by riwāyah.  
 Another point to be considered with regard to the cognition of maʿnā is that 
prior to al-Khaṭīb, al-Ashʿarī viewed that ʿilm (knowledge), maʿrifah (cognition), 
yaqīn (certitude), fahm (understanding), fiṭnah (sagacity), dirāyah (scire), ʿaql 
(intellect), fiqh (apprehension) are in general synonymous.83 Al-Khaṭīb had also 
                                                        
79 FWM, 1:468. 
80 Lowry, Legal Theory, 67. See Chapter Five. 
81 Qawāṭiʿ al-Adillah fī al-Uṣūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1997), 1:22. 
82 FWM, 1:551. 
83 According to him, God is described only by the attribute of ʿilm and not the rest because revelation 
employs only this attribute. Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 11. 
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applied these words interchangeably outside technical discussions. In the human 
realm, they all signify the mental cognition of maʿnā.  The sought maʿnā, however, is 
not the end in itself; rather it is the path towards a certain confessional spiritual 
progress. 
4.4.3 The Spiritual Darajāt Paradigm 
Muslim scholars cannot advocate the sanctity of the previous two 
paradigms except by having this third paradigm included, which connects the 
worldly campaigns and endeavours with the metaphysical realm. Ironically, this 
idea of darajāt or metaphysical degrees is fashioned by the previous two paradigms 
and it evidently leaves a significant impact on the intellectual framework of a 
scholarship. This study argues that it is not essentially isnād/riwāyah criticism or 
matan/dirāyah criticism that distinguishes between traditional ḥadīth critics and 
the Muʿtazilite ḥadīth methodology; rather it is a specific darajāt paradigm that 
every side adopted. As an initial example, the traditional ḥadīth critics place all the 
Companions at the highest darajat after the Prophet so long that whatever appears 
as contradictory in their reports must submit first to a reasonable hermeneutical 
temperament, instead of rejection. There is always an assumed higher rationale 
measure applied by the Companions.84 Al-Khaṭīb’s entry on ʿAmru ibn ʿUbayd in 
Tārīkh portrayed Muʿtazilite ḥadīth criticism as preconceived tendentious 
ideological criticism, rather than matn criticism. ʿAmru rejected Ibn Masʿūd’s 
tradition based on the presupposition of egalitarian Divine justice the Muʿtazilite 
adopted. He was also reported to have been willing to reject ʿAlī, ʿUthmān, al-
Zubayr, Ṭalḥah, and even the Prophet and God if the idea conveyed contradicted 
his logic.85 Apart from theoretical statements on ḥadīth criticism, the limited 
sources on ḥadīth-by-ḥadīth putative matn criticism applied by the Muʿtazilites have 
hindered the author’s thorough investigation on their actual view. Nevertheless, 
this idea of the essential role played by the darajāt paradigm with regard to the 
Companions is supported by Lucas’ proposal that the principle of Ṣaḥābah is the 
                                                        
84 See the debate of al-Adhramī and Ibn Abī Duʾād: TMS, 11:271. 
85 TMS, 14:63-88. TUG, II:302-305 (ʿAmr als Traditionarier). 
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first to be investigated in relation to the original ḥadīth criticism that forms the 
authentic representation of the Sunnī.86 Lucas also presented how this major 
theme has been ignored in English scholarship of Islamic historiography.87 
In relation to the above, the darajāt paradigm is intimately connected with 
the concept of faḍāʾil (metaphysical vantages). Lucas too investigated the Ṣaḥābah 
principle by examining attitudes towards faḍāʾil al-ṣaḥābah.88 This concept is rather 
obvious in the works of al-Khaṭīb.89 Epistemologically, the higher a person in 
faḍīlah, the nearer he is to God, and the better his cognition and rationalisation of 
objects of knowledge. The Qurʾānic verse states: God will elevate, by many degrees, 
those of you who believe and who have been given knowledge.90 Echoing the 
Ashʿarite theory of naẓār and iktisāb, al-Khaṭīb’s writings simultaneously harboured  
the noble merit of the Ṣaḥābah and the potential merit of all later human beings 
through speculations and efforts attained at best by being a muḥaddith and faqīh. 
Both have been identified as the real awliyāʾ accordingly, applying a somewhat 
confessional language.91 The highest aim of learning ḥadīth, thus, is not necessarily 
authenticity; rather a spiritual progress. Isnād is a part of dīn, a relationship with 
God. Al-Khaṭīb quoted a ḥadīth luminary Ḥammād ibn Salamah saying, ‘Whoever 
seeks ḥadīth not for the sake of nearness to God shall be doomed to spiritual 
confusion.’ Sufyān al-Thawrī was reported to answer when asked, who is the 
rabble? ‘They are those who copy down ḥadīth to seek [future] remuneration from 
people.’92 Al-Khaṭīb, ultimately, lauded scholars of ḥadīth saying: 
                                                        
86 Lucas, Constructive, 282. 
87 Ibid, 221-225. 
88 Ibid, 255. 
89 al-Kifāyah, 1:468, ʿadālat al-ṣaḥābah thābitah maʿlūmah. 
90 Qurʾān, al-Mujādilah 58:11. 
91 Sharaf-al-Aṣḥāb, 50, FWM, 1:150. 
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‘They are indeed the prominent leaders amongst the scholars, the masters 
amongst the great minds, members of al-faḍl wa’l-faḍīlah (spiritual advance 
and vantage) and al-martabah al-rafīʿah (the highly-elevated rank).’93 
However, al-Khaṭīb as usual did not confine the darajāt paradigm within the 
circle of ḥadīth. A comparison between the arrangement of topics in al-Shīrāzī’s al-
Lumāʿ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, al-Khaṭīb’s Kitāb-al-Faqīh and Abū Yaʿlā’s al-ʿUddah fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh 
surfaces al-Khaṭīb’s attempt to merging this paradigm with the dirāyah paradigm. 
While al-Shīrāzī begins his work with definitions of ʿilm, ẓann, naẓar and dalīl before 
explanation of uṣūl al-fiqh, Abū Yaʿlā begins immediately with defining uṣūl al-fiqh 
but reminded promptly on the importance of mastering furūʿ (branches) before 
recognising principles since many theorists amongst the theologians misunderstood 
the functions of legal principles. Al-Khaṭīb on the other hand initiates his treatise 
with twenty sections that list the faḍl and faḍīlah of the fuqahāʾ, addressing the 
traditionists using the style of their composition and informing legal students and 
academic minds with the darajāt paradigm.94 To further illustrate the features of 
this paradigm, this study numbers the sections of the introductory part and 
rearranges them thematically with relation to their aims: 
Section 1 and 11 establish a connection between fiqh, God given wisdom and 
spiritual goodness (khayr). 
Section 7, 9 and 10 instate the concept of intermediaries between God and 
the worshipping servants, and authorise the intermediaries in discerning 
good and evil.  
Section 17 and 18 extend the authority of a faqīh upon the whole community 
including spouses, children and slaves.  
Section 13 and 16 guarantee the presence of faqīh in every generation and 
that the level of religiosity in a town is related to this presence. 
                                                        
93 al-Kifāyah, 1:85.  
94 Although Lucas mentioned al-Khaṭīb’s advice for ḥadīth scholars to take legal disciplines seriously 
through Kitāb-al-Faqīh, he did not explain the role of this lengthy treatment with regards to al-
Khaṭīb’s readers from amongst the students of jurisprudence. The image of al-Khaṭīb’s “Salafism”, as 
Lucas depicted it, thereupon, is disconnected from a significant spiritual discourse, and a possible 
Ṣūfī tendency. Legal Principles, 315.  
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Section 4 and 14 illustrate the notion of elevation and rise to an advance 
metaphysical and worldly position through learning fiqh. 
Section 2, 3 and 5 introduce the idea of superiority between men who were 
likened to ores (maʿādin) of different qualities; sessions of fiqh over the 
circles of dhikr (chanting); seeking maʿnā over all types of worship; and 
fuqahāʾ over worshippers.  
Section 15 combines in general all other notions that place fiqh and fuqahāʾ at 
superior position. A tradition presented in this section states that the 
nearest people to the darajat of Prophethood is scholars and men of jihād. 
Section 8 places fiqh as the highest relation between man and God (mā ʿubida 
Allah bi shayʾin afḍal min al-fiqh).95  
Section 12 explains that the rank of a servant in the Hereafter depends on 
the final level (martabah) of knowledge he achieved during his life.  
Section 19 likens the marātib of heart with regard to knowledge to three 
types of land in relation to rainfall: fertile land, water-holding land and non-
beneficial land. Al-Khaṭīb commented: ‘The Messenger has combined in this 
tradition all marātib of fuqahāʾ and mutafaqqihūn without any exception.’ He 
interpreted the three types of land with the likes of faqīh, the likes of ḥadīth 
expert and the likes of individual with barren heart. 
Section 20 relates the division of hearts attributed to ʿAlī ibn Abū Ṭālib with 
the previous maratīb. Al-Khaṭīb remarked:  
‘This ḥadīth (ʿAlī’s speech) is amongst the best ḥadīth in meaning and the 
noblest in wording ... The rabbānī (Lordly) scholar is the one whose faḍl 
(spiritual advantage) is the highest that could be achieved by a fāḍil (a 
person who advances) and whose manzilah (stature) is the highest that could 
be attained by a mujtahid (expert) ... the meaning of rabbānī in its linguistic 
sense is the most elevated in the degree and the highest stature in 
knowledge.’96 
                                                        
95 Al-Khaṭīb’s treatment of this idea has attracted the later Ḥanbalī Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah to 
elaborate it in his work on the key to the eternal happiness. See his citation of al-Khaṭīb’s 
introduction and narration: Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿādah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 1:118. 
96 FWM, 1:184. 
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It is only by the end of these sections that al-Khaṭīb begins his exposition of 
fiqh in its linguistic, general and specific sense as legal studies. 
The above intangible notions are furthermore reflected in tangible part of 
scholarship. As for the sphere of isnād, al-Khaṭīb remarked: 
‘The ranks of narrators in knowledge are not equal. The one with superior 
isnād as we previously described should be favoured. If the asānīd of a group 
of head-narrators are equal in superiority, and the student need to choose 
amongst them, he should pick the one whose experience of seeking ḥadīth is 
vastly acknowledged, and whose academic meticulousness and proficiency 
are notable ... If they are equal in term of isnād superiority and academic 
traits, one should opt for those with noble status and lineage.’97   
 While in regards to fiqh and dirāyah, al-Khaṭīb did not leave a discussion on 
levels of fuqahāʾ, although he mentioned that there are different levels (tabāyun) of 
understanding.98 As for the mechanism of dirāyah, in contrast to Abū Yaʿlā, al-
Khaṭīb did not discuss whether people are of different levels of intellectual capacity 
(tafāwut al-ʿuqūl), although he used attributes such as tamma al-ʿaql (matured 
intellect), wufūr al-ʿaql (intelligent), etc. According to Abū Yaʿlā, both the Muʿtazilah 
and the Ashāʿirah hold that human intellectual capacities are identical; while the 
Ḥanābilah view that they are non-equal.99 The consequence of this thought is that 
humans are responsible towards God not in an equal manner, which is an extreme 
opposite to the Muʿtazilite egalitarian tendency. While al-Khaṭīb was silent on this 
subject, he did mention the better faḍl for a scholar who exerts himself in ijtihād 
(seeking knowledge) on challenging subjects and associated it with the Qurʾanic 
praise on tanāfus (competition).100 
 The truth for him has never been confined to any school of thought or legal 
community. Common people who are not well equipped to perform naẓar may 
follow (taqlīd) any of the scholars. Al-Khaṭīb clearly distinguishes between 
                                                        
97 al-Jāmiʿ, 1:126. 
98 FWM, 2:139. 
99 Abū Yaʿlā argued for the Ḥanbalites based on the ḥadīth collection titled Kitāb al-ʿAql by their faqīh, 
Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī. al-ʿUddah, 1:94. 
100 Qurʾān, al-Muṭaffifīn 83:26, FWM, 2:39. 
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individuals who are able to execute naẓar and ijtihād, and the common public. His 
allowance for taqlīd to the public did not specify any madhhab as well.101  There is 
an indication that charitable consideration of the status of the common public is a 
reaction to the Muʿtazilite denigration of their religious status since taqlīd 
according to them is blameworthy.102 Al-Khaṭīb reported this as being said about 
the Muʿtazilah without certainty.103 It does, however, fit with al-Khaṭīb’s portrayal 
of them as exclusivists who boast upon their intellectual certainty before the 
public.104 He portrayed his darajāt paradigm as more inclusive by allocating ḥifẓ 
(preservation) to the ḥamalah, naẓar to the scholars and ʿamal to the public. 
Knowledge raises the rank of a person, yet, al-Khaṭīb warned his audience on its 
mandate for action: 
 ‘Indeed, did not those pious predecessors attain the loftiest degrees (al-
darajāt al-ʿulā) that they attained except through stringent sincerity,105 
righteous actions and overwhelming abstinence from the attractive features 
of this lowly life? And did not the philosophers accede to the eudemonia 
except through rigorous efforts, temperate enjoyment of life, and giving out 
their surpluses to the destitute and the deprived?’ 
The above three paradigms inform theoretically al-Khaṭīb’s framework of 
ijtihād in sharʿī-related subjects. They explain to what extent his idea of scholarship 
and religion is connected to traditionalism, rationalism, institutional madhhab and 
constant pietism. Al-Shāfiʿī’s statement in al-Risālah alludes to these paradigms and 
it was quoted by al-Khaṭīb to intensify the importance of constant ijtihād: 
‘People with regards to knowledge are of different levels (ṭabaqāt). Their 
position with regard to it follows their degrees (darajāt) in learning. Hence, a 
seeker of knowledge should exert as much as he can, perseveres as possible 
                                                        
101 FWM, 2:133. 
102 Richard Frank, Knowledge and taqlīd: The Foundation of Religious Belief in Classical Ashʿarism, in 
Texts and Studies, vol. III, VII:37-62. 
103 FWM, 2:133. 
104 Thumma huwa yaftakhir ʿala al-ʿawām bi-dhahāb ʿumrihi fī dars al-kalām, wa-yarā jamīʿahum ḍāllīn 
siwāhu, wa yaʿtaqid an laysa yanjū illā iyyāh, li-khurūjihi fīmā zaʿama ʿan ḥadd al-taqlīd, wa-intisābihi ilā al-
qawl bi’l-ʿadl wa al-tawḥīd. See: Sharaf al-Aṣḥāb, 4.  
105 In the published version edited by Al-Albānī the phrase is read ikhlāṣ al-muʿtaqad, which means 
through purifying the creed, while the manuscript reads al-ikhlāṣ al-muʿtaqad that denotes what is 
translated above. See: Iqtiḍāʾ, 15. 
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as he can, and purifies his intention only for God, so he may acquire 
knowledge through [1] naṣṣ (traditional texts), [2] istinbāṭ (intellectual 
derivation), and [3] al-raghbat ila Allah (spiritual devotion to God).’106   
4.5 Ijtihād and Iḥāṭah 
4.5.1 Divine Commandment upon the scholars 
 The previous discussions illustrate that for al-Khaṭīb, ijtihād is the 
responsibility of scholars and the concealment of the final answer is meant for both 
the feasibility of ijtihād itself, and the integrity and creativity of scholars. In a legal 
theoretical study on Islam and authoritarian, Abou-El-Fadl depicts Islamic law as a 
work in movement.107 However, when dealing with the question of whether there is 
a correct answer to every textual and legal problem, Abou-El-Fadl divided Muslim 
jurists into two main camps; (1) mukhaṭṭiʾah and (2) muṣawwibah. The first argues 
that there is only one correct answer. Abou-El-Fadl quoted al-Khaṭīb arguing that if 
people were not supposed to find the correct answer, what is the point of 
munāẓarah? Mudhākarah and munāẓarah are useful because they have the potential of 
bringing scholars closer to the truth.108 The second camp according to Abou-El-Fadl 
argues that every mujtahid is correct and human may arrive only at predominant 
thought. However, Abou-El-Fadl gave several classical examples, which involve the 
change of answer according to circumstances. This is misleading since the 
mukhaṭṭiʾah including al-Khaṭīb were addressing polar questions in legal cases where 
it is impossible to have a double answer such as valid and invalid at the same time. 
Al-Khaṭīb rather had in mind two senses of muṣawwibah: (1) muṣīb al-ḥaqq (every 
answer is intellectually correct), which he rejected,109 and (2) muṣīb al-ajr (every 
credible attempt is rewarded, but the right one is double-rewarded). This fit 
beautifully into the darajāt paradigm.  
                                                        
106 al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risālah (Egypt, Muṣṭafā al-Bābī, 1938), 19, FWM, 2:204. 
107 Khaled Abou-El-Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (Oxford: Oneworld, 
2003), 145.  
108 Ibid, 147-148. FWM, 2:120-122. 
109 He brought several accounts where the Companions refute each other. 
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 Another question is regarding the conflict of interest where two clients are 
following two different schools of thought and the responses are opposing such as 
valid and invalid. Abou-El-Fadl asserted that for muṣawwibah the law of God is 
suspended until there is a formal legal adjudication between the competing 
interests. Al-Khaṭīb did not address the exact situation. However, his words 
indicated that only one of the views would be right. If the exact situation as above 
occurs, we may infer that al-Khaṭīb would recognise the said adjudication as 
another ijtihād where there is only one right answer too.  
 The above applies as well to ijtihād in the verification of tradition where a 
tradition cannot be approved as authentic and forgery concurrently. Previous 
verification is constantly open to revision and criticism with certain exceptions.110   
 This scheme of ijtihād preserves the authority and integrity of traditional 
texts and the dynamicity of intellectual efforts, with the confinement of relativity to 
the realm of metaphysical darajāt. Ijtihād becomes the way for scholars to come 
closer to God.     
4.5.2 The Continuity of Ijtihād  
The continuity of ijtihād in al-Khaṭīb’s scheme could be extrapolated from 
two points. First, the assertion on the authority of muḥaddith/faqīh/ʿālim and that 
Sharʿī sources have warranted the existence of these experts in every generation. 
Second, he accepts the legal status of ijmāʿ (correlative multiple ijtihāds) amongst 
the experts when obtained in every generation. Ijmāʿ is not confined to the time of 
the Companions, as was the view al-Khaṭīb ascribed to the Ẓāhirī Dāwūd ibn ʿAlī 
(270/884) and refuted it.111 For him, the experts amongst the Followers such as Saʿīd 
ibn al-Musayyib, Abū Salamah ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, and students of Ibn Masʿūd such 
as Shurayḥ were practising ijtihād in giving opinions during the later period of the 
Companion era and none of the Companion denounced their creativity. Therefore, 
the later in period could be elevated to a higher station and knowledge expertise. 
                                                        
110 See Chapter Six. 
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However, the established results (agreement and disputation) from the time of the 
Companions must not be nullified.112 If the Companions disagreed on a subject and 
they resulted in two different opinions, the Followers must not forbid people from 
following any of them. Doing so is a breach of ijmāʿ. Should there be an established 
ijmāʿ of Companions on two opinions, it is not permissible as well to form the third 
one. Al-Khaṭīb in this regard affirmed the authority of both the salaf and the 
contemporary scholars. Ijtihād is continuous as long as it does not contradict the 
naṣṣ (clear-cut texts)113 and agreed finalised subjects. 
4.5.3 Ijtihād and Authority 
 The study of authority from legal and theological perspectives often 
confined to the question of loyalty to a doctrinal community or principles. Melchert 
has pointed out that the traditionalists of Baghdād held out for exclusive 
dependence on ancient authority, only to find that their resistance to any 
dependence on later teachers was later untenable.114 In al-Khaṭīb’s traditionalism, 
the absence of grades of mujtahid within a specific legal school, sometimes 
exemplified in the genre of ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, bears a mark of Salafism as already 
granted in Lucas study. However, Lucas placed al-Khaṭīb amongst the pioneers of 
Madhhabī Salafism for his openness to being a Shāfiʿī.115  
 A notable aspect being Abou-El-Fadl’s assertion that generally the authority 
of God is preserved in an abstraction called the Sharīʿah, while the concrete 
understanding and implementation of God’s Authoritative Will is called fiqh. The 
latter is the product of human attempt to understand God’s Will and that the 
conceptual distinction was the product of the recognition of human limited 
capacity. Building on Friedman’s distinction between being “in authority” and being 
“an authority”, Abou-El-Fadl constructs the concepts of coercive authority and 
                                                        
112 Ittibāʿ al-salaf fī al-ijmāʿ wa al-khilāf. FWM, 1:435. 
113 Bāb fī Suqūṭ al-Ijtihād maʿa Wujūd al-Naṣṣ, Ibid, 1:504. 
114 Melchert, Formation, 137. 
115 Lucas, Legal Principles, 323. 
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persuasive authority.116 Within the Islamic legal theory, a mujtahid possesses only 
the second level of authority.117 The madhāhib hence were attributed with fiqhiyyah, 
and not sharʿiyyah. This coalesces with al-Khaṭīb’s schema where the Qurʾān, the 
Sunnah and the Ijmāʿ as the basis of Sharīʿah are deemed terminal authority. While in 
regards to them as sources for fiqh, al-Khaṭīb, following al-Shāfiʿī, presented duality 
and ambiguity in the deliberation of the three sources, making the role of a muftī 
and a mujtahid non-terminal albeit compelling. 
 While there is a strict emphasis on following Sharīʿah, there is no instruction 
on following a particular madhhab in al-Khaṭīb’s works, not even for instructional 
convenience. As for scholars with the opportunity to perform research, ijtihād is 
incumbent upon them and their dependence should be primarily on the indicants, 
before reference to any past luminaries; a consideration of darajāt. Whereas a 
layman may follow any of the appointed muftīs including, surprisingly, those 
accused as following whimsical despotism and heretics whose heresy does not pair a 
grave sin (fisq).118  
 As for the authority of state in opting for a particular legal view, it is 
officialised by orthodox consensus on the preservation of peace. According to al-
Khaṭīb, if scholars were to allow revocation of a ruler for his wrong choice of legal 
opinion, it will lead to incessant revocations by ambitious politicians that are 
beyond repair.119 
 In the case of gender, the social context of al-Khaṭīb’s circle may have not 
necessitated him to explicate the subject of female muftī. His enumeration of the 
requirements of muftīship, though, did not explicitly restrict any gender. However, 
al-Khaṭīb did allocate his attention to state that being a free person is not a 
requirement. Having learned from the renowned female ḥadīth scholar, Karīmah al-
Marrūdhiyyah (463/1071), al-Khaṭīb was aware of the involvement of women in 
                                                        
116 Abou-El-Fadl, In God’s Name, 18-23 
117 The scholars in Islam dispose authority in society; they do not directly dispose power. Akram al-
Nadwī, al-Muḥaddithāt: The Women Scholars in Islam (Oxford: Interface Pub., 2007), 3. 
118 FWM, 2:333. 
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ḥadīthī fatwā (responsa pertaining to ḥadīth). Akram Nadwi in his monumental study 
on female ḥadīth scholars quoted al-Khaṭīb saying: 
‘Where traditionist and witness differ from each other is the requirement for 
a witness on being a free person, not parent or descendant [of the party 
involved], not having any relation that leads to suspicion, not a close friend, 
and being a male in some types of testimony, and being two or four in some 
others. And all that is not considered in a traditionist. For we accept 
knowledge transmitted by a slave, a woman, a friend, etc.’120  
 Moreover, al-Khaṭīb had cited al-Bāqillānī’s opinion that the accredition and 
discredition of narrators offered by even a single knowledgeable woman should be 
accepted contrary to the opinion of many jurists of Madinah.121 Al-Khaṭīb’s Tārīkh 
also provides a section on renowned female scholars. 
4.5.4 Ijtihād and Areas of Expertise 
 In al-Jāmiʿ, al-Khaṭīb underlined: ‘For every science there is a method which 
is necessary for its aspirants to oblige.’122 He provided in the two methodological 
treatises the framework for three major areas of expertise. The author first uses al-
Khaṭīb’s section on compilation and composition in al-Jāmiʿ to illustrate his 
combination of ḥadīth and fiqh.  
(1) The Ḥuffāẓ-ship 
 According to al-Khaṭīb, ḥadīths were compiled narrator-based (musnad pl. 
masānīd) and topical-based (bāb pl. abwāb).123 The adoption of these two methods 
reflects the notion of combination between isnād and maʿnā. Abwāb collections 
arranged musnad ḥadīth (attributed to the Prophet) in topics, but early compilations 
had more mawqūf (stopped at the level of Companion) and mursal (fast-forwarded at 
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the tier of Follower) narrations, for not many musnad ḥadīth were available.124 Al-
Khaṭīb gave six accounts that prove the practice of topical arrangement amongst 
the early tradents of ḥadīth. These accounts seem to be a refutation against 
unknown contenders who view this act as profanity.125 He then listed a number of 
topics, which were often treated by the tradents.126 Prior to it, he provided the uṣūl 
(principal sources) for legal hypothetical cases and ḥadīths of legal import. A 
number of Companions were exemplarily listed, namely Ibn Masʿūd, Zayd ibn 
Thābit, Ibn ʿAbbās, and ʿAlī ibn Abū Ṭālib.  
 Attending to the compilation and composition based on narrators, al-Khaṭīb 
initially informed that this method was introduced either by the Egyptian 
traditionalist, Asad al-Sunnah (212/827) or the Egyptian traditional jurist who was 
formerly a Jahmī, Nuʿaym ibn Ḥammād (228/843).127 The introduction of musnad 
collection, then, cannot be identified with Ibn Ḥanbal or Baghdādian 
traditionalists.128 Next, he expounded the ranks of the Companions since the 
masānīd were arranged according to individual Companion. After that, al-Khaṭīb 
presented the uṣūl (principal sources) of ḥadīth as surmised by ʿAlī ibn al-Madīnī. 
They began with six leading tradents: al-Zuhrī, ʿAmru ibn Dīnār (126/743), Qatādah, 
Yaḥyā ibn Abī Kathīr (132/750), Abū Isḥāq al-Sabīʿī (129/7466) and Sulaymān al-
Aʿmash (148/765), and ended up with eleven tradents who transmitted from 
them.129 The juxtaposition of the list by al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Dāwūd al-Ṭayālisī (204/819) 
shows that the previous one is not terminal. Al-Khaṭīb had furthermore provided 
the lists of tradents whose narrations were sought after. According to him, al-Ḥāfiẓ 
                                                        
124 This may support the theory of back growth projection of isnād. However, it seems that the reason 
for non-availability is lesser communication amongst scholars in the regions. Al-Khaṭīb seems to 
allude to this point when he characterised the nature of ḥadīth transmission in every region. al-Jāmiʿ, 
2:286, makhārij al-sunan. 
125 See the question addressed to Wakīʿ in al-Jāmiʿ, 2:285. 
126 See Chapter Two. 
127 On the Iraq origin of the idea of musnad, see: G.H.A Juynboll, Muslim Tradition (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1983) 22.  
128 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:290. 
129 Ibn Abī ʿArūbah, Ḥammād ibn Salamah, Shuʿbah, Abū ʿAwānah, Sufyān al-Thawrī, Ibn Jurayj, Mālik 
ibn Anas, Sufyān ibn ʿUyaynah, Hushaym ibn Bashīr, Maʿmar ibn Rāshid and al-Awzāʿī. al-Jāmiʿ, 2:294 
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ʿUthmān al-Dārimī (280/894) regarded Ḥammād ibn Zayd (179/795), Ibn ʿUyaynah 
(198/814), Mālik, al-Thawrī and Shuʿbah as uṣūl al-dīn (principal sources of religion). 
Ibn Ḥanbal added to the last three Zāʾidah ibn Qudāmah (161/778) and Zuhayr ibn 
Ḥarb (234/849), and regarded the five as The Leaders.130 For al-Khaṭīb, fellows of 
ḥadīth had sought narrations of many others apart from them.131 It shows that the 
lists provided were not meant to dictate authorities but rather to highlight the 
paragon of transmission.132 
 Al-Khaṭīb finally provided the lists of works reportedly authored by ʿAlī ibn 
al-Madīnī and Ibn Ḥibbān. He credited the former as the philosopher of ḥadīth 
criticism and lauded the latter for his combination between ḥadīth and fiqh. Al-
Khaṭīb said: ‘His [Ibn Ḥibbān] last work was al-Hidāyah ilā ʿIlm al-Sunan in which he 
intended to showcase the two crafts: ḥadīth and fiqh. It was his best and greatest 
book.’133 
 To further prove that the previous enlistments were not statements of 
terminal authority, al-Khaṭīb had already provided a section on the highest level of 
expertise in the field of ḥadīth. According to him, the highest designation of ḥadīth 
acumen and the uppermost degree of the nāqilīn (i.e. ḥamalah) is al-Ḥāfiẓ. This 
designation was not customarily used for any other disciplines, not even, as 
familiarised in colloquial parlance, for the memorisers of the Qurʾān. It evokes more 
than a mere memorisation to include the sense of ultimate understanding, 
                                                        
130 Ibn Ḥanbal has also regarded ʿAbd Allāh al-Dārimī, the author of al-Sunan as The Leader. Siyar, 
12:226, 
131 See previous chapter. 
132 Melchert might have misrepresented the traditionalists when he quoted Abū ʿUbayd saying 
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preservation, safeguarding, and extending knowledge to later generation. Al-Khaṭīb 
lists the criteria by which one attains ḥuffāẓ-ship: 
1- Knowledgeable on the [standard] Sunan of the Prophet. 
2- Knowledgeable on the [major] channels of its transmission in general. 
3- Able to recognise and discern strands of transmission at particular levels. 
4- Retentive on the approved and disputed amongst the strands. 
5- Learned in the methodologies of grading transmitters. 
6- Learned in terminologies of al-taḥammul wa’l-adāʾ (receiving and 
transmitting). 
7- Learned in terminologies of ṭabaqāt (e.g. ṣaḥābī, tābiʿī) and its consequences. 
8- Learned in terminologies of tadlīs-related issues. 
9- Learned in textual errors and interpolations. 
10- Specialised in the field without much distractions. 
 One who fulfils these criteria makes the reliable reference in ḥadīth 
criticism.134 Scholars, however reputable they are nationwide or worldwide, 
including figures being perceived as saints, must subscribe to this mastership. For 
this reason, a retracement provided by al-ḥāfiẓ invites a wider scholarly reception. 
To clarify his assertion, al-Khaṭīb listed several names and the breadth of their 
experience with traditions:  
i. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Ḥammād ibn Abī Usāmah (201/817): 100,000 narrations. 
ii. Al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAlī ibn al-Madīnī: more than 100,000. 
iii. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn: 600,000 or more. 
iv. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Zurʿah al-Rāzī: more than 100,000. 
v. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Kurayb al-Hamdānī )247/862): more than 300,000. 
vi. Al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿUbayd Allah ibn ʿUmar al-Qawārīrī (235/850): 100,000. 
vii. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥaḍramī Muṭayyan (297/910): 100,000. 
viii. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū’l-ʿAbbās Ibn ʿUqdah (332/944): more than 400,000. 
 Compared to al-Rāmhurmuzī and al-Ḥākim, al-Khaṭīb was the first to 
emphasise the authority of ḥuffāẓ-ship and elaborate its conditions. Additionally, al-
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Khaṭīb believed that an expert would be recognised even if he humbly denied his 
expertise as he did for himself.135 The most repeated word al-Khaṭīb applied in his 
expositions pertaining to ḥuffāẓ-ship is ikthār (enrichment).136 Then, it would be 
acceptable to conclude that the notion of potential encompassment lies at the heart 
of his methodological framework for expertise in ḥadīth.   
(2) The Faqīh as an ʿĀlim 
 As mentioned previously, al-Ashʿarī and al-Khaṭīb sometimes equate fiqh 
with knowledge in general. In his technical definition of fiqh, al-Khaṭīb cited al-
Shīrāzī who says that fiqh is the cognition of Divine imperatives (al-aḥkām al-
sharʿiyyah) by the means of ijtihād.137 The approach al-Khaṭīb applied has yet to 
distinguish between the qatʿī and ijtihādī in fiqh, despite that he adopted the concept 
of ʿilm ḍarūrī. If fiqh is synonymous to ʿilm, there should be “al-fiqh al-ḍarūrī” or “qaṭʿī” 
apart from ijtihādī. Al-Khaṭīb, however, had explained earlier on that fiqh is the 
apparatus of ʿilm and that according to Ibn Qutaybah, an ʿālim is called faqīh based on 
the Arab norms of assigning to a thing the name of its cause. Thus, the apparatus is 
human effort and not an object that could be logically qualified with ḍarūrī-ness. 
Abū Yaʿlā also expressed this point.138 Al-Khaṭīb added to al-Shīrāzī and Abū Yaʿlā by 
citing the linguist Thaʿlab who states that the verb fa-qu-ha means ka-mu-la 
(completed). Compared to uṣūl works of his time, al-Khaṭīb was the only scholar who 
preserves this linguistic meaning that is useful to appreciating a faqīh as a kāmil 
(completed), and explaining fiqh as the highest form of servanthood. 
 When dealing with uṣūl al-fiqh, al-Khaṭīb and al-Shīrāzī both define it as the 
indicants (adillah) based on which fiqh (positive statutes) are known. However, while 
al-Shīrāzī enlists (1) God’s communique, (2) Prophet’s communique, practices, and 
                                                        
135 TFZ, 3:224, Asked, ‘You are the Ḥāfiẓ Abū Bakr?’ He replied, ‘I am only Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī, the ḥifẓ has 
ended with al-Dāraquṭnī.’ 
136 Section on al-Ikthār min al-Shuyūkh, section on dhikr baʿḍ akhbār al-mawṣūfīn bi’l-ikthār min katb al-
ḥadīth wa-samāʿihi. In his explication on the criteria for al-ḥāfiẓ, al-Khaṭīb remarked: fa-yanbaghī lahu 
an yakūna qad akthara min al-ḥadīth kitābatan wa-samāʿan. al-Jāmiʿ 
137 FWM, 1:191, al-Shīrāzī, al-Lumaʿ, 34. 
138 al-ʿUddah, 1:68. 
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tacit affirmations, (3) the affirmation of the Muslim Community, (4) qiyās, (5) the 
pre-Islamic judgement in the absence of adillah, and (6) a verdict from a scholar 
upon a layman, al-Khaṭīb emboldens that uṣul for fiqh are three.139 These are (1) 
Kitāb Allah, (2) the Sunnah of Muḥammad, and (3) the concurrent affirmations of 
experts (ijmāʿ ahl al-ijtihād).  The theme of ijtihād is once again upraised. It might be 
not far-fetched to suppose that based on al-Khaṭīb’s style, ijmāʿ al-ummah would be 
the sign of Sharīʿah while ijmāʿ ahl al-ijtihād situated as the source for fiqh. 
Nevertheless, al-Khaṭīb’s exclusion of these three as the source of fiqh draws closer 
to Abū Yaʿlā’s first level of indicants, which comprises of Qurʾān, Sunnah and Ijmāʿ.140 
The rational seeking al-Juwaynī would regard the restriction to these three as a sign 
of Ḥashawīs.141 Nevertheless, al-Khaṭīb and Abū Yaʿlā had both discussed the 
legitimacy of certain other indicants without naming them uṣūl, at least at the first 
level.142 In the case of al-Khaṭīb, the certain others such as qiyās (analogy), istiṣḥāb 
(presumption of continuity), and the pre-Sharīʿah state of things, are found to be 
amongst those he regarded as disputed principles. 
 In summary, al-Khaṭīb demanded a faqīh to encompass the uṣūl and other 
related subjects to indicants he mentioned in Kitāb-al-Faqīh in order to attain 
mastership of religious knowledge. The brevity of discussion he provided reflects 
his idea of expertness where an expert will know how to proceed independently in 
deeper subjects. When presented with the list of mujtahids Abū Ḥātim presented, al-
Khaṭīb remarked that it was rather exemplary for there are many more scholars and 
experts in every generation. The encompassment of their disputation and 
agreement is a sign of an expert.143 
                                                        
139 al-Shīrāzī, al-Lumaʿ, 35.  
140 al-ʿUddah, 1:72. 
141 al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 1:125. 
142 Abū Yaʿlā divides indicants of al-sharʿ (sharīʿah and fiqh) into three types: (1) aṣl (Qurʾān, Sunnah, 
Ijmāʿ), (2) mafhūm aṣl (derivatum of aṣl, namely mafhūm al-khiṭāb, dalīl al-khiṭāb and maʿnā al-khiṭāb), and 
(3) istiṣḥāb (presumption of continuity). Al-ʿUddah, 1:71. Al-Shīrāzī had also followed this scheme. Al-
Shīrāzī, al-Maʿūnah fī al-Jadal (Kuwait: Jamʿīyyat Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth, 1987), 26. 
143 FWM. 1:433. 
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(3) The Muftī 
 Similar to al-Shāfiʿī, al-Khaṭīb differentiates between fiqh (which root is f-q-h) 
and fatwā (which root is f-t-y). Lowry concludes that the root f-t-y in al-Shāfiʿī’s 
Risālāh does not inform a definitive conclusion. He suggests that it describes persons 
who accept a particular ḥadīth and it might possibly be a synonym of fiqh.144 Al-
Khaṭīb supplies us with the distinction when he cited al-Shāfiʿī detailing the criteria 
of a muftī. According to al-Shāfiʿī, a muftī should be: 
1- Learned in areas of Qurʾanic sciences, namely nāsikh wa-mansūkh, muḥkam wa-
mutashābih, taʿwīl wa-tanzīl, makkī wa-madanī, murād wa-fīmā unzil. 
2- Learned in ḥadīth sciences, similar to the topics related to Qurʾanic sciences. 
3- Learned in Arabic language and poetry to the use of understanding Qurʾān 
and knowledge. 
4- Fair and detached from unneeded conversation. 
5- Aware of disputed laws across regions. 
6- Naturally genius. 
 Al-Shāfiʿī ends up by saying, ‘If these qualities are attained, a person may 
issue opinions and deliver responsa pertaining to the lawful and the unlawful. If not, 
he may discuss ʿilm, but refrain from delivering responsa.’145 
 Fatwā or the act of issuing fatwā, called iftāʾ, therefore concerns the 
responsibility to address questions asked by the public. It is somewhat an additional 
task to ʿilm, which is the synonym of fiqh. According to Lowry, the terms ahl al-ʿilm 
and ahl al-fiqh overlap completely in the Risālah of al-Shāfiʿī. 
 It is at this point that we may qualify al-Khaṭīb four sources of ahkām as 
related to the ground of iftāʾ. The four-source scheme attributed by Schacht and 
some modern scholars to al-Shāfiʿī were elaborated by al-Khaṭīb under the section 
on the Criteria of a Muftī.146 They are: (1) Kitāb Allah, (2) Sunnah of Muḥammad, (3) 
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the Opinions of the Pious Predecessors whether in the agreed or the disputed 
subjects where ijtihād is feasible, and (4) positive qiyās (analogy) to arrive at the 
rulings on unprecedented issues (al-nawāzil). 
 Al-Khaṭīb had also added many more moral and intellectual qualities that a 
muftī should observe. After mentioning fiqh as the ultimate science, al-Khaṭīb 
penned the encompassment a muftī should endure: 
 ‘He needs to distinct between seriousness and joviality, differences and 
contradictions, beneficent and harmfulness, human affairs that transpire 
among them, and the customs which are familiar to them. It is thence an 
obligation of a muftī to study all that we have mentioned and he will not be 
able to do that except through meeting notables, mixing with members of 
convergent schools of inclination and various ideas (al-niḥal and maqālāt), 
having many debates and discussions with them, accumulating books, 
studying them and constant perusing of their subjects.’147    
4.5.5 The Ideal Ijtihād is Iḥāṭah 
 Based on the abovementioned conclusions, this section proposes that the 
best term to represent al-Khaṭīb’s methodological framework of ijtihād is iḥāṭah. The 
radical letters ḥ-w-ṭ cover a range of senses related to ḥifẓ, constant revision and 
care, enhancement, encompassment, comprehensive fiqh, making and performing, 
and knowing.148 The Qurʾanic use of aḥāṭtu to denote ʿalimtu (I knew) conflates 
beautifully with the aim of ijtihād, which is ʿilm.149 The following reasons supports 
its usage with regard to al-Khaṭīb: 
(1) Al-Khaṭīb’s statement as he concludes that the opponent of ḥadīth is either 
one of two: an ignorant layman or an arrogant savant. Both are borne out of 
lack of encompassment or experience of the actual scholarship.150 Al-Khaṭīb 
said: 
                                                        
147 FWM, 2:334. 
148 It may also be related metaphorically with a garden of knowledge since al-ḥāʾiṭ means the garden. 
Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif), 2:1052. 
149 Qurʾān, al-Naml 27:22. 
150 FWM, 2:151. 
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‘This conclusion is derived from the verse; “Rather, they have denied 
that which they encompass not (lam yuḥīṭū) in knowledge and whose 
interpretation (taʾwīl) has not yet come to them.”151 
(2) Al-Khaṭīb’s adoption of al-Shāfiʿī’s cognitive process for legal question, which 
is ideally iḥāṭat al-ẓāhir wa’l-bāṭin. The emphasis on ẓāhir means one cannot 
simply pick any bāṭin meaning without combining it with the ẓāhir.152 Al-
Khaṭīb cited al-Shāfiʿī saying:  
‘Should it be permissible for anyone to follow just a possible meaning 
and discard the literal text, it would appear that no scholar has a valid 
argument against another since every ḥadīth has many possible 
meanings. However, the truth in it is only one; that every ḥadīth stays in 
its obvious and general meaning unless being indicated otherwise by 
the Prophet or that scholars in general agreed to pick only the bāṭin 
(inner) meaning or to specify its ruling.’153 
(3) Al-Khaṭīb’s defence of the potentiality of ijmāʿ. Prior to al-Khaṭīb, Ibn Ḥazm 
challenges the legitimacy of ijmāʿ by rejecting the possibility of iḥāṭah. After 
depicting the scattered distribution of Companions and the scholars 
amongst their followers and later generation across many regions, he stated:  
‘It is impossible for anyone to encompass every statement of every 
person in these regions.’154 
Al-Khaṭīb defended the possibility of ijmāʿ saying: 
‘It is possible to have knowledge on the affirmations of (notable) 
scholars for an individual who occupies himself with seeking knowledge 
until he becomes an expert in it would not be unknown to people of his 
city and his neighbours. His presence or absence would not be 
unnoticeable. It is also possible for a governor to send researchers to 
towns and gathers information on all opinions.’155 
 Once again, al-Khaṭīb stressed the idea of expertness instead of sole 
dependence on concrete methodology in criticism and scholarship. 
                                                        
151 Qurʾān, Yūnus 10:39. 
152 Al-Shāfiʿī seems to despise legal relativity that destroy the essence of legality. What is the point of 
qualifying something as legal when everything is possible? 
153 FWM, 1:537. 
154 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Nubdhah al-Kāfiyah fī Aḥkām Uṣūl al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1985), 20. 
155 FWM, 1:425. 
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(4) Al-Khaṭīb comprehensive (iḥāṭah) composition technique combining 
multiple sides, often opposing, of a subject. Cooperson challenges modern 
scholarship for attributing the first catholic biographical dictionary to Ibn 
Khallikān (681/1282). After a survey on ṭāʾifah (group) model in Islamic 
biographical dictionaries, he argues that the first move back to 
comprehensiveness was exemplified by works that adopt some criterion 
other than ṭāʾifah-affliation as their basis of inclusion. According to him, 
Tārīkh Baghdād had included anyone of importance who had spent time in 
the city of Baghdād. The work encompasses a variety of ṭāʾifas including 
“caliphs, descendants of the Prophet, dignitaries, judges, legists, tradents, 
Qurʾān-readers, ascetics, righteous men, litterateurs, and poets.”156 
Conclusion 
 Al-Khaṭīb’s methodological writings illustrate the awareness of a ḥadīth and 
fiqh scholar of theological, legal and social problems in his surrounding. His journey 
to several Muslim cities exposed him to the marginalisation of ḥadīth studies due to 
several internal problems and the lack of intellectual approaches in explaining the 
foundation and principles of the discipline. His solution was then to encompass the 
isnād, maʿnāwī and darajāt paradigms. Instead of associating scholars such as al-
Khaṭīb to a certain madhhab or a set of legal principles, it is more appropriate, based 
on his methodological expositions, to analyse how these three paradigms were 
exploited in his undertakings. It is evident that even his favour of Shāfiʿism was due 
to its conformity to his envision of these three paradigms. Similarly, was his support 
of several rational tools such as qiyās and tamaḥḥul. Ijtihād was subsequently 
confined to those who have mastered the tools and his writings illustrated to some 
extent that it is beyond gender since accreditation and discreditation of narrators, 
and verification of ḥadīth were included as well in the forms of ijtihād. The study of 
legal tradition based on the narrative of four-madhhab paradigm has marginalised 
this concept of ijtihād. It was al-Khaṭīb who revitalised this subject and highlighted 
the crucial role of the ḥuffāẓ in the articulation of Sharīʿah and Sunnī Islam. With the 
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rise of a canonical culture around ḥadīth books, al-Khaṭīb attempted to advance the 
ḥuffāẓ as the balancing force and decisive authority in ḥadīth criticism. His idea of 
comprehensive criticism has shown that ḥadīth criticism was neither solely based on 
isnād nor matn, but is an expert-based criticism. The next chapter will elucidate how 














Following the outlines of al-Khaṭīb’s methodological framework for seeking 
knowledge, this chapter examines al-Khaṭīb’s conception of statements of 
knowledge. In both of his works, Kitāb al-Faqīh and Uṣūl-al-Riwāyah, he included 
observations on statements and their relations to the value of truth and falsehood. 
Following the line of thought defined by former Muslim scholars, al-Khaṭīb 
reviewed this subject under the topic al-akhbār, a topic that has been treated by 
legal theorists and sometimes theologians with regard to sources of knowledge and 
orthopraxy. More than a century later, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ in his attempt to contrive a 
primary reference for ḥadīth criticism steered attention to al-Khaṭīb’s classification 
of statement.1 Recently, a modern ḥadīth scholar, Ḥātim al-ʿAwnī highlighted Ibn al-
Ṣalāḥ’s proposition that al-Khaṭīb was the first to import the term mutawātir in its 
“technical sense” into the field of ḥadīth studies, which eventually led to the 
awkward problem of defining ḥadīth mutawātir.2 Hüseyin Hansu did not discuss this 
attribution while exploring the term mutawātir in ḥadīth criticism, yet his conclusion 
agrees with Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ that the term was foreign to early ḥadīth circles, thus 
furthermore asserts that its origin could be rooted in early epistemological 
exercises in the fields of theology and legal theory.3  
5.1 Mutawātir, ʿIlm and Khabar 
 The author begins by exploring two important concepts alluded by al-Khaṭīb 
in the chapter on akhbār in Uṣūl-al-Riwāyah; the forceful judgement of intellect (qaḍāʾ 
al-ʿaql) and reports of certain great number of individuals (al-tawātur).4 These two 
devices, according to al-Khaṭīb, epistemically informs us on the veracity of a 
                                                        
1 Dickinson, Introduction, 190. See Dickinson study of the English translation of mutawātir here. Ibn al-
Ṣalāḥ was seconded by Ibn Abī’l-Damm al-Shāfiʿī. See below. 
2 Ḥātim al-ʿAwnī, al-Manhaj al-Muqtaraḥ li-Fahm al-Muṣṭalaḥ (Saudi: Dār al-Hijrah, 1996), 91. 
3 Hüseyin Hansu, “Notes on the Term Mutawātir and Its Reception in Ḥadīth Criticism,” Islamic Law 
and Society 16 (2009): 383-408. 
4 al-Kifāyah, 1:108. 
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statement. Let us propose two questions and explore the responses amongst 
classical theorists to trace the background behind these two devices. 
The first question is: “Why” do we experience a visible object as existing?  
The author encountered three major responses to this question. The first 
indicates that it is due to many inner statements produced by the thing or the 
event. Al-Juwaynī gave al-Shāfiʿī’s example of witnessing a baby sucking milk from 
the breast. The nipple being inside the mouth, the sign of suction, the sign of 
epiglottal movement, the sign of swallowing and the gurgling sound prove that the 
milk arrives inside the baby.5 Each of these circumstantial evidences, known as 
qarāʾin (sing. qarīnah), produces a statement that by virtue of aggregation (tawātur) 
of these statements the intellect is forced to accept the occurrence of a thing. 
However, the same effect could not be imparted to a judge who did not experience 
the witnessing of the baby sucking the milk for some inner statements have been 
absent. According to al-Juwaynī, qarāʾin could not be expressed immediately by even 
the best “sentences” (al-qarāʾin lā tuballighuhā ghāyāt al-ʿibārāt).6 Although this 
example is discussed in the sense of approving the concept of qarāʾin, circumstantial 
evidences are in essence “ineffable statements” beyond expressional sentences. The 
multiplicity then imparts knowledge. 
The second answer is inferred from al-Juwaynī’s mention of legal theorists 
who stipulate a connection between the knowledge and sensory experience.7 One 
knows that an object exists because one senses it through his eyes, or ears, or touch, 
or other faculty of sense. In the above case, al-Juwaynī himself stated that the judge 
did not affirm the sucking of milk due to the lack of ʿayān (he did not see it 
directly).8 Intellectual force, therefore: requires mushāhadah (sensory experience) 
and the reason for its reasoning and judgment is its prior knowledge of sensory 
experience (iḥsas). 
                                                        
5 al-Juwaynī, al-Burhan, 1:575. 
6 Ibid, 1:576. Al-Juwaynī attributed the introduction of the concept of qarāʾin to al-Naẓẓām (see 
below). 
7 Ibid, 1:568. 
8 Ibid, 1:575. 
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The third answer is based on al-Juwaynī’s view on ʿilm that occurs according 
to experiences (ʿādāh).9 This, according to al-Juwaynī goes back to circumstances 
(qarāʾin) and they could not be defined or repudiated when they occur. Al-Juwaynī 
gave the example of knowing the anger of an angry person or the shyness of a shy 
person. There is no way for an explainer to conceptually construct the set of 
circumstances (ḍabt al-qarāʾin) that produce the effect of knowing them. However, 
al-Juwaynī here had left out the underlying force for qarinah to be recognised as 
qarinah, which according to the second answer is human sensory experience. It 
explains the reason for human recognition of evidence as evidence. Nevertheless, 
al-Juwaynī concluded at the end that tawātur ultimately belongs to the domain of 
experience (ʿādah).10 We can infer from this answer that it also indicates that 
tawātur al-qarāʾin (accumulation of circumstantial evidences) is what makes the 
intellect forces the knowledge that the thing is it is or the object exists or the event 
occurs. However, this tawātur could not be confined and defined. 
 The second question is: What makes us accept irresistibly “at times” the 
veracity of statements of “many” individuals? 
 There are also three responses for this. The first is al-Bāqillānī’s answer. For 
al-Bāqillānī, we found (wajadna) that the knowledge produced by statements of 
“many” is at the same level with knowledge we perceived (adraka) through our 
senses, and at the same level with what we found (wajada) in ourselves with the 
absence of doubt, and that the same knowledge is shared by women, public and 
uneducated person who are not exercising intellectual speculation (naẓar).11 Al-
Bāqillānī did not instruct us how this level is formed in our mind. According to al-
Juwaynī, al-Bāqillānī was also uncertain in determining how many “many” that 
produces this effect.12 
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 The second response is similar to the response to the previous question. The 
report of many on a certain object is recognised as true necessarily with regard to 
the existence of that object because we know that “the many” rely on sense 
(mustanaduhum al-ḥiss). This stems from the underlying notion that speculation is a 
locus of divergent intellects (al-naẓar muḍṭarab al-ʿuqūl); hence, it may produce 
conflicts.13 When the reports of many did not conflict each other, it is a sign that 
“the many” did not invent the object speculatively and that “the many” collectively 
obtained the knowledge through sensory experience. 
The third response retraces the subject back to the experience of tawātur al-
qaraʾīn. As we experience some knowledge, we retrospect the “many” surrounding 
inner statements that force our intellect to have that knowledge irresistibly.14 
According to al-Juwaynī, it is interesting that “many” is also a qarīnah, hence, in this 
current study; it is also an ineffable statement. It is possible that we do not rely only 
on “many”, but a set of statements accompanying the “many”.  
Nonetheless, in the responses to this second question, the “set” cannot be 
confined and defined as well, for ultimately, the certainty (the stop of intellectual 
demand for more evidence) is relative from one person to another. As cited by 
Zysow, al-Ghazālī later on discussed the difficulty involved in determining how 
many number of evidences makes knowledge ḍarūrī (irresistible) to a person.15 Al-
Ghazāli, here avoided hypothetically the concept of qarāʾin and focused mainly on 
testing the possibility of number in producing certainty and result. 
 The responses to these two questions illustrate how the experience of 
knowledge and the reports of many conflated. In both discussions, the notion of 
tawātur in the sense of corroboration is present. Whether the knowledge is imparted 
by a set of qarāʾin (circumstantial evidences) or by a group of aʿyān (sensing 
individuals), both convey statements, ineffable or uttered, and the “set” of these 
statements cannot be confined and defined in its way of consolidating certainty. 
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This explains why the discussions on tawātur lingered around the experience of 
knowledge and the retrospective modes of acknowledging.  
5.2  Mutawātir and Sunnah 
Another background study is inevitable here because of the confusion that 
occurs in this matter when related to the subject of Sunnah.  The aim is to trace the 
beginning of the encounter between the concept of tawātur and the concept of 
Sunnah. More than half a century ago, Joseph Schacht steered the attention of the 
academic world into the ideals of ancient schools. He proposed that Muḥammad ibn 
Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (204/820) was the first Muslim scholar who successfully layered a 
distinctive classification of khabar with the aim of bestowing Prophetic tradition an 
overriding authority against the more liberal doctrine of the ancient schools.16 For 
Schacht, khabar al-wāḥid, which denotes an individual report, was a familiar 
negative phenomenon to the ancients that the emergence of the idea of al-Sunnah as 
well as its identification through individual reports turned as a strange 
phenomenon to the schools.17 In reading al-Shāfiʿī’s classification, Schacht proposed 
‘transmissions’ by many to many (mā rawāhu al-kāffah ʿan al-kāffah) as synonymous 
to widespread tradition (khabar al-tawātur) and that both stand as counterparts to 
khabar al-khāṣṣah, describing the former as the requirement of the theologians to 
establish dogmatic truth. The role of al-Shāfiʿī has been probed, contested and 
analysed extensively in modern discourses.18 Ancient schools have been identified 
with ideals such as principle-based Sharīʿah, ʿamal-based Sharīʿah, raʾy-cum-ʿilm-based 
Sharīʿah, commonsensical-based Sharīʿah, alongside the transmission of events of the 
past (time of the Prophet) carried around in many modes (qiṣaṣ, faḍāʾil, sīrah, etc.) 
and “sometimes” referenced in legal decision, either verbatim, partial allusion or in 
spirit.19 The use of the word Sharīʿah here does not indicate that scholars in this 
                                                        
16 Schacht, Origins, 58. 
17 Ibid, 51. 
18 Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 12-13. 
19 Certain undetermined principles produce uniformity in early Islamic Law. Benjamin Jockish, 




period invented new codes of law for Islam, rather, every scholar and judge viewed 
their conduct as a legal actor as having a basis in Sharīʿah through coteries of 
channels mentioned above. However, the vast area of Islamic world has witnessed 
various and conflicting ideas of sharʿī judgements, despite the concept of Prophet as 
an example, the concept of Revelation as guidance, and the concept of scholars as 
interpreters of Sharīʿah (Islamic Law) in their governing activities have always been 
around. To reiterate Schacht’s thesis with an amendment, al-Shāfiʿī came to connect 
these three canons and provide a hermeneutical “framework” that maintains the 
Prophetic model as an intermediary between Revelation and Islamic Law. To use the 
Arabic word, it is a construct of Sunnah-based istinbāṭ that later developed into legal 
hermeneutic and influenced elements in legal theory. It denotes scholarly 
hermeneutical endeavours grounded in the conduct of the Prophet, who acted as 
the interpreter of the Qurʾān, and thus in effect, became a model for solving 
unprecedented legal cases. Istinbāṭ, then, encompasses two dimensions: the 
understanding (fiqh) of received authoritative texts from the past and the imitative 
reasoning to solve cases without precedents.20 In the view of the Shāfiʿīs, al-Shāfiʿī 
holds that ʿilm is obtained in two modes: ittibāʿ (imitation of precedence) and istinbāṭ 
(imitative reasoning for unprecedented).21  
The reception of al-Shāfiʿī’s formalised framework can be attested from the 
rise of the new genre that reflects al-sunan (Prophetic legal models) amongst his 
                                                                                                                                                              
Qurʾan, the Muwatṭạʾ and Madinan ʿAmal (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999), Juynboll, Muslim 
Tradition, 11-23, Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 26, 35 and 255. 
20 In the domain of text, istinbāṭ treats the nature and function of the language of revelation, which 
has triggered al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of bayān and his major exploit of the problem of ambiguity. In the 
domain of legal thought, it inspects the legal implication of God’s speech and the role of reason in 
defining what is sharʿī in a legal case. This term covers all the following; Wheeler’s view that al-Shāfiʿī 
presented text-based epistemology: Lowry’s assertion that al-Shāfiʿī was concerned with the 
relationship between Revelation which is fixed and Law that includes human manipulations of text: 
and Vishanoff’s conclusion that al-Shāfiʿī assigned key interpretive roles to the Prophet’s Sunnah, 
which defines a new canon of Revelation as the basis for the existing canon of Law and structures a 
hermeneutical and epistemological relationship between the two. Brannon Wheeler, Applying the 
Canon in Islam (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1996), 43-58, Lowry, Legal Theory, 273, 
Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 34, 44, 62-65, El Shamsy, The Canonisation of Islamic Law (cited earlier). 
21 al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm (Egypt: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 2001), 10:113. 
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colleagues and students.22 The Sunan of Abū Qurrah (203/818) of Yemen,23 the Sunan 
of Saʿīd ibn Manṣūr (227/842),24 and the Sunan of al-Dārimī (255/869)25 were 
examples of ḥadīth collections that become infused with legal vision in its division of 
topics. These works triggered the latter genre, which al-Khaṭīb called ṣiḥāh works 
(legally binding report collections) including the Ṣaḥīḥayn, Sunan Abū Dāwūd and 
Sunan al-Tirmidhī (titled al-Jāmiʿ). Scott Lucas named the phase that begins towards 
the end of al-Shāfiʿī’s life as the age of the “six books” (ca. 200-300/815-912) 
following al-Dhahabī’s personal reconstruction of the chronology of ḥadīth 
scholarship.26  Lucas argues against the influence of al-Shāfiʿī, although the trend of 
ḥadīth collections in this period is incipiently legalistic and globalised beyond local 
or regional circulation. The trend follows the framework of Sunnah-based istinbāṭ 
that provides a more universal instruction of raʾy cum ʿilm and begins to challenge 
local circles and reasoning of Sharīʿah. The notion of isnād that previously connoted 
personal “reliable relationship and transmission” was infused with the sense of 
“legally binding” amongst the traditionists. 
Al-Shāfiʿī was not widely celebrated for comprehensive tafsīr method,27 
sophisticated legal theory:28 technical criticism of ḥadīth:29 or even transmission of 
                                                        
22 It differs from early genres such as personal collection titled with musnad or jāmiʿ and the works 
known by the title muṣannaf such as Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-Razzāq. It is also reflected in personal istinbāṭ 
that does not necessarily transmit al-Shāfiʿī’s personal legal judgements such as in the projects of 
Four Muḥammads, namely, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (310/922), Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq Ibn 
Khuzaymah (311/923), Muḥammad ibn Naṣr al-Marwazī (294/906), Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn al-
Mundhir al-Naysābūrī (318/930). They, together with Abū Thawr (240/854) and al-Muzanī, were 
considered absolute mujtahids and produced many tafarrudāt (independent legal doctrines) due to 
what seems to be Sunnah-based istinbāṭ. See: Hallaq, Authority, 59-61.  
23 A recipient from Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfah and a teacher of Ibn Ḥanbal. Mughulṭay, Ikmāl Tahdhīb al-
Kamāl (Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadīthah, 2001), 12:20. See Chapter Two, al-Khaṭīb’s Library. 
24 A teacher of Ibn Ḥanbal. Siyar, 10:586. 
25 He authored two works in ḥadīth, Sunan that was sometimes called al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ and Musnad. It is 
possible that he was the first to author a collection of ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth. He was the teacher of al-Bukhārī, 
Muslim, Abū Dāwūd and al-Tirmidhī. TMS, 11:209, al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 4:95. 
26 Constructive, 73. 
27 Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 15. 
28 Wael Hallaq, “Was al-Shāfiʿī the master architect of Islamic jurisprudence?” International Journal Of 
Middle East Studies 25 (1993): 587-605. 
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ḥadīth.30 Yet, his compelling liberal framework31 that features aspects from these 
areas has enabled “reports” of binding Sunnah to confidently enter legal debates.32 
As ḥadīth works of the traditionalists began to apply a more systematic transmitter-
criticism upon khabar, early legal theorists and somehow theologians began to react 
by attempting to define “a compelling statement.” Complete rejection of individual 
reports in the sense of its legitimacy to compel argument unto others was 
attributed to Bishr al-Marīsī.33 Hierarchical grading of epistemology was 
transmitted from the Ḥanafī judge, ʿĪsā ibn Abān that will later serve as the model 
for most systematic and tri-partial classifications of reports in classical legal theory, 
perhaps due to Ibn Surayj’s synthetisation between the Shāfiʿī and the Ḥanafī 
paradigms in Baghdād.34 Multi-regional measure was proposed perhaps earlier as 
could be learned from the argument of al-Shāfiʿī’s interlocutor in Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm.35 This 
was later adopted by some Ḥanafīs in their condition for tawātur that Zysow 
translated as controverted conditions.36 Numerical measure was proposed by Abū’l-
Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf as observed by Van Ess. Abū’l-Hudhayl was said to propose twenty 
Companions with one of them guaranteed paradise as the criteria for certainty and 
decided on four narrators for a report to be considered probable of bearing truth. 
                                                                                                                                                              
29 Constructive, 151. 
30 TFZ, 1:265.   
31 He replaced taqlīd to early men with ittibāʿ that accommodates the general aims of their doctrines. 
al-Ihtijāj bi’l-Shāfiʿī, 38. 
32 Al-Khaṭīb cited the leader of aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth, Ibn Ḥanbal as saying, ‘Should one day aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth 
exercise intellectual disputation (Ibn Ḥanbal used takallama instead of rawā), they follow the 
intellectual language of al-Shāfiʿī.’ al-Iḥtijāj bi’l-Shāfiʿī, 40. Wadad al-Qāḍī did not tell us whether the 
rise of Nābita has any connection to Shāfiʿism.  
33 al-Dārimī, Naqd ʿUthmān ibn Saʿīd al-Dārimī ʿalā al-Marīsī al-Jahmī al-ʿAnīd (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-
Islāmiyyah, 2012), 244-245. 
34 Murtaze Bedir, “An Early Response to Shāfiʿī: ʿĪsā ibn Aban on the Prophetic Report (Khabar),” 
Islamic Law and Society 9 (2002): 285-311, Hallaq, Authority, 45-46. The tri-partial classification reflects 
the notions of: (1) ḍarūrī, (2) mashhūr/tawātur istidlālī, (3) āḥād. For more on the middle tier (mashhūr) 
and its replacement with Ṣaḥīḥayn paradigm, see: Brown, Canonization, 183-193. 
35 al-Shāfiʿī, Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm (Egypt: Maktabah Ibn Taymiyyah), 76. 
36 Zysow, Certainty, 11. 
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This was allegedly derived from certain indicative-texts in the Qurʾān.37 Regardless 
of the authenticity of these attributions, Van Ess argues that this reminiscence of 
ancient memory did give an impression of an authentic kernel of discussion held in 
the early days.38 We notice that it is within this milieu that the concept of reports of 
“many” and sometimes “multi-regional conditioned reports” enter the discussion 
on Sunnah. Traditionists somehow did not involve in advancing general 
epistemological theory of compelling report for their experience of certainty is 
based on potentiation of every single report, case by case. Even reports of one single 
individual tradent differ in its degrees of persuasive effect. 
5.3 Facts, Ijmāʿ and Mutawātir 
Obvious facts are usually not reported and documented. The fact that one 
woke up this morning is not normatively reported. However, if one woke up and fell 
painfully, it is more likely to be recounted to a friend. Similarly, the collections of 
reports did not verbalise obvious facts and how many people convicted those facts. 
The compilers did not write a statement “there is a Prophet named Muḥammad and 
one thousand people believed it” for it was an obvious fact. Sources will only record 
statement such as “I am Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Abdul Muṭṭalib,” for the 
genealogical input it conveys. There is no necessity to write the sentence “there was 
a city called Makkah where the opponents of the Prophet resided” in ḥadīth records. 
However, reports of history may contain these statements implicitly. Due to 
obviousness, many statements of facts are carried together without “utterances” or 
“expressional sentences.”  
From the beginning, al-Shāfiʿī, Wāṣīl and al-ʿAllāf himself had been pointing 
to the fact of these obvious incontrovertible historical facts.39 However, when the 
                                                        
37 TUG, III:266-267, IV:650-651. Van Ess, “L’autorité de la tradition prophétique dans la théologie 
mu’tazilite,” La notion d’autorité au Moyen Âge: Islam Byzance, Occident (Paris: 1982), 211ff. 
38 Van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology,   
39 According to Wāṣīl, the truth is known through four channels: the kitāb, statement agreed by 
everyone (khabar mujtamaʿ ʿalayhā), rational evidence (ḥujjat ʿaql), and consensus (ijmāʿ). For al-
ʿAskarī, Wāsil was the first to postulate this and the first to divide khabar into general (ʿāmm) and 
specific (khāṣṣ). Wāṣil defined ḥujjah as ‘every khabar dismissed from a possibility of [previous] 




works merge this fact with the qualifying concepts such as ijmāʿ, naql al-ʿāmmah ʿan 
al-ʿāmmah, mā rawāhu al-kāffah ʿan al-kāffah, Wāṣil’s al-Sunnah al-mujtamaʿ alayhā, 
obvious historical facts were intertwined with later debate on ijmāʿ in legal theory. 
This actually stems from the attempt to define facts. In Jimaʿ al-ʿIlm, al-Shāfiʿī 
approved that “the prayer of ẓuhr consists of four cycles of bow” is a fact. No one 
with sound mind will contest the veracity of this fact, even though the correct way 
of praying may be contested. Believers and non-believers alike witnessed Muslims 
perform it that way. Nevertheless, when he defines ijmāʿ in the same work, he used 
the expression, ‘it is when you say “people agreed (ajmaʿa al-nās),” you will find no 
one who is able of cognition of something will say people have not agreed.’40 This is 
the instance where facts are connected with public mental agreements. As for the 
conflation of fact with tawātur, Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm reported that al-Shāfiʿī’s interlocutor had 
proposed another way of knowing facts that can be employed to establish Sunnah 
which he calls tawātur al-akhbār.41 He first proposes a multi-regional condition.42 Al-
Shāfiʿī argues that this idea returns in ultimate inspection to the concept of 
individual report since every region transmits from a single line. His interlocutor 
then proposes four different strands for every transmission. Al-Shāfiʿī refutes this 
by saying that it does not exist at all. People have never recorded four lines from al-
Zuhrī, for instance, and later on, four lines from each of the first four. Al-Shāfiʿī then 
asks his interlocutor, what is the difference between three, four, five, and even 
seventy? Who came with the idea of four?43 Hence, for al-Shāfiʿī, there are only two 
                                                                                                                                                              
concordance itself (al-ittifāq ʿalā ʿayn al-tawāṭuʾ). Revelation in these events should be thrown away 
(muṭṭaraḥ).’ Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (395/1005), al-Awāʾil (Tanta: Dār al-Bashīr, 1408/1987), 374, ʿAbd al-
Jabbār, Faḍl al-Iʿtizāl wa Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah (Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyyah, 1974), 234, TUG, II:279-280 
and IV:649-650. 
40 Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm, 66. Elsewhere, al-Shāfiʿī defines ijmāʿ by saying, ‘I will not say and neither any of the 
scholar will say “this certain article (hādhā) is ijmāʿ”, except to a matter that whenever you meet any 
scholar, he will definitely say the same thing and report the same thing from people before him. The 
examples are like “Ẓuhr is four cycles,” “wine is forbidden” and so on and so forth.’ His examples 
represent necessarily incontrovertible facts concerning Islam. al-Risālah, 534. 
41 I thank Ḥātim al-ʿAwnī for locating the concept of tawātur in al-Shāfiʿī’s work that stands in 
extreme opposition to Schacht thesis. 
42 Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm, 76-80. 
43 Ibid, 82. 
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groups of statements that convey the Sunnah: obvious incontrovertible facts and 
reports that necessarily involve limited number of individuals at any level of 
transmission. However, when ‘what all people know as facts’ is expressed by khabar 
al-ʿāmmah (reports of public), al-kāffah ʿan al-kāffah (reports from all to all), ijmāʿ al-
nās (agreement of people), it is conflated with numerical or multi-regional tawātur 
that al-Shāfiʿī himself considered as otiose and conflated with ijmāʿ that will be 
developed in later legal theory. 
5.4 Revisions of Numerical and Expressional Khabar. 
Al-Naẓẓām may have attempted to revise al-Allāf’s numerical postulate. 
However, he found a more attractive concept to assail. He contested the concept of 
the ijmāʿ of many. If a group of blind people are brought together, they see no better 
than they did before, he averred as van Ess ascribed to him.44 For scholars like al-
Khaṭīb, the attack on ijmāʿ is absurd. Al-Khaṭīb had two types of ijmāʿ in his mind: 
ijmāʿ al-ʿāmmah wa’l-khāṣṣah (knowledge of everyone) and ijmāʿ al-khāṣṣah (collective 
conclusion of experts). For the first type, al-Khaṭīb gave the examples of Kaʿbah as 
the direction for prayer, fasting Ramaḍān, the obligation of pilgrimage, etc., which 
are incontrovertible facts related to Islam for a sound mind. According to al-Khaṭīb, 
whoever rejects this ijmāʿ, would in effect, practise disbelief (kufr). As for the second 
type, he gave several legal articles, which we find reported as well as ḥadīth such as 
no bequest for an heir. Al-Khaṭīb is of the view that whosoever rejects this 
agreement should be instructed and presented with evidences. If he remains 
persistent, it should be said to him, ‘You just want to disagree with the truth (al-
ḥaqq) and its people.’45 Al-Naẓẓām, however, was speculating on the possibility of 
mistake in any conclusion made collectively. It may not concern “the fact” which is 
not based on collective inference. Nevertheless, the consequence, according to Van 
Ess, is an attack on tawātur.46  
                                                        
44 TUG, III:385-386 (Die Problematik des iğmāʿ). 
45 FWM, 1:434. 
46 Van Ess suggested that it also had consequence on ḥadīth deemed as mutawātir, although the 
author does not know of anyone who qualifies ḥadīth with mutawātir by the time of al-Naẓẓām. 
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Al-Jāḥiẓ then made the classification of khabar more precise.47 His writing 
indicates that certainty is attained by either seeing the perceptible (al-ʿayān al-ẓāhir) 
or observing a widespread khabar (al-mutaẓāhir).48 As for objects that are not visible 
to the naked eye, al-Jāḥiẓ explained that we know it through statements which are; 
conveyed by friend and foe, good and bad person alike: widespread (mustafīḍah) 
amongst people: and no burdening speculation is required upon the hearer to verify 
it (lā kulfat ʿalā sāmiʿihā li taṣdīqihā). He did not give an example but his definition 
seems to correspond to al-Shāfiʿī’s ijmāʿ al-nās. However, al-Jāḥiẓ makes it more 
complicated as he names this class as al-akhbār al-mutawātirah. Then, al-Jāḥiẓ 
explains the second level of khabar, which denotes statements transmitted by a 
group of people whose conditions, such as the far distance between them, deny the 
possibility of previous conspiracy and forgery (khabar lā yumkin fī mithlihi al-tawāṭuʾ). 
This corresponds to what el-Omari called tawātur as held by Wāṣil.49 From this 
perspective, al-Jāḥiẓ differs from Wāṣīl in his definition and level of mutawātir. 
However, the first two types of khabar yield certainty. Al-Jāḥiẓ third level of khabar 
is individual reports whose veracity we infer by way of husn al-ẓann (fair judgement) 
and trust on the ʿadāla (integrity) of its transmitter. It is the same principle applied 
by the muḥaddithūn for accepting ḥadīth except that al-Jāḥiẓ seems to have never 
met muḥaddithūn who exhibit understanding of ʿilla (hidden flaw) in ḥadīth.50 
Abū’l-Qāsim al-Balkhī and Abū’l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī are amongst scholars who 
viewed this subject the other way around. In his work al-Muʿtamad, al-Baṣrī seems to 
support al-Balkhī’s view that tawātur is a product of acquired knowledge (muktasab), 
since according to al-Baṣrī; it is based on prior arrangement of a set of conclusive 
knowledges (mā waqafa wujūduhu ʿalā tartīb ʿulūm).51 As we have learned from al-
Juwaynī, necessarily imparted knowledge may be qualified by way of retrospection 
                                                        
47 al-Jāḥiẓ, Risāla al-Maʿāsh wa’l-Maʿād, in Rasāʾil al-Jāḥiẓ, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Hārūn (Cairo: Maktaba al-
Khānijī), 1:119-120  
48 al-Jāḥiẓ, Risāla fī Istinjāz al-Waʿd, in Rasāʾil al-Jāḥiẓ, 4:221. 
49 El-Omari, “Accommodation and Resistance ...”, 234. 
50 al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Ḥayawān, 1:166 
51 Abū’l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1982), 2:81. 
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with certain modes such as reports by many. We came to think of reports of many 
as a source only after the realisation of knowledge. Al-Baṣrī viewed it on the 
contrary. He argues that in order to hold that knowledge produced by tawātur is 
necessary; we should already have some kind of prior reasoning, i.e. accepting the 
conditions for recognising veracity. Therefore, the knowledge we obtained from 
tawātur is substantially a result of pre-acquaintance. Al-Baṣrī has given some other 
arguments to prove that tawātur yields acquired knowledge. 
The idea of iktisāb here may have been influenced by the concept of tawallud 
(productive arrangement) held by the Muʿtazilites. Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, 
therefore: advanced another way of expressing the concept of ḍarūrī in tawātur. The 
realisation of knowledge is not necessarily linked with certain number (ʿadad) or 
condition (ḥadd). Khabar according to him is not the real producer of knowledge. 
The relation of knowledge with khabar is like the one between having a son and 
intercourse or growing a plant and a seed. The relationship stems from the law of 
ʿādah. Hence, in the sense of ʿādah, the mutawātir constitutes knowledge. However, 
the very same knowledge could also be realised prior to mutawātir (ibtidāʾan) or 
through a solitary report.52 God may also impart any knowledge in humans without 
the need for intermediaries.  Hence, knowledge can be either ḍarūrī or iktisābī, or 
ḍarūrī iktisābī as well. The necessary knowledge is relative from one person to 
another due to ʿaqabāt (obstacles).53 
As for the division of statements of Sunnah in the realm of ʿādah, al-Ashʿarī 
provided what the following may represent: 
1. Sunnah facts known by everyone, generation after generation, e.g. the 
existence of the Prophet Muḥammad: that he had a mission: etc. 
2. Sunnah facts known and practised, e.g. obligatory prayers, number of bows in 
prayers, ablution, etc. 
                                                        
52 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 18. 
53 Ibid, 12-14, iktisābī may also be known in ḍarūrī way. 
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3. Sunnah identified by groups of experts that it yields the same effect as 
incontrovertible historical facts, e.g. wiping the leather footwear, no bequest 
for an heir, etc. 
4. Report of individuals (ḥadīth) that obligates action but its veracity cannot be 
terminally concluded (lā yuqṭaʿ ʿalā mughayyabihi).54 
The Asharīs have also informed that khabar is essentially an inner statement 
(maʿnā). Al-Bāqillānī defined khabar as what corresponds to either truth “or (aw)” 
false. Prior to him, khabar has been defined as what corresponds to truth “and (wa)” 
false. Al-Bāqillānī changed the conjunction to “or” for a statement cannot be 
qualified with two opposite qualities at the same time.55 Al-Bāqillānī then asserted 
that, in essence, khabar is an inner meaning carried in a being or an essence (maʿnā 
qāʾim bi’l-nafs) and expressions are indications (al-ʿibārāt tadull ʿalayhi). This is an 
extremely crucial statement for it shifts our understanding of khabar from 
transmitted sentences to uttered idea. Al-Khaṭīb followed al-Bāqillānī’s exact 
wording for the definition of khabar in Uṣūl-al-Riwāyah including the conjunction.56 
For this reason, the above multiple conceptions on tawātur, khabar and ḍarūrī must 
be considered when reading al-Khaṭīb’s treatment of this subject. 
5.5  Al-Khaṭīb and al-Sunnah al-Mutawātirah 
When al-Khaṭīb wrote his books, he was concerned with theoretical 
grounding due to his idea that the best expositor is the one who provides jawāb 
naẓārī (speculative deliberation), before jawāb fiqhī (explanation of traditional 
proofs). He seems to reiterate the division advanced by the theologians and legal 
theorists. Yet, it was slightly altered and perfectly suitable for the materials he had 
in his mind. Under the chapter “The Sunnah received directly from the Prophet and 
through others from him” in Kitāb al-Faqīh, al-Khaṭīb asserted:  
                                                        
54 Ibid, 23. 
55 al-Juwaynī, Talkhīṣ, 2:275 See Abū’l-Muẓaffar al-Samʿānī’s refutation on al-Baqillani’s argument in 




‘The Sunnah is of two states: The first is when it is received directly from 
the Prophet. It is mandatory upon every single Muslim to accept and 
testify upon it whether it commands obligatory, preferable, permissible 
or prohibited acts. Whosoever rejects it has committed kufr (disbelief), 
for he has accused the Prophet of lying in his statement. Whosoever 
(from the Muslims) accuses the Prophet of lying in his statement has 
committed apostasy and should be asked to repent. If he refuses, he 
should be sentenced to capital punishment. 
The second is [when the Sunnah is] received through [reported] 
statements related to him. The explanation for this type is made in two 
sections. The first concerns the attribution of the statement to the 
Prophet.57 The second concerns the circumstances of its content 
(matn).’58  
As for the content, al-Khaṭīb explained that a meaning of a text could either 
be in normative usage or permissive usage, being general or particular, being 
summarised or elaborated, and being abrogating or abrogated.59 
As for the attribution of statements, al-Khaṭīb following other legal theorists 
divided them into two: tawātur and āḥād.60 However, his treatment of tawātur differs 
from them. He does not define tawātur at all; rather he lists several historical facts, 
which may serve to establish Sunnah.61 They include: 
1. The Prophet migrated from Makkah to Madinah. 
2. He died in Madinah. 
3. He was buried in Madinah. 
4. His mosque is at Madinah. 
5. His pulpit is at Madinah. 
6. He honoured his companions. 
7. He cared for his companions. 
                                                        
57 It is very crucial to note that the term isnād used by al-Khaṭīb here does not refer to the technical 
definition of sanad. He will explain sanad under the category of āḥād. 
58 FWM, 1:276.   
59 Ibid, 1:293. 
60 Al-Khaṭīb will discuss this concept after several passages under the category of musnad. 
61 FWM, 1:276. 
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8. He opposed Abū Jahl and the polytheists. 
9. He revered the Qurʾān. 
10. He argued by the Qurʾān. 
11. He argued that it is a revelation. 
12. There are a number of obligatory prayers. 
13. The prayers have a number of bows. 
14. The prayers have certain basic movements (arkān). 
15. The movements in the prayers are in certain order. 
16. Zakāt is an Islamic obligation. 
17. Fasting is an Islamic obligation. 
18. Pilgrimage to Makkah has been established. 
These are the examples of what al-Khaṭīb calls tawātur min ṭarīq al-lafẓ. One 
will immediately recognise these as historical facts shared by everyone who knows 
about Islam, believers and non-believers alike, at least in the mind of al-Khaṭīb. We 
cannot say that al-Khaṭīb meant by this group, statements or meanings carried by 
the transmitters or implicitly reported in ḥadīth corpus since these will be included 
in al-Khaṭīb’s tawātur min ṭarīq al-maʿnā. The elaboration of this second group will be 
given in the next chapter.  
Tāriq ʿAwaḍullah noted that this exposition of al-Khaṭīb suggests that it is 
not a condition of tawātur to have a complete phrase of text (lafẓ al-ḥadīth) reported 
by a large number of narrators; rather the requirement is for a certain meaning to 
be specifically mentioned (manṣūṣan) in various riwāyāt (reports) even though with 
different wordings.62 ʿAwaḍullah’s interpretation, however, does not clearly 
distinguish between tawātur min ṭarīq al-lafẓ and tawātur min ṭarīq al-maʿnā of al-
Khaṭīb.  
The author proposes that al-Khaṭīb‘s concept was the idea of 
incontrovertible historical facts related to Prophet. Arguably, he did not say the 
phrase “an yarwīya (to report)” when he listed these facts. However, when he 
defined tawātur maʿnawī, he stated that ‘it is when multiple groups report (yarwī) 
various [events or subjects] (yaqaʿu bihi ʿilman), where there is one same general 
spirit that appears in their unrelated accounts.’ Thus, the shared meaning in these 
                                                        
62 Tāriq ʿAwaḍullah, Sharḥ Lughat al-Muḥaddith Manẓūmat fī ʿIlm Musṭalaḥ al-Ḥadīth (Egypt: Maktabah 
Ibn Taymiyyah, 2002), 96. 
183 
 
divergent accounts is similar in status to the historical facts that are shared by 
everyone and at times uttered (lafẓ).63 Nevertheless, for the fact that obvious 
historical facts come to later generation through reports, it is easily apprehended as 
to why they were discussed as akhbār. In summary, the best way to translate al-
Khaṭīb’s two types of tawātur based on his examples is: (1) Facts shared by everyone 
and at times expressed in utterance (lafẓī), (2) Facts known through conclusion from 
the aggregate of unrelated reports (min ṭarīq al-maʿnā). 
When al-Khaṭīb came to his work on reports, Uṣūl-al-Riwāyah, he did not 
divide facts into obvious facts and concluded facts. He explained what is meant by 
tawātur in akhbār. However, his “akhbār” features more as statement rather than 
report. The example for these akhbār is ḥudūth al-ajsām (bodies are created): ithbāt 
al-ṣāniʿ (the made thing has a maker): and that the concept of aʿlām al-rusul 
(messengers have signs) is true. These are not ḥadīth. Hence, when he spoke of 
tawātur al-akhbār in this book, he was not associating it with ḥadīth. He was simply 
mentioning that in the case of human reports, they are divided into two; reports by 
many and reports by a single or a number of individuals. However, he was 
concerned with epistemology that he had to associate reports of many with al-ʿilm 
al-ḍarūrī. Therefore, he defined it as ‘what is reported by a group of individuals 
whose number reaches the extent that it is impossible within their timeframe that 
they had conspired to lie, and that concordance in the period of the circulation of 
the report is not feasible, and that the report is not a result of misleads and 
confusions, and that reasons for being forced and suppressed to invent lies are 
inconceivable.”64 
The author did not find any relation al-Khaṭīb provided between this 
definition and ḥadīth. He related this definition to statements that we know as 
necessarily corresponding to the fact. In fact, it was found in Talkhīṣ al-Mutashābih 
that al-Khaṭīb while identifying the real name of a companion said: ‘The truth in his 
name is Wahb ibn Khanbash. This is how al-Shāʿbī stated it as reported from him in 
                                                        
63 FWM, 1:277. 
64 al-Kifāyah, 1:108-109. 
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a tawātur way by many ḥuffāẓ.’65 This is the example of al-Khaṭīb’s concept of 
tawātur report that follows exactly how some legal theorists defined it. 
Furthermore, al-Khaṭīb only mentioned “al-akhbār allatī yanquluhā aṣḥāb al-
ḥadīth (ḥadīths transmitted by traditionists)” in the third category of reports; 
reports which are undeterminable as to whether it represents the actual fact or not. 
This is a reiteration of al-Bāqillānī’s definition of āḥād; ‘any potential statement that 
we cannot affirms that it corresponds to the actual fact, but we cannot say that it is 
false either, neither by the way of necessity (ḍarūrī) nor by the way of inspection 
(istidlālī).’66 According to al-Khaṭīb, this type of khabar, i.e. ḥadīth, obligates action 
without we really know its veracity, similar to when a judge does not really know 
incontrovertibly the honesty of a witness. However, al-Khaṭīb had also included 
ḥadīth in the second group where he mentioned certain types of elevated or 
potentiated ḥadīth. This will be elaborated in the next chapter. What concerns here 
is the fact that there is no relation between tawātur and ḥadīth in this section of Uṣūl-
al-Riwāyah. 
Al-Khaṭīb’s explanation was confusing due to his attempt to synthesise views 
from theologians especially al-Bāqillānī, some legal theorists and aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth in 
several brief paragraphs. Notwithstanding that al-Khaṭīb has his own strategy in 
forcing readers to study his works,67 in the same manner as Ibn Ḥibbān’s strategy to 
compel people to memorise sunan and ḥadīth.68 Similarly, al-Khaṭīb had mixed 
different concepts of tawātur in Kitāb al-Faqīh as well when he further explains: 
‘Should that (the concept of tawātur) is recognised, it should be stressed 
that the number of reporters required for a statement of a group to yield 
knowledge is not identifiable. There is no signifier for a certain number to 
be appointed, neither by way of reasoning nor by way of revelation.’ 
Here al-Khaṭīb is reflecting upon facts. Then, he continues: 
                                                        
65 Talkhīṣ-al-Mutashābih, 1:411.  
66 al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 2:325. 
67 See tadlīs and tanwīʿ in the next chapter. 
68 Al-ḥīlat allatī iḥtalnāhā li-yaḥfaẓa al-nās al-sunan. Ibn Balbān, al-Iḥsān fī Taqrīb Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān (Beirut: 
al-Risālah, 1988), 1:151. 
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‘However, [ironically] we know that reports by a small number do not 
yield incontrovertible knowledge and reports by a large number yield 
incontrovertible knowledge. It has warranted that those informants had 
true knowledge of the subject matter (ʿalimūhu ḍarūrat), and that they 
were on “a certain state” which prevented them from agreement upon 
deceit, previous arrangement of conspiracy, or any room for provocation 
or pressure, since we know that whenever these situations are possible, 
we will not have confident knowledge [i.e. we will have doubt].’69 
Here, al-Khaṭīb is reflecting upon tawātur reports, although he had just 
recently mentioned that intellect cannot identify the number of this “many” or 
“large number.” 
Based on al-Khaṭīb’s examples, the author concludes that al-Khaṭīb was 
actually speaking of three different tawāturs that correspond to the following 
classes: 
1. Facts shared by everyone and at times expressed in utterance (lafẓī). 
2. Facts concluded from aggregate of unrelated reports (maʿnawī). 
3. Reports of many that establish a fact (tawātur al-riwāyah). 
5.6  Al-Khaṭīb’s Tawātur in Qurʾanic Studies  
Al-Khaṭīb’s childhood education and the collections of works in his library 
have proven his sufficient learning of qirāʾāt. This explains his negative remarks on 
some forms of readings that Abū al-Faḍl al-Khuzāʿī attributed to Abū Ḥanīfah. Al-
Khaṭīb doubted that Abū Ḥanīfah recited those forms, e.g. malaka yawma al-dīn. He 
later found the works of al-Khuzāʿī and reviewed, ‘I was full of shock and really 
doubtful about them until those experts in qirāʾāt told me that al-Khuzāʿī had 
terribly mixed everything and he shall not be trusted in his reports, particularly 
with regard to Abū Ḥanīfah.’70 In this section, the author attempts to examine al-
Khaṭīb’s position on al-qirāʾāh al-mutawātirah. 
The subject has been debated at length in modern scholarship especially its 
connection with the integrity of the Qurʾān itself. The most recent study on the 
                                                        
69 FWM, 1:277. 
70 TMS, 2:541. 
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subject was carried by Shady-Hekmat-Nasser.71 It is not surprising, however, based 
on the presented idea of tawātur in the study, that the only legitimacy for the 
existence of Variant Readings of the Qurʾān is the ḥadīth that speaks of the sabʿat 
aḥruf. 72 Despite that, it is possible as well that due to the existence of the variety of 
Readings that the ḥadīth was associated with the prevailing qirāʾāt.73 Due to the fact 
that the pre-ʿUthmān Qurʾanic discrepancies existed, it follows that qirāʾātiyyah 
(various-ness of Readings in principle, not in particulars) is a fact.74 Consequently, 
some scholars retrospectively qualify it with the attribute of mutawātirah. Hence, for 
them, its tawātur-ness has no depending relation at all on isnād and the ḥadīth of 
sabʿat aḥruf.75 As Nasser himself has already noted, Variant Readings might have 
later been shifted from ijmāʿ to isnād perspective.76 Nasser has also usefully shown 
that al-qirāʾāt al-mutawātirah may refer to the second level tawātur which is tawātur 
effectuated by experts, or in al-Khaṭīb’s term, ijmāʿ al-khāṣṣah.77 
We find an indication of the meaning of shawādhdh in qirāʾāt according to al-
Khaṭīb as he described Ibn Shanabūdh (328/939) by saying: ‘He selected ḥurūf from 
shawādhdh al-qirāʾāt which contradict the ijmāʿ.’78 The problem here is the 
                                                        
71 The Transmission of the Variant Readings of the Qurʾān: The Problem of Tawātur and the Emergence of 
Shawādhdh (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Nasser concluded that it is difficult, if not impossible: to apply the 
conditions of tawātur (as collated from several works of legal theorists) to the transmission of the 
canonical Readings of the Qurʾān. Nasser had also accentuated that the Qurʾān was hardly put in 
theoretical definition by early figures, such as al-Shāfiʿī, let alone to be associated with the concept of 
tawātur. Nasser observed that only some legal theorists considered tawātur as a parameter in defining 
the Qurʾān while others rejected it in formulation, although they held that it was received by later 
generation through tawātur. 
72 Ibid, 15. 
73 Ibid, 17. It is difficult to determine why a certain ḥadīth was recorded by a muḥaddith in his work. 
74 Ibid, 52-53. This may depend on the identification of the actual relation between the ʿUthmān 
consonantal outlines and Variant Readings. The codification implies that the pre-codification 
variance is a necessary phase. Ibn Mujāhid’s use of ijmāʿ and Sunnah, instead of riwāyah, as pointed 
out by Nasser, may denote the similar concepts adopted by al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī and al-Khaṭīb. 
75 The Variant Readings of the Qurʾān derive their legitimacy in scholarly circles from the Prophetic 
tradition of the sabʿat aḥruf, but their legitimacy in the public sphere derive from being 
acknowledged as agreed historical fact and the absence of tawātur rejections for many centuries. 
76 Ibid., 230. 
77 Ibid, 55, 62 and 76. 
78 TMS, 2:103. See also: Mustafa Shah, “The Early Arabic Grammarians …” (cited earlier). 
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uncertainty pertaining to the type of ijmāʿ al-Khaṭīb intended, for it connotes 
different ideas of tawātur-ness. Ismāʿīl ibn ʿAlī al-Khuṭbī’s recount of Ibn 
Shanabūdh’s story gives the impression that his Readings contradict the ʿUthmānī 
consonantal outlines (maṣāḥif).79 The Qurʾān, the muṣḥaf, the codification, the 
qirāʾāt in principle, and the qirāʾāt in particulars were all qualified by the term ijmāʿ, 
and consequently in the terms of some scholars, tawātur. However, ʿUthmānī muṣhāf 
may be associated with a type of ijmāʿ while qirāʾāt is associated with another type. 
Consequently, it is not possible then to identify whether al-Khaṭīb’s idea of 
shawādhdh stands only as a counterpart of tawātur ḍarūrī, or it is also an opposite of 
tawātur istidlālī. The closest that we have is the assertion that shawādhdh contradict 
the ijmāʿ of experts on qirāʾāt. Different concept of tawātur can be inferred 
depending on the identification of the mustanad (basis) and theoretical ground for 
this ijmāʿ. 
However, similar to the criticism of akhbār where āḥād could be regarded as 
absurd whenever it contradicts the incontrovertible fact denoted by the term 
tawātur or ijmāʿ, some Muslim scholars anticipated a challenge to the Qurʾān’s 
authenticity and devised tawātur to disprove possible theories or results of 
individual studies on the historicity or integrity of the Qurʾān. The speculations 
were based only on individual conclusions that are not of ḍarūrī knowledge. This 
line of thinking is present in the idea that fact can only be disproved by fact that 
underlies the notion of naskh al-mutawātir bi’l-mutawātir (abrogation of an agreed 
article by an agreed article). A similar line of thinking was employed by al-Khaṭīb to 
incorporate the principle of fact (tawātur) in ḥadīth criticism.  
5.7 Al-Khaṭīb and the Problem of Ḥadīth Mutawātir 
In this section, the author presents how the problem of ḥadīth mutawātir was 
derived from the misunderstanding of al-Khaṭīb’s presentation and that the 
narrowing down of the concept of tawātur maʿnawī to relate only to ḥadīth studies 
had began from this point and extended until it was revived anew by Abū Isḥāq al-
Shāṭibī (790/1388). 
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Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (643/1246) whose compendium became the canon of ḥadīth 
sciences for scholars who came after him placed al-mutawātir under the category of 
mashhūr (widespread ḥadīth) whose concept was originally introduced in the Ḥanafī 
division of reports. In order to project the identity of muḥaddith and ḥadīth sciences, 
Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ contended that the mutawātir class is the subject matter of jurists and 
legal theorists. Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ surmised, ‘although the master expert al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī did mention it, there are indications in what he said which shows that he 
was not following the scholars of ḥadīth in doing so.’ Ibn al- Ṣalāḥ asserted that the 
craft of the muḥaddithūn did not include any mutawātir as it does not exist in the 
sense of ‘report by man (Arabic for who which denotes any number of reporters), 
whose [report’s] veracity is ascertained incontrovertibly.’80 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ observed 
that never in the history of riwāyah, a statement is recorded to have numerical 
tawātur chains. Whoever attempts to present an example of it will do so to no avail. 
It is obvious that Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ was discussing the issue from the perspective 
of isnād, while al-Khaṭīb was addressing akhbār (meanings) as discussed by 
theologians and legal theorists. Agreeing with Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Dickinson asserted that 
al-Khaṭīb’s knowledge in al-Kifāyah owes a good deal to the early opponents of aṣḥāb 
al-ḥadīth. This is true only if Ibn Fūrak’s division of aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth is kept aside, for 
al-Khaṭīb may have agreed with the conclusion of fuqahāʿ or nuẓẓār aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth.81 
Nevertheless, a thorough study of al-Khaṭīb’s section as presented above has shown 
that al-Khaṭīb was precise in using the term riwāyah for the title of his work. It 
concerns riwāyah in general even though most of the content is related to ḥadīth. 
For al-Khaṭīb, whether a riwāyah can be considered a ḥadīth or not, it is determined 
by a ḥāfiẓ who owns an extensive experience in ḥadīth criticism, not by solely 
learning principles he provided in Uṣūl-al-Riwāyah. Whether a ḥadīth can be 
considered a Sunnah or not, it is determined by a faqīh who exercises istinbāṭ al-
                                                        
80 Al-khabar alladhī yanquluhu man (alladhi) yaḥsulu al-ʿilmu bi-ṣidqihi (may refer to man or khabar) 
ḍarūratan. Dickinson’s translation can be misleading. The use of adjectival pronoun man by Ibn al-
Ṣalāḥ is a clever escape from definite association with many since man in Arabic may refer to both 
singular and plural. The easier way to read it is to replace yaḥṣulu with naḥṣulu al-ʿilmā bi-ṣidqihi. 
Dickinson, Introduction, 189-191. 
81 See Chapter Four. 
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maʿānī. The author has also shown that there is no direct relation between ḥadīth 
and mutawātir given by al-Khaṭīb. The introduction of historical facts (mutawātir) as 
a basis for criticism is crucial for him. If there is an individual report that suddenly 
contradicts the fact that Muḥammad migrated from Makkah to Madinah by saying 
that he migrated to India, it will be easily deemed absurd. Al-Khaṭīb aims at 
deliberating how some logical arrangement constructs the potentiality of individual 
reports. 
Undoubtedly, early traditionists and ḥadīth experts such as Ibn Ḥibbān 
(354/965) had already decided that all khabar (ḥadīth) are āḥād, which means that all 
chains of narration of ḥadīth could not escape from being solitary at least in one tier 
of the chain.82 However, when khabar reflects a statement of fact pertaining to 
Sunnah, it can easily be qualified with tawātur. Ibn Ḥibbān alluded to the distinction 
between ḥadīth and Sunnah in his innovative division of topics in al-Anwāʿ wa’l-
Taqāsīm.83 Prior to him, al-Shāfiʿī’s student, Ibn Mahdī had explicitly differentiated 
between dexterity in ḥadīth and Sunnah.84 Al-Khaṭīb’s treatment has enabled us to 
conceive that riwāyah, ḥadīth and Sunnah can possibly be synonymous and 
otherwise, but easily deemed mutawātir when observed from the perspective of the 
khabar (statement) carried by them. If one single person tells us that that London is 
a big city, the report (sentence) is solitary, but the statement reflects a fact that no 
one will deny, hence, retrospectively it constitutes tawātur. 
Nevertheless, Ibn al-Ṣalāh’s imagination of ḥadīth mutawātir has led him to 
suggest the ḥadīth “Whoever deliberately lies on my name, let him prepare a seat for 
himself in the hell” as a possible candidate for the criteria of numerical tawātur. 
However, he expressed scepticism by quoting a master expert of ḥadīth who 
commented, ‘Never in this world exists a ḥadīth which has all ten companions who 
were guaranteed paradise narrated it all of them save this one, and never had we 
                                                        
82 Ibn Balbān, al-Iḥsān, 1:156. 
83 Op. Cit. 
84 Ibn Mahdī stated, ‘Sufyān al-Thawrī is an expert with regard to ḥadīth but not Sunnah. Al-Awzāʿī is 
an expert with regard to the Sunnah, but not with ḥadīth. But Mālik ibn Anas is an expert with regard 
to both.’ Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥilyah, 6:332.  
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known of a ḥadīth that was related from more than sixty companions of the Prophet 
save this one.’ It is clear that Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ was looking for a ḥadīth with a certain 
number of chains. 
Ibn al-Ṣalāh was not the first to study the notion of ḥadīth mutawātir. 
Amongst those who discussed ḥadīth and immediately mentioned the quality of 
tawātur were the contemporaries of al-Khaṭīb such as the Mālikīs al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn ʿAbd 
al-Barr85 and al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ,86 the Shāfiʿī al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Bayḥaqī87 and others 
from the generation after him. An account was attributed to the Ḥanbalī Ibn al-
Jawzī who said: 
‘I have arduously traced al-aḥādīth al-mutawātirah and there are a number of 
them; the ḥadīth of intercession, the ḥadīth of Reckoning, the ḥadīth of seeing 
God in the hereafter, the ḥadīth of washing two legs in ablution, the ḥadīth of 
the torment of the grave, and the ḥadīth of wiping the footwear.’88  
The statement, however, does not clearly dismiss that Ibn al-Jawzī might 
have meant by these examples that their subjects were reported in an accumulation 
of ḥadīths, similar to the concept of tawātur maʿnawī. Nevertheless, it may be said 
that the association of the term ḥadīth with the term mutawātir appeared during the 
sixth/twelfth century. In the first period of seventh/thirteenth century, Ibn al-
Ṣalāḥ and al-Nawāwī were the ones who brought ḥadīth mutawātir to a serious 
discussion by examining the number of isnād. Both, however, concluded that ḥadīth 
mutawātir is extremely rare, or no longer exists as a phenomenon.89 The author has 
                                                        
85 Raddū al-aḥādīth al-mutawātirah fī ʿazāb al-qabr wa-fitnatihi, wa-raddū al-aḥādīth fī al-shafāʿah ʿalā 
tawāturihā. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Jāmiʿ Bayān, 2:1052.  
86 Ḥadīth anīn al-jidhʿi wa-huwa fī nafsihi mashhūr muntashir wa’l-khabr bihi mutawātir. Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, al-
Shifā bi-Taʿrīf Ḥuqūq al-Muṣtafā (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1979), 1:303. 
87 See al-Bayḥaqī’s discussion on tawātur maʿnawī of the generosity of Ḥātim of Ṭayy, Dalāʾil al-
Nubuwwah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1988), 1:33. 
88 Attributed to Ibn al-Jawzī by Muḥib Allāh al-Bahārī (1119/1707) in Musallam al-Thubūt, apud ʿAbd al-
ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Laknawī (1225/1810), Fawātīh al-Raḥamūt bi-Sharḥ Musallam al-Thubūt (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 202), 2:147. I have checked the manuscript of Musallam al-Thubūt to ensure that 
it is not the words of al-Bahārī mistakenly attributed to Ibn al-Jawzī. See: (Mss. Univ of King Saud, 
8144) fol. 134. The attribution was seconded in: al-Kattānī (1382/1962), Naẓm al-Mutanāthir min al-
Ḥadīth al-Mutawātir (Egypt: Dār al-Kutub al-Salafiyyah), 20.   
89 al-Nawawī, al-Taqrīb wa’l-Taysīr, 85.  
191 
 
highlighted that Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ was defining mutawātir from the perspective of legal 
theorists even though with slight amendments. Nasser did not interpret this 
amendment and his reading of al-Khaṭīb was tempered by his understanding of Ibn 
al-Ṣalāḥ.90 
Nevertheless, the idea of numerous isnād in his discussion of tawātur has 
sparked the interest of Ibn Ḥajar who found that there is surfeit of ḥadīth that fit the 
criteria. Ibn Hajar, as quoted by his students, al-Sakhāwī and al-Suyūṭī, averred that 
Ibn al-Ṣalāh’s claim of rarity and the other’s claim of non-existence (possibly al-
Nawawī) are invalid and their claims were resulted from incomprehensive study.91 
In refuting both scholars, Ibn Ḥajar imagined the situation where a ḥadīth is 
recorded in several authentic works and their isnāds were enormously various as it 
is impossible that their narrators had conspired to lie. Hence, it produces al-ʿilm al-
yaqīnī (confident knowledge) on the authenticity of the ḥadīth. The ḥadīth is then 
mutawātir and the example for this kind is numerous.92 To my knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to define the concept of ḥadīth mutawātir in the literature of ḥadīth 
terminologies. 
The idea of ḥadīth mutawātir might have also been inspired by Ibn Taymiyyah 
(728/1328) who tackled the issue from a different perspective. Ibn Taymiyyah 
agreed that tawātur connotes several different concepts and the most accurate of 
them refers to a decisive knowledge that a khabar comprises as adopted by Abū’l-
Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī.93 Numerical tawātur generally falls into the category of al-mashhūr 
as viewed by the Ḥanafīs. Ibn Taymiyyah also agreed that the quality tawātur might 
                                                        
90 Nasser, Variant Readings, 72. It is worth noting that Ibn al-Ṣalāh was extremely concerned with 
isnād that he denigrated ajzāʾ of his time for their non-strict application of isnād principle to the 
extent that he was understood as to prohibit totally the activity of re-evaluating ḥadīth. See: Ḥamzah 
al-Malībārī, Taṣḥīḥ al-Ḥadīth ʿinda Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1997). 
91 Nasser attributed Ibn Ḥajar’s statement to al-Suyūṭī. al-Sakhāwī, Fatḥ al-Mughīth, 3:407, al-Suyūṭi, 
Tadrīb, 2:629. 
92 Ḥ 56-59.  
93 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, 4:30. 
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be used as a restatement of ijmāʿ.94 However, he went further to elevate aṣḥāb al-
ḥadīth by applying the concept of ijmāʿ al-khāṣṣah (agreement of the experts).95 To 
achieve this, Ibn Taymiyyah introduced al-tawātur al-ʿāmm (general) and al-tawātur 
al-khāṣṣ (specific).96 Since ijmāʿ of the experts is based on decisive knowledge, it is 
not outlandish to propose that a statement is tawātur amongst them. In the case of 
ḥadīth studies, a ḥadīth that is unanimously accepted by ḥadīth scholars, denotes 
that it is mutawātir for them since they have al-ʿilm al-yaqīnī on its veracity. Hence, 
tawātur could occur in specific group regardless of the ignorance of others about it. 
That language of Arab consists of noun, verb and ḥarf is tawātur among the linguists 
despite the unawareness of some on that categorisation. However, Ibn Taymiyyah 
went further by stressing that when the Ummah accepts a ḥadīth, like many 
traditions recorded in Ṣaḥīḥayn, it shows that its veracity is known decisively. 
Hence, a ḥadīth such as innamā al-aʿmālu bi’l-niyyāt is mutawātir in the sense of 
agreement, even though it is not mutawātir from the perspective of transmission.97  
Ibn Taymiyyah was essentially not interested in the modes of transmission. 
His main concern was the utilisation of ḥadīth. He strove to show that khabar al-
wāḥid occasionally yield knowledge. However, Ibn Taymiyyah was precise to note 
that some khabar yield knowledge for both the public and the experts, whereas 
some others yield knowledge only for the expert.98 To demonstrate how ḥadīth 
yields knowledge, he replicated al-Juwaynī’s discussion of al-qarāʾin. Khabar wāḥid 
yields knowledge when accompanied by qarāʾin. Hence, the first class of khabar 
according to Ibn Taymiyyah is khabar we know incontrovertibly its veracity due to 
qarāʾin.99 However, the public could easily miss the qarāʾin while they were 
                                                        
94 Ibid, 18:48. Ibn Taymiyyah used the indication “treated by the Ummah with acceptance (talaqqathu 
al-ummah bi’l-qabūl) as a sign of tawātur for the Ṣaḥīḥayn. 
95 al-ḥadīth al-ṣaḥīḥ al-mutawātir ʿinda ahl al-ʿilm bi’l-ḥadīth, Ibid, 4:71-72.  
96 Ibid, 18:69. 
97 Ibid, 18:49. The same idea was already applied by the Ḥanafīs when they considered a mashhūr 
ḥadīth if it is treated by the ummah with acceptance as tantamount to mutawātir. See: al-Jaṣṣāṣ on the 
tradition of ʿUbādah in al-Fuṣūl fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Kuwait: Ministry of Awqāf, 1994), 2:360. 
98 Ibn Taimiyyah, Majmuʿ Fatāwā, 18:49. 
99 Ibid, 18:44. 
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recognised immediately by the experts.100 Ibn Taymiyyah was careful not to discuss 
how many qarāʾin that one needs to sense knowledge as irresistible for this will 
return the discussion into the concept of tawātur as consolidated knowledge 
confined to the notion of undeterminable “many”. However, we can observe here 
that ultimately al-Naẓẓām’s introduction of al-qarāʾin finds its application in ḥadīth 
criticism. Al-Juwaynī had already provided its protective shield by rejecting the 
possibility of ḍabṭ (defining condition) of qarāʾin either by quality or quantity for 
they are recognised based on ʿādah (experience). Ibn Taymiyyah used the analogy of 
satiation where it cannot be identified with either quantity or quality of food. If we 
keep asking for a definition, Ibn Taymiyyah will say that the definition itself is 
khabar wāḥid and its veracity is independent upon our knowledge on the 
trustworthiness of the giver of the definition.101 
Nevertheless, the idea of ḥadīth mutawātir with numerous isnāds was still 
pursued by al-Suyūṭī to add to his composition of works which no one else has ever 
composed anything of its kind.102 Since then, ḥadīth mutawātir turns an orthodox 
concept that bears a totally different sense from the concept of tawātur discussed by 
al-Khaṭīb.103 
                                                        
100 Ibid, 4:410 
101 Ibid, 9:92.  
102 He authored a large work, which he extolled that none has authored a work of its kind, and then 
summarised it in an abridged version. However, these two works are confused between three titles; 
al-Fawāʾid al-Mutakāthirah fī al-Aḥādith al-Mutawātirah, al-Azhār al-Mutanāthirah fī al-Akhbār al-
Mutawātirah and Qaṭf al-Azhār al-Mutanāthirah fī al-Akhbār al-Mutawātirah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī). 
In Tadrīb al-Rāwī, al-Suyūṭī mentioned that he authored first al-Azhār al-Mutanāthirah and summarised 
it later with the title Qaṭf al-Azhār al-Mutanāthirah. However, the modern publication of Qaṭf al-Azhār 
al-Mutanāthirah contains al-Suyūṭī’s introduction featuring it as an abridged version of al-Fawāʾid al-
Mutakāthirah. This suggests that al-Fawāʾid was the title of the original work and the abridged version 
should be titled al-Azhār. Qatf al-Azhār, therefore, is an abridgement of the latter. Another issue is that 
the abridged version was found in two manuscripts with different number of ḥadīth characterised as 
mutawātir. The first manuscript introduces 113 ḥadīths while the second manuscript omits thirty of 
them. Tadrīb, 2:629-631. 
103 Another proof for this is al-Sakhāwī had pointed out al-wuḍūʾ min mass al-dhakar as ḥadīth 
mutawātir while al-Khaṭīb did not mention it amongst the examples of tawātur, although he had a 
dedicated study on the same ḥadīth. Fatḥ al-Mughīth, 3:402. See Chapter Two. 
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When Juynboll advanced his reappraisal of ḥadīth terms, he was looking into 
tawātur from the lenses of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, despite that Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s use of man instead 
of jamāʿah connotes a certain strategy, and also Ibn Ḥajar.104 Juynboll was right 
when he said that not even one ḥadīth has a proto-wording supported by isnād 
strands with the requisite number of transmitters in ‘every tier’ of transmission, 
from beginning to end, and as a consequent, the tawātur phenomenon is dead. He 
argues that no Muslim scholar or Islamicist has ever noticed that this condition for 
the validity of a tawātur transmission is merely otiose.105 Juynboll understood 
tawātur as “broad authentication” and this may to some extent reflect the early 
scholars attempt to demonstrate the non-demonstrative obviousness. The author 
presented that Sunnah and ḥadīth scholars from the beginning had acknowledged 
that ḥadīth are āḥād. Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm has already rejected the condition of numerical 
tawātur at every tier. 
 Based on the above, Juynboll also argued that tawātur lafẓī is a 
historiographical criterion, which appears never to have had any demonstrable 
applicability.106 Our study of al-Khaṭīb and others has enabled us to revise this 
assertion to say; tawātur lafẓī can potentially be observed whenever speeches or 
writings by Muslims and others express any phrase that reflects a fact concerning 
Islam and also others. However, the proof and certainty of any historical fact will 
remain a debate in intellectual demonstrations. 
Conclusion 
The author’s attempt to understand the treatment of the concept of tawātur 
in al-Khaṭīb’s works has led to the observation that the problem of tawātur stems 
from the idea that human reasoning is able to manipulate the conveyance of a 
statement. Hence, a statement coming from a single person may be derived from 
intellectual creativity rather than reality. It was more prevalent amongst the 
                                                        
104 G.H.A Juynboll, “(Re) Appraisal of Some Technical Terms in Ḥadīth Science,” Islamic Law and Society 
8:3 (2001): 303-349. See: 327. 
105 Ibid, 329. 
106 Ibid, 330. 
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rationalists who inspected the nature of reasoning and became sceptical of its 
function. The rationalists had to figure out several intellectual concepts to express 
personal experience of incontrovertible knowledge. In their attempts to define fact 
and knowledge of fact, Muslim scholars devised a number of expressional terms 
such as ijmāʿ and tawātur. Historical facts, however, come to us in various forms. 
Furthermore, theological background infused a concept with different ideas even 
though the same expressional term is used. Consequently, scholars in the same field 
of study differed extremely in their understanding of a term. Ijmāʿ, ḍarūrī, muktasab 
and tawātur were examples of terms that have different meanings when applied by 
scholars from different backgrounds. Early ḥadīth scholars have a different idea of 
tawātur from the one employed by later scholars in defining ḥadīth mutawātir. In this 
regard, al-Khaṭīb’s appropriation of the concept of tawātur cannot be taken as a 
mere adoption of rational discourse. It conveys a significant strategy in the 
formation of maʿnā-based ḥadīth criticism. As for tawātur maʿnawī, Wael Hallaq 
posited that inductive corroboration has informed the underlying logical-
methodological foundation for a number of material and theoretical legal 
principles, ranging from the various types of Prophetic reports to consensus. 
According to Hallaq, it was grounded partly in a subjective theological 
transcendentalism and partly in rational-cum-empirical justification.107 It was this 
logic that appeared in the forth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries (the time of al-
Khaṭīb) with the introduction of tawātur maʿnawī that has been extended later in al-
Shāṭibī’s concept of thematic induction (al-istiqrāʾ al-maʿnawī). It was further 
developed and incorporated in the concept of kulliyyāt (universal truths) and 
eventually maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah (the higher objectives of Sharīʿah). The next chapter 
will explore the role of takhrīj in ḥadīth criticism and the formation of tawātur 
maʿnawī.  
  
                                                        
107 Wael Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration, Probability and Certainty in Sunni Legal Thought,” in 
Islamic Law and Jurisprudence: Studies in Honor of Farhat J. Ziadeh, ed. Nicholas Heer (Seattle: University 










This chapter argues that ḥadīth scholars proved the high potentiality and 
compelling authority of ḥadīth in establishing the Sunnah, through an application of 
takhrīj, whose principles and techniques were deliberated in the project of al-Khaṭīb. 
The notion of takhrīj appropriated by al-Khaṭīb in Baghdād tackles the task of 
inspecting the rāwī; his identity and credibility, the marwī (object of narration) and 
ḥāl al-riwāyah (the circumstances around narration). A series of works connected to 
the identification of narrators and the maʿānī al-sunan through mechanism such as 
ikhrāj (extrication after comparison) and tawātur maʿnawī (spirit aggregate-
necessitation) will be presented to illustrate how takhrīj operates to inform 
potentiality and high potentiality in the study of Sunnah.   
6.1 Jaḥālah and the Identification of Rāwī 
 Al-Khaṭīb’s work al-Kifāyah is the repository for the principles of takhrīj al-
riwāyah some of which he reported from the past luminaries and the other 
communicates the result of his own research. Takhrīj al-riwāyah is portrayed as such 
a complicated concept that it can only be appreciated through the elaboration of its 
multiple dimensions. In general, it is an attempt to potentiate a meaning in order to 
articulate an article of Sunnah and Islam through a sort of transmitted statement. A 
riwāyah combines two entwined components: the marwī which acts as a collective 
reference for spirit, meaning, statement, expression and script; and its rāwī, which 
represents the human agent who acts as its carrier and whose conduct informs the 
history of the marwī. 
 Al-Khaṭīb foregrounded the virtue of this activity in the exordium of al-
Kifāyah where he asserts that al-salaf al-māḍīn (past luminaries) inspected both rāwī 
and marwī.1 This is the first point at which he began to present a constructive 
critique of the traditionalists. To set the context for several coming sections, we will 
focus initially on just one principle of takhrīj, which the author terms as taʿyīn al-rāwī 
(the identification of transmitter). This term corresponds to the appearance of cases 
                                                        
1 al-Kifāyah, 1:83. 
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of jahālat al-ʿayn (unidentified bearer of an identity) al-Khaṭīb attributed to the 
ḥadīth corpora.2 According to al-Khaṭīb, prominent ḥuffāẓ and leading tradents have 
been observed to transmit from unidentified agents. Al-Sabīʿī transmitted from 
labels such as Jabbār al-Ṭāʾī, Qays ibn Kurkum, etc., and the tradent Qatādah 
transmitted from Jarīḍ ibn Kulayb. These labels refer to informants no one had ever 
mentioned anything pertaining to their existence. At least, if two tradents 
transmitted from an informant, one can be relatively convinced of his existence in 
this world.3 Al-Khaṭīb expressed here one of the principles of takhrīj: the success in 
taʿyīn al-rāwī potentiates the reliability of both the rāwī and the riwāyah (occurrence 
of transmission).  
6.1.1  Majhūl, Mubham and Muhmal  
 The unidentified agent explained in the above section is called in al-Kifāyah 
as majhūl. Since the Arab culture permeated the geographical grounds where the 
transmission of traditions operated, it infused several cultural elements to the 
personal label of a narrator. In this study, Basic Designation (BD) refers to a person’s 
given name and his patronym, e.g. al-Ḥusayn ibn Jamīl (translated as al-Ḥusayn son 
of Jamīl).4 In some instances, a person could be recognised just by his patronym 
such as Ibn Fulān (Son of So-and-so). Cultural Designation (CD) on the other hand 
could possibly add to the basic designation or replace it with the name of the 
grandfather, the matronym, the teknonym, the nickname, the gentilic, etc. 
Although before al-Khaṭīb, the judge al-Rāmhurmuzī and the Ṣaḥīḥayn-driven ḥadīth 
theorist al-Ḥākim of Nishapur have succinctly pointed out occasions of misreads 
and distortions in designations, the complex consequence of connection between 
elements of orthography, phonetics, anthroponomastic and takhrīj has never been 
comprehensively classified and precisely demonstrated in volumes before al-Khaṭīb. 
                                                        
2 Ibid, 1:245. 
3 If one single person explained that any agent from whom he transmitted a statement is granted his 
trust, it makes a separate issue. Al-Khaṭīb discussed this in al-Kifāyah, 1:252. 
4 The author considers both as Basic Designation from the perspective of takhrīj study for a name 





The absence of the whole BD is categorised as mubham (unlabelled, lit. 
animalised) while partial missing of the BD belongs to muhmal (unassociated). The 
example of the first is أصحابه من رجل عن  which may refer to any man from amongst the 
companions of the person. To address the similar cases, al-Khaṭīb composed his 
dictionary, al-Asmāʾ al-Mubhamah fī al-Anbāʾ al-Muḥkamah. References such as “a 
man”, “a youth”, “a woman”, “a group from x” feature in the Qurʾān and the ḥadīths 
alike. Pertaining to ḥadīth, a humble effort was initiated by al-Ḥāfiẓ Al-Azdī-al-Miṣrī 
(409/1018) whose book al-Ghawāmiḍ wa’l-Mubhamāṭ consists of a total of seventy 
accounts.5 Al-Khaṭīb’s work was the first extensive study on the subject in which he 
managed to compile more than 230 ḥadīths featuring the unlabelled.6 However, the 
arrangement of information in this work suggests that it is not meant as a self-guide 
to identifying names of the unlabelled participants; rather it seems to be a memory 
aid for a ḥāfiẓ. Instead of listing alphabetically or topically all ḥadīths in whose isnāds 
these obscured references featured, the materials were listed alphabetically based 
on the figured names of the previously unnamed. 
For this reason, al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Nawawī abridged the book in al-Ishārāt.7 Al-
Nawawī explained that his selection of al-Khaṭīb’s work was due to its preference 
amongst experts, even though Ibn Bashkuwāl’s work was more comprehensive.8 Al-
Nawawī rearranged the content based on the name of the Companion-figure. 
Ultimately, al-Khaṭīb’s work was included in an encyclopaedic collection by al-Ḥāfiẓ 
Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-ʿIrāqī (826/1423) entitled al-Mustafād combining the 
                                                        
5  See: al-Azdī, al-Ghawāmiḍ wa’l-Mubhamāṭ fī al-Ḥadīth al-Nabawi, (Jeddah: Dār al-Manārah, 2000). 
6 al-ʿIrāqī and al-Suyūṭī counted only 171. Abū’l-Faḍl al-ʿIrāqī, Sharḥ al-Tabṣirah wa’l-Tadhkirah, (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2002), 2:288, Tadrīb 2:853.   
7 al-Nawawī, al-Ishārāt ilā Bayān al-Asmāʾ al-Mubhamāt, (Damascus: Dār al-Bayān, 2009). 
8 Several titles have been composed after al-Khaṭīb. See: Ibn Bashkuwal (533), al-Ghawāmiḍ wa’l-
Mubhamāṭ, (Jeddah: Dār al-Andalus, 1994) and Ibn Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī, Īḍāḥ al-Ishkāl (Kuwait: Maktabah 
al-Muʿallā, 1988). Regarding the series of works, abridgements and addenda in this subgenre, see: al-
Kattānī, al-Risālah al-Mustaṭrifah, 122. 
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unreferenced both in the matn and the isnād.9 Prior to these initiatives, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ 
highlighted this subject as a distinct category in his ḥadīth curriculum.  
The second category, muhmal refers to instances where part of BD is absent, 
e.g. محمد عن   or سعيد ابن عن  (“from Muḥammad” without featuring the patronym, or 
“from Ibn Saʿīd” without mentioning the given name). Al-Khaṭīb method was to 
cross-reference all strands of transmission that refer to the same tradition or event 
to trace the complete name of a narrator. It was also traced through the study of 
informants, recipients and the confreres of the unassociated narrator. So far as the 
available references are concerned, al-Khaṭīb’s work was the first and the only one 
mentioned by experts in this subject.10 The work of later Andalusian Abū-ʿAlī-al-
Jayyānī al-Ghassānī (498/1105) is restricted to this feature within the isnāds in Ṣaḥīḥ 
al-Bukhārī.11  
After two centuries, al-Khaṭīb’s work was reported to be audited by the great 
grandson of the Ayyubid Sultan, al-Malik al-Muʿaẓẓam, whose name is Muḥammad 
ibn Ismāʿīl (756/1355).12 He was also known as Nāṣir al-Dīn, Son of Kings, a great 
tradent and a Ṣūfī at the khānqāh (lodges) of Saʿīd al-Suʿadāʾ in Cairo.13 It was 
through him that al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Bulqīnī (805/1403) the author of Mahāsin al-Isṭilāḥ, 
received al-Khaṭīb’s work; as well as his student al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar. 14  
Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ did not discuss this category distinctively. Under the Category 
53 on Homographic References, he pointed out al-Ghassānī’s work, which had led 
Eerik Dickinson to translate muhmal restrictively as unpointed words.15 Al-Sakhāwī, 
failed to find other than al-Khaṭīb’s work, agreed that the category deserves a 
                                                        
9 Abū Zurʿah al-ʿIrāqī, al-Mustafād min Mubhamāt al-Matn wa’l-Isnād (Egypt: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 1994). 
10 Abū’l-Faḍl al-ʿIrāqī , Sharḥ al-Tabṣirah, 2:271.    
11 Al-Ghassānī, Taqyīd al-Muhmal wa-Tamyīz al-Mushkil (Makkah: Dār ʿAlam al-Fawāʾid, 2000). 
12 al-Fāsī, Dhayl al-Taqyīd, 100. 
13 His great grandfather refuted al-Khaṭīb to defend Abū Ḥanīfah. See: Chapter Seven. 
14 Bint al-Shāṭiʾ, ed. al-Bulqīnī, Maḥāsin al-Iṣtilāḥ (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif), 69. 
15 Dickinson, trans. Introduction, 266. Al-ʿIrāqī gave Ḥammād as an example of muhmal where it could 




dedicated study and cited his professor, Ibn Ḥajar who explained it as the opposite 
of al-muttafiq wa’l-muftariq in producing doubt.16 This has proven al-Khaṭīb’s success 
in constructing a principle of takhrīj and manifesting the possibility of taʿyīn-al-rāwī.  
6.1.2  Cultural Variants in Patronym 
 This category can be collectively identified with al-mansūbūn ilā ghayr al-ʾābāʾ 
(those whose designation replaces the patronym). The basic designation is 
complete; however, the patronym is replaced with other designation due to cultural 
practices. There are several variants in this category: 
(1) The patronym is replaced with the name of the grandfather, e.g. Abū 
ʿUbaydah ʿĀmir ibn al-Jarrāḥ. The full name is ʿĀmir ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn 
al-Jarrāḥ. 
(2) The patronym is replaced with the matronym, e.g. Muʿādh ibn ʿAfrāʾ. 
His father’s name is al-Ḥārith. 
(3) The patronym is replaced with the name of the grandmother, e.g. 
Yaʿlā ibn Munyah. His father’s name is Umayyah. 
(4) The patronym is replaced with pseudo-patronym (other than the 
father, such as stepfather), e.g. al-Ḥasan ibn Dīnār. His father is Wāṣil. 
Dīnār is the husband of his mother. 
(5) The given name and the patronym are same that an error might be 
presumed, e.g. al-Ḥajjāj ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Aslamī. 
(6) The given name resembles the father’s teknonym, e.g. Sinān ibn Abī 
Sinān. 
Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ highlighted variants (1) to (4) under Category 57, in points (3), 
(1), (2) and (4) respectively. Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ did not refer to any work of al-Khaṭīb, as he 
would do in many other categories.17 It is possible that these variants have been 
probed in al-Khaṭīb’s work titled al-Asmāʾ al-Mutawāṭiʾah wa’l-Ansāb al-Mutakāfiʾah 
(The Concordant Names and the Equivalent Pedigrees). The work seems to have 
been lost since early time for no ḥadīth expert or theorist made any reference to it. 
The term al-asmāʾ al-mutawāṭiʾah was used by al-Jāḥīẓ to refer to ism (word) that 
bears several meanings due to which sūʾ al-taʾwīl (false identification) occurs in 
                                                        
16 Fatḥ al-Mughīth, 4:304. See future section on al-muttafiq. 
17 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Introduction, 289. 
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reading.18 However, this does not relate to the study of narrators. It will make more 
sense to intimate Ibn Qutaybah’s use of this term in the field of individual 
identification. Under the title “al-Asmāʾ al-Mutawāṭiʾah fī al-Qabāʾil (The concordant 
names amongst the tribes)” in his book al-Maʿārif, Ibn Qutaybah gave an example of 
the name Muḥārib. According to him, it may refer to Muḥārib ibn Fihr from the 
tribe of Fihr, Muḥārib ibn Khaṣfah from the tribe Qays of ʿAylān, or Muḥārib ibn 
ʿAmr ibn Wadīʿah from the tribe of ʿAbd Qays.19 It is possible that al-Khaṭīb’s work 
lingered around the same subject. 
As for the variants (5) and (6), they have been treated extensively before al-
Khaṭīb by al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū’l-Fatḥ al-Azdī al-Mawṣilī (374/984) in his works Man Wāfaqa 
Ismuhu Isma Abīhi and Man Wāfaqa Ismuhu Kunyat Abīhi.20 
6.1.3  Names and Teknonyms 
 Prior to al-Khaṭīb, ḥadīth experts such as Ibn al-Madīnī, Ibn Ḥanbal, al-
Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Muqaddamī (301/914), al-Nasāʾī, Ibn al-Jārūd 
(307/920), al-Dūlābī (310/923), Abū ʿArūbah al-Ḥarrānī (318/930), Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Abū 
Aḥmad al-Ḥākim al-Kabīr (378/989), Ibn Mandah, al-Ḥākim al-Naysabūrī, and Abū 
Bakr al-Shīrāzī (411/1021) paid more attention to clarifying names and teknonyms 
of narrators.21 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ discussed this subject under Category 50 (Point 8). The 
author lists below variants found in the works of the above scholars and later works 
pertaining to this category: 
(1) The normative case where the name and the teknonym are known. 
(2) The teknonym is known but the name is unknown or 
undetermined, e.g. Abū Anas al-Kinānī. 
(3) The name takes a teknonym form while the person also owns a 
teknonym, e.g. Abū Bakr ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ḥārith ibn 
Hishām al-Makhzūmī (teknonym: Abū ʿAbd al-Rahmān) and Abū 
                                                        
18 Cited in HMDB, 1:24. 
19 Ibn Qutaybah, al-Maʿārif (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif), 113. 
20 Both are published (Kuwait: Markaz Makhṭūṭat wa’l-Turāth, 1988). 
21 al-Kattānī, al-Risālah, 120. 
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Bakr ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAmr ibn Ḥazm al-Anṣārī (teknonym: Abū 
Muḥammad). 
(4) The name takes a teknonym form and the person does not own any 
teknonym, e.g. Abū Bilāl al-Ashʿarī. 
(5) The name is better known than the teknonym, e.g. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
ibn ʿAwf and Thābit ibn Qays and al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī (teknonym: Abū 
Muḥammad). 
(6) The teknonym is better known than the name, e.g. Abū Isḥāq al-
Sabīʿī (His name is ʿAmr ibn ʿAbd Allāh). 
(7) The narrator owns a number of teknonym, e.g. ʿAbd al-Malik ibn 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Jurayj (teknonym: Abū al-Walīd and Abū Khālid). 
(8) The narrator has a nickname in a teknonym form while having a 
teknonym, e.g. ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Abū al-Ḥasan (Nickname: Abū 
Turāb). 
(9) The teknonym is similar to the patronymic, e.g. Abū Ṣāliḥ ibn Ṣāliḥ. 
(10) The teknonym is similar to one’s spouse teknonym, e.g. Abū Ayyūb 
al-Anṣārī and his wife Ummu Ayyūb al-Anṣāriyyah. 
(11) The name is known but the teknonym is disputed, e.g. Ubayy ibn 
Kaʿb. Abū al-Mundhir and Abū’l-Ṭufayl are given for teknonym. 
(12) The teknonym is known but the name is disputed, e.g. Abū Hurayra 
al-Dawsī, (names reported: ʿAbd Allāh or ʿAbd al-Raḥmān). 
(13) Both the name and the teknonym are disputed, e.g. Safīnah the 
servant of the Messenger of Allah. Names given are: ʿUmayr, Ṣāliḥ, 
and Miḥrān. Teknonyms given are: Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Abū al-
Bukhturī. 
 
Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ mentioned most of these variants under Category 50: Names and 
Teknonyms.22 As for variant (2), al-Khaṭīb’s contemporary Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr specified 
two sections: Man ʿUrifa min al-Ṣaḥābah bi’l-Kunyah wa-lam Yūqaf lahu ʿalā Ism aw 
Ukhtulifa fīhi and Man Lā Yūqaf Lahu Minhum (al-Tābiʿīn wa-Man Baʿdahum) ʿalā Ism wa-
lā ʿUrifa bi-Ghayr Kunyah. Both are in his work, al-Istighnāʾ.23 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ discussed it 
in point (2) of the category. The two examples mentioned for variant (3) were first 
                                                        
22 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Introduction, 249. 




given by al-Khaṭīb. Ibn al-Salāḥ quoted solely from him in point (1a). He also added 
variant (4) in point (1b).24 
Ibn Ḥibbān was the first to dedicate a work to variant (5): Kunā Man Yuʿraf bi’l-
Asāmī.25 Al-Khaṭīb did not work on this but Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ specified a separate 
category for it; Category 51, The Teknonyms of Those Better Known under Their 
Names.26 However, al-Khaṭīb did point out the opposite of it as in variant (6). He 
gave two cases at the end of Ghunyat al-Multamis.27  
Variant (7) until (13) were all given by Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ except (10) for which the 
Egyptian Ibn Ḥayyuviyē (366/977) authored his work, Man Wāfaqat Kunyatuhu Kunyat 
Zawjihi min al-Ṣaḥābah.28 Variant (9) was creatively introduced by al-Khaṭīb’s one 
and only dedicated work with regards to teknonyms titled Man Wāfaqat Kunyatuhu 
Isma Abīhi min-mā lā Yuʾman Wuqūʿ al-Khaṭaʾ fīhi. Through the published abridgment 
made by al-Ḥāfiẓ Mughulṭāy, it is learned that al-Khaṭīb was addressing cases such 
as Ibrāhīm ibn Ismāʿīl and Ibrāhīm whose teknonym is Abū Ismāʿīl. Possibilities of 
misrecognition and switch could be foreseen since the form of ابن (son) could be 
misread as ابو (father). Al-Khaṭīb had made it clear from the title and the entries that 
this subgenre does not function as a mere record of variants; rather it serves an 
important cause of identifying possibilities of doubt and applying takhrīj.  
6.1.4 Al-Mufradah, al-Mushkil, al-Multabis and al-Mudallas 
 The phenomena of unicity (mufradah), multiplicity, problematic multiplicity 
(mushkil), confounding multiplicity (multabis), and projected multiplicity (mudallas) 
in designations have also been incorporated in the anatomy of takhrīj principles. In 
Category 49 of his work, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ pointed out the work of al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Bardījī 
titled Ṭabaqāt al-Asmāʾ al-Mufradah that collected unique names, teknonyms and 
                                                        
24 Op. cit, 250. 
25 The work does not extant. See; al-Kattānī, al-Risālah, 121. 
26 Op. Cit, 255. 
27 Dhikr man ghalabat kunyatuhu ʿalā ismihi. See: 2:457-459. 
28 Published (KSA: Dār Ibn al-Qayyim, 1988). 
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nicknames where a reference was borne by only one narrator.29 A revision of al-
Bardījī’s work was submitted by Ibn-Bukayr-al-Ṣayrafī (388/988) in his Naqd al-
Ṭabaqāt fī al-Asmāʾ al-Mufradah.30 These were the only works reported with regard to 
unicity. Al-Khaṭīb did not provide any reference to this subject perhaps for its 
simple clarity and non-immediate relation with the possibility of doubt. 
 The opposite of the above where a narrator was assigned with multiple 
references that confuse a verifier of ḥadīth is called al-multabis or al-mushkil. It seems 
that Al-Azdī-al-Miṣrī once again initiated a pioneering work titled Īḍāḥ al-Ishkāl fī al-
Riwāyāt.31 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ discussed this phenomenon under Category 48.32 He 
immediately connected it with tadlīs (tradent’s obfuscation of source) and 
highlighted al-Khaṭīb’s intentional multiplying of his professors’ name.33 Al-Khaṭīb 
had elucidated many dimensions of tadlīs in a specific work. The problem of tadlīs, 
either for trickery or strategy, can be solved through the technique of takhrīj, whose 
first concrete step is taʿyīn al-rāwī. In al-Kifāyah, al-Khaṭīb pursued the section on the 
theoretical explanation of tadlīs with a section related to taʿyīn al-rāwī.34 It shows 
that taʿyīn can eliminate the problem induced by multiplicity.  
 Al-Khaṭīb, then, treated a more complicated problem connected to 
multiplicity. He tackled the subject of an informant with two patronyms where 
most often the father’s name is similar to the father’s teknonym. For instance, he 
presented the case of Maʿdān ibn Ṭalḥa and Maʿdān ibn Abī Ṭalḥah when both refer 
                                                        
29 Published (Damascus: Dār Ṭilās, 1987). 
30 Unpublished (Mss. Islamic Univ. of Madinah, [1236] 634). 
31 Unpublished, see: Brockelmann, GAL, 1:281. Arabic version: 3:231. Sezgin, Tārīkh al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 
1:461. 
32 Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Introduction, 241-242. 
33 The tadlīs referred to here is assigning a reference that does not immediately point to a narrator. 
His designation, hence, is multiplied. The purpose of this kind of tadlīs varies from concealing the low 
credibility of a narrator to keeping the student or a reader attentive by offering variations. See 
exposition of al-Khaṭīb’s tadlīs in: al-Sakhāwī, Fatḥ al-Mughīth, 334:1 . Al-Khaṭīb recorded his 
professors by many names and that one needs to master takhrīj in order to identify his informant in 
an isnād. 
34 Bāb al-qawl fī al-rajulayn yashtarikān fī al-ism wa’l-nasab, fa-tajīʾu al-riwāyat ʿan aḥadihima min ghayr 
bayān, wa aḥaduhuma ʿadl wa’l-ākhar fāsiq. al-Kifāyah, 2:165. 
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to the same individual. This was treated extensively in the first section of his work 
titled, Ghunyat al-Multamis ʾĪḍāḥ al-Multabis. According to al-Khaṭīb, a ḥadīth critic 
needs to be aware of this phenomenon since there are instances where the similar 
case such as Bashīr ibn ʿAmr and Bashīr ibn Abī ʿAmr, actually refers to two different 
individuals. Only a real expert would then be able to discover instances such as this 
and he will be undoubtedly aware of a difference between the mudallas (projected 
multiplicity for the sake of obfuscation) and mere variations of designation. This is 
another concrete evidence for taʿyīn being devised to potentiate (strengthen) a 
riwāyah.  
6.1.5  Al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif 
 Al-Azdī-al-Miṣrī once again introduced another huge problem in isnād 
orthography where variations in phonetics affect the identification of the 
narrator.35 The form سالم, for instance, may lead to Muḥammad ibn Salām al-Bīkandī 
al-Bukhārī and Muḥammad ibn Sallām al-Sāʾiḥ, depends on the way a reader 
identifies the sound. He pioneered a work titled al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif to treat the 
homographic heterophonic labels that lead to multiple individuals. The gravity of 
this subject is butressed by the fact that al-Dāraquṭnī had asked al-Azdī-al-Miṣrī to 
read his work to him and eventually composed his own work with the same title.36 
Al-Khaṭīb learned about this intriguing project through al-Barqānī and al-Ṣūrī.37 Al-
Khaṭīb then proved his extensive gauging of isnād corpora by composing a 
magnanimous supplement to the two giants’ works that he titled al-Muʾtanif 
Takmilah al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif (The Commencement, A Supplement for Cases of 
Homographic Heterophonic References). His work contributes in five ways: (1) 
supplying cases which were not mentioned by them, (2) rectifying their errors, (3) 
adding the overlooked variations and identifications related to the homographs 
they featured, (4) elaborating the information given previously in an overly concise 
                                                        
35 al-Azdī-al-Miṣrī, al-Mutalif wa’l-Mukhtalif fī Asmāʾ Naqalat al-Ḥadīth (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
2007).  
36 al-Dāraquṭnī, al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1986). 
37 Usāmah al-Sayyid, Asānīd al-Miṣriyyīn (Cairo: Dār al-Faqīh, 2011), 171-174. 
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manner, and (5) presenting more superior isnāds for ḥadīths they recorded in their 
works. The Egyptian idea then was revised and expanded extensively in Baghdād. 
This subgenre has also shown that ḥadīth critics have not only discovered the 
difficulties engendered by relative vowel markings, but they also demonstrated 
variations related to diacritical pointing of letters and phoneme identification. 
Example for pointing is the form سىد that may lead to Subad ibn Razām ibn Māzi (سبد) 
and Sanad ibn Muḥammad ibn Sanad (سند). Meanwhile, the example for phonemic 
variation is ڡھر. The last letter may be identified with dāl or rāʾ that leads to 
respectively Fahd ibn Kathīr (فھر) and Fihr ibn Mālik (فھد)  . 
Al-Khaṭīb’s work was edited until the end of his life as he only revealed it to 
the Baghdādians when he returned from his stay in Tyre. Due to its late 
composition, his student Ibn Mākūlā has discovered several errors and 
shortcomings. Al-Khaṭīb was aware of this revision and requested the student’s 
review. However, Ibn Mākūlā revealed his work only after the demise of al-Khaṭīb. 
Ibn Mākūlā’s work (Rectifying Awhām) then proves to be easier in organisation and 
more comprehensive, which granted him Ibn Ḥajar’s remark as the best reference in 
the subject.38 Al-Khaṭīb’s work, however, remains more useful with regard to ḥadīth 
retracement since Ibn Mākūlā eliminated ḥadīths from his work. Once again, al-
Khaṭīb’s idea of taʿyīn genre was not simply a preservation of individual profiles, but 
connected to attaining expertise in takhrīj and ḥadīth criticism. Nevertheless, the 
case of homographic heterophonic names has inspired al-Khaṭīb on another 
challenging subject which is the instances where the labels are homographic and 
homophonic, yet they still lead to multiple individuals. 
6.1.6  Al-Muttafiq wa’l-Muftariq 
 When Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ expounded this topic in Category 54, he identified seven 
patterns of homophonic labels with possibility of multiple individuals referred by a 
                                                        
38  Ibn Mākūlā, Tahdhīb al-Awhām, 57-58. This work was intended to rectify the errors of al-Azdī-al-
Miṣrī, al-Dāraquṭnī, al-Khaṭīb’s errors in rectifying them, and al-Khaṭīb’s errors in his work. Prior to 
this, Ibn Mākulā has already compiled a dictionary of homographic referential labels combining 
between content from al-Khaṭīb’s al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif, al-Dāraquṭnī’s work, and two of al-Azdī-al-
Miṣrī’s works, al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif and Mushtabih al-Nisbah. See below fn. 
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pattern.39 Based on this, he evaluated al-Khaṭīb’s pioneering work as non-
exhaustive of all patterns. These patterns are: 
(1) Homophonic given names and patronyms, e.g. al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad 
that was borne by six individuals. 
(2) Homophonic given names, patronyms and higher patronyms, e.g. 
Aḥmad ibn Jaʿfar ibn Ḥamdān that was borne by four individuals. 
(3) Homophonic teknonyms and gentilics, or teknonyms and nicknames, 
e.g. Abū ʿImrān al-Jawnī, which was borne by two individuals, and Abū 
Bakr ibn ʿAyyāsh that was borne by three individuals. 
(4) Homophonic given names and fathers’ teknonyms, e.g. Ṣāliḥ ibn Abī 
Ṣāliḥ that refers to four individuals. 
(5) Homophonic personal names, patronyms and gentilics, e.g. 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Anṣārī that refers to two individuals. 
(6) Homophonic names or teknonyms without further associations, e.g. 
Ḥammād or Abū Ḥamzah. 
(7) Homophonic gentilics e.g. al-Ḥanafī that may refer to a tribe or a legal 
school. 
It was discovered that al-Khaṭīb had treated the sixth pattern in his work on 
muhmal. As for the seventh pattern, the early ḥadīth experts treated this subject 
within the genre of ansāb (affiliations). Another possibility is that it was detailed in 
the lost al-Asmāʾ al-Mutawāṭiʾah. All the previous five patterns had already been 
addressed by al-Khaṭīb in his work al-Muttafiq wa’l-Muftariq. 
In his catalogues of works, al-Kattānī mentioned three works with the same 
title. However, the earliest by Abū Bakr al-Jawzaqī (338/998) of Nishapur does not 
address the same subject.40 Based on this and further studies, al-Khaṭīb’s work was 
the first and the only existing one which has preserved 1751 cases capable of 
producing innumerable possibilities. Every case was supported with the occurrence 
of the name in the isnād and the ḥadīth to which it is attached. The introduction of 
                                                        
39 Introduction, 277. 
40 al-Muttafiq wa’l-Muftariq, the work of al-Jawzaqī should be considered amongst the mustakhrajāt 
since it treats the agreed ḥadīth (muttafiq) and separately reported ḥadīth (muftariq) of al-Bukhārī and 
Muslim. This should be added to Brown’s analysis of mustakhraj genre and al-Jawzaqī preceded al-
Ḥākim in his searching for the underlying pattern of Ṣaḥīḥayn. See: Ibn Nuqṭah, al-Taqyīd, 1:215, Ibn 
Hajar, al-Nukat ʿalā Kitāb Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (Islamic University of Madinah, 1984), 1:136, Brown, Canonization, 




work on this subject has amazed all authors in ḥadīth criticism that no single book 
on ḥadīth terminologies afterward left the discussion on al-Muttafiq wa’l-Muftariq.41 
Initially, the motivation for this work was triggered by an error made by Ibn Maʿīn 
who mistaken ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Qurayr (قريں)  for ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Qurayb (قريب) , since 
both ʿAbd al-Malik were informants for Mālik ibn Anas. Ibn Maʿīn charged Mālik 
with error in reporting it as Ibn Qurayr. Al-Khaṭīb refuted him and defended Mālik. 
Although this incident would better suit the subject of homographic heterophonic 
patronyms, al-Khaṭīb unravelled potential errors of misidentification and proved 
the high potentiality of rectification through unparalleled adroitness in isnād 
scrutiny. This serves as a challenge to anyone who aspires to theorise ḥadīth 
criticism.  
6.1.7  Al-Mutashābih fī al-Rasm  
 Based on the two previous categories, al-Khaṭīb invented a new category 
that combines both homographic heterophonic and homophonic labels. Prior to 
him, al-Azdī-al-Miṣrī highlighted different possibilities of reading gentilics due to 
cases of homographic heterophonic in his work, Mushtabih al-Nisbah. The gentilic 
 according to him could be read al-Sibyī, al-Shaybī, al-Sībī and al-Sabnī, and he السٮٮی
supplied each reading with an individual affiliated with it.42 Al-Khaṭīb expanded 
this idea to invent a distinct subject that is al-mutashābih fī al-rasm. It refers to the 
same reading possibilities, however, with extension to the given names and 
patronyms. It includes possibilities of homophonic label in part of a designation, 
albeit heterophonic in the other part. It bears a high possibility of error for a failure 
in reading a part of personal name while there is similarity that occurs in the other 
part that will lead to an extremely wrong identification. This culminates in his 
monumental work, Talkhīṣ al-Mutashābih fī al-Rasm wa-Ḥimāyat mā Ashkala minhu ʿan 
Bawādir al-Taṣḥīf wa’l-Wahm (A Conclusive Guide on Homophonic and Heterophonic 
Problems and Solving the Problems of Distortions and Errors). 
                                                        
41 See for examples: al-Bulqīnī, Maḥāsin al-Iṣṭilāḥ, 613, al-Sakhāwī, Fatḥ al-Mughīth, 4:285; Ibn Ḥajar has 
begun to abridge al-Khaṭīb’s work. 
42 al-Azdī-al-Miṣrī, Mushtabih al-Nisbah (India, Ilah Abad: 1327/1909), 37. 
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Approximately, 1442 entries have been treated in this work distributed into 
five chapters. There is a noticeable outline in each chapter even though al-Khaṭīb 
did not explicitly mention them. First, he will list heterophonic patronyms of the 
narrators. Then, he will present its occurrences in the given names. If there are 
cases connected to single variation caused by the hidden superscript alif, he 
presented them in the third part of each chapter. The book has this part in the first, 
second and fourth chapter. However, in the fourth chapter, it was deferred to the 
end of the chapter. Except for the first chapter, the fourth part of each chapter 
addresses the occurrences of heterophonic labels in both given name and patronym. 
This is the basic outline of every chapter. 
 As for the differences between chapters, Chapter One treated the variants in 
vowel marking. For example, the form سلمہ ىں عمرو  could refer to both ʿAmru ibn 
Salamah and ʿAmru ibn Salimah. Whereas the example for hidden superscript alif in 
this chapter is صىلح ىں سعىد . Assuming that there is a dagger alif after the letter ṣād, the 
name may refer to Saʿīd ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Kūfī al-Asadī, while without an alif, it may refer 
to Saʿīd ibn Ṣulḥ al-Qazwīnī. In the Chapter Two, al-Khaṭīb addresses cases of 
consonantal points, first with regard to one letter, then with regard to two and 
ultimately three letters in a name. Example for two letters is the form معمل ىں اللـه عىد 
may refer to both ʿAbd Allāh ibn Maʿqil and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mughaffal. As for Chapter 
Three, it was divided into two sections: the first concerning the variants in the 
apposition of one letter; the second treats phoneme identification for two letters 
and their appositions. For the first, the form   may refer to ʿAbd 
Allāh ibn Arqam and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Arqam. As for the second, the form 
may refer to Maʿqil ibn Yasār and Maʿqil ibn Sinān. These instances are studied 
according to the aforementioned order.  
In Chapter Four, al-Khaṭīb presented variants occurred because of phoneme 
identification and connective form of letters. Examples for this are  
that could be read ʿAbd Allāh ibn Munīb, ibn Minbar and Qunbur, and 
that could be read Ziyād ibn Ḥudayr and Ziyāḍ ibn Jubayr (when the second letter is 
read connected to the third). Finally, the last chapter concerns the form ٮـــٮ  which 
could refer to both ibn and bint. One of the cases al-Khaṭīb mentioned was Umayyah 
ibn Abī al-Ṣalt and Umayyah bint Abī al-Ṣalt. 
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 The complicated arrangement mentioned above regarding al-Khaṭīb’s work 
has diverted the attention of later scholars to the work of his student, Ibn Mākūlā, 
titled al-Ikmāl fī Rafʿ ʿĀriḍ al-Irtiyāb ʿan al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif.43 Although this work 
was based on al-Khaṭīb’s al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif, its equal attention to Mushtabih al-
Nisbah of al-Azdī-al-Miṣrī has convinced scholars to include it in the category of al-
Mushtabih. It was also on the latter’s book, Ibn Nuqṭah based his work, Ikmāl al-Ikmāl 
or al-Istidrāk. Our study of al-Khaṭīb’s work, however, has revealed that out of 25 
main patterns he provided in the work, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ mentioned only five patterns 
under Category 55.44 However, it was Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ who maintained that al-
mutashābih fī al-rasm is a distinct category from al-muʾtalif wa’l-mukhtalif focused by 
Ibn Mākūlā. 
 Al-Khaṭīb himself had supplied his work with another work. He found that 
the amount of cases involving a single letter difference would require a separately 
dedicated work. Hence, Tālī Talkhīṣ al-Mutashābih (A Sequel for the Conclusive Guide 
on Homophonic and Heterophonic Problems) was composed consisting of two major 
sections. The first section tackles the cases of the personal names of narrators. The 
example for this is Zayd ibn Jubayr and Ziyād ibn Jubayr, where the difference is in 
the additional alif  (زيد، زياد) . The likes of this case will be placed under the chapter on 
alif. The first section, then, enlisted (ا، ب، ت، ط، ف، ل، م، و، هـ، ي) . The second section of 
this work treated these differences in the patronymics. Under the chapter on yāʾ, for 
instance, al-Khaṭīb mentioned Qays ibn Saʿīd and Qays ibn Saʿd. A single yāʾ 
differentiates them (سعيد، سعد) . Al-Khaṭīb succeeded in listing numerous accounts for 
the letters (ا، ب، ت، ر، ف، ل، م، ن، و، هـ، ي)  for this section. Based on the non-complete 
manuscript of this work, al-Khaṭīb had provided 83 basic entries with 222 variations 
for the first section, while for the second; he listed 63 basic entries with 164 
variations. Whenever available, he will present the ḥadīth narrated by the narrator 
with the variant, which has granted the book a collection of 289 ḥadīths. Some of the 
missing entries and variations in this work were discovered in the abridged version 
                                                        
43 Published (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī). 
44 Introduction, 283-285. 
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of it made by al-Suyūṭī.45 Although al-Khaṭīb’s arrangement of materials is difficult 
to follow, they had also provided him with useful information for determining 
instances such as inversions that occurred in the names of narrators. 
6.1.8 Al-Mushtabih al-Maqlūb 
Al-Khaṭīb had discovered another potential route for misidentification 
within isnāds. He collected the cases in Rāfiʿ al-Irtiyāb fī al-Maqlūb min al-Asmāʾ wa’l-
Ansāb (The Dispeller of Doubts in Cases of Switches between Names and Patronyms). 
Unfortunately, the work is not extant. Nevertheless, the present study has traced 
the excerpts from it through citations made by al-Ḥāfiẓ Mughulṭāy in his dictionary 
of narrators.46 It shows that the work concerns the switching of order between the 
first name of a narrator and his patronym where coincidentally there exist another 
one or more narrators who bear the inverted name.47 Amongst the cases given by 
al-Khaṭīb in this work is Ziyād ibn al-Mundhir and al-Mundhir ibn Ziyād.48 Both 
were borne by real narrators. Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ explained this subject under Category 56 
and criticised al-Khaṭīb’s title since it gives an impression of a mere switch between 
the first name and the patronym.49 For Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, al-Khaṭīb’s work concerns more 
                                                        
45 It is known as Khulāṣah al-Kitāb al-Tālī li’l-Talkhīṣ (Unpublished). Al-Suyūṭī followed al-Khaṭīb in 
dividing the books into two sections; however, he rearranged the names alphabetically based on 
their first letter, not on the modifying letter. See: Tāli al-Talkhīṣ, 1:14. 
46 Mughulṭay, Ikmāl Tahdhīb al-Kamāl, 1:234, 2:330, 3:238, 3:331, 3:315,  3:335,  3:365, 3:371, 3:392, 5:55, 
123:5 , 234:5 , 5:289, 30:6 , 6:117, 350:6 , 7:20, 67:7 , 7:155, 7:309, 372:7 , 8:8, 19:8 , 8:22, 55:8 , 8:59, 8:133, 
8:194 and 8:196. 
47 Inversions in ḥadīth-related subjects: 
- The wording disorder where the order of words in the matn is inverted. 
- The isnād-matn switch where an isnād for a matn is replaced with an isnād for another matn. 
- The partial-isnād switch where part of the isnād is switched with a part from another isnād. 
- The basic name-patronym switch where the first name is switched with the patronym. 
- The consequential name-patronym switch where as a consequence of the above, another 
narrator is mistakenly identified. 
- The reference-bearer switch where a narrator is mistakenly identified with another due to 
sharing the same personal name, patronym or gentilic.   
Al-Khaṭīb’s work treated cases (4) and (5). 
48 Ibid, 5:123. 
49 Introduction, 286. 
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than that where the consequence of the switch by mistaking the narrator for 
another narrator who bears the inverted name constructs the main gist of the book. 
He suggested the title “Transmitters resembling one another in names and 
patronyms and distinguished by the inversion of their names and patronyms.” It 
was al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū’l-Faḍl al-ʿIrāqī who then named this phenomenon as al-mushtabih 
al-maqlūb (inverted homophonies).50 Ultimately, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī composed a 
work titled Nuzhat al-Qulūb fī Maʿrifat al-Mubdal wa’l-Maqlūb suggesting a distinction 
between al-qalb (inversion) and al-ibdāl (replacement).51 
Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ had already alluded to the fact that this inversion might have 
been mistakenly done by scholars such as al-Bukhārī. He cited a case from al-Tārīkh 
al-Kabīr where al-Bukhārī reversed the name Muslim ibn al-Walīd, who is ibn Rabāḥ 
al-Madanī, into al-Walīd ibn Muslim.52 The inverted name refers to the renowned 
Damascene student of al-Awzāʿī. The likes of these instances have inspired al-Khaṭīb 
to prove his profundity in ḥadīth expertise by composing in the genre of awhām as 
will be presented soon.  
Excursus I: The Tradition of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿd 
 In his al-Tārīkh al-Kabīr, al-Bukhārī provided two entries: Ḥarām ibn Ḥakīm 
and Ḥarām ibn Muʿāwiyah.53 According to al-Khaṭīb, the two names are referring to 
a single person and al-Bukhārī has erred in recognising them as two separate 
individuals. Al-Khaṭīb suggested that it was the narrators from Muʿāwiyah ibn Ṣāliḥ 
who alternated between the two names saying sometimes Muʿāwiyah from al-ʿAlāʾ 
from Ḥarām ibn Ḥakīm, and the other Muʿāwiyah from al-ʿAlāʾ from Ḥarām ibn 
Muʿāwiyah.54 In his commentary on al-Muwaḍḍiḥ, al-Muʿallimī defended al-Bukhārī 
by presenting three main arguments: 
                                                        
50 Sharḥ al-Tabṣirah, 2:279. 
51 The work is lost. See: Kashf al-Ẓunūn, 2:1945. 
52 Al-Bukhārī, al-Tārīkh al-Kabīr (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyyah), 8:153 (2534), Ibn Abī 
Ḥātim, Bayān Khaṭaʾ al-Bukhārī (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyyah), 130 (608). 
53 Ibid, 3:101(351) and 3:102(353). 
54 Muwaḍḍiḥ, 1:108. Recipients from Ibn Mahdī differed in their narrations as well. 
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(1) The mention of Ḥarām ibn Muʿāwiyah in all al-Khaṭīb’s isnāds is the 
result of an error in transmission. 
(2) No one has ever mentioned Ibn Muʿāwiyah amongst the ancestors of 
Ḥarām. 
(3) The ḥuffāẓ have agreed on distinguishing between the two narrators. 
Al-Khaṭīb had presented four strands to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Mahdī to prove 
that Ibn Mahdī was aware that the informant for al-ʿAlāʾ ibn al-Ḥārith was Ḥarām 
ibn Muʿāwiyah. He reported that Yaḥyā al-Ḥimmānī had possibly narrated it from 
Ibn Mahdī otherwise: naming him Ḥarām ibn Ḥakīm.55 Through the application of 
takhrīj, we know that both were reporting the same ḥadīth of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿd, the 
Companion-figure. In addition to al-Khaṭīb, more than six sources recorded Ibn 
Mahdī reporting it from Muʿawiyah ibn Ṣāliḥ from al-ʿAlāʾ featuring Ḥarām ibn 
Muʿāwiyah.56 Based on al-Muʿallimī’s argument, all the previous sources have erred 
in transmitting the name as Ibn Muʿawiyah. Although some of the sources reported 
from Ibn Mahdī otherwise (Ḥaram ibn Ḥakīm),57 Abū Nuʿaym had recorded a 
support for the first version of Ibn Mahdī’s narration where Ibn al-Madīnī narrated 
it from Muʿawiyah from al-ʿAlāʾ mentioning Ḥarām Ibn Muʿawiyah too. These 
corroborative chains reflect that the two names were variably referring to a single 
narrator from ʿAbd Allāh as asserted by al-Khaṭīb. If the mention of Ibn Muʿāwiyah 
was an error as argued by al-Muʿallimī, al-Bukhārī had created an individual out of 
error in sources. In addition, while biographical sources state that Ḥarām ibn Ḥakīm 
is a nephew of ʿAbd Allāh, we find Abū Nuʿaym asserted that ʿAbd Allāh is the uncle 
of Ḥarām ibn Muʿāwiyah. A patronymic pattern does not necessarily indicate 
someone in the line of ancestry. As argued by al-Khaṭīb, al-Haytham ibn Ḥumayd 
had narrated the same ḥadīth of Ḥarām ibn Muʿawiyah while naming him Ḥarām ibn 
                                                        
55 Traced in: Abū-Nuʿaym, Ḥilyah, 9:51. 
56 Traced in: Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1968), 7:501, Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad (Beirut: 
Muʾassasah al-Risālah, 2001), 37:181(22505), 31:346(19008), al-Tirmidhī, al-Jāmiʿal-Kabīr (Beirut: Dār al-
Gharb, 1998), 1:197(133), cf. footnote, al-Dārimī, Musnad (Saudi Arabia: Dār al-Mughnī, 2000), 
189(1189), Abū-Nuʿaym, Maʿrifat al-Ṣaḥābah, 3:1670, al-Maqdisī, al-Ahādīth al-Mukhtārah (Beirut: Dār 
Khiḍr, 2000), 9:411, and many others. 
57 Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, 31:346(19007),  
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Ḥakīm.58 The ḥuffāẓ were not necessarily in agreement with al-Bukhārī when they 
were merely reporting two variations of a single transmission. For this reason, al-
Khaṭīb’s argument against al-Bukhārī seems convincing enough to later biographers 
that the dispute has been unfailingly highlighted in their works.59 This observation 
of al-Khaṭīb is not possible without erudition in all previous categories discussed 
above. 
6.2 The Errors of the Prominent Ḥuffāẓ 
The above is error number 29 al-Khaṭīb mentioned under the section on the 
errors of al-Bukhārī in his work, The Book that Expounds the Errors of Unification and 
Multiplication. Al-Khaṭīb also stated that al-Dāraquṭnī may have copied al-Bukhārī in 
his al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif.60 Al-Khaṭīb noticed some of al-Dāraquṭnī’s criticism on 
al-Bukhārī in similar cases. Al-Bukhārī’s al-Tārīkh al-Kabīr had received diverging 
responses from ḥadīth experts.61 Subsequently, al-Khaṭīb discovered that Ibn Abī 
Ḥātim’s criticism of al-Bukhārī’s Tārīkh was often based on errors that were the 
result of his misreading of the work.62 Al-Muʿallimī, however, explained that al-
Bukhārī’s Tārīkh was published three times with revisions. Hence, the copy Ibn Abī 
Ḥātim had in front of him was not the copy which al-Khaṭīb consulted.63 In the case 
of the above error, al-Muʿallimī did not refer to variations in copies, as he would do 
in other cases to defend al-Bukhārī. Nevertheless, al-Khaṭīb presented in his works 
the likes of the above error and attacked fiercely the great ḥuffāẓ before him. The 
present form of al-Muwaḍḍiḥ supplies us with seventy-four errors of al-Bukhārī, 
eleven errors of Ibn Maʿīn, four errors of Ibn Ḥanbal, two errors of Ibn al-Madīnī, an 
                                                        
58 Traced in: al-Dārimī, Musnad, 290(1191). 
59 See: al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-Kamāl (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Risālah, 1980), 5:517, and all works that add on 
him. 
60 2:572 and 573.  
61 Brown, Canonization, 68. For the reception of the work, see page 96-97.  
62 See his work: Bayān Khaṭāʾ al-Bukhārī. 
63 This was seconded in: Melchert, “Bukhārī and Early Ḥadīth Criticism,” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, 121:1 (2001): 8. Some provisional views on the textual history of al-Tārīkh al-Kabīr 
were provided. No study has been made on Muwaḍḍiḥ as a copy of the work.  
216 
 
error of Muḥammad al-Dhuhlī, two errors of Yaʿqūb al-Fasawī, six errors of Muslim 
ibn al-Ḥajjāj, two errors of Ibrāhīm ibn Isḥāq al-Ḥarbī, an error of Abū Dāwūd al-
Sajistānī, three errors of Abū al-ʿAbbās Ibn ʿUqdah, an error of al-Dāraquṭnī, an error 
of Ibn Abī Ḥātim, and an error of Abū Bakr Ibn ʿAbdān al-Shīrāzī in his revision of al-
Bukhārī. Al-Khaṭīb then proceeded with eight cases, which could not be decisively 
solved where some of these ḥuffāz had erred as well. To prevent the future 
traditionists from falling into the same errors, al-Khaṭīb provided afterwards 544 
entries where similar mistakes could happen. Although al-Khaṭīb’s fascinating 
apology in the preface of the work was taken by Brown to illustrate the canonical 
culture around Ṣaḥīḥayn in Baghdād,64 al-Khaṭīb’s responses carried very 
disparaging remarks such as “al-Bukhārī has erred dreadfully (khaṭāʾ qabīḥ) in this 
point.”  Furthermore, the book was not confined to errors of al-Bukhārī. It portrays 
an honest recognition of problem and doubt in the corpus of transmission and 
evokes takhrīj from those ‘ruziqa al-baḥth wa’l-fahm wa-inʿām al-naẓar (endowed with 
ability and opportunity to perform research and equipped with understanding and 
deep speculation).’65 It serves as an emblem of achievement and authority amongst 
the Baghdādian traditionalists that al-Khaṭīb had always been compared to al-
Dāraquṭnī. For al-Khaṭīb, every generation has their own scholar to be consulted 
although those who came later in time were indebted to the former. Al-Khaṭīb 
quoted the Shāfiʿī’s propagator of munāẓarah, al-Muzanī who said, ‘If a book were 
revised seventy times, there would still be a mistake in it, for God has not permitted 
that any book be ṣaḥīḥ except His Book (the Qurʾān).’ Then, he cited ʿAbd Allāh ibn 
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal indicating the same. With this work, al-Khaṭīb grounded firmly 
another genre that an expert who wants to perform takhrīj must engage which is 
the genre of awhām (errors). 
                                                        
64 Canonization, 265-267. It is worth noting that this book was meant for ḥadīth experts. The apology is 
then understandable. 
65 Muwaḍḍiḥ, 1:5. 
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6.3 Potentiality in the face of Awhām 
It is tempting to trace the genesis of awhām genre to the rationalistic 
challenge upon the traditionalists’ total reliance on transmitted reports and 
rejection of speculative resorts. It was reported that the accusation of tadlīs (isnād 
trickery) was launched first by al-Ḥusayn al-Karābīsī (258/872), a close friend of Ibn 
Ḥanbal. Al-Karābīsī was a prominent traditionist himself, but his exposé of tadlīs was 
exploited by the Muʿtazilites to attack the activity of the traditionalists. This 
disgruntled Ibn Ḥanbal and in return it costed al-Karābīsī his scholarship in 
Baghdād due to the former’s negative remark. According to Ibn Ḥanbal, al-Karābīsī 
has wickedly achieved what the opponents previously failed.66 Al-Khaṭīb reported 
al-Ṣayrafī cautioning Shāfiʿīte disseminators in Baghdād of the effect of Ibn Ḥanbal’s 
remarks by comparing between the fate of al-Karābīsī and Abū Thawr.67 The 
aforementioned friendship turns into enmity and al-Karābīsī was later known 
amongst the traditionalists, including al-Khaṭīb, as the first theologian to assert that 
one’s pronunciation of the Qurʾān was created (lafẓiyyah). Melchert identified this 
point as the reason for Ibn Ḥanbal’s attack on al-Karābīsī and included the latter 
amongst the semi-rationalists.68 Al-Karābīsī was eventually deemed the leader of al-
Lafẓiyya and later Ḥanbalī sources qualified them asbeing more evil than Jahmiyya.69 
Interestingly, al-Bukhārī whose legacy began to challenge that of Ibn Ḥanbal was 
associated with similar issues. The idea of al-Bukhārī’s stricter rule of isnād in the 
Ṣaḥīḥ was connected to the elimination of even the slightest possibility of tadlīs.70 
Yet, al-Bukhārī’s similar practice of resorting to taʿlīq (the citation of a suspended 
                                                        
66 Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī, Sharḥ ʿIlal al-Tirmidhī (Dār al-Mallāḥ, 1978), 2:807, Siyar, 11:290. 
67 Despite that al-Ṣayrafī already recognised al-Karābīsī as ten times more knowledgeable than Abū 
Thawr. TMS, 8:611. Al-Khaṭīb was concerned with al-Karābīsī’s legacy that he explained the scanty 
ḥadīths narrated from this Shāfiʿī’s disciple was due to Ibn Ḥanbal’s remark. Otherwise, his writings 
prove his wise understanding and vast knowledge. 
68 Formation, 71-72. 
69 Ibn Baṭṭah, al-Ibānah al-Kubrā (Riyadh: Dār al-Rāyah, 1994), 5:344. Ashāʿirah elaborated the verbal 
noun lafẓ as indicating both malfūẓ (noun for the object of utterance) and talaffuẓ (noun for the act of 
uttering). This scheme of thinking affects the way of takhrīj al-maʿnā as will be discussed soon. 
70 See a thorough study on this: Khalid al-Durays, Mawqif al-Imāmayn al-Bukhārī wa-Muslim min Ishtirāṭ 
al-Luqyā wa’l-Samāʿ fī al-Sanad al-Muʿanʿan (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd). Also: Brown, Canonization, 284. 
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isnād) was also criticised by the traditionists.71 He too was attributed to lafẓiyyah, 
which according to Brown, was told by al-Khaṭīb in the tone of vindication, for the 
Ashʿarīs in essence adopted lafẓiyyah as the right position.72  
Nevertheless, the above perceptions illustrate to some extent the relation 
between tadlīs, tawārīkh and awhām genres that inform the polemical background 
behind the formulation of takhrīj al-riwāyah. It spells out a history of intense revision 
of what Muhammad Abd al-Rauf terms “the ṣaḥīḥ movement,” or more precisely, 
the taṣḥīḥ (evaluation) of diffused traditions.73 From the perspective of Ṣaḥīḥayn 
historiography provided by Brown, they serve the takhrīj paradigm envisioned by al-
Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī and adopted by any later critic who applied the rules of 
Ṣaḥīḥayn. Brown, however, did not consider al-Tirmidhī’s earlier practice as 
appropriating another sense of takhrīj prevalent amongst the scholars of traditional 
fiqh. Apart from mentioning after almost every ḥadīth in his Jāmiʿ that “on the same 
subject, there were ḥadīths reported from so-and-so amongst the Companions”, al-
Tirmidhī also retraced the practice of a ḥadīth content amongst the prominent 
scholars. It is a unique documenting endeavour where a maʿnā of ḥadīth is being 
traced beyond its verbal expressions and extending beyond the Ṣaḥīḥ’s collections. 
Al-Khaṭīb referred to al-Tirmidhī’s work as ṣaḥīḥ. Takhrīj in this regard, was more 
than a salient application of Ṣaḥīḥayn canon.74 
From the perspective of taʿyīn al-rāwī, of all al-Khaṭīb’s related works, none 
was confined or specified to the narrators of Ṣaḥīḥayn. Rather, they seem to 
illustrate the quest for personal authority in isnād study and ḥuffāẓ-ship. The early 
works of al-Azdī represent an Egyptian attempt while the Andalusian attempt of Ibn 
al-Faraḍī requires further scrutiny due to the lack of primary materials. It was only 
                                                        
71 Mohammad Fadel, “Ibn Hajar’s Hady al-Sārī: A Medieval Interpretation of the Structure of al-
Bukhārī’s al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 54:3 (Jul. 1995): 170. See: Muʿallaq.  
72 al-Subkī, Tabaqāt, 2:117: Many Ḥanbalīs attempted to portray Ashaʿirah as Jahmiyyah including his 
professor al-Dhahabī.  
73 Muḥammad Abd al-Rauf, Ḥadīth Literature, 274 
74 Canonization, 211. 
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in the second generation of al-Khaṭīb’s students, the work on al-Muʾtalif wa’l-
Mukhtalif, for instance, addresses solely the narrators of Ṣaḥīḥayn. 
 On the epistemological plane, the whole corpus of taʿyīn al-rāwī and the genre 
of awhām al-muḥaddithīn have induced the sense of “unstable transmissions” within 
the mega project of the traditionalists. The works serve ironically as both solution 
and problem for isnād potentiality. Ṣaḥīḥayn have been proposed as the model 
during al-Khaṭīb’s time for the high potentiality awarded to the ḥadīth they 
reported; yet they also require a canonisation process as elaborately shown by 
Brown. It is within these circumstances that we may apprehend al-Khaṭīb’s remark 
as he stated: ‘The reports which were transmitted in the Ṣiḥāḥ’s works on the 
Sunnah do not yield incontrovertible knowledge (ʿilm), although they obligate action 
upon their imperatives.’75 Al-Khaṭīb explained this more explicitly in al-Kifāyah as 
he maintained “that the reports transmitted by aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth on disputed laws 
inform the third type of human report in general; a type where one does not really 
know whether it is authentic or not. It is obligatory upon a traditionalist to suspend 
and cease from deciding whether they are conclusively authentic or not, for there is 
no way that one can be sure of that. One side in the disputed subjects is no better 
than the other”. 76  
 Although al-Khaṭīb’s classification of reports reiterates the division 
advanced by early speculative rationalists, apparently al-Khaṭīb was not simply 
adopting it in favour of a rational method. He encountered hundreds of possibilities 
of errors in the aforementioned works in this chapter and the continuous revision 
within the awhām genre; it is understandable that negotiation on the authenticity of 
ḥadīth especially in written materials is inevitable.   
To add to the complexity of takhrīj, a maʿnā could be potentiated, even if the 
identification of narrator has failed, as long as tawthīq al-rāwī (accreditation of the 
narrator) is recognised. In al-Kifāyah, al-Khaṭīb cited al-Bāqillānī who asserted that if 
we do not know the name and the lineage of a narrator, but we know that he is 
                                                        
75 Kitāb al-Faqīh. Ṣiḥāḥ’s works according to al-Khaṭīb include the work of Muslim, al-Tirmidhī, al-
Nasāʾī and Ibn Khuzaymah. TMS, 2:44. 
76 Fa-lam yakun al-qaḍāʾ bi-aḥad al-amrayn fīhā awlā min al-ākhar. 
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trustworthy and reliable, it is incumbent upon us to accept his transmission.77  Al-
Khaṭīb did not give any example to show how this is possible.78  
Nevertheless, this principle is the basis for the acceptance of ijāzah. As long 
as one can be sure of a reliable connection to the Prophet, the requirement of samāʿ 
(direct audition) then is placed at the highest level of potentiality, but not as an 
exclusive apparatus. Al-Khaṭīb delineated several forms of ijāzah in al-Kifāyah. 
According to him, those who follow ẓāhir (apparent of things) rejected ijāzah for it is 
nothing more than a disconnected transmission or transmission from anonymous 
individuals. However, ijāzah according to al-Khaṭīb differs as the continuity was 
guaranteed by the mujīz (the issuer of the license).79 Hence, riwāyah transmitted 
through the way of ijāzah yields potentiality and obligates action. Al-Khaṭīb 
portrayed that a majority of scholars maintain this view including al-Karābīsī, Ibn 
Ḥanbal and al-Bukhārī.80   
Takhrīj communicates a wider aim for scholars like al-Khaṭīb. In his writings, 
it is connected with the general taṣnīf (arrangement of maʿānī into topics). It 
combines the ability to provide a “clean” and sometimes superior isnād for a subject 
of study and the ability to evidence a sound maʿnā. In al-Jāmiʿ, al-Khaṭīb advised 
students of ḥadīth to avoid the mere act of copying scripts from the tradents. Those 
who aspire for headship in ḥadīth should exercise taṣnīf and only “gripping the pen 
of takhrīj” can perfect it.81 Prior to him, al-Rāmhurmuzī quoted al-Karabīsī who 
criticised the traditionalist Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām for copying al-Shāfiʿī’s 
arguments without attribution. When asked to resolve a legal problem, Abū ʿUbayd 
could not rise to the level of al-Karābīsī. Al-Karābīsī then remarked, ‘You are only a 
transmitter of scripts (rāwiyah).’ Al-Rāmhurmuzī concluded from this the 
                                                        
77 al-Kifāyah, 2:170. 
78 An instance that might exemplify this principle is his acceptance of the tradition of Muʿādh 
concerning qiyās as a Sunnah. FWM, 
79 al-Kifāyah, 2:85. 
80 Ibid, 2:80. 
81 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:282. 
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importance of combining between riwāyah and dirāyah.82 Eventually, al-Khaṭīb 
launched his mega project of takhrīj that combines the study of rāwī and marwī. 
Excursus II: The Tradition of the Domestic worker 
It was narrated on the authority of Abu Hurairah that a woman used to clean 
a mosque and later died. The Messenger of God missed her one day and asked about 
her. Upon being told that she had died, he asked why he was not informed about her 
passing. It appears as if they had treated her affairs as of normal event. He told 
them: Lead me to her grave. They led him to the place and he said prayer before the 
grave. The Prophet said: Verily, these graves are full of darkness for their dwellers. 
Verily, the Mighty and Glorious God illuminates them by virtue of my prayer over 
them. 
Muslim recorded this tradition in his Ṣaḥīḥ featuring the following chain: 
Ḥammād ibn Zayd > Thābit > Abū Rāfiʿ > Abū Hurayrah.83 Regardless of any other 
issues pertaining to this ḥadīth, one may ask an important question concerning the 
text. Why was the grave filled with darkness while the cleaner has been doing good 
deeds and noticed by the Prophet himself? It is already believed by Muslims that 
good deed will be rewarded with goodness, not darkness. 
Al-Khaṭīb compared between the transmissions of this ḥadīth from Ḥammād 
and found that there were several versions of it.84 Al-Khaṭīb went beyond Muslim to 
report that the above version was related by Abū Dāwūd al-Ṭayālisī.85 We find that 
al-Bukhārī recorded the same ḥadīth and ended it at the mention of the prayer of 
the Prophet before the grave.86 Hence, the above question does not arise when 
reading al-Bukhārī. Did al-Bukhārī eliminate the problematic maʿnā of the ḥadīth? 
Al-Khatib did not mention al-Bukhārī or Muslim in his exposition. He provided a 
                                                        
82 al-Muḥaddith al-Fāṣil, 238.  
83 Muslim, al-Musnad al-Ṣaḥīḥ (Beirut: Dār Iḥyaʿ al-Kutub, 1991), 2:659(956). 
84 al-Waṣl-al-Mudraj, 2:634. 
85 al-Ṭayālisī, Musnad (Cairo: Hajar, 1999), 4:194(2568). 
86 al-Bukhārī, al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Mukhtaṣar (Dār Ṭawq al-Najāh, 1422/2001), 1:99(458). 
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number of transmissions showing that some students of Ḥammād related the ḥadīth 
without the part mentioning the darkness of the grave, like al-Bukhārī. To further 
prove that the interpolation of the narration has occurred in transmissions from 
Ḥammād, al-Khaṭīb presented the versions of ʿĀrim ibn al-Faḍl, Muḥammad ibn 
ʿUbayd and ʿAffān that evidenced the separation between the two events. They 
stated that after the mention of the Prophet’s prayer, Thābit said that “I was told 
once that the Prophet used to say” and he mentioned the part related to the 
darkness. They were therefore; two different occasions and the last part was 
Thābit’s mursal narration that was mistakenly inserted in some versions of the 
ḥadīth as appeared in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. When commenting on al-Bukhārī’s shorter 
version of the ḥadīth, Ibn Hajar benefited from al-Khaṭīb’s study of this interpolation 
to laud on al-Bukhārī’s treatment.87 
6.4 Takhrīj al-Marwī and Maʿnā Criticism 
 Cases similar to the above were tackled by al-Khaṭīb in al-Mudraj 
(Interpolated Dicta). The work offers a serious study on the marwī (text), yet with a 
convincing demonstration of isnād criticism. It manifests the traditionists’ postulate 
that any problem in the matn of ḥadīth can be traced back to an explicit or implicit 
problem in the isnād. Hence, al-Khaṭīb had exhibited that the ability to present matn 
criticism in the form of isnād criticism constructs a sign of a true expert in ḥadīth 
and grants a compelling authority to a ḥāfiẓ. The concept of takhrīj al-maʿnā can be 
attested to inform the undercurrent of al-Khaṭīb’s work. This was later clarified by 
Ibn Ḥajar as he argued that one could not notice the interpolated words, phrases or 
texts except after an extensive learning of established, speculative and possible 
meanings.88 Al-Khaṭīb had himself asserted that ḥadīth comes with what can be 
accepted by minds (mujawwizāt al-ʿuqūl), not with impossible matters.89 However, a 
traditionalist should be aware of the difference between irrationals and 
                                                        
87 Ibn Hajar, Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah), 1:553. 
88 Ibn Hajar, al-Nukat, 2:811. 
89 FWM, 1:354. 
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transcendental subjects in exercising the takhrīj of maʿnā.90 To demonstrate the 
exercise of maʿnawī criticism through the technicalities of isnād criticism, al-Khaṭīb 
presented numerous cases of interpolations between meanings in ḥadīth and 
arranged them in the following groups:   
(1) Interpolations of narrator’s words or speech in the ḥadīth of the Prophet. 
i. Interpolations of the words of the Companions. 
ii. Interpolation of the words of the Followers. 
(2) Interpolations of some words from a report obtained by a narrator in his 
other report of the same story or account.  
i. Accounts of those who interpolate a word he did not received from a 
tradent in a ḥadīth he received directly from that tradent. 
ii. Accounts of those who combine unchained words (mursal) with 
elevated ḥadīth (marfūʿ) in a single account. 
(3) Cases of mixing between different ḥadīths in one single account. 
(4) Cases where a Companion received from a narrating Companion, then a 
separate ḥadīth associated with the receiving Companion was interpolated in 
his current account from the narrating Companion. 
(5) Cases where a group of narrators related conflicting accounts but their 
accounts were harmonised together in one single account. 
  In theory, the meticulous recognition of idrāj serves as an indicator of the 
mastery of takhrīj since idrāj constructs semantically the opposite of ikhrāj 
(extrication). Al-Khaṭīb launched a powerful weapon against the accusation of 
heedless stuffing of riwāyah connoted by the epithet of ḥashawī through the 
expounding of hundreds of cases where idrāj is heedfully perceived and the original 
idea (maʿnā) of an account can be demonstratively extricated. He demonstrated that 
through the idrāj-ikhrāj mechanism, not only a fabricated ḥadīth can be detected, 
even a single foreign word, if not a letter, can be removed from the original account. 
Moreover, a mixture of wordings from different tradents in one single story can be 
revised and returned back to their relative original states. For this reason, we find 
al-Khaṭīb forthrightly included the cognition of interpolations amongst the 
conditions of ḥuffāẓ-ship.91 
                                                        
90 See Chapter Three. 
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6.5  Why Maʿnā Criticism? 
 Before further examining this idea in al-Khaṭīb’s writings, first it is crucial to 
expound al-Khaṭīb’s understanding of criticism. Since the idea of khabar bears the 
possibility of both being affirmed or denied, criticism serves as sometimes 
dismissive and limitative, and the other constructive and affirmative. This is proven 
from al-Khaṭīb’s argument against those who view that individual reports should be 
conclusively evaluated as fraud whenever there is no information on its 
authenticity either through necessary knowledge or indication (istidlāl). This view 
argues that if God knows the authenticity of a report, He will surely provide an 
indication of its authenticity. Whenever there is an absence of indication for a 
report, we must affirm conclusively that the report is fraud. Al-Khaṭīb replied to 
this argument saying that the same is applied whenever there is no affirming 
indication that the khabar is fraudulent. One shall not reject ḥadīth and follow his 
prejudice in neglecting the ḥadīth. Here, one of the most crucial points in 
understanding the traditionalists’ argument for ḥadīth, when they stated that it is 
ẓānnī, is underpinned by al-Khaṭīb. Contrary to the perception that the probability 
of ḥadīth indicates a lesser epistemological effect, a ḥadīth based on this debate 
cannot be totally rejected without any sufficient indication.92 The implication of 
this debate is undeniably forcing an inspection of a ḥadīth from all dimensions and 
whenever one fails to do so, a submission to the authority of ḥuffāẓ is inevitable. 
Moreover, al-Khaṭīb forced his opponent into another consequence of his argument. 
He maintained that if it is warranted, we must affirm the infidelity or despotism of 
leaders, judges, governors, officers and many others whenever there is no proof for 
their belief and honest devotion in their hearts. According to al-Khaṭīb, there is no 
way to prove that. Ultimately, for al-Khaṭīb, we have never been asked by God to 
affirm the final authenticity of ḥadīth. We were only asked to act upon a report 
when its potential veracity is present, similar to our acceptance of human testimony 
in court.93 
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 Criticism then is an effort to potentiate a ḥadīth and this is one of the 
meanings implied by the term takhrīj.94 Whenever a traditionalist such as al-Khaṭīb 
mentioned that a ḥadīth “akhrajahu” so-and-so from amongst the ḥuffāẓ, it does not 
simply mean that the ḥadīth or narration was recorded by so-and-so, rather it 
indicates that the ḥadīth was potentiated by the fact that a ḥāfiẓ has extricated it 
from amongst hundreds of thousands of reports.95 It is left for the student then to 
recognise the ḥuffāẓ.  
 Having clarified the above, takhrīj al-riwāyah in the writings of al-Khaṭīb can 
be connected to the tracing of maʿnā for several reasons: (1) his conception of 
Sunnah, (2) the flexibility and ambiguity of maʿnā, (3) solving the problem of wording 
conflict, and (4) the maʿnawī paradigm serves as a pragmatic tool in ḥadīth, 
jurisprudence, legal theory and theology. 
6.6 Maʿānī-based Sunan 
Al-Khaṭīb’s writings illustrate a significant distinction between rasm al-ḥadīth 
(the script of ḥadīth) and its muqtaḍā (imperative), or more precisely maʿnā (spirit). 
He exhibited a fascinating way of delivering the concept of Sunnah to both the 
jurists and the tradents. When he wrote to the jurists, he presented the definition of 
Sunnah that emphasises the generality of rusūm (outward forms or scripts) 
regardless of its degrees of legal force between obligatory or supererogatory. 
According to him, the Sunnah is what has been prescribed to be emulated (mā rusima 
li-yuḥtadha).96 These rusūm may refer to what he elaborated in al-Kifayāh as he stated 
that the traditionists ‘codified (dawwana) the Prophet’s explicit statements and 
deeds. They reported, despite various circumstances, everything concerning him 
including his states of awaken or asleep; his standing or sitting; his clothes and 
rides; his foods and drinks. Even what he did with his fingernail, how he spitted out 
                                                        
94 Ibn Fāris mentioned amongst the meaning of the radical khāʾ-rāʾ-jīm is an extrication and 
distinction between two kinds. Muʿjam Maqāyīs al-Lughah (Dār al-Fikr, 1979), 2:176. 
95 TMS, 5:450 (Muslim’s use of akhrajahu), 7:545 (Bishr al-Ḥāfī’s use of akharajahu and its relation to the 
soundness of ḥadīth). 
96 FWM, 1:257.  
226 
 
phlegm from his mouth, and what he spoke when he did something or during a 
certain incident, all have been scribed.’97 We find that al-Khaṭīb’s illustration of 
traditionist’s perception on this idea of Sunnah was inspired by al-Rāmhurmuzī and 
part of the passage was copied verbatim from his book.98 This emphasis on rusūm 
thus represents the ḥadīth-dependent conception of Sunnah.99 For the fact that the 
jurists have always used the term Sunnah with supererogatory acts, al-Khaṭīb 
advised them to alter the definition into what has been prescribed to be emulated 
supererogatively. This advice was previously stated by Abū Yaʿlā and before him the 
Ḥanbalī Ibn Shihāb al-ʿUkbarī (428/1037).100 For Ibn Shihāb, Sunnah and Sharīʿah are 
synonymous. However, the definition was mentioned earlier by Ibn Fūrak and 
echoed later by al-Khaṭīb’s student the Ashʿarī-Mālikī Abū-al-Walīd-al-Bājī 
(474/1082).101 Al-Bājī stated that for ahl al-ḥadīth, sunan are what the Prophet 
prescribed (rasama) for the whole Muslim community. 
When al-Khaṭīb wrote to the traditionists, he criticised those who neglect 
the study of both parts: rāwī and marwī, and ignored istinbāṭ al-maʿānī (insightful 
conclusion based on the meaning). They focused mainly on rusūm. According to al-
Khaṭīb, they are deluded and they had been ḥamalat asfār (book-carrying 
donkeys).102 From this perspective, al-Khaṭīb was advocating al-Shāfiʿī’s istinbāṭ-
based Sunnah.103 Therefore, he preceded al-Kifāyah with two chapters that reiterate 
al-Shāfiʿī‘s hermeneutical scheme and the main gist of the concept of bayān. 
Furthermore, when the rationalists and the traditionalists alike contested al-
                                                        
97 al-Kifāyah, 1:86. 
98 From ḥatta al-qalāmah until ittabaʿūhum bi-iḥsān. Cf. al-Muḥaddith al-Fāṣil, 159-160. 
99 For modern proposal on the distinction between ḥadīth-dependent Sunnah and other form of 
Sunnah, see: Adis Duderija, “A Paradigm Shift in Assessing/Evaluating the Value and Significance of 
Ḥadīth in Islamic Thought: From ʿulumu-l-isnād/rijāl to ʾusūlu-l-fiqh,” Arab Law Quarterly 23 (2009): 195-
206. Duderija should have consulted al-Khaṭīb before addressing the proposal as a paradigm shift. 
100 Ibn Shihāb al-ʿUkbarī, Risālah fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Kuwait: Maktab al-Shuʾūn al-Fanniyyah, 2010), 13, Abū 
Yaʿlā, al-ʿUddah, 1:166. 
101 Ibn Fūrak, al-Ḥudūd fī al-Uṣūl, 149, al-Bājī, al-Ḥudūd fī al-Uṣūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 
2003), 113-114. Much of the content was learned from al-Bāqillānī. 
102 al-Kifāyah, 1:83. 
103 Compare Sunnah-based istinbāṭ in the previous chapter and istinbāṭ-based Sunnah in this chapter. 
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Shāfiʿī’s authority and profundity in the ḥadīth script, al-Khaṭīb responded by 
noting his ability to grasp the wujūh (aspects of meaning) in the Qurʾān and al-sunan 
al-manqūlah (transmitted imperatives of ḥadīth scripts). He extolled al-Shāfiʿī’s ability 
to derive and evidence maʿāni al-sunan (the spirits of Prophetic imperatives) through 
the language of dalāʾīl (indicants) and burhān (rational inference), and al-Shāfiʿī’s 
important contribution in leading the traditionalists into the understanding of 
these spirits (tawqīfihim and tanbīhihim ʿalayhā).104 
 Having incorporated these elements in his writings, al-Khaṭīb delivers an 
impression that the Sunan of the Prophet are essentially the imperatives carried 
within the corpus of traditions. He did provide a discussion on the genesis of these 
spirits in relation to the revelation from God. Eight views were laid out on this 
which are: (1) the Sunnah of the Prophet is essentially the spirit revealed by God, (2) 
God permits the Prophet to invent a Sunnah based on what he perceives as maṣlaḥah 
(best interest), (3) Everything in the Sunnah was inspired in the innermost heart of 
the Prophet, (4) Every Sunnah either has a basis in, or serves as a bayān for the 
Qurʾān (5) The establishment of extra-Qurʾān Sunnah is based on the Divine 
Command to obey the Prophet and its predestined agreement to the Divine Will, (6) 
Every Sunnah has a basis in the Qurʾān, (7) The message of God comes to the Prophet 
every time he wants to inform a Sunnah, and (8) The Sunnah is the wisdom that was 
inspired in the innermost heart of the Prophet.105 Although these views may 
possibly induce a debate on the primordial nature of Prophetic imperatives when 
they are related with God’s knowledge, these views do not immediately show 
whether the Sunnah, particularly the explicit statements (al-sunan al-qawliyyah) of 
the Prophet were inspired verbatim by God or otherwise. Al-Khaṭīb did not leave 
behind a discussion on ḥadīth qudsī (Divine words outside the Qurʾān) to enable a 
thorough comparison. However, al-Khaṭīb provided the conclusion that whatever is 
held on the genesis of Sunnah, the transmitted traditions carried the imperatives of 
the Prophet (amr al-Rasūl) that should be regarded with deference. As he associated 
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the recognition of these meanings or imperatives with the fuqahāʾ, al-Khaṭīb seems 
to agree with istinbāṭ-based Sunnah. 
In summary, al-Khaṭīb’s brief exposition on this subject does not completely 
solve the tension between ḥadīth-dependent Sunnah that emphasises the rusūm and 
fiqh-dependent Sunnah that emphasises the maʿānī, despite that his recognition of 
fiqh as the highest science alludes to the maʿānī.106 
6.7 The Nature of Sunnah’s Transmission 
A significant debate has arisen with regard to the nature of the transmission 
of the above imperatives. It has been accepted by the traditionalists that the main 
repository for these imperatives is ḥadīth corpora. In his article on the language of 
ḥadīth, Mustafa Shah explores al-Khaṭīb’s exposition of riwāyah-bi’l-maʿnā 
(transmission of meaning rather than script) and observes its connection with the 
grammarians’ attitudes towards ḥadīth scripts.107 More than one century after al-
Khaṭīb, two Andalusian scholars, Ibn al-Ḍāʾiʿ (680/1281) and Abū Ḥayyān al-Gharnāṭī 
(786/1384) argued that ḥadīths had not been transmitted as they were originally 
heard from the Prophet, but rather they were diffused only in the general sense and 
spirit of their meaning. This argument has its root in the grammarian debate on 
whether ḥadīth script makes a legitimate source for the study of Arabic grammar. As 
Shah has accentuated, the details of this grammar-related debate could be learned 
from Khizānat al-Adab of ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn ʿUmar al-Baghdādī (1093/1682).108 
Shah has successfully illustrated that al-Khaṭīb was aware of early 
philological debates that relate to the nature of Sunnah’s transmission; verbatim or 
being paraphrased. Al-Khaṭīb had made use of the opinions of philologists such as 
                                                        
106 In al-Khaṭīb’s poem: The scholar of our time has no good in him, you see forms without meanings. 
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al-Khalīl ibn ʾAḥmad (175/791), al-ʾAṣmaʿī (213/828), al-Naḍr ibn Shumayl (203/819) 
and ʾAbū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim (224/838), and reported their divergent views. However, 
conflicting approaches has also been observed amongst the traditionists. Al-Khaṭīb 
then infused in his al-Kifāyah the approaches from various groups to illustrate to the 
traditionists the historical occurrences of this practice. 109 
In his presentation, al-Khaṭīb analysed meticulously the approaches of 
previous luminaries. He preceded it with mentioning the view that a complete 
ḥadith should be transmitted verbatim and that paraphrasing is completely 
forbidden. Then, he moved into transmissions of words where he treated two tactics 
of the traditionists: (1) using synonyms, and (2) switching the order of words. Next, 
he presented approaches pertaining to alterations of letters such as addition, 
deletion, replacement, inversion, lessening the doubling sound, or changing the 
grammatical case of a letter. Al-Khaṭīb furthered in the next phase to the 
maintaining of peculiarities where he featured those who kept the verbatim even if 
it contravenes the elevated diction (al-lughah al-faṣīḥah) and those who retained 
solecisms as they are during delivery. After all these subsections that relate to the 
ḥadīth script, al-Khaṭīb recounted the view that differentiates between ḥadīth and 
other accounts where only the former should be transmitted verbatim. Al-Khaṭīb 
then integrated debates on three techniques of the traditionists into this subject: (1) 
on the approval for narrating incomplete ḥadīth not for adding phrases, (2) on the 
segmentation of a long ḥadīth to accommodate subject division, and (3) on the 
rectification of solecism in ḥadīth. In these three sections, al-Khaṭīb produces his 
view very clearly that they depend on the intended meaning of an account. If the 
intended meaning is retained, one may abbreviate and segregate any ḥadīth script. 
As for solecism, it should be emended if it alters the intended import of the ḥadīth. 
All the historical anecdotes and early approaches al-Khaṭīb mentioned in 
this chapter is to prepare the application of takhrīj that shall be accompanied with 
careful attention towards the maʿnā or the marwī. The permutations of script should 
not lessen the potential of maʿnā whenever the history of the transmission of Sunnah 
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is intricately learned. The proof for this observation is that already before a century, 
al-Rāmhurmuzī had discussed the same subject, albeit more briefly.110 If al-
Rāmhurmuzī placed the discussion on paraphrasing under the section on emending 
solecism, al-Khaṭīb placed this discussion inside the chapter on transmitting the 
Sunnah. It is not only then a subject of reading the script of ḥadīth, but the 
transmission of meanings from the Prophet. Al-Khaṭīb had reminded the reader at 
the beginning of the chapter that a scholar who conveys a Sunnah is acting as an 
intermediary between God and His servants.111 There is an espousal of a spiritual 
space that joins the two sides, which demands a careful observation of one’s own 
preparation to enter its realm.  
Finally, al-Khaṭīb’s argument for the permissibility of transmitting the maʿnā 
of the Sunnah was based essentially on the convention of the “majority of meaning-
experts” that only scholars acquainted with the profundities of the meanings of 
Sunnah could exercise this license. Then, al-Khaṭīb argued from the perspective of 
the universality of Muḥammadan’s imperatives, not scripts, where scholars have 
agreed that the Sunnah can be translated and disseminated in other languages. The 
third argument comes in the form of an answer to a question concerning verbal 
prayers that should be recited in verbatim such as adhān and tashahhud. Al-Khaṭīb 
responded that these words were sanctioned by tawqīf, i.e. Divine assignation. There 
is no indication that other Sunnah should follow the same.112 
The final proof that characterises the nature of the Sunnah’s transmission is 
attested from the application of takhrīj. Al-Khaṭīb had attempted to potentiate the 
script of the naḍrah tradition in his dedicated work on it. This is mentioned at the 
end of the chapter. The result of this takhrīj was numerous potential wordings. 
According to him, sometimes it says rubba muballigh, and the other it is rubba ḥāmil. 
Sometimes it reads maqālatī, and the other it is ḥadīthan. Al-Khaṭīb concluded that it 
evidently shows the transmission of the meaning of the khabar, rather than the 
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exact script. Furthermore, the mention of addāhā kamā samiʿahā (he conveyed it the 
way he heard it) in the khabar was required from the tradent, not the wise (faqīh) or 
wiser.113 It is another part where we encounter the possibility of two modes of 
Sunnah implicitly incorporated in the works of al-Khaṭīb: ḥadīth-dependent Sunnah 
and meaning-dependent Sunnah. 
6.8 Takhrīj as the Potentiation of Maʿnā 
 Another precedent that should be considered with regards to understanding 
the script-maʿnā dynamics in takhrīj is the problem of defining maʿnā. In Tārīkh 
Baghdād, al-Khaṭīb reported the following account: 
The judge Abū Bakr, Aḥmad ibn Kāmil narrated: One day I visited the 
judge Abū Umayya and he said to me: What is the maʿnā of this ḥadīth? I 
asked: Which ḥadīth? He said: The saying of Abū Mūsā “Whenever we 
ascended with the Messenger of God qidada (separately), we say takbīr.” I 
said to him: Perhaps you mean the ḥadīth reported by Sulaymān al-Taymī, 
from Abū ʿUthmān al-Nahdī, from Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī, he said: 
“Whenever we ascended with the Messenger of God fadfada (at the 
desert), we say takbīr.” In the session, the judge al-Jubayrī was present. He 
commented that the Qurʾān uses ṭarāʾiq qidada. I said to him: Be silent! 
And he kept silent.  
I visited him (Abū Umayya) another day and he asked: What is the 
maʿnā of the ḥadīth, which says that the Prophet asked menstruated 
woman to use qarṣah (pinch) on the trace of the blood? I said to him: It is 
not qarṣah but it is firṣah. A firṣah is a fold or piece of covering cloth. 
Ḥadīth-experts say firṣah and the right word is firṣah. Yet, he abandoned 
my statement and dictated to people firṣah or qarṣah.114 
These two incidents reflect how the maʿnā of ḥadīth was interpreted as the 
right script of the ḥadīth. However, we have also learned from al-Khaṭīb that maʿnā 
requires istinbāṭ. It is not surprising then to find that maʿnā is the most pragmatic 
tool used by scholars to propagate a certain interpretation for the ambiguities 
associated with this concept. In his study on the semantic theory of the Arabic 
tradition, Kees Versteegh has enumerated sixteen connotations of the word maʿnā 
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114 TMS, 7:521. 
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observed from various Islamic disciplines.115 The earliest written materials that 
connect maʿnā with sources of religious meanings belong to the genre of maʿānī al-
Qurʾān. It was within this genre that the first writing on the dichotomy of 
majāz/ḥaqīqah was introduced. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this study to 
trace every possible meaning of maʿnā and locate its application within the 
intellectual milieu of Baghdād. Two important issues, however, are worth 
mentioning here for their appearance in the works of al-Khaṭīb. The first concerns 
the general understanding of the terminology of lafẓ and maʿnā, and the second 
treats maʿnā between the realised normative (ḥaqiqah) and the permissive (majāz) 
usage. 
As for the first, Versteegh points out Ibn Fāris (395/1004), al-Rummānī 
(384/994) and Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s (684/1285) view that maʿnā is related to maqṣūd 
(the intention of the speaker). Then, he cited the attribution to Thaʿlab (291/904) 
that takes meaning and explanation and interpretation as amounting to the same 
idea (al-maʿnā wa’l-tafsīr wa’l-taʾwīl wāḥid). These represent two different approaches 
to the semantic component of speech.116 In relation to this, Versteegh presents 
Koulughli’s analysis that concludes two approaches amongst classical Arab linguists 
in defining maʿnā. The first sees maʿnā as maqṣūd of the speaker and the second 
believes in independent form/meaning dichotomy in the sense of the modern 
distinction between “significant/signifié.” In other words, there is a static entity 
representing the reverse side of a phonetic expression (lafẓ). According to him, this 
second view did not develop until the writings of al-Jurjānī (5th/11th century). 117 Al-
Khaṭīb did not discuss lafẓ and maʿnā in the same breadth of this linguistic 
theorisation. However, when clarifying how a change of phonetic expressions does 
not necessarily affect the maʿnā, al-Khaṭīb used the term al-maʿnā al-maqṣūd min al-
lafẓ (the meaning intended by the expression). He argues that if one conveys a 
statement of a certain person by using a different expression that preserves al-maʿnā 
                                                        
115 Kees Versteegh, “The Arabic Tradition,” in The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Traditions: 
Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek, Arabic, eds. Wout van Bekkum et al (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub., 1997), 
230-231. 
116 Ibid, 228-229. 
117 Djamel Eddine Koloughli, “À propos de lafẓ et maʿnā,” Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales 35 (1983): 43-63. 
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al-maqṣūd, it is not a deception (kadhb) or alteration (taḥrīf). According to al-Khaṭīb, 
God does the same when He repeats stories and dialogues in the Qurʾān with diverse 
expressions, yet they convey the same meaning. Moreover, the Qurʾān translates 
dialogue of the past nations into Arabic that necessarily involves various linguistic 
permutations.118 Al-Khaṭīb did not inform us how the maqṣūd of a speaker and the 
ẓāhir of his speech can work together in determining the imperative of a ḥadīth.  
A related case might clarify the importance of this relation. Ibn al-Jawzī 
rebuked al-Khaṭīb for his interpretation of Ṭāriq ibn Ashyam’s account of Sunnah. 
Ṭāriq related that he had prayed behind Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān and ʿAlī and 
none of them in their time “yaqnut.” Ṭāriq said to his son, ‘This (qunūt) is bidʿah 
(heresy).’ According to Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Khaṭīb takes this expression (qanata) to refer 
to a specific prayer people invented in the time of Ṭāriq’s son, not the qunūt in the 
obligatory dawn prayer that the Shāfiʿīs hold as Sunnah. Hence, the quality of 
innovation is directed to that invention. According to Ibn al-Jawzī, the obvious 
meaning of the statement does not warrant al-Khaṭīb this understanding.119 We do 
not have a clear indication for al-Khaṭīb’s method in this interpretation. It can only 
be assumed that a set of indicants has established the Shāfiʿīs’ qunūt as Sunnah in al-
Khaṭīb’s collection that his identification of meaning is modulated based on this set 
of indicants. 
The second issue with regard to maʿnā centres on majāz which al-Khaṭīb 
defines as every word that is used for a meaning other than that for which it was 
assigned in original coinage (al-waḍʿ). According to al-Khaṭīb, when the Prophet 
conversely called a horse an ocean, he was applying majāz where the qualities of 
energised motion and grandeur were intended. Majāz features as well in the Qurʾān 
and al-Khaṭīb refuted those who reject this substantive, particularly the Ẓāhirīs. To 
illustrate that their view was uncherished, al-Khaṭīb recounted that it was only said 
that Abū Bakr the son of Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī subscribed to the rejection. An expression, 
however, should not be treated under the mode of majāz except when signified by 
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an indicant.120 Despite his definition of majāz that literally embodies the idea of 
transference of assigned meaning, al-Khaṭīb’s elaboration of the concept portrays 
majāz as the permissive modes of expression that coincides with other scholars’ 
articulation such as studied by Ella Almagor.121 Al-Khaṭīb mentioned explicitly Abū 
ʿUbaydah’s archetypal work for reference.122 It is worth noting too that majāz had 
also been regarded as the equivalent of maʿnā.  
What we may conclude from the above is that maʿnā is usually potentiated by 
an interference of other indicant whenever potential challenges involved. When a 
maʿnā is perceived, a set of other indicants will be marshalled together to affirm its 
determination. This is where ḥadīth-dependent Sunnah and maʿnā-dependent Sunnah 
conflate in the writings of al-Khaṭīb. Takhrīj is applied to bring as many possible 
ḥadīths as one can to potentiate a maʿnā. This can be observed in all chapters of al-
Khaṭīb’s works and all topic-based collections of ḥadīth where corroboratively safe 
isnāds potentiate a ḥadīth and corroborative narrations potentiate a meaning. The 
concept is then exploited to high-potentiate a meaning-dependent Sunnah as will be 
shown in the next section. 
6.9  The Epistemology of Potential Khabar and Maʿnā 
 Since maʿnā is sourced from the scripts of ḥadīth (khabar) and the available 
statements pertaining to religion (akhbār), the present study colligates al-Khaṭīb’s 
classification of statements in al-Kifayah, his classification of Sunnah in Kitāb al-Faqīh, 
and his scattered elucidations on statements throughout his works, to configure al-
Khaṭīb’s epistemology of khabar and maʿnā. The result is enlisted as follows: 
A. The sphere of ḍarūrī  
In this group, al-Khaṭīb places the knowledge of the whole community 
(ijmāʿ al-ummah), statements of facts (tawātur), and rational principles, 
e.g. the temporal origin of bodies, the existence of a maker for a made 
                                                        
120 FWM, 1:213-217.  
121 Ella Almagor, “The early meaning of Majāz and the nature of Abu ʿUbayda’s exegesis,” in The 
Qur'an: Formative Interpretation, ed. A. Rippin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 263-282.  
122 Mustafa Shah, “The Philological Endeavours …” (cited earlier). 
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thing, and the availability of signs for a messenger. They yield 
certainty/necessary truth/incontrovertible knowledge.  
 
B. The sphere of istidlāl (speculatively acquired knowledge).  
i. Khabar al-āḥād that yields istidlālī (acquired) knowledge, and 
terminal in the recognition of its veracity (maqṭūʿ bi-ṣidqihi): 
1. Statement of God. 
2. Statement of the Messenger. 
3. Statement of one person in front of the Messenger with the 
absence of disapproval. 
4. Statement of a person in the presence of a group with the absence 
of disapproval. 
ii. Statement of “many” that yields istidlālī knowledge: 
1. The concurrent affirmation of scholars, e.g. sexual intercourse 
nullifies pilgrimage, sexual intercourse nullifies fasting, the 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the defendant’s acquittal is 
attained by oath, prohibition of marrying a woman and her 
paternal or maternal aunt at the same time, no bequest for an 
heir, etc.123 In theory, concurrent affirmation of scholars 
represents the qiyās of many, which may explain al-Khaṭīb’s 
statement when he said that qiyās in principle yields knowledge.  
iii. Potentiated maʿnā that yields istidlālī knowledge: 
1. When it is evidenced by tawātur maʿnawī, e.g. the existence of 
sensory miracles of the Prophet, and the authority of ijmāʿ. 
2. When it was adopted by a generation of scholars and transmitted 
to another generation with acceptance (often reported in a dictum 
with unreliable isnād), e.g. no bequest for an heir, the seawater is 
purifying and its deads are lawful, the burden of compensation 
(diyah) is on the tribe (ʿāqilah).124 
 
iv. Individual report yields high potential of truth (sometimes called 
“knowledge” based on a certain epistemological construct): 
1. When its imperative is effectuated by Sunnah mutawātirah (tawātur 
ḍarūrī or tawātur maʿnawī), e.g. the dictum “My community will not 
agree on error.” 
2. When Muslim Community agrees on its validity. 
                                                        
123 Some of these imperatives have been reported as ḥadīth as well. 
124 These scripts have been reported as ḥadīth in many works, but their isnāds according to al-Khaṭīb 
are not safely reliable. 
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3. When its imperative is received with acceptance and practiced by 
Muslim Community or some of them. 
4. When it is evaluated as thābit (affirmed) after 
speculation/indication, or elevated after potentiation. 
v. Derived meaning (qiyās) by āḥād (individuals) yields high 
potentiality. 
  
C. An individual dictum that yields potentiality and not knowledge. 
All ḥadīths in disputed laws amongst the jurists: final answer 
should be suspended. When they are evaluated to be safely 
reliable, they are elevated to (iv.4). 
  
D. On the opposite, a statement can be decisively recognised as absurd 
when: 
1. Its imperative contradicts a rational mind, e.g. the eternity of 
bodies. 
2. Its imperative contradicts a clear-cut text in the Qurʾān.  
3. Its imperative contradicts historical facts concerning the Prophet 
or tawātur maʿnawī. 
4. Its imperative compels a vital religious obligation yet there is no 
way to inspect or infer its reliability, e.g. the source is completely 
unknown. 
5. It tells an extremely historic event with participation of the whole 
community, yet isolated individuals carried its narration.125 
Some important observations can be deduced from the above schema.  First, 
the whole schema seems to be an implementation of al-Baqillānī’s division which al-
Khaṭīb cited in al-Kifayah. al-Bāqillānī underscored, ‘Statements are of two types: 
the first type is when it is known (ʿilm) that the Prophet had spoken about it, either 
by necessity (ḍarūrī) or through speculation (istidlālī); the second is when there is no 
way to know whether he had pronounced them or not.’126 Although al-Bāqillānī 
speaks of two types, his expression carries three classes: ḍarūrī, istidlālī and the non-
determinable. The groups A, B, and C above correspond precisely to these classes. 
When al-Bāqillānī underlined that ‘A single person may deliver a statement yet the 
message is known epistemically true (yuʿlam ṣidquhu qaṭʿān) like the statement of the 
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Prophet ... it is the maʿānī that should be considered, not the expressions (al-ʿibārāt),’ 
al-Khaṭīb expanded this point as in group (B.i).127 Terminological variations 
emerged as al-Khaṭīb named them as khabar al-āḥād, while al-Bāqillānī did no do the 
same. 
Group (ii) and (iii) are essentially similar except that (ii) is usually referenced 
as ijmāʿ ahl al-ijtihād. All types between group (iv) and (C) are qualified with khabar 
that obligates actions, but does not yield knowledge. Ḥadīth scripts may feature in 
the group (ii), (iii.1), and (iii.2). Scripts are certainly present in the group (iv) and 
(C). Meanings of the script are of highest import. For this reason, ḥadīth in general is 
attributed with conflicting qualifications such as indicating al-Sunnah al-
mutawātirah, yielding only ghalabat al-ẓann, does not yield knowledge, ḥadīth yields 
knowledge, ḥadīth is Sunnah and ḥadīth is knowledge.  
In al-Khaṭīb’s writings, the interaction between khabar and qiyās is reflected 
in the relation between (iv.4) and (v). A sound khabar is preferred over qiyās. 
However, rational inference (also called qiyās) may approve or disprove a khabar, as 
in (D.1). 
Al-Khaṭīb did not produce an example for (iv.2) and (iv.3). Through the use 
of this mechanism, namely khabar agreed by ijmāʿ or al-talaqqī bi’l-qabūl, Ṣaḥīḥayn 
have been advanced to secure what Brown calls a middle tier: one that yielded an 
epistemological certainty below the almost unattainable confidence conveyed by 
unimpeachable mass-transmission (tawātur) but above the mere probability (ẓann) 
yielded by āḥād ḥadīths.128 Scholars who participated in the canonisation of Ṣaḥīḥayn 
have pursued the attachment of Ṣaḥīḥayn with these conceptual and even linguistic 
notions. 
However, seemingly convincing is that al-Khaṭīb include this postulate to 
accommodate the juridical exercises that emphasise establishment of meanings. 
Subsequent to the appropriation of the concept of Sunnah mutawatirah and the 
appearance of themes related to maʿnā in his writings, he provided the jurists with 
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an argumentative tool, invited the traditionalists into learning it and provided them 
with a mechanism to potentiate certain weak dictum. This exemplifies in the 
concept of tawātur maʿnawī. 
6.10 The Role of Takhrīj in Tawātur Maʿnawī 
Al-Khaṭīb included in his Kitāb al-Faqīh the concept of tawātur min ṭarīq al-
maʿnā that entails a necessarily original imperative. In al-Kifāyah he just used the 
general term al-Sunnah al-mutawātirah (necessarily original Sunnah) that 
epistemically secures a higher level than individual dictum. This concept has been 
adopted by the Baghdādian Shāfiʿīs likewise appreciated from the same discussion 
in al-Shīrazī’s work.  
Al-Khaṭīb depicted this type of tawātur as an aggregate of statements 
conveyed by a number of groups in several unrelated occasions, through which 
unassociated imperatives were established; yet as a whole they project the same 
spirit.129 To inform the traditional jurists how this tool affirms a legal principle, he 
elucidated how tawātur maʿnawī proved that the Companions shared one general 
spirit: acting upon statement or report of trustworthy individual (khabar al-wāḥid al-
ʿadl). Then, he addressed the theologians showing that fiqh study has proven the 
sensory miracles of the Prophet through tawātur maʿnawī. According to al-Khaṭīb, 
the ḥadīths informed the utterance of praises of God by stones in the hands of the 
Prophet, the audible cry of the tree trunk before him, the spring of water from 
between his fingers, the multiplication of scant food, his spitting water into a 
leather water container causing it to flow abundantly, the conversation with 
animals, etc., and all these instances pointed in general to the occurrence of sensory 
miracle. By so doing, al-Khaṭīb illustrated to everyone the importance of takhrīj in 
establishing theological, legal, historical and traditional principles, since they began 
with the extrication of a cluster of, at least potential, ḥadīth scripts.  
                                                        
129 Based on this, Hallaq’s statement that tawātur maʿnawī is an instance where “the transmissions 
differ from one another in wording, but they all share the same meaning” can be misleading. It does 
not clearly differentiate between tawātur maʿnawī and the instances of ikhtilāf al-alfāẓ (varying 
expressions) or paraphrasing. See: Inductive, 20.  
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What proves this observation is that al-Khaṭīb demands any discussant on a 
legal principle to identify whether the principle was derived from a Sharīʿah 
imperative or rational impression. The legal principle of ijmāʿ according to him was 
derived from the belief in an idea of Shariʿah. It was not invented by any speculative 
or rational inference or observation of nature. Hence, any attempt to prove or 
discuss the authority of ijmāʿ must begin with its cause in the Sharīʿah: reports from 
the past. There is no uncontested way to prove any article of Sharīʿah outside the 
sphere of report. For example, one cannot simply invent a ritual such as punching a 
bag as an act of worship in Islam. We may recall Ibn al-Qāṣṣ’s slogan “he who rejects 
reports, would in effect, denounce the Sharīʿah.” 
Al-Khaṭīb was aware that the script “My Community will not agree on 
ḍalālah (a confusion or fusion of truth and false)” is highly contestable. Some 
traditionalists cling unto it tightly but reject the script attributed to Muāʿdh that 
includes qiyās as the legitimate source of legal judgment. Al-Khaṭīb refuted those 
traditionalists saying that the text of Muʿadh tradition is more widely known and its 
isnād is more potential than the My Community text and isnād. How can one accept 
ijmāʿ and rejects qiyās based on ḥadīth scripts? 
Al-Khaṭīb portrayed to us that ijmāʿ was not derived from khabar wāḥid (one 
report) but from khabar al-āḥād (imperative of individual reports). The conceptual 
spirit of “ijmāʿ of scholars” was derived from a cluster of reports. Al-Khaṭīb then 
provided a sample for tawātur maʿnawī in affirming this spirit. 
First, he provided the context for argument where he attributed to al-
Naẓẓām and the Rafiḍīs the antithesis of ijmāʿ. According to Van Ess, Naẓẓām viewed 
the ijmāʿ of the traditionalists as ḥadīth-based and rejected the reliance on the 
suspicious ḥadīth.130 Whereas al-Khaṭīb illustrated that ijmāʿ was spirit-based and 
the ḥadīth was a potential expression of an established spirit of Sharīʿah. As for the 
Rāfiḍīs, al-Khaṭīb indicated that they uphold the Imām-based Sharīʿah.131  
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Al-Khaṭīb discussed many hypothetical arguments against ijmāʿ. The concern 
of this section is the exposition of tawātur maʿnawī. Al-Khaṭīb provided in total 
thirty-one accounts whose general spirit and the gist of meaning can be expressed 
in ten statements:  
1- That the uniting community will not agree on confusion. 
2- That the Hand of God is by the side of the uniting community. 
3- That the comfort and prosperity of Paradise are gained through loyalty 
to the uniting community and that Evil befalls the lesser in number 
particularly the loner. 
4- That one who dissociates from the uniting community has removed the 
pledge of Islam from his neck. 
5- That ijtihād is legitimate as long as one remains within the uniting 
community. 
6- That division took place within the Israelites and the followers of 
Muḥammad. All attacking sects are exposed to the Hellfire except those 
who remain in the uniting community. 
7- That the three acts which please God are tawḥīd, providing good counsel 
to the rulers and staying within the uniting community. 
8- That the previous pious judges were advised to maintain agreement in 
the uniting community. 
9- That whatever is seen best by the Muslim uniting community would be 
seen best by God. 
10- That the previous reminders given by predecessors included the loyalty 
to the uniting community. 
The thirty-one accounts provided by al-Khaṭīb are highly contestable. 
However, each statement has potential due to takhrīj; he provided corroborative 
strands and narrations for each of them. Hence, the spirit of each statement, namely 
al-jamāʿah (the uniting community), has a great potential in having a basis in 
Shariah. Due to the fact that the aggregate of these statements fits al-Khaṭīb’s 
criteria for tawātur al-riwāyah, the spirit (maʿnā) informed by this aggregation, which 
is “agreement of the uniting community” then is necessarily original (a spirit 
embraced by the Prophet and Companions). It is crucial to remind that al-Khaṭīb’s 
idea of community is restricted to the people of our time, the unborn are not called 
believers and the deceased are called past believers. Ijmāʿ as a principle for legal 
decision in a certain generation is a perfect example of spirit-based Sunnah, which 
was carried within the ḥadīth corpora and extricated and evidenced through the 




 Al-Khaṭīb’s writings elaborately demonstrate an awareness of the presence 
of doubts and problems in the study of ḥadīth. It was not simply a theoretical 
postulate attached to the substantial corpora of Prophetic dicta. Takhrīj was the 
earliest critical concept systemised and applied to address these challenges and 
other polemical attack such as the mishmash of foreign, secular, and creative 
imperatives with possible original imperatives. The concept and systematic 
criticism of idrāj was introduced to suppress its antithesis of hashwu into mere 
theoretical assumption. Subsequently, the claim of ikhrāj was intimated with careful 
observation of both rāwī and marwī, challenging the cogency of distinction between 
isnād criticism and matn criticism. Contrary to the entrenched perception that 
traditionalists ignored the study of meaning in defining sound tradition, al-Khaṭīb 
as the recognised ḥāfiẓ of his time, incorporated numerous themes related to 
meaning, which may lead to the construction of independent maʿnawī criticism 
outside the conventional uṣūlī theorisation. More precisely, the concept of takhrīj 
advocates expert-based criticism. This is supported by the fact that although ḥadīth 
criticism theorists laid out their scientific rules, it is in their takhrījāt that their 
actual craft could be appreciated. Fair assessment of a critic’s personal methodology 
can only be attained through reapplication of takhrīj to enable comparison. To 
rephrase the conclusion judiciously asserted by al-Khaṭīb, the criticism of any ḥadīth 
is not simply based on instructions of isnād or matn criticism or dictation of the 
evaluation of the past critics - it is an inspiration in the innermost heart of a long-










7.1  Setting the Context 
Upon the establishment of Niẓāmiyyah College in Baghdād, al-Khaṭīb’s friend 
and ḥadīth student, Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, was appointed as its chief professor by the 
vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (assassinated in 485/1092). Similar to al-Khaṭīb, al-Shīrāzī was 
a good friend of the Ḥanbalīs and the Shāfiʿīs, as well as the Ashʿarīs, who infiltrated 
the circles of the latter.1 The curriculum at the college embraced an inclusive 
approach during his headship. Six years after al-Khaṭīb, the city witnessed several 
frictions between the Ḥanbalīs and the Shāfiʿīs. The course of Shawwāl 469 AH/April 
1077 CE recorded the celebration of a Jew’s conversion to Islam before Ibn al-
Qushayrī who came to Baghdād not more than a year before. Ibn al-Qushayrī 
(514/1120) was the fourth son of the Ashʿarī Ṣūfī ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī and he 
studied under Abū’l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī in Nishapur. The cause of Shāfiʿism against 
Ḥanafism in Nishapur was imported to Baghdād where as a Shāfiʿī, he associated the 
Ḥanbalīs with extreme anthropomorphism (tajsīm) in his sessions which were also 
attended by his benefactor, al-Shīrāzī.2 Al-Subkī portrayed Ibn al-Qushayrī’s multi-
faith sessions as highly poignant and saintly where conversion frequently occurs, 
whereas Ibn al-Jawzī reported the Ḥanbalīs’ mocking accusation that the Islam Ibn 
al-Qushayrī propagated was the Islam of appeasement, not the Islam of true 
pietism.3 The aforementioned conversion had led to violent killings following the 
clash between the partisans of Ibn al-Qushayrī and the partisans of the Ḥanbalī al-
Sharīf Abū Jaʿfar al-Hāshimī (470/1078). Although descended from the Hāshimī 
family, Abū Jaʿfar pursued the harsh cause of al-Barbahārī (329/941) and was a 
staunch opponent of rationalism, particularly Ashʿarism, as well as Sufism.4 
Al-Shīrāzī had invited scholars to petition Niẓām al-Mulk who was in 
Khurāsān to interfere in the riot. Eventually, he was accused by the Ḥanbalīs as the 
mastermind behind the Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī evangelical cause. In the reconciliation 
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plenary attended by the officials and several notable figures of the latter, al-Shīrāzī 
is portrayed as compelled to appease Abū Jaʿfar by handling a curriculum of Uṣūl al-
Fiqh that censures Ashʿarism and kissing the head of the latter as a sign of 
surrender.5 Ibn al-Qushayrī was eventually sent back to Khurāsān with the 
condition that he not returns to Baghdād. The Ḥanbalīs spread the words amongst 
the public of al-Shīrazī’s denouncement of Ashʿarism, which according to al-Subkī 
aggravated him to the extent that he once again wrote to Niẓām al-Mulk. Due to 
these instances, al-Shīrāzī’s exact theological position becomes a matter of some 
ambiguity for modern scholars.6 Nevertheless, the letter written in 470 AH/1078 CE 
warrants an investigation, as awell as the imprisonment of Abū Jaʿfar, who was 
previously held at the palace of the Caliph, where he was allowed a gradually 
limited number of visitors.7 In the report of Ibn al-Jawzī, heretical jurists, probably 
from the Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī faction, poisoned him in the same year.8 
The clash between the two sides during this phase was also corroborated by 
the takfīr of the Ḥanbalīs in a public speech at Tuesday Market made by a preacher 
from Niẓāmiyyah called al-Iskandarānī, which resulted in the crowd throwing 
bricks at him. He was, however, saved by the Niẓāmiyyah Shāfiʿīs, although the 
collision between them also turned violent following a military intervention. Livnat 
Holtzman elaborated in a recent article the above frictions in order to chart 
important stages in the Sunnī Revival.9 She suggests that the event of Ibn al-
Qushayrī ‘symbolises the defeat of the rationalistic kalām to the traditional branch 
of knowledge.’ However, it was within this milieu in Baghdād and also Khurasān 
that al-Ghazālī’s project of intellectual mysticism thrives, paving the way for the 
                                                        
5 Recall the difference between sources of fiqh in al-Lumaʿ and in al-Maʿūnah fī al-Jadal, where in the 
latter it resembles Abū Yaʿlā’s deliberation. See Chapter 4. Amongst those who attended and 
surrendered to Abū Jaʿfar was Abū Saʿd al-Ṣufī. See the account on al-Khaṭīb’s demise in Chapter 1. 
6 See also the editorial remark on the theology of al-Shīrāzī by ʿAbd al-Majīd al-Turkī in: al-Shīrāzī, 
Sharḥ al-Lumaʿ, 1:73-89. 
7 al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 4:235. 
8 al-Muntaẓam, 16:182 and 195. 
9 Livnat Hotzman, The Miḥna of Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and the Fitna Ibn al-Qushayrī (d. 514/1120), in 




expansion of the late Ashʿarism. The legacy and qualification of former scholars like 
al-Khatib, therefore; could not escape the filtration of the previous two spectrums 
of traditionalism. 
7.2  The Perceptions on al-Khaṭīb’s Theological Stance 
 As in the case of al-Shīrāzī, the theological position of al-Khaṭīb has been 
unclear to modern researchers. The assertion of his former affiliation to Ḥanbalism 
too has been taken with less critical assessment.  
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Kattānī (466/1074), the Ṣūfī and leading tradent of Damascus 
who was also a friend and a student of al-Khaṭīb informed the people of Damascus 
that al-Khaṭīb favoured the theology of al-Ashʿarī. Al-Kattānī was amongst the 
copyists of Tārīkh Baghdād and people sought him to compare their copies.10 As he 
narrated from al-Khaṭīb, he explained that al-Khaṭīb’s professors such as al-Barqānī 
and al-Azharī also narrated from the student. Al-Kattāni’s statement represents a 
depiction from the nearest source.11 Next in priority of proximity to al-Khaṭīb was 
ʿAbd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī (529/1135). In the extraction of his work made by the 
Ḥanbalī al-Ṣarīfīnī (641/1244), al-Fārisī, after referring to al-Khaṭīb as the ḥāfiẓ of his 
time, mentions simply that he was an Ashʿarī in theology (ashʿariyy al-ʿaqīdah) and 
goes on to praise his eloquence and strong arguments together with excellence in 
calligraphy, reading skill, comprehension and memory.12 Nothing concerning his 
connection to Ḥanbalism was mentioned. 
 Certainly, the above depiction was utilised by Ashʿarī propagators such as 
Ibn ʿAsākir who placed al-Khaṭīb at the fourth rank amongst the followers of al-
Ashʿarī.13 Later on, al-Subkī in his biographical dictionary of the Shāfiʿī jurisconsults, 
repeated this point.14 
                                                        
10 See ʿAwwād’s remark on his copy, TMS, 1:183. Biography in: Siyar, 18:248. 
11 TIM, 10:175. 
12al-Ṣarīfīnī, al-Muntakhab, 107. 
13 Tabyīn, 271. 
14 Ṭabaqāt, 4:29-39. 
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 Later Ḥanbalī biographers, however, paraded interesting attitudes towards 
this point. When it comes to Ibn al-Jawzī (656/1258), he presented al-Khaṭīb as a 
Ḥanbalī who later converted to Shāfiʿism due to his sympathy to the mubtadiʿah 
(heretics) and his learning from them, in addition to the harsh treatment he 
received from a fraction of Ḥanābilah. In this narrative, Al-Khaṭīb was being 
portrayed as a defector from “mainstream” Sunnism i.e. Ḥanbalism. Ibn al-Jawzī 
sought to prove al-Khaṭīb’s implicit hatred against the Ḥanbalīs by revealing his 
criticism of their main figures in Tārīkh Baghdād. To respond to al-Khaṭīb’s 
prevailing credibility as al-ḥāfiẓ, he quoted the head tradent of Hamadhān, al-Ḥāfiẓ 
Ismāʿīl al-Qūmasānī (497/1104)15 saying that there were three ḥuffāz he abhorred for 
their fanaticism; al-Hākim for his favour of Shiʿism; and Abū Nuʿaym and al-Khaṭīb 
for their fanaticism towards Ashʿarism. Al-Khaṭīb’s praises of certain theologians 
were also brought forward.16 Ibn al-Jawzī omitted his Ḥanbalī professor al-Ḥāfiẓ 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Anmāṭī’s (538/1143) remark concerning al-Khaṭīb in his 
biography, even though he himself narrated it on another page of al-Muntaẓam. Al-
Anmāṭī was a prominent Ḥanbalī tradent of Baghdād and a copyist of al-Khaṭīb’s 
Tārīkh. According to him, a Ḥanbalī devotee called Ibn al-Faqīrah (495/1102)17 
exhumed and destroyed the grave of al-Khaṭīb saying that this person ‘treated 
unjustly (taḥāmul) our fellow Ḥanbalīs.’ Al-Anmāṭī saw him one day and took the axe 
from his hand. He reminded him that al-Khaṭīb was a great ḥāfiẓ and scholar, and 
asked him to repent.18 
Ibn al-Jawzī’s narrative was echoed by another Ḥanbalī Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī 
(909/1503) in his refutation against Ibn ʿAsākir. He initially agreed with Ibn ʿAsākir 
on the matter of al-Khaṭīb’s Ashʿarism but added that al-Khaṭīb was extremely 
                                                        
15 Recorded as al-Qūmasī in al-Muntaẓam. Biography in: TIM, 10:788.  
16 al-Muntaẓam, 16:129-135. 
17 TIM, 10:772. 
18 al-Muntaẓam, 9:133. 
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fanatical against the Ḥanbalīs (kathīr al-ʿaṣabiyyah) to the extent that he criticised 
and refuted Ibn Ḥanbal himself on certain issues.19  
Centuries later, Ibn Taymiyyah’s student, al-Dhahabī criticised Ibn al-Jawzī 
for his exaggerated statement on al-Khaṭīb and his own partiality in favour of 
Ḥanbalism. Al-Dhahabī, just like Ibn Taymiyyah, recounted the transitional phases 
of al-Ashʿārī and associated al-Khaṭīb with the final phase where al-Ashʿarī and his 
putative work al-Ibānah conformed to the creed of Ibn Ḥanbal.20 Al-Dhahābi 
published part of al-Khaṭīb’s work; al-Qawl fī’l-Ṣifāt to show that al-Khaṭīb was 
against figurative interpretation of what seems as anthropomorphic attributes of 
God. This is similar to the Salaf, Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah himself. Commenting 
on al-Kattānī’s attribution to Ashʿarism, al-Dhahābī narrowed it down to the issue of 
Divine attributes saying that the madhhab of al-Ashʿarī was to accept these 
attributes the way they were dictated (tumarr kamā jāʾat).21 Quite blurrily, al-Subkī 
criticised al-Dhahabī for his ignorance of al-Ashʿarī’s views. According to him, al-
Ashʿarī also supported taʾwīl in the sense of figurative interpretation.22   
The work of al-Khaṭīb on the attributes was edited and published by ʿAbd 
Allāh-Yūsuf-al-Judaie whose editorial remark attributed al-Khaṭīb to Salafism. 
Thereupon, and with the help of Ibn al-Jawzī’s remark on al-Khaṭīb previous 
Ḥanbalism, and his few passages on the evil of kalām, modern Salafīs regarded al-
Khaṭīb as following the authentic paradigm of Ahl al-Sunnah and his grounding and 
resourceful works on ḥadīth theory and criticism may be consulted with a less 
critical attitude. 
7.3  Al-Khaṭīb’s Text on Divine Attributes 
 Al-Khaṭīb’s text was published based on a single manuscript which 
comprises of two sections: (1) al-Khaṭīb’s narration with his isnād to Ibn Ḥanbal 
                                                        
19 Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, Jamʿ al-Juyūsh wa’l-Dasākir ʿalā Ibn ʿAsākir, ed. Muḥammad Fawzī (Master Diss., 
Islamic University of Madinah, 1418/1997), 189. 
20 See below, fn 43. 
21 TIM, 10:179-186. 
22 Ṭabaqāt, 4:32-33. 
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concerning the uncreated-ness of Qurʾān, and (2) a narration from the Baghdādian 
Abū-Ṭalib-al-Ṣayrafī (563/1168) via his own isnād of al-Khaṭīb’s reply to the question 
by a certain individual from Damascus concerning the attributes of God. 
 Al-Ṣayrafī was a teacher of Ibn ʿAsākir and he went to trade in Damascus in 
519AH/1125CE. There is no information found concerning his theological affiliation. 
Ibn ʿAsākir mentioned that he eventually returned to Baghdād and al-Samʿānī 
reported that he copied a lot of books despite his old age.23 According to al-Dhahabī, 
al-Samʿānī credited him with trustworthiness. He was the only person who narrated 
al-Khaṭīb’s text from the latter’s direct student, the Shāfiʿī Muḥammad ibn Marzūq 
al-Zaʿfarānī (517/1123).24 This indicates that he received the work before his trade 
mission to Damascus and his source is unavailable for verification by the 
Damascenes. Ibn ʿAsākir who reported a lot from al-Khaṭīb’s students seems to be 
unaware of this text. 
 The above was the only chain for the work and according to al-Judaei, the 
transmitters of the manuscript cannot be identified since it was merged with the 
manuscript of Iʿtiqād al-Sunnah by al-Ismāʿīlī. However, amongst the transmitters of 
the latter was Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Qudāmah (541-620/1147-1223). Ibn 
Qudāmah was found to have recorded the above transmission and al-Khaṭīb’s text in 
Dhamm al-Taʾwīl and through his chain; al-Dhahabī narrated it in al-ʿUluww.25  
 As far as content is concerned, part of the text resembles strikingly the text 
of Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī.  The followings are the comparison between the two 
texts. 
 After mentioning the question from a Damascene, al-Khaṭīb began by saying 
that there were traditions recorded in ṣiḥāh and sunan works concerning this 
subject. The next part appeared to be unreadable. Then, al-Khaṭṭābī and al-Khaṭīb 
both said: ‘Madhhab al-salaf ithbātuhā wa-ijrāʾuhā ʿalā ẓawāhirihā, wa-nafyu al-kayfiyyah 
                                                        
23 TDQ, 57:10, TIM, 12:286. 
24 Ibn Kathīr, Ṭabaqāt, 1:558. He was amongst the copyists of TMS: Siyar, 19:471. 
25 Ibn Qudāmah, Dhamm al-Taʾwīl (UAE: Dār al-Fatḥ, 1994), 13, al-Dhahabī, al-ʿUluww li’l-ʿAliyy al-Ghaffār 
(Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, 1995), 253. 
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wa’l-tashbīh ʿanhā. Wa-qad nafāhā qawmun fa-abṭalū mā athbatahu Allah.’ Al-Khaṭṭābi 
then pursued with ‘Wa-ḥaqqaqahā qawmun mina’l-muthbitīn,’ whereas al-Khaṭīb 
differed slightly saying ‘Wa-ḥaqqaqahā mina’l-muthbitīn qawmun.’ They agreed on the 
next line; ‘fa-kharajū fī dhālika ilā ḍarbin mina’l-tashbīh wa’l-takyīf.’ They differed again 
where al-Khaṭṭābī said ‘al-ṭarīqah al-mustaqīmah bayna al-amrayn,’ and al-Khaṭīb said, 
‘al-ṭarīqah al-mutawassiṭah bayna al-umūr.’ The rest of al-Khaṭīb’s text is similar to al-
Khaṭṭābī’s one beginning from ‘wa’l-aṣl fī hādhā anna al-kalām fī al-ṣifāt farʿun ʿan al-
kalām fī al-dhāt,’ until ‘wa-wajaba nafyu al-tashbiḥ ʿanhā.’ Whereas al-Khaṭṭābi pursued 
with ‘li-anna Allah laysa ka-mithlihi shayʾun,’ al-Khaṭīb said ‘liqawlihi tabāraka wa-taʿālā,’ 
and cited the verse of the Qurʾān26 that mentions the same phrase. Al-Khaṭīb, then, 
added another verse from the Qurʾān,27 but al-Khaṭṭābī ended with ‘wa-ʿalā hadhā 
jarā qawl al-salaf fī aḥādīth al-ṣifāt.’ 28  
 These similarities indicate that either al-Khaṭīb was simply copying al-
Khaṭṭābī, or he memorised the work, or the transmission of the text has been 
somewhat compromised.29 Al-Khaṭṭābī’s text was published by Ibn Taymiyyah 
attributing it to his famous work, al-Ghunyah ʿan al-Kalām. Al-Khaṭīb also possessed 
this book. The book is considered lost and al-Suyūṭī published only part of it. The 
above text cannot be appreciated from the published part making Ibn Taymiyyah 
the only source for it at present. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyyah remarked that the 
text of al-Khaṭṭābī was circulated by many scholars such as al-Khaṭīb, Abū Bakr al-
Ismāʿīlī, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAmmār al-Sajistānī al-Harawī (422/1031), Abū Ismāʿīl al-Harawī 
(481/1089), Abū ʿUthmān al-Ṣābūnī (449/1057) and Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr.30 The original 
text, thus, remains outside critical assessment. 
                                                        
26 Qurʾān, al-Shūrā: 11. 
27 Qurʾān, al-Ikhlāṣ: 4. 
28 al-Khaṭṭābi, al-Ghunyah ʿan al-Kalām wa Ahlihi (Cairo: Dār al-Minhāj, 2004), taken from al-Suyūṭī, 
Ṣawn al-Mantiq wa’l-Kalām (Majmaʿ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyyah, 1970), 137. 
29 The same observed in the comparison between al-Khaṭīb’s introduction in al-Kifāyah and al-
Rāmhurmuzī’s al-Muḥaddith al-Fāṣil. 
30 Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, 5:58-59. The edition may have several errors. 
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 Notwithstanding this, al-Khaṭīb’s text has more additions. He mentioned 
first that some heretics accused transmitters of these anthropomorphic ḥadīths with 
either the infidelity of tashbīh (assimilating God with human) or the heedless of taʿṭīl 
(evicting God from attributes). The mention of taʿṭīl is somewhat confusing since al-
Khaṭīb already qualified the Sunnīs as muthbitūn (affirmers). Unless the type of 
affirmation includes a certain sense of suspension, al-Khaṭīb’s description of 
affirmers being accused with unconscious eviction invites more questions. Al-
Khaṭīb, nonetheless, refuted the attack by saying that these seemingly 
anthropomorphic attributes were also mentioned in the Qurʾān. It was not 
essentially a problem of ḥadīth. 
 However, al-Khaṭīb admitted that ḥadīths pertaining to this subject are of 
three groups: (1) sound traditions, (2) forged traditions, and (3) disputed traditions. 
Unfortunately, al-Khaṭīb remarked that he had never worked on the third group 
and he might pursue it in the future. 
 The mention of ithbāt in the text has convinced many to include al-Khaṭīb 
amongst ahl al-ithbāt (the affirmers). Moreover, al-Khaṭīb stressed that we shall not 
interpret the attribute al-yad (lit. hand) with al-qudrah (power), nor al-samʿ (hearing) 
and al-baṣar (seeing) with al-ʿilm (knowing). At first glance, this will place him 
against the Ashʿarīs who adopted the figurative interpretation. Then, he mentioned 
that we must not say that these are body parts or equate them with it. The issue is 
whether al-Khaṭīb rejects al-taʾwīl al-tafṣīlī (affirming a certain specific parabolic 
meaning), but accepts al-taʾwīl al-ijmālī, which the later Ashʿarīs called al-tafwīḍ 
(acknowledging a ẓannī maʿnā while entrusting the yaqīnī maʿnā to God). If he 
adopted the tafwīḍ of decisive meaning, he would not be in the same camp with Ibn 
Taymiyyah who affirms tafwīd al-kayf (entrusting the deliberation of modality to 
God) together with the confident affirmation of prima facie meaning. Al-Qawl fī al-
Ṣifāt leaves us with no answer. 
 To add to the frustration of determining al-Khaṭīb’s exact stance, he had also 
stated strongly in Jāmiʿ al-Ādāb that the taʾwīl of these attributes occurs in many 
ways and guises (ṭuruq wa-wujūh). What does he mean by taʾwīl? Can al-Khaṭīb’s 
stance, thereupon, be appreciated from the predecessors’ deliberations? 
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7.4  The Classical Approaches to the Anthropomorphic Attributes 
 This controversial theological problem has been discussed extensively until 
the modern time from many perspectives and points of view. According to Ian 
Netton, ‘Islam too has had a problem of divine ‘faces’; not in the sense of a single 
deity divided up among, or represented by, many gods, but simply in the fact that 
Muslims over the age have regarded their one God in several widely differing 
ways.’31 This arose mainly from the anthropomorphic depictions of God in the 
traditional sources. As al-Khaṭīb argued above, it began with the Qurʾān’s depiction 
of God itself where it speaks of affirmation and negation concomitantly.32 A reader 
of classical approaches to this subject would intuitively find that every reported 
position might be qualified by a somewhat relative affirmation and negation. This 
section, however, will present only major thoughts with regard to 
anthropomorphism and corporealism in order to locate al-Khaṭīb’s idea. According 
to Shah, the discursive classical discourse on this issue began during the last years 
of the third Caliph ‘Uthmān’s reign. Shah delineates the early discourse on 
attributes ranging from ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sabaʾ to the alleged influenced Shiʿī sects 
such as al-Bayāniyyah, al-Hishāmiyyah, al-Manṣūriyyah, al-Mughīriyyah, al-
Yūnusiyyah, and others, which were deemed by Sunnī scholars as mujassimah 
(corporealists). Furthermore, he highlighted the views attributed to the 
traditionalist Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (150/767) and the Shīʿī Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam al-
Kūfī (ca. 179 or 199/796 or 815).33 
 Ultimately, Jaʿd ibn Dirham (124 or 125/742 or 743) was reported to affirm 
God as the real Actor of everything, emphasise predestination, but refuted 
anthropomorphic implications of affirming attributes such as God speaking directly 
                                                        
3131 Ian Richard Netton, Allah Transcendent (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1989), 2. 
32 See the verses in the text of al-Khaṭīb above. Also: Shah, The Anthropomorphic Depictions, 543-615. 
33 Binyamin Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qurʾān in Theology of al-Qasim ibn 
Ibrahim (Boston: Brill, 1996), 4, Alexander Hainy Khaleeli, “Hisham ibn al-Hakam: arch-heretic?” 
Journal of Shīʿa Islamic Studies 3.iii (2010): 288-290, al-Shahrastānī, Muslim Sects and Divisions, trans. A.K. 
Kazi & J. G. Flynn (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 130, 158, 153, 152 and 161, Ibn Taymiyyah, Darʾ Taʿāruḍ, 




to Moses or in need of friendship with Abraham.34 Ibn Taymiyyah affirmed that Jaʿd 
was the eponymous founder of taʿṭīl (eviction of Divine attributes).35 His disciple 
Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (127/745) conceptualised it more when he divided the attributes 
into those specific to God such as Creation, Giver of life and death, and 
Omnipotence, and those common to both God and man such as life, knowledge, etc. 
In affirming God’s ontological difference to creatures, Jahm evicted the description 
of God through any human attributes. The absolute transcendence of God and His 
Sole Eternity (baqāʾ) was further affirmed in the negation of the everlasting nature 
of Heaven and Hell.36 In the writing of al-Khaṭīb, Abū Ḥanīfah was portrayed to 
conclude, ‘Two evils come to us from the east: Jahm the evictor (muʿaṭṭil) and 
Muqātil the assimilator (mushabbih).’37  
In the midst of the tension between the two sides, the Muʿtazilah proposed 
rational deliberation and sophistication.38 To affirm God’s justice and unicity, He 
was reduced to vague eternal oneness, i.e. a free spirit from attributes. Abū al-
Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, as reported incompletely by al-Khaṭīb too, stated that the qualities 
were not in God’s essence, and thus separable from it, thinkable apart from it, but 
they were His essence.39 The Muʿtazilah devised two approaches against traditional 
dicta; (1) rejection of spurious dicta that affirm anthropomorphism, and (2) 
metaphorical delineation based on hermeneutics and linguistic license. The concept 
of taʾwīl was magnified favouring tadabbur (inward) meanings over tabādur (prima 
facie) of meaning. The concept of majāz serves as the linguistic apparatus for the 
endeavours. The Muʿtazilah were certainly of various grades of sophistications, but 
their common introduction of speculative or philosophical theology has been 
                                                        
34 Wilfred Madelung, Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 
506-507. 
35 Ibn Taymiyyah, Darʾ Taʿāruḍ, 2:331. 
36 Richard Frank, “The Neoplatonism of Jahm ibn Ṣafwān,” in Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism, ed. 
Dimitri Gutas, IX:395-424. 
37 TMS, 15:207. 
38 See early anthropomorphism tendency in: TUG, III: 142. 
39 TMS, 4:582, Duncan Black McDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional 
Theory (Beirut: Khaiyats, 1965), 136-137. 
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widely recognised. Ultimately, the Muʿtazilah’s language threatened the normative 
simple experience of religion for ordinary people. The ordinary person’s apparent 
anthropomorphism poses a less dangerous threat than anthroposophism, which 
figures God in terms of human wisdom.40 In the observation of Ian Netton, this 
sense of transcendence leads semiotically, logically and inexorably to the ‘death’ of 
the word ‘God’, although none articulated it like that.41 Similar to this argument, Ibn 
Taymiyyah ascribed the Muʿtazilah to taʿṭīl. 
Ibn Ḥanbal stood against the Baghdādian Muʿtazilah’s sophistication and the 
implicit eviction behind the campaign of the created-ness of God’s Scripture. Ibn 
Ḥanbal and his followers amongst the “aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth” favoured the texts and 
expressions dictated by, or transmitted from the direct receivers of the Scripture; 
the Prophet and his Companions. Historically, ideas and derivatives of human 
wisdom in this subject have led to violence and severe excommunication. It was 
argued that Ibn Ḥanbal revived the notion of bi-lā kayf propagated first by Abū 
Ḥanīfah in term of negation, but approved the circulated dicta amongst traditional 
scholars devising the concept of imrār kamā jāʾat (let them pass the way they were 
transmitted).42 Theological deliberators named the Ḥanbalīs as Ḥashawīs (heedless 
disseminators). The support of traditional scholars and propagators for the mere 
ascription of human attributes amongst the laymen awarded them the accusation of 
tashbīh (assimilating God to human) and tajsīm.43 
Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, being trained in the Muʿtazilite milieu, embraced 
some empathy for speculative questions, yet simultaneously, was convinced by the 
majestic sophistication of traditional transmissions. Contrary to Ibn Ḥanbal whose 
influence was prevalent amongst the traditionalists and the public, particularly in 
Baghdād, Ashʿarism penetrated the worldwide discourse of the philosophers, 
                                                        
40 For Ibn Taymiyyah, taʿṭīl is more dangerous than tashbīh. See: Naqd Asās al-Taqdīs (Madinah: al-
ʿUlūm wa’l-Ḥikam, 1425), 3.  
41 Netton, Allah Transcendent, 332. 
42 Montgomery Watt, Early Islam: Collected Articles (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1990), 88.  




theologians, rationalists and traditionalists alike. Whereas modern Ashʿarīs reject 
his retraction from figurative interpretation, modern Salafīs emphasis al-Ashʿarī’s 
conversion to Ḥanbalī Sunnī position after his migration to Baghdād. His adoption of 
figurative interpretation was reduced to the two former phases which were 
Muʿtazilism and the phase of being influenced by Ibn Kullāb.44 Al-Ashʿarī’s position, 
then, becomes a bone of contention between many Sunnī fractions until the modern 
time.45 Ultimately, his stance could be identified amongst four main attitudes 
combining an affirmation and a sense of negation: 
(1) ithbāt al-lafẓ wa-tafwīḍ al-maʿnā al-qaṭʿī (affirming the text and consigning 
the decisive meaning to God),46  
(2) ithbāt al-lafẓ wa-taʾwīl al-maʿnā (affirming the text and assigning a 
parabolic meaning),  
(3) ithbāt al-lafẓ wa-thubūti al-maʿnā al-murād wa-nafy al-kayf (affirming the 
text with the existence of a certain signified meaning, and negating corporealism), 
and 
(4) ithbāt al-lafz wa-tathbīt al-maʿnā al-ẓāhir wa-tafwīḍ al-kayf (affirming the 
text, assigning prima facie meaning, and consigning the modality). 
 Nevertheless, due to the fact that al-Ashʿarī has been acknowledged as 
belonging to those who maintain ithbāt (affirmation), it was generally recognised 
that ithbāt was the collective identity of people of Sunnah regardless of a more 
specific identification either with the Ashʿarism or the Ḥanbalism, particularly in 
their conceptions of taʾwīl, tafwīḍ and takyīf. As far as al-Khaṭīb is concerned, the 
question still remains: which sense of Ashʿarism he was perceived to belong? 
                                                        
44 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, 3:228, Ibn Kathīr, Ṭabaqāt, 1:210. See also: Harith Ramli, “The 
Predecessors of Ashʿarism: Ibn Kullāb, al-Muḥāsibī, and al-Qalānīsī” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic 
Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2016). 
45 Modern scholars had spoken of different interpretation of Ashʿarism. See: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Fuṣūl 
fī al-ʿAqīdah bayna al-Salaf wa’l-Khalaf (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2005). Richard Frank, “Elements in 
the Development of the Teaching of al-Ashʿarī,” in Texts and Studies on the Development and History of 
Kalām, ed. Dimitri Gutas, vol. II: Early Islamic Theology: The Muʿtazilites and al-Ashʿarī, VI:141-190. 




7.5  Al-Khaṭīb on al-Mutashābihāt and al-Taʾwīl 
 The text of al-Qawl clearly denies any association of al-Khaṭīb with takyīf. 47 It 
also excludes him from the view that expresses, for instance, the meaning of yad as 
qudrah (power), or reduces the meaning of listening or hearing to knowing. This 
position represents the second view attributed to al-Ashʿarī, at least during the first 
two theological phases, as mentioned above. We are left with the views (1), (3) and 
(4) to locate al-Khaṭīb’s taʾwīl and his association with Ashʿarism. 
 It is crucial, however, to explore related topics before pursuing this concept. 
The first of them is the question of whether the Qurʾanic verses and ḥadīths 
pertaining to attributes belong to the category of mutashābihāt or muḥkamāt.48 The 
scope of this study does not allow a deliberation of views and divisions in this topic. 
Ibn Taymiyyah (728/1328) was the pivotal figure who decidedly asserted that 
traditionally there was none amongst the pious predecessors and the great scholars 
who qualified Divine attributes as mutashābih. Ibn Taymiyyah argued logically that 
when we recite the verse, which mentions “God is All-knowing,” we certainly know 
the maʿnā (meaning) of this verse. There was no obscurity and confusion involved in 
this type of attributive verses.49 Later Ḥanbalīs such as Marʿī al-Karmī (1033/1624) 
inversely asserted that verses of attributes belong to mutashābihāt.50 The Shāfiʿī al-
Zarkashī (794/1392), prior to him, had specified a section on the mutashābihāt verses 
pertaining to Divine attributes in his ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān.51 He was echoed by al-Zurqānī 
(1367/1948) who also pointed out the work of Ibn al-Labbān (749/1348), Radd al-
                                                        
47 Richard Frank suggests that bi-lā kayf in Ashʿarī writings means more than without saying “why?” 
or “how?” to include the negation of physical attributes for kullu mā fī al-ʿālam min al-mukayyafāt 
(everything in the world which has physical attributes is created). Elements, 155-157. 
48 These are among the hermeneutical categories which were devised by early exegetes for the 
classification of the Qurʾān’s contents which have their origin in a Qurʾānic pericope, Q. 3:7. Al-Khaṭīb 
preceded al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī who posits that the quest to fathom the import of such verses 
exercised the mind and that individuals were rewarded for ingeniously dissipating their energies 
therein. See these terms in: Mustafa Shah, Tafsīr: Interpreting the Qurʾān (London: Routledge, 2013), 
1:22-23. 
49 Majmūʿ Fatāwā, 13:294-295. 
50 Aqāwīl al-Thiqāt (Beirut: al-Risālah, 1985), 60. 
51 al-Zarkashī, al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, 1984), 2:78. 
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Mutashābihāt ilā al-Āyāt al-Muḥkamāt.52 Modern scholars such as al-Qaraḍāwī 
conclude that this was the view of the majority of the Sunnīs contrary to Ibn 
Taymiyyah.53 Insofar as al-Khaṭīb is concerned, there was no reference as to 
whether he regarded the said verses and ḥadīths as mutashābihāt or otherwise. He 
did mention an opinion that views one of the Qurʾanic opening letters, kāf-hā-yā-
ʿayn-ṣād as referring to Divine attributes, in the midst of his elaboration on 
mutashābihāt.54 It is insufficient, however, to ascribe to al-Khaṭīb any position with 
certainty.   
 Nevertheless, in defining mutashābihāt, al-Khaṭīb presented first Ibn 
Qutaybah’s linguistic explanation of the term referring originally to anything that 
hinders a clear distinction due to its similarity to another thing. Al-Khaṭīb then 
provided some other views such as (1) mutashābihāt are synonymous to mujmāl 
(summary speeches), (2) mutashābihāt are God’s hidden knowledge, (3) mutashābihāt 
are stories and parables apart from legal verses in the Qurʾān, and (4) mutashābihāt 
refer to the opening letters of certain chapters in the Qurʾān. Leah Kinberg has 
studied ideas pertaining to mutashābihāt explaining these views including the 
concept of ambiguity and similarity in relation to them.55 Al-Khaṭīb eventually cited 
Ibn Fūrak who takes mutashābihāt to mean both “ambiguous” and “similar” but, in 
addition to Kinberg’s list, have meanings that seem similar to falsehood (bāṭil).56 The 
mutashābihāt was perceived as a fusion of disobliging meanings. According to Ibn 
Fūrak, one should be able to distinct (tamyīz), ascertain (tabayyun), speculate (naẓar) 
                                                        
52 Possibly the one published with the title Izālat al-Shubuhāt ʿan al-Āyāt wa al-Aḥādīth al-Mutashābihāt 
(Dār Ṭuwayq, 1995). See: al-Zurqānī, Manāhil al-ʿIrfān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 
1995), 2:226. 
53 al-Qaraḍāwī, Fuṣūl fī al-Aqīdah, 34. 
54 It was reported that these letters are description of God’s attributes; kāf refers to kāfī (the 
sufficient), hāʾ to hādī (the guide), yāʾ is taken from ḥakīm (the wise), ʿayn for ʿalīm (the all-knowing), 
ṣād for ṣādiq (the honest). See: FWM, 1:211. 
55 Leah Kinberg, “Muḥkamāt and Mutashābihāt (Koran 3/7): Implication of a Koranic Pair of Terms in 
Medieval Exegesis,” Arabica 35:2 (1988): 143-172.  
56 FWM, 1:209. 
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and recognise (ʿilm) the truth from the falsehood in these meanings.57 The 
mutashābihāt then do not represent the limits to which reason must subjugate itself, 
rather an array of questions where istidlāl and naẓar must be employed. Ibn Fūrak 
also attributed this to al-Ashʿarī in Mujarrad.58 
 This view is further proven in al-Khaṭīb’s answer to the question of whether 
the scholars are able to fathom mutashābihāt, i.e. obtain taʾwīl. In Kitāb-al-Faqīh, al-
Khaṭīb cited the Shāfiʿī Abū Bakr al-Ṣayrafī who divided the mutashābih into two 
types. The first is known only to God based on the verse 7 of Āl-ʿImrān in the Qurʾān. 
It reads “wa-mā yaʿlamu taʾwīlahu illa Allah wa’l-rāsikhūn fī al-ʿilm yaqūlūn āmanna bihi.” 
The focal point is on the beginning part where the Qurʾān expresses that no one 
knows the taʾwīl except for God. The second type is the mushtabihāt, which was taken 
from the tradition of al-Nuʿmān ibn Bashīr where the Prophet says: ‘The lawful is 
clear and the unlawful is clear, and between them are mushtabihāt (confusing) 
matters which are unknown to most people.’ According to al-Ṣayrafī, this type of 
mutashābih is impliedly known to few people (the scholars). Al-Ṣayrafī here blended 
together mutashābihāt and mushtabihāt in the category of mutashābih. 
 Al-Khaṭīb disagreed with the consequence of this division. He sanguinely 
responded: 
 ‘The truth is –and God knows better– the [interpretation of] mutashābihāt is 
known to the erudite amongst the scholars (al-rāsikhūn fī’l-ʿilm). And God has 
never mentioned anything in His scripture except that He had provided a 
path for scholars towards its cognition (maʿrifah).’59 
 Al-Khaṭīb gave several traditions to support this view. He remarked that 
historically not a single thing in the Qurʾān except that people had discussed its 
taʾwīl including the opening letters of some chapters, e.g. alif-lām-rāʾ, alif-lām-mīm-
ṣād, etc. 
                                                        
57 In his work, Ibn Fūrak only mentions that al-mutashābih is a problematic (mushkīl) matter that 
requires thinking and contemplation. See: al-Ḥudūd, 147. 
58 Al-Ashʿarī: ‘It implies that al-mutashābih is a fusion of text with possibilities of contradicting 
meanings that it becomes confusing (ishtabaha). For many opposing meanings are involved, the right 
meaning can only be ascertained through al-naẓar wa’l-istidlāl.’ See: Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 190-191. 
59 FWM, 1:210-211. 
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 To further strengthen his argument, al-Khaṭīb discussed the verse-7-of-Āl-
ʿImrān. According to Kinberg, this verse has presented the Qurʾanic commentators 
with two main questions: one concerns the definition of muḥkamāt and 
mutashābihāt; the other touches the legitimacy of Qurʾān interpretation.60 With 
regard to the second question, the verse employs a vague syntactic structure that 
accommodates both “that Allah alone knows the taʾwīl of mutashābihāt,” and “that 
taʾwīl also can be attained by the erudite amongst the scholars.” Al-Khaṭṭābī whose 
text was replicated in al-Khaṭīb’s aforementioned text asserted that majority of the 
scholars read the verse with a stop after the phrase “illa Allah”. They will 
recommence with “wa’l-rāsikhūn fi’l-ʿilm yaqūlūn āmannā bihi” making the preceding 
wāw as the wāw of al-istiʾnāf (recommencement).61 Al-Khaṭīb disagreed with this 
opinion. He presented Mujāhid’s recitation that does not stop after “illa Allah” and 
combines it with the phrase afterwards. Mujāhid was also reported to interpret the 
verse inserting the phrase “yaʿlamūn taʾwīlahu wa-yaqūlūn” (they know the 
interpretation and they say). Al-Khaṭīb argued: ‘If this is not the case, there will be 
no faḍīlah for the erudite amongst the scholars, for everyone including the common 
believers will definitely say ‘amannā bihi’ (we profess it).’ At this point, the darajāt 
paradigm clearly influenced al-Khaṭīb’s interpretation. Being questioned with the 
absence of wāw before the word yaqūlūn to ensure that his reading conforms to the 
stylistic requirement of the language, al-Khaṭīb provided two answers: first is the 
legitimacy of ellipsis by the omission of the conjunctive wāw in Arabic rhetoric; the 
other is to place the verb yaqūlūn on the grammatical position of ḥāl (while) 
denoting ‘they know the taʾwīl while they are saying.’62 
 Nevertheless, if the verse indicates what al-Khaṭīb asserted, why is there a 
negative remark exemplified in the phrase “the perverse at heart eagerly pursue 
the mutashābihāt in their attempt to make trouble and to pin down a specific 
meaning of their own”? Al-Khaṭīb’s answer could be appreciated from the story of 
Ṣabīgh ibn ʿIsl who was flogged and punished by ʿUmar the Caliph for asking 
                                                        
60 Kinberg, Muḥkamāt, 143. 
61 al-Khaṭṭābī, Maʿālim al-Sunan (Aleppo: al-Maṭbaʿah al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1932), 4:331. 
62 FWM, 1:212. 
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questions on mutashābih in the Qurʾān.63 Kinberg mentioned this story when 
discussing the possibility of interpretation amongst those who view that 
mutashābihāt concerns ambiguous verses. Referring to Harris Birkeland’s study on 
the opposition towards tafsīr amongst classical Muslim scholars, this story at face 
value serves as a sign of opposition against tafsīr. However, according to Birkeland, 
this story could not be a proof for the opposition at such an early time. ʿUmar may 
have been a strict ruler, but the activity of tafsīr flourished during or after Ibn 
ʿAbbās’ time. Nevertheless, the story, according to him, does reflect the later 
Ḥashawī or Ḥanbalī opposition to tafsīr.64 Al-Khaṭīb too had not taken ʿUmar’s 
punishment as a prohibition to asking about mutashābihāt. Contrary to al-Ghazālī 
who stated that ʿUmar was closing the doors of jadal and kalām, al-Khaṭīb viewed 
that Ṣabīgh was punished because ʿUmar had seen in him the tendency of casting 
doubts upon the ordinary Muslims by discussing difficult subjects and leading 
people to the wrong interpretation (fāsid al-taʾwīl).65 This notion of al-taʾwīl al-fāsid 
reiterates the Ashʿarī’s concept of the valid naẓar according to the right condition. 
Scholars are given the right to speculate in order to “arrive” at the truth; hence, 
learning questions are allowed and praiseworthy contrary to the trouble-making 
questions. The negative remark in the above verse refers to the latter. Al-Khaṭīb 
presented several traditions where the Prophet reprimanded those who ask 
questions in order to publicise the error of scholars or to avoid responsibility. 
Elsewhere, al-Khaṭīb mentioned that the Caliph ʿAlī was the only one amongst the 
Companions who requested people to ask him of anything that will occur until the 
end of time where he promised an answer for everyone. According to al-Khaṭīb, this 
was done in the right condition since ʿAlī only uttered this statement after given 
authority and it was not in the time of the previous Caliphs.66 Naẓar, ijtihād and 
taʾwīl, therefore: necessitate the right intention and the right condition. 
                                                        
63 Ibn Ḥajar, al-Iṣābah fī Tamyīz al-Ṣaḥābah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 3:370. 
64 Harris Birkeland, “Old Muslim Opposition against Interpretation of the Koran,” in The Qurʾān: 
Formative Interpretation, ed. Andrew Rippin (USA: Ashgate Varorium, 1999), 41-80. 
65 al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ, 1:88, FWM, 2:19, Ibn ʿAsākir reported the stories of Ṣabīgh from the chain of al-
Khaṭīb. See: TDQ, 23:408-409. 
66 FWM, 2:351-353. 
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 Having clarified the above and al-Khaṭīb’s concept of mutashābihāt, it is 
easier to apprehend al-Khaṭīb’s statement in al-Jāmiʿ concerning the ḥadīths of 
Divine attributes. Al-Khaṭīb wrote: 
 ‘In his dictations, a tradent should avoid from narrating traditions which 
the minds of ordinary men are incapable of comprehending them for they 
might fall into errors and wrong estimations. They might fall into 
assimilating God with creatures or describing Him with improper 
descriptions. The example for this is the traditions pertaining to the Divine 
attributes whose prima facie meanings entail tashbīh, tajsīm or attaching body 
parts and organs to the One who is al-azalī al-aadīm (the pre-eternal and the 
timelessly eternal). Even though these ḥadīths are sound and its taʾwīl occurs 
in many ways and guises, the right of these ḥadīths is they are not to be 
delivered except to those who deserve them (li-ahlihā). We fear that those 
who are in ignorance of their meanings will take the outward meaning 
(yaḥmiluhā ʿalā ẓāhirihā) or abominate them and accuse the honest 
transmitters of forgery.’67 
 What we learn from this important passage is that the ẓāhir meaning in this 
regard is not to be taken as the intended meaning.68 Based on the discussion in the 
previous chapters, ijtihād is a responsibility of and confined to scholars who possess 
the right tools for naẓar and istidlāl. The ordinary men therefore: need to be 
distanced from engaging with highly speculative subjects.   
 From this point of view, we may safely exclude the possibility (1) of al-
Khaṭīb’s Ashʿarism. It leaves us with only two possibilities whose difference lies in 
the conceptual idea of maʿnā.  
If maʿnā is understood in the sense of signifié, taʾwīl then is a synonym of tafsīr 
where the relatively outward meaning is acceptable.69 It refers to the position 
number (4). This was the position of Ibn Taymiyyah when he refuted those who 
viewed that the ẓāhir of these attributive verses and ḥadīths are not intended (ghayr 
murād). According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the affirmation of the lafẓ entails the 
affirmation of the prima facie or tabādur. It does not imply any corporeality or 
anthropomorphism, since the Divine realm is utterly different and extremely 
                                                        
67 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:107-108. 
68 See literal meaning, intended meaning and understood meaning in: Gleave, Islamic Literalism, 4-5. 
69 See Chapter Six. 
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disparate from the realm of the creatures.70 Any deviation from prima facie meaning 
would be an alteration (taḥrīf). This binary of “ẓāhir ghayr murād: prima facie 
meaning” was employed by Ibn Taymiyyah to refute both muʾawwilah (non-
outward-based interpreters) and mufawwiḍah (consignors) while preserving the 
simple easy experience of religion for the public. Both groups affirmed the lafẓ but 
with the emphasis on ẓāhir ghayr murād. Ironically, it was simplicity too that caused 
Ibn Taymiyyah many troubles for according to the simple minds, the prima facie 
meaning always entail anthropomorphism or assimilation. 
It seems that maʿnā has been understood as maqṣūd (intended) by al-Khaṭīb. 
Thus, another binary could be proposed; “ẓāhir ghayr murād: maqṣūd meaning.” 
When the affirmation of maʿnā is asserted, it does not necessarily entail an 
affirmation of the prima facie meaning, rather a reference to a specific intended 
meaning by God, known to the erudite, “signified” not solely by language (lisān 
ʿarabiy), but also by the entirety of ʿilm. It is not a taʾwīl in the sense of figurative 
interpretation. Whereas Ibn Taymiyyah’s position could be represented by ithbāt al-
maʿnā (actively affirming the meaning), this position could be expressed by thubūt 
al-maʿnā i.e. the existence of the Divine intended meaning or metaphysical meaning. 
This intended meaning rejects eviction of the words and takyīf such as explained by 
al-Khaṭīb, but added the highly strong insistence on negating tajsīm and 
corporealism of the physical realm, contrary to Ibn Taymiyyah. They differed in the 
ultimate endpoint of taʾwīl cum tafsīr where Ibn Taymiyyah stopped at linguistic 
prima facie but the second group allowed for speculation to penetrate or transgress 
further. However, the acquired meaning is exclusive to the scholar and should not 
be qualified by any linguistic modality. 
This might explain al-Khaṭīb’s view of Ashʿarism. It does coalesce with the 
impression that al-Ashʿarī was different from the Literalists (of prima facie) due to 
his insistence that we can talk about God only in a symbolic language. However, al-
Ashʿarī also opposed the Traditionists severe restriction of reason.71 For the fact 
                                                        
70 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, 3:43, also al-Risālah al-Madaniyyah fī Taḥqīq al-Majāz wa’l-Ḥaqīqah fī 
Ṣifāt Allah Taʿālā (Makkah: al-Maṭbaʿah al-Salafiyyah, 1932), 7-10. 
71 Frank, Elements, 186-187. 
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that the Prophet did not encounter this “rupture of language”, as Netton put it, it 
was the duty of mujtahid to employ the interpretive tools such as qiyās. 
Al-Khaṭīb had succinctly noted,  
‘The qiyās (reasoning) in tawḥīd is of two types. The praiseworthy is when it 
leads to the affirmation of the Maker and His unicity, and the affirmation of 
the Unseen realm, the Scriptures and His Messengers. The blameworthy one 
is when it leads to heresy and ilḥād (atheism) such as assimilating His 
attributes with attributes of creatures (tashbīh) or rejecting the texts in 
which God and His Messenger affirm His attributes due to one’s [corrupted] 
reasoning.’72 
If kalām is qualified by qiyās in matters of dogma, it is here supported and 
defended as long as it does not nullify the traditional dicta and understanding.  
Having clarified the above, a question still remains. Whether the 
accessibility to this seemingly exclusive, mysterious and ineffable meaning of 
attributes confined to the exercise of learning and speculating upon thousands of 
ḥadīth or is it accessible through the taṣawwuf paradigm, which explains the later 
Ashʿarī accommodation of theosophical taṣawwuf. What was the perception towards 
taṣawwuf in al-Khaṭīb’s writings? 
7.6  Al-Khaṭīb and Taṣāwwuf 
 As far as the available works are concerned, there was no self-testimony that 
connects him with taṣawwuf.73 The concept of taṣawwuf itself was a matter of debate 
as reflected in Ibn al-Jawzī’s discussion on the origin of the name in Talbīs Iblīs.74 A 
renowned Ḥanbalī mystic, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, who was also a student of al-
Khaṭīb’s student, Ibn ʿAqīl, listed eight fine virtues on which Sufism is built. These 
are: (1) Liberal generosity, (2) Contentment, (3) Patience, (4) Symbolic instruction, 
(5) Living away from home, (6) Wearing the dervish cloak made of coarse wool (ṣūf), 
                                                        
72 FWM, 1:511. 
73 Ahmet Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2007). 
74 Florian Sobieroj, “The Muʿtazila and Sufism,” in Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of 
Controversies and Polemics, ed. Fred de Jong and Bernd Radtke (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 68-92. 
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(7) Wandering travel (in a state of abstinence), and (8) Spiritual poverty.75 All these 
eight had been touched in al-Khaṭīb’s al-Zuhd wa’l-Raqāʾiq. However, there was no 
record of him practising some of them such as wearing ṣūf and renunciant 
wandering. Ibn al-Jawzī on the other hand had written a refutation titled Dhamm-
ʿAbd-al-Qādir and criticised the luminary that led to a conflict between him and his 
grandson.76 The following is an attempt to identify al-Khaṭīb’s attitude towards 
taṣawwuf through comparing his treatment of biographies of Ṣūfīs with Ibn al-
Jawzī’s assessment of Sufism. Apart from being identified with Ḥanbalism, Ibn al-
Jawzī represented a spectrum in the circle of al-ḥuffāẓ that may reflect a diversity of 
attitudes within aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth.  
7.7  Al-Khaṭīb’s Sources for Biography of Ṣūfīs 
To assess the background and possibility of influence, al-Khaṭīb’s sources in 
his treatment of the Ṣūfīs are crucially significant. The following are notable Ṣūfīs 
and their works which al-Khaṭīb had evidently consulted in his writings: 
1. Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī, Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān of Nishapur 
(412/1022).77 
He was a pioneering Ṣūfī writer. According to al-Khaṭīb, he visited 
Baghdād several times and authored tafsīr, ḥadīth and biographical works 
for the Ṣūfīs. Some sources attribute to him more than thirty works. Al-
Khaṭīb audited ḥadīths from the generation who heard directly from him. 
One of al-Khaṭīb’s masters, al-Ḥāfiẓ Yūsuf ibn Aḥmad al-Qaṭṭān (n.d.) of 
Nishapur accused al-Sulamī of fabricating ḥadīths for the Ṣūfīs. This 
Shāfiʿīte master doubted al-Sulamī’s transmission from the Shāfiʿīte al-
Aṣamm and his ḥadīth competency which he proved by his transmission of 
the Tārīkh of Ibn Maʿīn after the demise of al-Hākim of Nishapur. Al-
                                                        
75 al-Jīlanī was deemed the pole of the saints. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, Pearls of the Heart, trans. Muhtar 
Holland, printed with The Summary of Religious Knowledge (Florida: al-Baz Publishing Inc., 2010), 166. 
76 al-Dhahabī: ‘Ibn al-Jawzī did not grant a proper credit to ʿAbd al-Qādir.’ Siyar, 21:376-377, TIM, 
12:1107-1109.  
77 Jean-Jacques Thibon, L'œuvre d'Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Sulami, 325/937-412/1021, et la formation du 
soufisme (Damascus: Institut français du Proche-Orient, 2009). 
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Khaṭīb’s friend al-Qushayrī, however, told him of the thaumaturgic gift of 
al-Sulāmī he experienced in person. Al-Khaṭīb commented on al-Qaṭṭān’s 
remark: ‘Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān was highly respected by the people of his 
city, and of great importance amongst his Ṣūfī followers. He was also a 
well-accomplished ḥadīth tradent and a respected author of biographies, 
and ḥadīth topics and subjects. He had a Ṣūfī lodge in Nishapur, which I 
have visited. His grave is people’s spot for blessings and I have visited it 
too.’78 
 The consulted works: 
1- Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyyah 79 
2- Tārīkh al-Ṣūfiyyah 80 
3- al-Ikhwah wa al-Akhawāt min al-Ṣūfiyyah 81 
2. ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Jahḍam al-Jīlī, Abu’l-Ḥasan of Hamadhān (414/1023). 
He migrated from Hamadhān and became well known as the Ṣūfī of 
Makkah. Amongst those transmitted from him were al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Azdī al-
Miṣrī and al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Quḍāʿī. Ibn al-Jawzī reported that some people 
accused him of fabricating traditions. However, the tradent and historian 
of Hamadhān, Shīraviyē of Daylam praised his ḥadīth transmission and his 
Ṣūfī practices saying that he was well known in these regions.82 
The consulted work would be his work on biography of the Ṣūfīs 
titled Bahjah al-Asrār which al-Dhahabī evaluated as full of frauds.83 Al-
                                                        
78 TMS, 3:42. 
79 Compare: TMS, 14:136 and al-Sulamī, Ṭabaqāt, 162.    
80 TMS, 3:280, 5:470, 6:423, 7:13, 7:439, 7:609, 8:292, 13:545. The book Tārīkh al-Ṣūfiyyah does not 
extant. 
81 TMS, 7:609. Al-Sulamī’s book does not extant. 
82 Ibn Ḥajar, Lisān al-Mīzān, 5:554-555. 
83 al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 4:304. 
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Khaṭīb received this work from Ibn Jahḍam’s student ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz the 
scribe, who learned it in Makkah.84 
3. Maʿmar ibn Aḥmad al-Ṣūfī, Abū Manṣūr of Isfahan (418/1027). 85 
Al-Khaṭīb received his work Ṭabaqāt al-Nussāk during his visit to 
Jarbādhiqān while he was learning under Abū Nuʿaym.86 
4. His professor, Abū Nuʿaym al-Isfahānī (430/1039). 
Al-Khaṭīb certainly reported directly from the professor.87 He also 
cited extensively from his Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ.88 Amongst the works of Abū 
Nuʿaym he brought to Damascus: 
1- Al-Thuqalāʾ - a literary work on humour. 
2- Riyāḍat al-Mutaʿallimīn – on Ṣūfī training of the carnal soul. 
5. His friend, ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Hawāzin, Abū’l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī 
See below for further elaboration. 
6. Unknown authors 
These works are mentioned amongst the books al-Khaṭīb brought to 
Damascus: 
1- Akhbār Fuḍayl ibn ʿIyāḍ 
2- Akhbār Bishr ibn al-Ḥārith 
3- Akhbār Dāwūd al-Ṭāʾī 
4- Akhbār Wuhayb ibn al-Ward 
5- Akhbār Ibrāhīm ibn Adham 
6- Akhbār Ḥātim al-Aṣamm 
7- Kalām Dhī’l-Nūn al-Miṣrī 
8- Kalām Yaḥyā ibn Muʿāz al-Rāzī 
                                                        
84 TMS, 6:330, 6:459, 8:688. 
85 See Chapter One. 
86 TMS, 6:493, 8:145, 8:168, 9:477. 
87 ‘Dhakara lī Abū Nuʿaym,’ See: TMS, 2:204, 11:321, and 16:603. 
88 TMS, 7:545. Cf. Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥilyah, 8:338. 
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9- Kalām Abī Bakr al-Shiblī89 
7.8  Comparative Studies on the Main Taṣawwuf Figures 
 The selection of the figures of this section is based on three criteria: (i) The 
mention of their works in the library of al-Khaṭīb, (ii) the length of treatment al-
Khaṭīb allocated for their biographical entry in Tārīkh, and (iii) Ibn al-Jawzī’s 
criticism of them in the section on the devil’s deception of the Ṣūfīs in Talbīs Iblīs. 
Ibn al-Jawzī’s evaluation will be appreciated as well from his other work Ṣifat al-
Ṣafwah. 
7.8.1  Al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (243/857) 
 Al-Muḥāsibī’s main agenda was an inspection of mystical psychology, which 
exemplified in his work al-Riʿāyah li-Ḥuqūq Allah. His autobiographical work titled 
Waṣāyā could be considered as the prototype for al-Ghazālī’s al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl. 
He also had a short treatise on the nature of the intellect named Māhiyat al-ʿAql wa 
Maʿnāhu. After his long journey of seeking the right path, he came to a realisation 
that led him to emphasise the role of self-discipline in taming the carnal soul, which 
informs his concept of muḥāsabah (self examination). Gavin Picken did an elaborate 
study on this early master of the Ṣūfīs of Baghdād.90 
 Al-Khaṭīb began his biographical entry by praising him as amongst those 
who were blessed with the combination (ijtamaʿa lahu) of zuhd with maʿrifat of ẓāhir 
and bāṭin. This was neither a statement of al-Sulāmī, nor Abū Nuʿaym or al-
Qushayrī.91 Al-Khaṭīb praises his works in zuhd, theology and theological refutations 
saying that they are full of benefits. The picture of al-Muḥāsibī’s achievement in 
Ashʿarī theology was presented through the statement of al-Khaṭīb’s Ashʿarī 
professor Ibn Shādhān that al-Muḥāsibī’s work titled al-Dimāʾ was the chief 
                                                        
89 See the chapter “The Ṣūfīs of Baghdād” in: Karamustafa, Sufism, 1-26.  
90 Gavin Picken, The Life and Works of al-Muḥāsibī (Routledge, 2011). Cf. Josef van Ess, Die Gedankenweld 
Des Ḥārit̲ Al-Muḥāsibī Anhand Von Überstzungen Aus Seinen Schriften Dargestellt Und Erläutert. (Bonn: 
Selbstverlag des Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Bonn, 1961). 




reference for the Ashʿarīs concerning the civil wars amongst the Companions.92 Al-
Khaṭīb’s input echoes ʿAbd al-Qāhir’s remark that ‘upon the writings of al-Muhasibi 
in kalām, ḥadīth, fiqh, and taṣawwuf rest those amongst us who are theologian, ḥāfiẓ, 
jurist, and Ṣūfī.’93  
 As studied in an article by Picken, al-Muḥāsibī faced a criticism from Ibn 
Ḥanbal.94 It was not surprising then to find Ibn al-Jawzī citing him in many places to 
the extent that al-Muḥāsibī was rendered the root of a pandemic (aṣl al-baliyyah).95 
Both brought into the picture Abū Zurʿah’s famous description of al-Muḥāsibī’s 
books as heretical and deviant writings. Al-Khaṭīb, however, preceded it with the 
narrative that Ibn Ḥanbal’s critic of al-Muḥasibī was due to his engagement in 
kalām. Elsewhere, al-Khaṭīb had also reported Abū Zurʿah’s description of Ṣaḥīḥ 
Muslim as the mine for heretics.96 Melchert has entertained the fact that Ibn Ḥanbal 
associated al-Muḥāsibī with Jahmism, probably for the problem of lafẓ.97 Al-Khaṭīb 
ended by intimating that al-Muhāsibī’s loss of endearment from scholars during his 
demise was due to his conflict with Ibn Ḥanbal.  
7.8.2 Dhū’l-Nūn al-Miṣrī (245/859) 
 Dhū’l-Nūn was the first to publicise his mystical experiences and to 
formulate the theory of gnosis (maʿrifah). This refers to knowledge arising from 
God’s providential communication of spiritual light into the heart of a Ṣūfī, which 
differs from common knowledge (ʿilm) that comes from sensory perception. He was 
                                                        
92 TMS, 9:104. 
93 ʿAbd al-Qāhir, Uṣūl al-Dīn, 308-309. 
94 Gavin Picken, “Ibn Ḥanbal and al-Muḥāsibī: A Study of Early Conflicting Scholarly Methodologies,” 
Arabica (Revue d’études arabes et islamiques) 55.3 (2008): 337-361. 
95 Ibn al-Jawzī, Talbīs, 243-244. 
96 Tarikh, 5:450. 
97 Melchert, Formation, 73-75. 
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also the first to introduce the Ṣūfī doctrines of aḥwāl wa maqāmāt (states and 
stations).98  
 Al-Khaṭīb had a long entry on him and defended his narrations of ḥadīth. 
According to him, there were spurious traditions traced back to Dhū’l-Nūn. He 
reported al-Azharī’s mention of al-Dāraquṭnī’s doubt over traditions Dhū’l-Nūn 
reported from Mālik ibn Anas since Dhū’l-Nūn was a mere preacher (wāʿiẓ). 
However, al-Sulamī had reported that al-Dāraquṭnī also said: ‘If the chain to Dhū’l-
Nūn is clean, his traditions are sound for he himself is trustworthy.’ Al-Khaṭīb 
concluded that the culprit for these spurious traditions would be amongst those 
who feature later in the chains. 
 Al-Khaṭīb also included a one page long of Dhū’l-Nūn’s answer to the Caliph 
al-Mutawakkil in which he gave a detailed description of the awliyāʾ Allah (saints of 
God). He also dictated a prayer to Judge Yaḥyā ibn Aktham for al-Mutawakkil, which 
includes the phrase bi-dhikrika fī dhikrika ilā dhikrika (by virtue of, being in, and 
heading to Your remembrance).99 In al-Zuhd wa’l-Raqāʾiq, al-Khaṭīb cited Dhū’l-Nūn 
more than five times amongst them his ishārah (Ṣūfī allusion) on the cure of maʿṣiyah 
(disobedience).100 
 Ibn al-Jawzī included Dhū’l-Nūn amongst the masters of innovation. After 
citing Ibn Ḥanbal and Abū Zurʿah’s mention of heretical books and writings, he 
reported that al-Sulamī affirmed Dhū’l-Nūn as the first to have discussed the Ṣūfī 
states and stations in his town. ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, a leading figure in 
Egypt and a follower of Mālikī madhhab refuted Dhū’l-Nūn. Consequently, Dhū’l-Nūn 
was boycotted by the scholars of Egypt and accused as a zindīq.101 
                                                        
98 B.A. Dar, “Ṣūfīs before al-Ḥallāj,” in A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden, 
1963), 340-341, Karamustafa, Sufism, 6. 
99 TMS, 9:373. 
100 al-Muntakhab min al-Zuhd, 122. 
101 Ibn al-Jawzī, Talbīs, 243. 
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7.8.3 al-Junayd al-Baghdādī (289/910) 
 Al-Junayd was the leader of Baghdād’s mystical school, yet was recognised 
by all mystical schools due to his balanced view on exotericism and esotericism. His 
main teaching treats the concept of God’s unity (tawḥīd) and human sobriety (al-
ṣahw). He was associated with al-Muḥāsibī and his uncle al-Sariy ibn al-Mughallis al-
Saqaṭī (253/867). Al-Junayd’s mysticism retains submissiveness to God in the 
concept of fanāʾ (annihilation) where a Ṣūfī must return to consciousness over his 
relationship with God after fanāʾ.102 
 Al-Khaṭīb had his biographical entry in pages where he qualified al-Junayd 
with the learning of ḥadīth and the jurisprudence of Abū Thawr.103 According to al-
Khaṭīb, he was the unique master of his time in the science of aḥwāl, Ṣūfī language, 
and the method of exhortation. He was attributed with numerous magnificent 
incidents and thaumaturgic gifts. This was echoed by al-Qushayrī who named al-
Junayd as sayyid hādhihi al-ṭāʾifah (the master of this movement).104 Al-Khaṭīb 
portrayed al-Junayd’s orthodoxy by his famous statement on taṣawwuf being 
intertwined with ḥadīth, sometimes with Kitāb and Sunnah. This raised his credibility 
that even Ibn Surayj’s innovative juridical teaching was boosted magically due to his 
learning from al-Junayd. Next, al-Junayd was also being widely recognised by 
scribes of ḥadīth, philosophers and theologians that attended his session altogether 
as attested by the Muʿtazilī al-Kaʿbī. In al-Khaṭīb’s al-Zuhd, al-Junayd defines 
taṣawwuf as applying to all praiseworthy characteristics according to the Sunnah.  
  Ibn al-Jawzī cited al-Junayd’s definition as well.105  However, he also 
reported that al-Junayd was attested by witnesses several times over being an 
apostate or zindīq.106 Ibn al-Jawzī reported on the authority of Abū’l-ʿAbbās Ibn ʿAṭāʾ 
that when Ghulām Khalīl reported the apostasy of the Ṣūfīs to the Caliph, al-Junayd 
                                                        
102 A. H. Abdel Kader, ed. and trans, The Life, Personality and Writings of al-Junayd (London, 1976), 
Karamustafa, Sufism, 15-17. 
103 TMS, 8:168. 
104 al-Risālah al-Qushayriyyah, 63. 
105 Ibn al-Jawzī, Talbīs, 238. 
106 Ibid, 247. 
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disguised himself as a jurist who teaches the jurisprudence of Abū Thawr.107 The 
wisdom of al-Junayd pertaining to asceticism, nevertheless, was provided in Ṣifat al-
Ṣafwah.108 
7.8.4 Al-Ḥusayn ibn Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj (309/922) 
 Al-Ḥallāj left the most controversial legacy in the history of early Sufism. 
Contrary to the sober Sufism of al-Junayd and his use of allusions (ishārāt) to express 
divine mysteries and mystical experiences, al-Ḥallāj represents the intoxicated 
version of mysticism and employs blunt and bold expressions. Louis Massignon 
pioneered the detailed study of al-Ḥallāj’s life and teachings.109 The central theme of 
his Sufism was love with God where a Ṣūfī ultimately reached a union with God. The 
majority of Muslim scholars reported that due to this notion of al-ḥulūl wa’l-ittiḥād 
(monism), al- Ḥallāj was prosecuted. 
 Al-Ḥallāj enjoys the longest entry amongst the biography of the Ṣūfīs al-
Khaṭīb provided in Tārīkh Baghdād.110 After the account on his genealogy, al-Khaṭīb 
mentioned his learning from al-Junayd and other Ṣūfī masters. The first part of the 
biography, then, portrayed al-Ḥallāj as the disputed figure amongst the Ṣūfīs 
themselves. According to al-Khaṭīb, the majority of Ṣūfīs denounced him, but early 
Ṣūfīs such as Abū’l-ʿAbbās Ibn ʿAṭāʾ and Muḥammad ibn Khafīf (371/982) recognised 
al-Ḥallāj’s favoured status with God. Ibn Khafīf, who was also a Shāfiʿī and a friend of 
al-Ashʿarī, designated him ʿālim rabbānī (Godly scholar).111 Al-Ḥallāj, according to al-
Khaṭīb, possessed the talent of exquisite linguistic expressions, and mellifluous 
utterances and poetry. Those who denounce him associated him with trickery and 
zandaqah, yet he was still celebrated to the days of al-Khaṭīb. 
                                                        
107 Ibid, 251. 
108 2:416. 
109 Louis Massignon, The Passion of al-Hallaj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam, trans. Herbert Mason (Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1994), Herbert Mason, “Hallaj and the Baghdād School of Sufism,” in The Heritage of 
Sufism, ed. Leonard Lewisohn (Oxford: Oneworld, 1999), 65-81. 
110 TMS, 8:688.  
111 He was the teacher of al-Bāqillānī: TIM, 8:365. 
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 Al-Khaṭīb apologised to his readers that he would report the accounts of al-
Ḥallāj despite arguments apropos his status. He presented more than twenty-five 
accounts on various events in the life of al-Ḥallāj. Next, al-Khaṭīb provided nearly 
on the same length what have been said concerning al-Ḥallāj’s trickery. The third 
part consists of the detailed story of al-Ḥallāj after being captured by the minister 
Ḥāmid ibn al-ʿAbbās. It also contains the arguments of the jurists against his creed 
and teachings. An account was reported on the authority of some close individuals 
that scholars and fuqahāʾ asked al-Ḥallāj during the inquisition about the meaning of 
burhān (the proof of God). Al-Ḥallāj replied that they (i.e. burhān) are manifestations 
in the form of a cloth being cloaked around a man of purity, to whom a magnet of 
attraction directs the souls. The fuqahāʾ unanimously said: ‘This is a speech of 
zandaqah (monism)!’ Al-Khaṭīb criticised the attribution of this evaluation as 
zandaqah to the fuqahāʾ. According to him, this “some close individuals” is 
unidentified (majhūl) and his narration cannot be accepted.112 The fuqahāʾ approved 
the death penalty for some other reasons. Al-Khaṭīb ended this section with the 
words of Naṣr the guard, ‘He was treated unjustly; he was amongst the worshippers 
of God.’ 
We are left without any decisive result when reading al-Khaṭīb’s entry on al-
Ḥallāj. Al-Khaṭīb had also praised Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī whom al-Qushayrī 
told him was transferring the poems of al-Ḥallāj through his works.113 Contrary to 
this impression, Ibn al-Jawzī was undoubtedly firm in his stance on al-Ḥallāj, to the 
extent that he adopted the view that whosoever thought otherwise was breaching 
the agreement of the fuqahāʾ.114 For him, the favour of the Ṣūfīs or the scholars of his 
time to al-Ḥallāj was a sign of stupidity and ignorance of the Sharīʿah. Al-Ḥallāj 
enjoys no single mention in Ṣifat al-Ṣafwah. Ibn al-Jawzī even wrote a treatise 
                                                        
112 Massignon argued that al-Khaṭīb criticised the account to support the Ashʿarī position on witness. 
See: al-Ḥallāj, 250. 
113 TMS, 3:42. 
114 Ibn al-Jawzī, Talbīs, 250-251. He did mention that Abū’l-ʿAbbās Ibn Surayj was silent and hesitated 
to comment on the pronouncement of al-Ḥallāj’s apostasy made by a judge. Ibn Surayj replied: ‘I do 
not have any idea on his decision.’ 
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dedicated to revealing the tricks of al-Ḥallāj and the position of scholars concerning 
him. It was titled al-Qāṭiʿ li-Maḥāl al-Lijāj al-Qāṭiʿ li-Miḥal al-Ḥallāj.115 
7.8.5 Abū Bakr al-Shiblī (334/946) 
 Al-Shiblī was an important Ṣūfī of Persian descent and a learned scholar in 
ḥadīth and Mālikī jurisprudence. He was a high-ranking government official but 
converted to Sufism at the age of forty. Similar to his friend al-Ḥallāj, he befriended 
al-Junayd until he admired him. Eventually, he denounced the way of al-Ḥallāj to 
prefer concealment of Divine Love due to Divine Jealousy. The allusions of al-Shiblī 
were considered amongst the wonders of Baghdād. His immersion in love with God, 
nevertheless, led him to be hospitalised frequently in the mental asylum in 
Baghdād. Al-Junayd, however, saw al-Shiblī’s return to sobriety during his prayers 
and acknowledged his state.116 Ibn Taymiyyah, on the other hand, considered him 
maghlūb (psychologically interrupted). 
 Al-Khaṭīb’s entry on al-Shiblī is nearly as long as his entry on al-Junayd. 
After mentioning the various reports on his real name, al-Khaṭīb stated that 
accounts and stories about al-Shiblī are numerous but he could not find a ḥadīth 
narration traced back to al-Shiblī’s chain except the one which says, ‘Meet God in 
the state of destitution. Do not meet Him in the state of wealth.’ In his biography, al-
Khaṭīb reported that al-Shiblī learned ḥadīth for twenty years and frequented the 
jurists’ sessions for twenty years. Whenever he was ashamed by a legal question in 
the session of Abū ʿImrān al-Ashyab, al-Shiblī gave eighteen answers for the simple 
question. Abū ʿImrān kissed his head and admitted that he had only learned twelve 
answers. Al-Junayd remarked that al-Shiblī’s view should not be taken as a mere 
speculation for God guides his vision. Al-Shiblī also yelled “the secrets, the secrets!” 
to remind the Ṣūfīs from revealing them to the aghyār (other than God). Elsewhere 
in Tārīkh, on several occasions, al-Khaṭīb qualified narrators with descriptions such 
                                                        
115 ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-ʿAlūjī, Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī (Baghdad: Wizārah al-Thaqāfah wa’l-Irshād, 1965), 
136 and 226. 
116 Alexander Knysh, Islamic Mysticism: A Short History (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 64-66. 
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as ‘he was a follower of al-Shiblī,’ indicating his knowledge of a group affiliated with 
the figure. 
 Whereas in the Tārīkh of al-Khaṭīb, Abū Bakr Ibn Mujāhid was reported to 
witness in his dream that the Prophet qualified al-Shiblī as a man of Paradise; Ibn al-
Jawzī reported another story on the conversation between the Ibn Mujāhid and al-
Shiblī. It was reported by al-Khaṭīb too. Commenting on the story, Ibn al-Jawzī 
criticised al-Shiblī’s explanation of a Qurʾānic verse, contrasting it to the opinions of 
other Qurʾanic exegetes. Al-Shiblī employed it to support his act of perforating his 
new cloth as a sign of ascetic patched garment.117 In al-Ṣafwah, Ibn al-Jawzī 
described al-Shiblī’s act as foolish and legally prohibited.118 Ibn al-Jawzī explained 
the ḥadīths reporting patches on the clothes of the Prophet and Companions as 
circumstantial. The Ṣūfīs according to him are more superficially pretentious. Ibn 
al-Jawzī’s account of al-Shiblī in al-Ṣafwah repeated several anecdotes provided 
beforehand by al-Khaṭīb.119 
7.8.6 Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (386/996) 
 Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Makkī wrote a manual on Sufism entitled Qūt al-Qulūb, 
which blends together Islamic law and mysticism. He has been recognised as the 
link between early Ṣūfīs and ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī as well as al-Ghazālī. Harith 
Ramli did an extensive study on al-Makkī’s idea of knowledge and theology. 
According to Ramli, al-Makkī can be placed in a category of traditionalists who did 
not practice fiqh exclusively according to the opinions of one jurist, but shared 
many things in common with the early Ḥanbalī school, including hostility to 
rationalist theology. To some extent, al-Makkī has incorporated the teaching of the 
Sālimiyyah in his work.120 
                                                        
117 See: Chapter on corrupting the clothes, Talbīs, 293.  
118Ṣifat al-Ṣafwah (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2009), 1:12. 
119 Ibid, 1:540. 
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 Al-Khaṭīb narrated from a son of al-Makkī, Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar (445/1053) and 
mentioned his friends’ auditions from another son, Abū’l-Ḥasan ʿAlī (458/1066).121 
Both sources were considered sound. According to al-Dhahabī, ʿUmar was a 
transmitter of the Qūt.122 Al-Khaṭīb did not evaluate al-Makkī’s ḥadīth acumen but 
reported his composition of the Qūt employing the language of the Ṣūfīs where he 
mentioned certain things pertaining to the Divine attributes that people have never 
heard and obnoxiously denounced.123 Al-Khaṭīb stated that when al-Makkī preached 
in Baghdād, “it was said” that he uttered in his speech “None is more dangerous 
upon the creatures than the creator himself.” For this reason, people accused him of 
heresy and boycotted him. Al-Khaṭīb’s final account on al-Makkī was a statement of 
Baghdād’s leading tradent, al-ʿAtīqī (441/1049) which indicates al-Makkī’s piety and 
reputation in his writings on tawḥīd (God’s unicity).124  
 Ibn al-Jawzī recounted that al-Makkī composed Qūt-al-Qulūb for the Ṣūfis 
that he filled up with fabricated traditions, daily prayers, which have no basis, and 
heretical beliefs. Al-Makkī mentioned in the book that God manifests (yatajalla) 
himself to his awliyāʾ in this world.125 Ibn al-Jawzī also criticised al-Makkī for his 
arrangement of the Ṣūfī diet for the sake of attaining mukāshafah (unveiling of 
Divine secrets). It is only a way of being cruel to the body that actually weakens it. 
Hunger is only praiseworthy to a limit and the quotes from people of mukāshafah for 
Ibn al-Jawzī are kalām fārigh (empty talk).126 Ibn al-Jawzī also refuted al-Makkī’s 
argument for Ṣūfī songs based on dreams. According to him, it is only the Ṣūfīs’ 
taqsīmāt (arrangement of songs), which have no basis in the Sharīʿah.127 
                                                        
121 TMS, 13:148 and 13:587. 
122 TIM, 9:671. 
123 “Ashyāʾ munkarah mustashnaʿah” should be read in passive voice, instead of firmly attributing the 
judgment to al-Khaṭīb. 
124 TMS, 4:151. 
125 Ibn al-Jawzī, Talbīs, 240. 
126 Ibid, 313. 
127 Ibid, 349. 
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7.8.7 Abū’l-Qāsim Al-Qushayrī (465/1072) 
 Al-Qushayrī was a pivotal figure of Sufism who was trained under Abū ʿAlī al-
Daqqāq in Nishapur. He also studied Shāfiʿī jurisprudence with Abū Bakr al-Ṭūsī 
(420/1029) and learned legal theory as well as theology from Ashʿarīs such as Ibn 
Fūrak and Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (418/1027). Al-Qushayrī was involved in the 
struggles between the Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī faction in Nishapur. Al-Qushayrī’s 
main concern was to reconcile between suspected elements of Sufism with 
Shāfiʿism. He composed a work on tafsīr employing the language of Sufism.128 His 
treatise on mysticism called al-Risālah al-Qushayriyyah was probably the most 
popular systematic work on Sufism has ever been written. 
Al-Qushayrī was amongst the friends al-Khaṭīb included in his Tārīkh.129 
Based on this reason, the treatment was quite short and no year of demise was 
recorded. Al-Khaṭīb reported that al-Qushayrī came to Baghdād in 448 AH/1056 CE. 
He taught ḥadīth and delivered exhortatory sermons as well. Al-Khaṭīb pointed out 
that al-Qushayrī was an Ashʿarī in theology and a Shāfiʿī in positive law. In the Fihrist 
of al-Mālikī, al-Khaṭīb brought three of al-Qushayrī’s works to Damascus. They are 
Ithbāt al-Awliyāʾ (Affirming the Sainthood), Fuṣūl fī al-Ishārāt (Sections on Ṣūfī 
Allusions) and Akhbār al-Ṣūfiyyah (Biographies of the Ṣūfīs). According to al-Khaṭīb, 
al-Qushayrī’s Ṣūfī allusions are zestful (malīḥ) and his exhortations are excellent. As 
a ḥadīth tradent, he was also trustworthy due to which al-Khaṭīb had written down 
narrations from him. 
Ibn al-Jawzī included al-Qushayrī in his criticism of the Ṣūfīs. He stated that 
al-Qushayrī authored for them al-Risālah wherein he spoke on annihilation (fanāʾ) 
and subsistence (baqāʾ) in God, contraction (qabḍ), expansion (basṭ), the mystical 
moment (waqt), the state (ḥāl), ecstatic rapture (wajd), ecstatic finding (wujūd), 
unification (jamʿ), separation (farq), sobriety (ṣahw), intoxication (sukr), tasting 
(dhawq), drinking (shurb), erasure (maḥw), affirmation (ithbāt), self manifestation 
                                                        
128 Richard Bulliet, The Patricians of Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History (Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1972), 155, Martin Nguyen. Ṣūfī Master and Qur'an Scholar: Abū’l-Qāsim al-Qushayri ̄and the Lạtā'if 
al-Ishārāt (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011). 
129 TMS, 12:366. 
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(tajallī), co-presence (muḥāḍarah), unveiling (mukāshafah), glimmers (lawāʾiḥ), 
dawnings (ṭawāliʿ), flashes (lawāmiʿ), inconstancy (talwīn), stability (tamkīn), the 
exoteric law (sharīʿah), the esoteric reality (ḥaqīqah), etc. According to Ibn al-Jawzī, 
these are all baseless illusions and mixings of truth with profanity. He added that al-
Qushayrī’s Qurʾanic exegesis was even more absurd.130 Al-Qushayrī enjoys no entry 
in his Ṣifat al-Ṣafwah. 
7.9 Legacies and Responses 
 The above sections have shown the extent to which al-Khaṭīb’s stances on 
theology and taṣawwuf could be perceived. Apart from Ibn ʿAqīl and Ibn al-Qushayrī, 
al-Khaṭīb represents another juncture at which two traditional schools -
interestingly, within the circles of aṣhāb al-ḥadīth- distinguished from one another. 
Al-Khaṭīb’s seeming approval of speculation in theology and his ambiguous position 
on taʾwīl was arguably of a similar view to the one replicated in the writings of al-
Ghazālī. The concept of the knowledge of the erudite amongst the scholars bears 
principle similarity to the concept of the mystical cognition of Divine attributes by 
“the few” or “the elect” amongst the servants.131 Ordinary minds, however, should 
be distanced from exercising theological deliberations.132 On the other hand, Ibn 
Taymiyyah reiterated al-Khaṭīb’s principle in al-Qawl, that “the discourse pertaining 
to the attributes is a branch of the discourse relating to the Essence (Dhāt) and thus 
follows its rules exactly,” 133 Al-Khaṭīb thus serves as a reference for both schools of 
thought. 
 Nevertheless, to magnify al-Khaṭīb’s influence on particulars of discursive 
theology would be an overstatement. His works concerned more ḥadīth and fiqh, and 
his legacy in these areas are much more celebrated as further observed in the genre 
                                                        
130 Talbīs, 240-241. See: Annabel Keeler, “Ṣūfī Tafsīr as a Mirror: al-Qushayrī the murshid in his Laṭāʾif 
al-ishārāt” Journal of Qurʾānic Studies 8 (2006): 1-21.   
131 Ali Ḥasan, “al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd on Creation and the Divine Attributes,” in Models of God and 
Alternative Ultimate Realities, eds. J. Diller and A. Kasher (Springer Netherlands, 2013), 153-155. 
132 See: ʿAbd Allāh Ḥāmid ʿAlī, A Return to Purity in Creed, trans., al-Ghazālī, Iljām al-ʿAwām ʿan ʿIlm al-
Kalām (USA, Lamp Post Productions, 2008). 
133 Majmūʿ Fatāwā, 3:25. 
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of ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, particularly amongst the Shāfiʿīs. Al-Dhahabī went further to 
assert that he was amongst the prominent Shāfiʿī jurists. The assessment on the 
reception for each of his works is beyond the scope of the present study. Some of it 
has been presented in Chapter Two. It is worthwhile to examine some early and 
important responses to al-Khaṭīb. 
 As many previous studies were not equipped with works of the first 
generation of al-Khaṭīb’s biographers, the origin of controversies in his biography 
have never been traced to the earliest source. With the publication of new 
materials, it is surprising to find that the first writing to contain relatively negative 
images of al-Khaṭīb comes from a Ẓāhirī called al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ṭāhir. He was also 
qualified with being a Malāmatī Ṣūfī.134 It contrasts the common perception that it 
was the Ḥanafīs who responded fiercely to al-Khaṭīb due to his accounts on Abū 
Ḥanīfah. Even the Ḥanbalī responses such as in the writings of Ibn al-Jawzī were 
earlier than the Ḥanafīs’. Nevertheless, Ibn Ṭāhir was also an ardent seeker of ḥadīth 
who travelled barefoot, at least twenty farsakhs (approximately four miles) a day, 
across the cities in Muslim world. Ibn Ṭāhir was reported to make mistakes 
frequently in his transmission and in his reading. He professedly adopted the 
madhhab of Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī. Interestingly, al-Ḥamawī reported that Ibn Ṭāhir 
criticised many of the Shāfiʿīs due to his adoption of Ḥanbalism. Ibn Ḥajar refuted 
this point suggesting that al-Ḥamawī had mistaken him for the Ḥanbalī Ibn Nāṣir al-
Salāmī (550/1155).135 Ironically, it was Ibn Nāṣir who accused Ibn Ṭāhir of adopting 
the ibāḥah (liberal) version of Sufism.  
 Amongst the issues Ibn Ṭāhir ascribed to al-Khaṭīb was the frequent visit by 
a handsome youth in Damascus.136 Malti-Douglas attributed this to al-Ḥamawī 
without explanation on the source of the story. The accounts actually mention that 
this incident was exploited by a Rāfiḍī in Damascus to report al-Khaṭīb to the 
                                                        
134 For his biography, see: TIM, 11:92. Also: Sara Sviri, “Ḥakīm Tirmidhī and the Malāmatī Movement 
in Early Sufism,” in The Heritage, ed. Lewisohn, 583-613. 
135 Ibn Ḥajar, Lisān al-Mīzān, 7:211-216.  Muḥammad ibn Nāsir al-Salāmī al-Ḥanbalī was a professor of 
Ibn al-Jawzī. Abū Saʿd al-Samʿānī stated that Ibn Nāṣir loves to condemn people. Ibn al-Jawzī 
defended him by associating al-Samʿānī with fanaticism over Shāfiʿī madhhab. TIM, 11:991-996. 
136 Ibn Ṭāhir, al-Manthūrāt, 46-47. The modern version is a recollection from available sources. 
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authority. The mention of a handsome youth, however, is quite intriguing. Ibn Nāṣir 
asserted that Ibn Ṭāhir had authored a work on the permissibility of lustful look at a 
handsome non-bearded face. If this is true, was he associating al-Khaṭīb with his 
version of Sufism or was he using this account to support Ẓāhirism?137 He had 
already been reported attributing the same to Ibn Maʿīn.138 Inversely, Malāmatīs 
have always been accused practising a liberal form of Sufism and are commonly 
misrepresented.139 Despite his work on Sufism titled Ṣafwat al-Taṣawwuf in which he 
criticised Malāmatiyyah, the authenticity of Ibn Ṭāhir’s Malāmatī affiliation 
requires further study due to the mysterious nature of this faction.  
 Nevertheless, Ibn Ṭāhir reported the account on the authority of Makkiy al-
Rumaylī. The same Makkiy was reported by Ibn ʿAsākir to have seen a dream where 
the Prophet attended the recitation of Tārīkh Baghdād with al-Khaṭīb and some 
Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarīs.140 Ibn Ṭāhir had also reported that al-Khaṭīb accused al-Dāraquṭnī 
with an inclination to Shīʿism, a point that portrayed him more as a Nāṣibī.141 In a 
nutshell, it is evident that many accounts presented by al-Ḥamawi (except the 
drunkenness) and Ibn al-Jawzī were evinced by Ibn Ṭāhir. 
 As mentioned above, the second earliest response to al-Khaṭīb comes from 
the later Ḥanbalī side one century after al-Khaṭīb’s demise. It was Ibn al-Jawzī who 
first revealed al-Khaṭīb’s implicit attack on some Ḥanbalī figures. Ibn al-Jawzī even 
authored a work dedicated to this subject titled al-Sahm al-Muṣīb fī Bayān Taʿaṣṣub al-
Khaṭīb (A Hitting Arrow, on Exposing the Fanaticism of al-Khaṭīb). Specific 
refutations in ḥadīth and legal subjects have been given in Chapter Two. Up to this 
point, Ibn al-Jawzī supposedly pioneered this narrative.    
                                                        
137 Ẓāhirī madhhab was reported to allow looking at an amrad while other Sunnī madhhabs prevented 
even being alone with him. 
138 He related that Ibn Maʿīn recited a ṣalawāt (prayer) upon a beautiful face of a girl and every fair 
face. TIM, 11:95.  
139 A Malāmatī will purposely act in such a way that the people will reject him.  
140 See below. 
141 See Chapter One. Ibn Ṭāhir, al-Manthūrāt, 27. 
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  Malti-Douglas has also highlighted al-Ḥamawī’s report accusing al-Khaṭīb of 
drunkenness. Al-Ḥamawī’s source was the lost al-Muntakhab of al-Nakhshabī selected 
by the Shāfiʿī Abū Saʿd al-Samʿānī. Al-Samʿānī had already expressed his doubt about 
it since only al-Nakhshabī revealed about al-Khaṭīb’s drunkennes, whereas he had 
met coteries of al-Khaṭīb’s colleagues and students who have never mentioned such 
a thing. The text essentially speaks on taghayyur al-ḥāl (the change of state). The 
first person who met al-Khaṭīb before al-Nakhshabī noticed only this change and 
did not consider it as drunkenness. This may refer to a probable Ṣūfī experience. On 
another note, the grandson of Ibn al-Jawzī, and al-Ḥamawī too, preserved some of 
al-Khaṭīb’s poems on intoxication, the wine of love, beauty and the preference of 
being killed to being parted by a lover. Assuming that al-Khaṭīb was secretly a Ṣūfī, 
these features would beautifully represent pieces of his mystical allusions.  
 As for the Ḥanafī response, the grandson of Ibn al-Jawzī Yūsuf ibn Qizughlī 
(654/1256), having been a Ḥanafī following his friendship with the Ayyūbid Ṣulṭān, 
al-Malik al-Muʿaẓẓam ʿĪsā ibn Abī Bakr ibn Ayyūb (r. Damascus 615-624/1218-1227) 
did not mention al-Muʿaẓẓam’s writing about al-Khaṭīb in his biography. Al-
Muʿaẓẓam was an ardent Ḥanafī who took part in polemical disputations between 
schools of thought. Yūsuf was formerly a Ḥanbalī and his adoption of Ḥanafism did 
not beset his reverence for Ibn Ḥanbal like his grandfather. The friendship between 
him and al-Muʿaẓẓam influenced each other’s views.142 Like Yūsuf, al-Muʿẓẓam 
respected Ibn Ḥanbal and asked the Ḥanbalī controversial scholar, ʿAbd al-Ghaniyy 
ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid (600/1204) to reorganise Musnad Ibn Ḥanbal according to topics. 
He also owned ten volumes of Ḥanafī’s jurisprudential teachings gathered by 
scholars for his personal use. Ironically, ʿAbd al-Ghaniyy was nearly killed for 
reading al-ʿUqaylī’s book, al-Dhuʿafāʾ, in which Abū Ḥanīfah was mentioned amongst 
the weak narrators of ḥadīth.143 It is within this milieu that al-Muʿaẓẓam composed 
his work, al-Sahm al-Muṣīb fī al-Radd ʿāla al-Khaṭīb, a title similar to the one 
mentioned in Yūsuf’s biography of al-Khaṭīb. Yūsuf’s writing emphasised al-Khaṭīb’s 
                                                        
142See this friendship in: al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyyah, 2004), 29:95. 
143 TIM, 12:1211. 
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attack on Ḥanbalism and his immersion in loving the beauty of the handsome 
youth.  This may suggest that the defence of Abū Ḥanīfah was done through inviting 
the Ḥanbalīs to attack al-Khaṭīb who was the source for such derogatory accounts. 
7.10 Receptions in the Traditional Sciences 
 Despite the above issues, this section pursues to list those who transmit al-
Khaṭīb’s works and those who have benefitted from them to trace the course of his 
legacy into later generations. It is undisputable that from the magnitude of his 
works and his disseminations of knowledge across several regions, the total number 
of his students, supervisees and those who received learning from him is beyond 
possible count. Bashshār ʿAwwad has briefly introduced eighty-two students of al-
Khaṭīb in his editorial exordium of the Tārīkh. The present study has traced more 
than 100 names associated with al-Khaṭīb in numerous strands of transmissions. 
This section selectively presents a number of them arranged in several groups to 
explicate the permeation of his thought: 
(i) Reciter, Copyists and Those Who Transmitted Extensively 
1. Abū Manṣūr Nāṣir al-Baghdādī (468/1076), the reciter of the Tārīkh in al-
Khaṭīb’s sessions in Baghdād.144 
2. Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Shīḥī (489/1096), a tradent and a copyist of 
most of al-Khaṭīb’s works to the extent that al-Khaṭīb granted him his 
personal copy.145 
3. Abū’l-Qāsim Makkiy al-Rumaylī (492/1099), learned from al-Khaṭīb at 
Damascus, Tyre and Baghdād, and attended his illness and death.  
4. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad, Abū Manṣūr Ibn Zurayq al-Qazzāz al-Ḥarīmī 
(535/1141), he audited the Tārīkh from al-Khaṭīb except for the 36th part. He 
also learned from many copyists regarding the Tārīkh including his father.146 
                                                        
144 al-Muntaẓam, 8:301-303. 
145 Siyar, 19:152. 
146 TIM, 11:632. 
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This study has found that he related more than 250 ḥadīths from al-Khaṭīb 
placing him amongst the top students.  
5. Abū Ghālib Shujāʿ al-Dhuhlī (507/1114).147  
6. Abū Naṣr al-Muʿammar al-Anmāṭī (514/1120).148  
(ii) The Family of Khayrūn 
1. Abū’l-Faḍl Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥasan (488/1095), also known as Ibn al-Bāqillānī. 
Like al-Khaṭīb, out of humility, Abu’l-Faḍl refused to be called al-Ḥāfiẓ. Al-
Khaṭīb pays high regard for him that he allowed him to include any 
beneficial addition to the Tārīkh.149 
2. Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Malik (539/1145), the nephew of Abu’l-
Faḍl. He produced and sold copies of the Tārīkh.150 
(iii) The Family of Yaʿlā 
1. ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn (469/1077), Abū’l-Qāsim, the first 
son of Abū Yaʿla al-Farrāʾ. He learned ḥadīth and isnād studies from al-
Khaṭīb.151 
2. Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad (526/1132), Abū’l-Ḥusayn, son of Abū Yaʿlā, the 
author of Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah. He benefitted a lot from the Tārīkh. 
(iv) The ʿAlawīs 
1. Abū’l-Maʿālī Muḥammad al-Murtaḍā al-Ḥusaynī (480/1087), the most 
renowned ʿAlawī of his time. His ḥadīth acumen is due to his learning from 
al-Khaṭīb.152 
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150 TIM, 11:717. 
151 Ibn al-Najjār, Dhayl, 2:118. 
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2. Abū’l-Qāsim al-Nasīb.153 
(v) Baghdād 
1. al-Amīr Ibn Mākūlā.154 
2. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, Abū Bakr al-Shāshī (507/1114), the tutor for al-
Shīrāzī’s lectures who became the Ashʿarī-Shāfiʿī professor at Niẓāmiyyah.155  
3. Abū’l-Baqāʾ al-Milḥī, the Qurʾān reader (519/1125).156 
4. Abū’l-Qāsim al-Shurūṭī, the tradent (528/1134).157 
5. Ibn al-Muṭṭawwiʿah al-Asadī (532/1138).158 
6. Abū’l-Ḥasan Ibn al-Sharīf al-Anṣārī (532/1138),159 and many others. 
(vi) Kūfah 
1. Abū’l-Ghanāʾim al-Narsī (510/1117), the tradent of Kūfah.160 
(vii) ʿUkbarā 
1. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Ibn Tawbah, Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Asadī (535/1141), the 
Shāfiʿī student of al-Shīrāzī.161 
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1. Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad, Abū Badr (539/1145), the teacher of Ibn ʿAsākir.162 
(ix) Damascus 
1. Abū Muḥammad Ibn al-Nakhkhāṣ (462/1070).163 
2. Naṣr Abū l-Fatḥ al-Maqdisī (490/1097), the leading Ashʿarī-Shāfiʿīte in Shām. 
He was amongst those seen in the aforementioned dream of Makkiy.164  
3. Ibrāhīm Abū Isḥāq al-Qushayrī (501/1108), he copied a lot of al-Khaṭīb’s 
works.165 
4. ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad al-Samarqandī (516/1122), the Ḥāfiẓ. He learned from 
al-Khaṭīb many of his works with his daughter.166 
5. Abū Muḥammad al-Sulamī (526/1132), the most renowned Musnid of 
Shām.167 This study unveiled that he related more than 100 accounts from al-
Khaṭīb. 
(x) Tyre 
1. Abū’l-Fatḥ al-Turkī al-Tunkutī (486/1093), the transmitter of Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim in 
Andalus.168 
2. Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar of Seville (501/1108). He transmitted al-Muʾtanif and 
Kitāb al-Faqīh to the renowned al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ.169 
3. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū’l-Fityān ʿUmar al-Dihistānī (503/1110).170 
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4. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Al-Muʾtaman ibn Aḥmad al-Sājī, Abū Naṣr (507/1114).171 
5. Ghayth ibn ʿAlī, Abū’l-Faraj al-Armanāzī (509/1116), the khaṭīb, tradent and 
historian of Tyre. He owns a copy of Taqyīd al-ʿIlm and Talkhīṣ al-
Mutashābih.172 
6. Naṣr Allah ibn Muḥammad, Abū’l-Fatḥ al-Miṣṣīṣī (542/1148), the transmitter 
of al-Asmāʾ al-Mubhamah. He moved to Damascus and became the last person 
to narrate from al-Khaṭīb there. 173 
(xi) Hamadhān 
1. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Abū ʿUmar al-Walāshjirdī (502/1109), the Shāfiʿī jurist who 
learned from al-Khaṭīb in Baghdād.174 
(xii) Traders 
1. Ibn al-Khashshāb, al-Mubārak ibn Saʿīd al-Asadī (505/1112). He went to trade 
in Andalus in 483 AH/ 1090 CE and transmitted Tārīkh Baghdād there.175 
(xiii) Mālikīs 
1. Abū’l-Walīd al-Bājī.176 
2. Ibn Ẓunayz, ʿAlī Abū’l-Ḥasan (474/1082) of Majorca, Andalusia. He was a 
linguist and jurist who wrote most of al-Khaṭīb’s books at Tyre and obtained 
their copies.177  
                                                                                                                                                              
170 TIM, 11:45. 
171 Ibid, 11:104. He said, ‘After al-Dāraquṭnī, Baghdād has never produced a ḥāfiẓ who is more brilliant 
than al-Khaṭīb.’ 
172 Ibid, 11:124, Maʿrūf, ed. TMS, 1:63. 
173 Ibid, 11:816. See below: Zaynab. 
174 Ibid, 11:36, al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:308. 
175 Ibn Bashkuwāl, al-Ṣilah (Tunis: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmi, 2010), 2:276. 
176 al-Ishbīlī, Fihrist, 553. 
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3. ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad, Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Ghassānī (530/1136). He resided at the 
eastern minaret of Umayyad Mosque, Damascus. He was a Mālikite Muftī who 
inclined greatly to aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth.178 This study has retraced more than 250 
accounts he related from al-Khaṭīb, placing him amongst the top narrators. 
(xiv) Ḥanafīs 
1. ʿUmar ibn Ibrāhīm, Abū’l-Barakāt al-Ḥusaynī al-Kūfī (539/1145), the Imām of 
the Mosque of Abū Isḥāq al-Sabīʿī. He was a leading Zaydite and Muʿtazilite 
scholar who concealed his belief on the created-ness of the Qurʾān.179 
(xv) Ẓāhirīs 
1. Muḥammad ibn Futūḥ, Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥumaydī (488/1095), a student of 
Ibn Ḥazm from Majorca. He learned from al-Khaṭīb in Damascus.180 
2. Abū’l-Ḥasan al-ʿAbdarī (493/1100) from Majorca. He went to Baghdād, 
befriended al-Khaṭīb and learned jurisprudence from Abū Bakr al-Shāshī al-
Shāfiʿī, the student of al-Khaṭīb. He left the method of Ibn Ḥazm and 
converted to Shāfiʿism and produced a taʿlīqah.181 He transmitted al-Khaṭīb’s 
partition of Sunan Abū Dāwūd to Ibn al-ʿArabī.182 
(xvi) Ḥanbalīs 
1. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū ʿAlī al-Baradānī al-Baghdādī (498/1105), a well-known 
traditionist.183 He was said to be more expert in ḥadīth than Shujāʿ al-Dhuhlī. 
                                                        
178 Ibid, 11:507. 
179 Siyar, 20:145-146. 
180 Ibid, 19:120. 
181 Ibn Bashkuwāl, al-Ṣilah, 2:39. 
182 al-Ishbīlī, Fihrist, 143. 
183 Siyar, 19:220. He said: ‘Perhaps al-Khaṭīb has never seen someone like himself.’ 
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2. Abū’l-Wafāʾ Ibn ʿAqīl (513/1119). He stated, ‘amongst them (my professors) 
was al-Khaṭīb, the ḥāfiẓ of his time. Yet, our Ḥanbalī fellows had asked us to 
boycott a group of scholars. This restrained me from beneficial 
knowledge.184 
3. Katāʾib Abū’l-Barakāt Ibn al-Muqaṣṣiṣ (513/1119).185 
4. Abū’l-Saʿādāt al-Hāshimī al-Baghdādī (521/1127).186 
5. Qāḍī al-Māristān, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Bāqī al-Baghdādī (532/1138), the 
Musnid of ʿIrāq. He was the student of both Abū’l-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī and Abū 
Yaʿlā.187  
(xvii) Ṣūfīs 
1. Abū Saʿd al-Muzakkī al-Ḥaramī (491/1098), who resided in Herat. He learned 
from al-Khaṭīb in Baghdād.188 
2. Yūsuf al-Hamadhānī, Abū Yaʿqūb (535/1141), one of the leading Ṣūfīs.189 
3. Abū Saʿd al-Zawzanī al-Ṣūfī (536/1142).190 
(xviii) Children 
1. Yaḥyā ibn ʿAlī Ibn al-Ṭarrāḥ (536/1142).  
2. Mufliḥ ibn Aḥmad Abū al-Fatḥ al-Baghdādī (537/1143).191 
3. Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Urmawī (548/1153), the Musnid of Iraq and a Shāfiʿī 
jurist.192 
                                                        
184 Ibn Rajab, Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah (Riyadh: Obeikan, 2005), 1:320. 
185 TIM, 11:209. 
186 Ibid, 11:365. 
187 Siyar, 20:23-24. 
188 Ibid, 19:202. 
189 Ibid, 18:274.  
190 See Chapter One. 
191 Siyar, 20:165. 
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They were brought by their fathers to the classes of al-Khaṭīb for blessings 
and knowledge. 
7.11 Receptions of al-Khaṭīb’s Scholarship by Female Scholars 
1. Fāṭimah bint al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Faḍluviyē al-Rāzī (521/1127) 
She was also known as Bint Ḥamzah. She was a head Ṣūfī in Baghdād where 
she built a ribāṭ for female Ṣūfīs. She studied under al-Khaṭīb and was amongst the 
links between him and Ibn ʿAsākir who met her in Baghdād.193 Ibn al-Jawzī also 
received traditions from her.194  
2. Al-Mubārakah bint ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Aḥmad al-Shahrazūrī, Umm al-Faḍl, 
Sittu al-Ahl (513/1119). 
She learned Taqyīd al-ʿIlm with the following Kamāl from al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd 
Allāh.195 
3. Kamāl bint al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad al-Samarqandī, Umm al-Ḥasan, Sitt 
al-Shuyūkh (558/1163). 
She was the wife of the tradent ʿAbd al-Khāliq al-Yūsufī.196 She learned 
Taqyīd al-ʿIlm with her father who transmitted directly from al-Khaṭīb.197 ʿAbd Allāh 
was born in Damascus wherein he learned from al-Khaṭīb. 
4. Fāṭimah bint Saʿd al-Khayr al-Anṣāriyyah (600/1203)  
5. Zaynab bint Saʿd al-Khayr al-Anṣāriyyah (n.d.) 
6. Rabīʿah bint Saʿd al-Khayr al-Anṣāriyyah (n.d.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
192 Ibid, 20:183. 
193 TDQ, 3:308. 
194 TIM, 11:373 
195 See below. Her biography in: TIM, 11: 196 and 212. 
196 Siyar, 20:420 
197 Taqyīd, 25. 
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7. Laylā bint Saʿd al-Khayr al-Anṣāriyyah (n.d.) 
These are the daughters of Saʿd al-Khayr ibn Muḥammad (541/1147) who was 
a well-known tradent and a teacher of al-Samʿānī. They audited Jāmiʿ al-Ādāb with 
the father and the boy Nāfiʿ ibn ʿAbd Allāh (n.d.)  from al-Mubārak ibn Muḥammad 
al-Buzūrī in 529 AH/1135 CE who obtained an ijāzah from al-Khaṭīb.198 Saʿd travelled 
from his homeland, Valencia to China where Fāṭimah was born, and learned in 
many cities such as Isfahan and Hamadhān. In Baghdād, he also learned from Abū 
Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.199  
 
8. ʿAzīzah bint ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn ʿAlī Ibn al-Ṭarrāḥ (600/1203) 
She audited the whole al-Kifāyah from her grandfather who received it 
directly from al-Khaṭīb. ʿAzizah was also the tradent from whom Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn al-
Maqdisī (643/1245), the author of a ṣaḥīḥ’s work titled al-Aḥādīth al-Mukhtārah 
obtained his traditions.200 She was the sister of the following. 
9. Niʿmah bint ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā, Umm ʿAbd al-Ghaniyy (604/1208) 
She was known as Sitt al-Katabah. She migrated to Damascus and learned 
from her grandfather numerous works by al-Khaṭīb. Amongst those mentioned by 
Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qūṣī; al-Jahr bi’l-Basmalah, al-Jāmiʿ li Akhlāq al-Rāwī wa Ādāb al-Sāmiʿ, 
Masʾalat al-Iḥtijāj bi’l-Shāfiʿī, al-Sābiq wa al-Lāḥiq, al-Kifāyah, al-Bukhalāʾ, al-Qunūt, and 
Ṣawm Yawm al-Shakk. She was also the teacher of Ḍiyāʾ al-Maqdisī and ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm 
al-Mundhirī (656/1528).201 
10. Zaynab bint Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad, Umm al-Faḍl al-Qaysiyyah (610/1214) 
                                                        
198 al-Jāmiʿ, 2:307 and 1:59. 
199 TIM, 11:782. 
200 Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn al-Maqdisī, Thabat Masmūʿāt (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah, 1999), 205-206. TIM, 
12:1221. 
201 TIM, 13:94. 
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She was the wife of the khaṭīb of Damascus, Abu’l-Qāsim al-Dawlaʿī. She 
studied al-Asmāʾ al-Mubhamah with Naṣr Allah al-Miṣṣīṣī.202 
11. Asmāʾ bint ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥasan ibn Abī Bakr al-Mihrānī, Umm al-Ḥasan al-
Dimashqiyyah (867/1463) 
She was a renowned tradent of Damascus. She audited Riwāyāt al-ʾĀbāʾ ʿan al-
Abnāʾ from Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Naṣr Allah, Kamāl al-Dīn and Aḥmad ibn 
ʿAbd al-Ghālib.203 
 The above lists show that the distribution of al-Khaṭīb’s transmissions and 
works took place mostly in Baghdād, Damascus and Tyre, and mainly amongst the 
Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarīs and aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth. This study has failed to uncover any direct 
reception from the Ḥanafī ḥadīth circle. This might have proven the success of 
traditionalism brought by al-Qudūrī to the legal school, yet it requires further study. 
Al-Khaṭīb’s legacy seems to be celebrated mainly in Damascus. He used to enjoy 
huge crowds at the Umayyad Mosque. His student Ibn al-Akfānī reported that when 
he died, letters were sent to numerous groups in Damascus informing them about 
the news.204 Ultimately, al-Khaṭīb seems to have attempted to conceal his 
inclinations amongst the public. Nevertheless, his views and thoughts have given 
support to Ashʿarism. The grandson of Ibn al-Jawzī reported that the Ḥanbalīs were 
perplexed by al-Khaṭīb’s views. They came to his session on Friday and sent a small 
paper through a young boy which contains: ‘By the name of God who raised the 
Muʿtazilah through Ibn Abī Duʾād, the Jahmiyyah through Jahm ibn Abī Ṣafwān, the 
Karāmiyyah through Ibn Karām, the Ashāʿirah through you (aʿazza bika al-Ashāʿirah), 
tell us: What is your madhhab?!’205   
 
 
                                                        
202 Al-Asmāʾ al-Mubhamah, Exordium. Her biography in: TIM, 13:237. 
203 Ibn Fahd al-Makkī, Muʿjam al-Shuyūkh (Riyadh: Dār al-Yamāmah), 397. 
204 Ibn al-Akfānī, Dhayl, 32. 












 Although there were controversies surrounding the persona of al-Khaṭīb, his 
books and intellectual thoughts continues to be studied and revised in later 
generations. His organisation and articulation of ḥadīth principles appeared 
successful enough to pose a threat to any contesting legal school willing to identify 
itself as the true representor of ḥadīth scholarship. Many substantial ideas and their 
connections to early discourse on the study of Sunnah were obfuscated and 
tampered due to the emergence of debates related to the determinacy of maʿnā, 
particularly with regard to the Divine Attributes, between the Ashʿarīs and the 
Ḥanbalīs. Al-Khaṭīb’s legacy seems to be celebrated highly by the Ashʿarīs of 
Damascus. The study of ḥadīth was not a marginalised discipline anymore. This 
attracted the attention of the rulers to the extent that a formal institution was built 
for the study of ḥadīth. It was founded by al-Malik al-ʿĀdil Nūr al-Dīn Mahmud ibn 
Zanki (re. 662-671 AH/1146-1174 CE) and Ibn ʿAsākir was entrusted as its first Shaykh 
al-Ḥadīth. The study of al-Khaṭīb’s legacy can be said to ultimately find its venue in 




 The author’s extended encounter with the scholarship of al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī throughout this research has allowed him to follow the quest of a diligent 
scholar in searching for the real meaning of an intellectual journey. Being brought up 
in a surrounding that fostered the religious practices and encouraged the traditional 
way of learning, the scholar was expeditious enough to observe that debates and 
conversations amongst the juridical and legal community of Baghdād were ultimately 
associated with identifying the valid connection to Prophetic traditions, and 
providing a successful demonstration of a coherent and systematic methodology in 
addressing intellectual and social problems of the Muslim world. His life since then 
was devoted to collecting ḥadīth and approaching any figure or circle that would 
enrich his experience with the tradition, accompanied by ceaseless desire to collect 
important books and works. Contrary to the common perception that he was 
influenced by certain scholars of ḥadīth such as al-Barqānī and al-Ṣūrī, and recent 
views that he was arduously pursuing the Ṣaḥīḥayn paradigm; he actually achieved 
mastery in ḥadīth at a much earlier age while he was trained by Shāfiʿī professors in 
jurisprudence, and his aim was wider and more inclusive. The Shāfiʿīs and the 
Ḥanbalīs of Baghdād were the main groups he frequented for this aim because they 
were the ones who identified themselves as aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth. However, the nascent 
international culture of the Muslim world had brought together various issues, 
amongst which the rise of theological debates that generated a number of serious 
thinkers who – in the course of their attempt to face the challenge of scholars from 
other religions – considered the discipline of ḥadīth as a trivial subject. This attitude 
had its lasting effects not only amongst the theologians, but also jurists and legal 
practitioners. The scholar’s resort to traditional theologians introduced him to 
concepts germane to Islamic epistemology. His concern for sincerity and genuineness 
compelled him to speak of the external and internal problems of the traditional 
circles and the challenging problems in the sources. The Ashʿarīs provided him with 
rational justification for the study of ḥadīth and Sunnah. He was a man of piety, and 
although traditional theology had convinced him on certain subjects, he observed 
that ḥadīth qualifies as the route to ultimate happiness and the loftiest rank in the 
hereafter. He believed that there is guidance within the ḥadīth corpora to address 
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intellectual curiosity, learning questions and hypothetical problems, and that the 
study of fiqh is the mechanism to unravel meanings which are needed for that vision. 
His thorough investigation into the history of isnād exposed him to phenomena which 
became fundamental for its evaluation, and his exposure to the idea of meaning 
affected his concept of takhrīj which combines the evaluation of rāwī and marwī. 
Furthermore, it was al-Shāfiʿī’s hermeneutic of ambiguity and al-Bāqillānī’s theory of 
khabar that informed the foundation of his ḥadīth criticism. Although he adopted 
many views of the Ashʿarīs, he was careful not to lose those of the aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth who 
stood against Ashʿarism, particularly the Ḥanbalīs. His main concern was to present 
ḥadīth studies the way it should be, the crucial foundation of the Sharīʿah.  
 In this study, the author has observed that there was a considerable influence 
of Ashʿarism, particularly the views of al-Bāqillānī on the systematisation of ḥadīth 
criticism. A more convincing conclusion would require a study on connections 
between al-Bāqillānī and ḥadīth scholars apart from al-Khaṭīb such as Abū’l-Walīd al-
Bājī and others. Since al-Ashʿarī’s view of knowledge was fundamentally based on the 
concept of ʿādah, the author noticed that this notion was embodied in many 
statements of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, especially those that address epistemological 
concerns. The concept represents Ashʿarite cosmology, whereas the theory of atomic 
points created anew at every moment has a significant impact on the meaning of 
necessary (ḍarūrī) and customary (ʿādah). This was furthermore employed in the 
division of human knowledge. The definition of iktisāb, hence, follows a certain 
theological epistemology. In the chapter on tawātur, it was proven that scholars 
differed in their understanding of the term based on their theological and 
epistemological background. Although al-Khaṭīb did not explain the reason behind 
the use of certain terms in his writings, it is somewhat helpful, albeit non-conclusive, 
to look at connections and close assocations to obtain some explanations. The 
concept of ʿādah as experience plays a vital role in defining the ʿilm obtained through 
tawātur. Al-Khaṭīb employed it to explain several principles of ḥadīth critcism. The 
cognition of reliable ḥadīth itself is based on the cognition of ʿādah that a reliable 
criticism of ḥadīth according to this scheme can only be achieved after an extensive 
experience in the field. In the author’s opinion, this epistemology of ʿādah deserves 
further study for a better understanding of its connection to the concept of maʿnā in 
Sunnī epistemology.  
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 The author has also discovered the crucial function of maʿnā in ḥadīth studies. 
It advances a problem in reading the works of early compilers of ḥadīth. In other 
words, it is difficult to determine whether a record of any ḥadīth in a book was due to 
its script, maʿnā, gist or general spirit. When a scholar argued by a ḥadīth, was he 
relying on the ḥadīth itself or its conformity to a specific maʿnā adopted prior to the 
argumentation? Al-Khaṭīb’s treatment of tawātur maʿnawī alluded to the idea of maʿānī 
transmitted through the vehicle of ḥadīth. The author suggests that the concept of 
maʿnā needs further exploration especially on its function as the binding force 
between fiqh and ḥadīth. It was due to his appreciation of the important role of maʿānī 
that al-Khaṭīb placed fiqh at the highest position amongst Islamic sciences. The 
dynamic relation between the script and the maʿnā leaves a significant impact on the 
activity of takhrīj and ḥadīth criticism. 
 Finally, the formation and articulation of ḥadīth criticism, and furthermore its 
relation to traditional Sunnī epistemology, were undoubtedly not the product of one 
single person or even one generation. The study of al-Khaṭīb’s contribution to ḥadīth 
criticism should not be understood as an attempt to ignore the beneficial 
contribution of earlier, contemporary and later scholars. The limited scope permitted 
by this dissertation has not allowed the exploration of many other dimensions of al-
Khaṭīb’s scholarship. It is hoped that this study has shed some light on the scholarship 
of this al-ḥāfiẓ and his contribution to the articulation of Sunnī Islam in general. In 
conclusion, the author suggests that there are two important concepts that inform 
the theory of knowledge in traditional Sunnī epistemology; the concept of ʿādah and 
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(Berlin: New York: De Gruyter, 1975). 
Fadel, Mohammad, “Ibn Hajar’s Hady al-Sārī: A Medieval Interpretation of the 
Structure of al-Bukhārī’s al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 54:3 (Jul. 
1995): 170.  
Fakhry, Majid, Philosophy, Dogma and the Impact of Greek Thought in Islam (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Variorum, 1994). 
Forster, Michael, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2010). 
Frank, Richard,  
-- “Attribute, Attribution and Being: Three Islamic Views,” see: Gutas, Dimitri, vol. 
III-Classical Islamic Theology, V:258-278. 
-- “Elements in the Development of the Teaching of al-Ashʿarī,” see: Gutas, Dimitri, 
vol. II: Early Islamic Theology: The Muʿtazilites and al-Ashʿarī, VI:141-190. 
-- “Knowledge and taqlīd: the Foundation of Religious Belief in Classical Ashʿarism,” 
see: Gutas, Dimitri, vol. III-Classical Islamic Theology, VII:37-62. 
-- “Remarks on the Early Development of the Kalām,” see: Gutas, Dimitri, vol. I: 
Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism in Medieval Islam, VI:315-329. 
-- “The Neoplatonism of Jahm ibn Ṣafwān,” see: Gutas, Dimitri, vol. I: Philosophy, 
Theology and Mysticism in Medieval Islam, IX:395-424. 
-- “Two Islamic Views of Human Agency,” see: Gutas, Dimitri, vol. III-Classical Islamic 
Theology, VI:37-49.  
Gilliot, Claude, “Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfarāyīnī,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam Three, ed. G. 
Krämer et al (Leiden: Brill, 2009). 
Goldziher, Ignaz, Muslim Studies (Muhammedanische Studien), ed. S. M. Stern, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971). 
Graham, William “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 23:3 (1993): 495-522.  
308 
 
Griffel, Frank, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology (Oxford: oxford University Press, 
2009). 
Guindo, Souleyman, al-Taʾdīb fī al-ʿAsr al-ʿAbbāsī al-Awwal (Saudi Arabia: Islamic Univ. 
of Madinah, 2011).  
Günther, Sebastian, “Modern Literary Theory Applied to Classical Arabic Texts, 
Ḥadīth Revisited,” in Understanding Near Eastern Literatures: a Spectrum of 
Interdisciplinary Approaches, eds. Verena Klemm and Beatrice Gruendler (Wiesbaden: 
Reichert, 2000), 171-176. 
Gutas, Dimitri,  
-- Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām, vol. I: Philosophy, Theology 
and Mysticism in Medieval Islam (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2005). 
-- Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām, vol. II: Early Islamic 
Theology: The Muʿtazilites and al-Ashʿarī (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2007). 
-- Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām, vol. III: Classical Islamic 
Theology: The Ashʿarites (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2008). 
Halife, Hacı, Kashf al-Ẓunūn ʿan Asāmī al-Kutub wa al-Funūn (Beirut: Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth). 
Halkin, A. S. “The Ḥashwiyya,” Journal of the American Oriental Society (1934): 1–28. 
Hallaq, Wael,  
-- “A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise on Juridical Dialectic,” Muslim World 77 
(1987): 197-206.  
-- “On Inductive Corroboration, Probability and Certainty in Sunni Legal Thought,” 
in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence: Studies in Honor of Farhat J. Ziadeh, ed. Nicholas Heer 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990), 3-31. 
-- “The Authenticity of Prophetic Ḥadīth: A Pseudo-problem,” Studia Islamica 99 
(1999): 75-90. 
-- “Was al-Shāfiʿī the master architect of Islamic jurisprudence?” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 25 (1993): 587-605. 
-- Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2001). 
Ḥāmid ʿAlī, ʿAbd Allāh, A Return to Purity in Creed (trans. of al-Ghazālī’s Iljām al-ʿAwām 
ʿan ʿIlm al-Kalām) (USA, Lamp Post Productions, 2008). 
Hansu, Hüseyin, “Notes on the Term Mutawātir and Its Reception in Ḥadīth 
Criticism,” Islamic Law and Society 16 (2009): 383-408. 
309 
 
Hārūn, ʿAbd al-Salām, (ed.), Rasāʾil al-Jāḥiẓ (Cairo: Maktaba al-Khānijī). 
Ḥasan, Ali “al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd on Creation and the Divine Attributes,” in 
Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, eds. J. Diller and A. Kasher (Springer 
Netherlands, 2013), 153-155. 
Heck, Paul, “The Epistemological Problem of Writing in Islamic Civilization: al-Ḫatīb 
al-Baġdādī’s Taqyīd al-ʿilm” in Studia Islamica 94 (2002): 85-114. 
Heer, Nicholas, “The Proof for the Truthfulness of the Prophet” (paper presented at 
the 1967 annual meeting of the Western Branch of the American Oriental Society in 
Portland, Oregon, 2006, updated 2013). 
Helm, Heinz, Die Ausbreitung der šāfiʿitischen Rechtsschule von den Anfängen bis zum 8. 
/14. Jahrhundert, (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1974).  
Hodgson, Marshall, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
Hotzman, Livnat, The Miḥna of Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and the Fitna Ibn al-Qushayrī 
(d. 514/1120), in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2016), 660-678. 
Hurvitz, Nimrod, The Formation of Ḥanbalism: Piety into Power (London: Routledge, 
2002). 
Hussain, Ather Shahbaz, The Nuzhah of Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (852/1449); a Translation 
and Critical COmmentary (PhD Diss., University of Birmingham, 2012).  
Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Yūsuf ibn ʿAbd Allāh,  
-- al-Istīʿāb fī Maʿrifat al-Aṣḥāb (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1992).  
-- al-Istighnā fī Maʿrifat al-Mashhūrīn min Ḥamalat al-ʿIlm bi’l-Kunā (Riyadh: Dār Ibn 
Taymiyyah, 1985). 
-- Jāmiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm wa Faḍlihi (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1994). 
--al-Istidhkār al-Jāmiʿ li-Madhāhib Fuqahāʾ al-Amṣār (Damascus: Dār Qutaybah, 1993).  
Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Ṣāliḥī al-Ḥanbalī, 
-- Jamʿ al-Juyūsh wa’l-Dasākir ʿalā Ibn ʿAsākir, ed. Muḥammad Fawzī (Master Diss., 
Islamic University of Madinah, 1418/1997). 
-- Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ wa Tabṣirat al-Ayqāẓ (Damascus, Dār al-Nawādir, 2011).  
-- Tanqīḥ al-Taḥqīq fī Aḥādīth al-Taʿlīq (Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, 2007). 
Ibn Abī ʿĀsim, Aḥmad ibn ʿAmru, al-Āḥād wa’l-Mathānī (Riyadh: Dār al-Rāyah, 1991).  
Ibn Abī Ḥātim, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Rāzī,  
-- al-Jarḥ wa’l-Taʿdīl (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif, 1952).  
310 
 
-- Bayān Khaṭaʾ al-Bukhārī (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyyah).  
Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, Abū’l-Ḥusayn Ibn al-Farrāʾ, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah (Saudi Arabia: 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 100 Years Publication, 1999).  
Ibn al-Abbār, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Balinsī, al-Takmilah li Kitāb al-Ṣilah 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1995).  
Ibn al-Akfānī, Hibat Allāh, Dhayl Dhayl Tārīkh Mawlid al-ʿUlamāʾ wa Wafayātihim 
(Riyadh: Dār al-ʿĀṣimah, 1989). 
Ibn al-Anbārī, Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim, Sharḥ Khuṭbat ʿĀʾishah Umm al-Muʾminīn fī 
Abīhā (Damascus: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī, 1962). 
Ibn al-ʿArabī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Muʿāfirī, ʿĀriḍat al-Aḥwazī bi-Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ 
al-Tirmidhī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah). 
Ibn al-ʿArabī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-
Manṣūb (Yemen: Wizārah al-Thaqāfah). 
Ibn al-Athīr, ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad,  
-- al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1987).  
-- al-Lubāb fī Tahdhīb al-Ansāb (Baghdād, Matkabat al-Muthanna). 
Ibn al-Dumyāṭī, Aḥmad ibn Aybak, al-Mustafād min Dhayl Tārīkh Baghdād (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī). 
Ibn al-Jawzī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī,  
-- al-Mawḍūʿāt min al-Aḥādīth al-Marfūʿāt (Madinah: al-Maktabah al-Salafiyyah, 1966). 
-- al-Muntaẓam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Umam (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 
1992).  
-- al-Taḥqīq fī Aḥādīth al-Khilāf (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1415). 
-- Dafʿu Shubah al-Tashbīh bi-Akuff al-Tanzīh (Cairo: al-Kulliyyāh al-Azhariyyah, 1991). 
-- Darʾ al-Lawm wa al-Ḍaym fī Ṣawm Yawm al-Ghaym, (Riyadh: Dār al-Bashāʾir, 1994). 
-- Dhamm al-Hawā (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1998). 
-- Ghāyat al-Nihāyah fī Ṭabaqāt al-Qurrāʾ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2006). 
-- Ṣifat al-Ṣafwah (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2009). 
-- Virtues of the Imam Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, ed. & trans. Michael Cooperson (New York: 
New York Univ. Press, 2013). 
Ibn al-Labbān, Abū’l-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, Izālat al-Shubuhāt ʿan al-Āyāt wa 
al-Aḥādīth al-Mutashābihāt (Dār Ṭuwayq, 1995).  
311 
 
Ibn al-Maḥāmilī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, al-Lubāb fī al-Fiqh al-Shāfiʿī. (Madinah: Dar 
al-Bukhārī, 1416 H).  
Ibn al-Najjār, Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd, Dhayl Tārīkh Baghdād (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb 
al-ʿArabī). 
Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, 
-- Muqaddamah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2002).  
-- Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ al-Shāfiʿiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah, 1992). 
Ibn al-Wardī, ʿUmar ibn Muẓaffar, Tatimmat al-Mukhtaṣar fī Akhbār al-Bashar (al-
Maṭbaʿah al-Wahbiyyah, 1285/1868),  
Ibn ʿArrāq, ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad, Tanzīh al-Sharīʿah al-Marfūʿah min al-Akhbār al-
Shanīʿah al-Mawḍūʿah (Lebanon: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah). 
Ibn ʿAsākir, ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥasan, 
-- Muʿjam Ibn ʿAsākir (Damascus: Dār al-Bashāʾir, 2000). 
-- Tabyīn al-Kadhib al-Muftarī fī mā Nusiba ilā al-Imām Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (Damascus: 
Maṭbaʿah al-Tawfīq, 1347/1928) 
-- Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1995) 
Ibn Balbān, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī, al-Iḥsān fī Taqrīb Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān (Beirut: al-Risālah, 
1988). 
Ibn Bashkuwal, Abū’l-Qāsim Khalaf ibn ʿAbd al-Malik,  
-- al-Ghawāmiḍ wa’l-Mubhamāṭ, (Jeddah: Dār al-Andalus, 1994).  
-- al-Ṣilah fī Tārīkh Aʾimmat al-Andalus (Tunis: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmi, 2010). 
Ibn Fāris, Abū’l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad, Muʿjam Maqāyīs al-Lughah (Dār al-Fikr, 1979). 
Ibn Fūrak, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan,  
-- al-Ḥudūd fī al-Uṣūl (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1999). 
-- Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987). 
Ibn Ḥajar, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-ʿAsqalānī,  
-- al-Iṣābah fī Tamyīz al-Ṣaḥābah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah). 
-- al-Talkhīṣ al-Ḥabīr (Egypt: Qurṭubah, 1995). 
-- Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah). 
-- Lisān al-Mīzān (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah, 2002).   
-- Nuzhat al-Albāb fī al-Alqāb (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 1989). 
-- Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-Niẓāmiyyah, 1909). 
Ibn Ḥanbal, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, Musnad (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Risālah, 2001). 
312 
 
Ibn Ḥayyuviyē, Abū’l-Ḥasan Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh, Man Wāfaqat Kunyatuhu 
Kunyat Zawjihi min al-Ṣaḥābah (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn al-Qayyim, 1988). 
Ibn Ḥazm, ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad, al-Nubdhah al-Kāfiyah fī Aḥkām Uṣūl al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1985). 
Ibn Ḥibbān, Abū Ḥātim Muḥammad, Mashāhīr ʿUlamāʾ al-Amṣār (Egypt: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 
1991).  
Ibn Kathīr, Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar,  
-- al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah (Dār Hajar).  
-- Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ al-Shāfiʿiyyīn (Egypt: Maktabah al-Thaqāfah al-Dīniyyah, 1993). 
Ibn Khallikān, Aḥmad ibn Muhammmad, Wafayāt al-Aʿyān wa Anbāʾ Abnāʾ al-Zamān 
(Beirut: Dār Ṣādir).  
Ibn Mākūlā, ʿAlī ibn Hibat Allah, al-Amīr,  
-- al-Ikmāl fī Rafʿal-Irtiyāb ʿan al-Muʾtalif wa’l-Mukhtalif fī al-Asmāʾ wa’l-Kunā wa’l-Ansāb  
(Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī). 
-- Tahdhīb Mustamirr al-Awhām ʿalā Dhawī al-Maʿrifah wa ʾŪlī al-Afhām (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1990).  
Ibn Manẓūr, Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad, Lisān al-ʿArab (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif). 
Ibn Nuqṭah, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Ghaniyy,  
-- al-Taqyīd li-Maʿrifat al-Ruwāt wa’l-Sunan wa al-Masānīd (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif, 
1983).  
-- Takmilat al-Ikmāl (Saudi Arabia: Umm al-Qura Univ., 1987).  
Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, Abū Bakr ibn Aḥmad,  
-- Manāqib al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī (Damascus: Dār al-Bashāʼir 2003). 
-- Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah (India: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif, 1978).  
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Muḥammad ibn Abū Bakr, Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿādah (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah). 
Ibn Qudāmah, Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad, Dhamm al-Taʾwīl (UAE: Dār al-
Fatḥ, 1994).  
Ibn Qutaybah, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muslim, 
-- al-Maʿārif (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif). 
-- Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth (Muʾassasah al-Ishrāq, 1999). 
Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī, Zayn al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān,  
-- Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah (Riyadh: Obeikan, 2005). 
313 
 
-- Sharḥ ʿIlal al-Tirmidhī (Dār al-Mallāḥ, 1978). 
Ibn Saʿd, Muḥammad ibn Saʿd ibn Manīʿ, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1968).  
Ibn Taghrī Bardī, Abū’l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf, al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah fī Mulūk Miṣr wa al-
Qāhirah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah). 
Ibn Ṭāhir, al-Maqdisī al-Qaysarānī,  
-- Īḍāḥ al-Ishkāl (Kuwait: Maktabah al-Muʿallā, 1988).  
-- al-Manthūrāt min al-Ḥikayāt wa’l-Suʾālāt (Riyadh: Dār al-Minhāj, 1430/2009).  
Ibn Taymiyyah, Abū’l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm,  
-- al-Nubūʾāt (Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, 2000). 
-- al-Risālah al-Madaniyyah fī Taḥqīq al-Majāz wa’l-Ḥaqīqah fī Ṣifāt Allah Taʿālā (Makkah: 
al-Maṭbaʿah al-Salafiyyah, 1932). 
-- Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa’l-Naql (Riyadh: Univ. of Imam, 1991). 
-- Majmūʿ Fatāwā (Madinah: King Fahd Complex, 2004). 
-- Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah (Riyadh: Univ. of Imām, 1986). 
-- Naqd Asās al-Taqdīs (Madinah: al-ʿUlūm wa’l-Ḥikam, 1425).  
Imran, Muhammed “Legal Stratagems (Ḥiyal) and Usury in Islamic Commercial Law” 
(PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010). 
Jacques, R Kevin, Authority, Conflict and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic 
Law (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
Jockish, Benjamin, Islamic Imperial Law (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007).  
Juynboll, G.H.A,  
-- “(Re)Appraisal of Some Technical Terms in Ḥadīth Science,” Islamic Law and Society 
8:3 (2001): 303-349. 
-- “Khabar al-Wāḥid” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, eds. P. Bearman et al 
(Leiden: Brill, 2006), 4:896.  
-- “Shuʿba b. al-Ḥajjāj and his Position among the Traditionists of Baṣra” Le Muséon 
111 (1998): 187-226. 
-- Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983).  
Karamustafa, Ahmet, Sufism: The Formative Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2007). 
Keeler, Annabel “Ṣūfī Tafsīr as a Mirror: al-Qushayrī the murshid in his Laṭāʾif al-
ishārāt” Journal of Qurʾānic Studies 8 (2006): 1-21.   
314 
 
Kennedy, Hugh, The Court of the Caliphs: When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World (Da 
Capo Press Inc, 2006). 
Khaleeli, Alexander Hainy, “Hisham ibn al-Hakam: arch-heretic?” Journal of Shīʿa 
Islamic Studies 3.iii (2010): 288-290.  
Kinberg, Leah, “Muḥkamāt and Mutashābihāt (Koran 3/7): Implication of a Koranic 
Pair of Terms in Medieval Exegesis,” Arabica 35:2 (1988): 143-172.  
Kirabiev, Nur, “Paideia and Adab in Islam,” in Educating for Democracy: Paideia in an 
Age of Uncertainty, eds. Alan Olson, David Steiner, Irina Tuuli (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004). 
Knysh, Alexander, Islamic Mysticism: A Short History (Leiden: Brill, 2000). 
Koloughli, Djamel Eddine, “À propos de lafẓ et maʿnā,” Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales 35 
(1983): 43-63. 
Kulaybān, Asyā, (ed.) Tārīkh al-Anbiyāʾ (ascribed to al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī) (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2004). 
Lambton, A.K.S. et al, “Iṣfahān” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, eds. P. 
Bearman et al (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 4:97-107. 
Landau-Tasseron, Ella, “The ‘Cyclical Reform’: A Study of the Mujaddid Tradition,” 
Studia Islamica 70 (1989): 99. 
Le Strange, Guy,  
-- “A Greek Embassy to Baghdād in 917 A.D., translated from the Arabic MS of al-
Khaṭīb, in the British Museum Library,” The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great 
Britain and Ireland 3 (1897): 35-45. 
-- Baghdad During the Abbasid Caliphate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900).  
Levi, Giovanni, “On Microhistory,” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, ed. P. 
Burke (Cambridge, 1991). 
Lowry, Joseph, Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Muḥammad Ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʻī 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
Lucas, Scott  
-- “The Legal Principles of Muḥammad B. Ismāʿīl Al-Bukhārī and Their Relationship 
to Classical Salafi Islam,” Islamic Law and Society 13:3 (2006): 289-324. 
-- Constructive Critics, Ḥadīth Literature and the Articulation of Sunnī Islam: The Legacy of 
the Generation of Ibn Saʿd, Ibn Maʿīn and Ibn Ḥanbal (Leiden: Brill, 2004).  
Madelung, Wilfred,  
315 
 
-- Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985). 
-- Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran (New York: Bibiliotheca Persica, 1988). 
Makdisi, George,  
-- Ibn ʿAqīl: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 
1997).  
--The Rise of the Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and The West (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1981). 
Malik, Habeeb Ahmad, The Educational Theory of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (University of 
Pennsylvania, 1993). 
Malti-Douglas, Fedwa, 
-- “Humor and Structure in Two “Buḫalāʾ” Anecdotes: al-Ǧāḥiẓ and al-Haṭīb al-
Baġdādī,” Arabica 27:3 (1980): 300-323. 
-- “Structure and Organization in a Monographic Adab Work: al-Taṭfīl of al-Khaṭīb 
al-Baghdādī,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 40:3 (1981): 227-245. 
-- Structures of Avarice: The Bukhalāʾ in Medieval Arabic Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1985). 
-- “Controversy and Its Effects in the Biographical Tradition of Al-Khaṭīb Al-
Baghdādī,” Studia Islamica 46 (1977): 115-131. 
Marçais, W., “al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, First Edition, ed. M. 
Th. Houtsma (Brill, 1913–1938), 4:929 -930.  
Marozzi, Justin, Baghdad, City of Peace, City of Blood (London: Penguin Books, 2014). 
Mason, Herbert, “Hallaj and the Baghdād School of Sufism,” in The Heritage of Sufism, 
ed. Leonard Lewisohn (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 1999), 65-81. 
Massignon, Louis, The Passion of al-Hallaj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam, trans. Herbert 
Mason (Princeton Univ. Press, 1994).  
McDonald, Duncan Black, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and 
Constitutional Theory (Beirut: Khaiyats, 1965). 
Medina, Ana María Rivera “al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī,” in Encyclopaedia of The Medieval 
Chronicle (Leiden: Brill, 2012).  
Melchert, Cristopher,  
-- “Abū Nuʿaym's Sources for Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ, Ṣūfī and Traditionist,” in Les maîtres 
soufis et leurs disciples des IIIe-Ve siècles de l'Hégire (IXe-XIe), ed. Geneviève Gobillot et 
Jean-Jacques Thibon (Beyrouth, Presses de l’Ifpo, 2012), 145-159.  
316 
 
-- “Bukhārī and Early Ḥadīth Criticism,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 121:1 
(2001): 8. 
-- The Formation of Sunnī Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
Mez, Ādam, The Renaissance of Islam, trans. Salahuddin Bakhsh (India: Kitāb Bhavan, 
1995).  
Mourad, Suleiman, “Towards a reconstruction of the Muʿtazili tradition of Qurʾanic 
exegesis” in Aims, methods and contexts of Qur'anic exegesis (2nd/8th-9th/15th centuries), 
ed. Karen Bauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 101-137. 
Motzki, Harald, 
-- “Dating Muslim Traditions: A Survey,” Arabica 52: (2005): 204-253. 
-- “The Muṣannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī as a Source of Authentic Aḥādīth of 
the First Century A. H.,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50:1 (1991): 1-21. 
-- “Theme Issue: Methods of Dating Early Legal Traditions,” Islamic Law and Society 
19:1 (2012): 1-10. 
Mughulṭay, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Ibn Qalīj,  
-- Ikmāl Tahdhīb al-Kamāl fī Asmāʾ al-Rijāl (Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadīthah, 2001). 
-- Intikhāb-Kitāb-Man-Wāfaqat-Kunyatuhu-Isma-Abīhi-min-mā lā Yuʾman-Wuqūʿ-al-
Khaṭaʾ-fīhi (Jamʿiyyat Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth, 1988).  
Muslim, Ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Naysābūrī, al-Musnad al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Mukhtaṣar bi-Naql al-ʿAdl ʿan 
al-ʿAdl ilā Rasūl Allah (Beirut: Dār Iḥyaʿ al-Kutub, 1991). 
Nallino, C. A, La literature arabe des origins à l’époque de la dynastie umayyade, trans. 
Charles Pellat (Paris: Maisonnneuve, 1950). 
Nasser, Shady Hekmat, The Transmission of the Variant Readings of the Qurʾān: The 
Problem of Tawātur and the Emergence of Shawādhdh (Leiden: Brill, 2013).  
Netton, Ian Richard, Allah Transcendent (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1989). 
Nguyen, Martin, Ṣūfī Master and Qur'an Scholar: Abū’l-Qāsim al-Qushayri ̄and the Lạtā'if 
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